diff --git a/app/build.gradle b/app/build.gradle index 954be429..500d0467 100644 --- a/app/build.gradle +++ b/app/build.gradle @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ android { minSdk = 24 targetSdk = 35 versionCode = gitCommitCount - versionName = '2.0.4' + versionName = '2.0.5' resourceConfigurations += supportedLocales optimization { keepRules { diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Asn1Attestation.java b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Asn1Attestation.java index f8783da1..71a53e94 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Asn1Attestation.java +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Asn1Attestation.java @@ -71,11 +71,13 @@ ASN1Sequence getAttestationSequence(X509Certificate x509Cert) return Asn1Utils.getAsn1SequenceFromBytes(attestationExtensionBytes); } - public int getAttestationSecurityLevel() { + @Override + protected int realAttestationSecurityLevel() { return attestationSecurityLevel; } - public RootOfTrust getRootOfTrust() { + @Override + protected RootOfTrust realRootOfTrust() { RootOfTrust tee = teeEnforced.getRootOfTrust(); if (tee != null) return tee; return softwareEnforced.getRootOfTrust(); diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Attestation.java b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Attestation.java index 4cf82cc3..f1830723 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Attestation.java +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/Attestation.java @@ -132,9 +132,32 @@ public int getAttestationVersion() { return attestationVersion; } - public abstract int getAttestationSecurityLevel(); + /** + * Display-only variant used by the simulated report: reports TEE as the security level + * and returns a chosen root of trust. Every other field is shared with the real data, + * and the real parse result is left untouched. + */ + public void applyFakeReport(io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.home.FakeReportState state) { + this.fakeReport = state; + } + + private io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.home.FakeReportState fakeReport; + + public int getAttestationSecurityLevel() { + if (fakeReport != null) return KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT; + return realAttestationSecurityLevel(); + } + + protected abstract int realAttestationSecurityLevel(); + + + public RootOfTrust getRootOfTrust() { + if (fakeReport != null) return fakeReport.locked() == null ? null : new RootOfTrust(fakeReport.locked(), fakeReport.bootState()); + return realRootOfTrust(); + } + + protected abstract RootOfTrust realRootOfTrust(); - public abstract RootOfTrust getRootOfTrust(); // Returns one of the KM_VERSION_* values define above. public int getKeymasterVersion() { @@ -142,6 +165,7 @@ public int getKeymasterVersion() { } public int getKeymasterSecurityLevel() { + if (fakeReport != null) return KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT; return keymasterSecurityLevel; } diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/AuthorizationList.java b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/AuthorizationList.java index a8b21ef4..32831c4a 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/AuthorizationList.java +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/AuthorizationList.java @@ -751,6 +751,63 @@ public AttestationApplicationId getAttestationApplicationId() { return attestationApplicationId; } + /** + * Display-only copy for the simulated report: same tags, but no root of trust tag, + * so the bootloader section can be presented as the user chose. The parsed object + * itself is never modified. + */ + public AuthorizationList(AuthorizationList base) { + purposes = base.purposes; + algorithm = base.algorithm; + keySize = base.keySize; + digests = base.digests; + paddingModes = base.paddingModes; + ecCurve = base.ecCurve; + mlDsaVariant = base.mlDsaVariant; + rsaPublicExponent = base.rsaPublicExponent; + mgfDigests = base.mgfDigests; + rollbackResistance = base.rollbackResistance; + earlyBootOnly = base.earlyBootOnly; + activeDateTime = base.activeDateTime; + originationExpireDateTime = base.originationExpireDateTime; + usageExpireDateTime = base.usageExpireDateTime; + usageCountLimit = base.usageCountLimit; + noAuthRequired = base.noAuthRequired; + userAuthType = base.userAuthType; + authTimeout = base.authTimeout; + allowWhileOnBody = base.allowWhileOnBody; + trustedUserPresenceReq = base.trustedUserPresenceReq; + trustedConfirmationReq = base.trustedConfirmationReq; + unlockedDeviceReq = base.unlockedDeviceReq; + allApplications = base.allApplications; + applicationId = base.applicationId; + creationDateTime = base.creationDateTime; + origin = base.origin; + rollbackResistant = base.rollbackResistant; + osVersion = base.osVersion; + osPatchLevel = base.osPatchLevel; + attestationApplicationId = base.attestationApplicationId; + brand = base.brand; + device = base.device; + product = base.product; + serialNumber = base.serialNumber; + imei = base.imei; + secondImei = base.secondImei; + meid = base.meid; + manufacturer = base.manufacturer; + model = base.model; + vendorPatchLevel = base.vendorPatchLevel; + bootPatchLevel = base.bootPatchLevel; + deviceUniqueAttestation = base.deviceUniqueAttestation; + identityCredentialKey = base.identityCredentialKey; + moduleHash = base.moduleHash; + } + + /** + * Display-only copy for the simulated report: same tags, but no root of trust tag, + * so the bootloader section can be presented as the user chose. The parsed object + * itself is never modified. + */ public String getBrand() { return brand; } diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/CertificateInfo.java b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/CertificateInfo.java index 6f822287..3f0def3b 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/CertificateInfo.java +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/CertificateInfo.java @@ -35,6 +35,30 @@ public X509Certificate getCert() { return cert; } + /** + * Display-only copy used by the simulated report: same certificate object, a different + * reported status. Only the rendering layer ever receives it. + */ + public CertificateInfo(CertificateInfo base, int fakeStatus) { + this.cert = base.cert; + this.issuer = base.issuer; + this.status = fakeStatus; + this.securityException = fakeStatus == base.status ? base.securityException : null; + this.attestation = base.attestation; + this.certException = base.certException; + this.provisioningInfo = base.provisioningInfo; + } + + public CertificateInfo(CertificateInfo base, X509Certificate fakeCert) { + this.cert = fakeCert; + this.issuer = base.issuer; + this.status = base.status; + this.securityException = base.securityException; + this.attestation = base.attestation; + this.certException = base.certException; + this.provisioningInfo = base.provisioningInfo; + } + public RootPublicKey.Status getIssuer() { return issuer; } diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/EatAttestation.java b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/EatAttestation.java index e2bffd4e..5643f494 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/EatAttestation.java +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/EatAttestation.java @@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ public EatAttestation(X509Certificate x509Cert) } /** Find the submod containing the key information, and return its security level. */ - public int getAttestationSecurityLevel() { + @Override + protected int realAttestationSecurityLevel() { if (teeEnforced != null && teeEnforced.getAlgorithm() != null) { return teeEnforced.getSecurityLevel(); } else if (softwareEnforced != null && softwareEnforced.getAlgorithm() != null) { @@ -122,7 +123,8 @@ public int getAttestationSecurityLevel() { } } - public RootOfTrust getRootOfTrust() { + @Override + protected RootOfTrust realRootOfTrust() { return rootOfTrust; } diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/RootOfTrust.java b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/RootOfTrust.java index 87467d12..38a62587 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/RootOfTrust.java +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/attestation/RootOfTrust.java @@ -81,6 +81,32 @@ public static String verifiedBootStateToString(int verifiedBootState) { } } + /** + * Display-only copy for the simulated report. Nothing outside the rendering layer + * receives it, and the parsed root of trust stays untouched. + */ + public RootOfTrust(Boolean locked, int state) { + this(spoofBootKey(locked, state), locked != null && locked, state, new byte[32]); + } + + /** + * A zero boot key is flagged as suspicious, so only present that for the states where + * the app itself legitimately shows it (unlocked or unverified boot). + */ + private static byte[] spoofBootKey(Boolean locked, int state) { + if (locked == null) { + return new byte[32]; + } + if (locked && state == KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED) { + var key = new byte[32]; + for (int i = 0; i < key.length; i++) { + key[i] = (byte) (0x5a + i * 7); + } + return key; + } + return new byte[32]; + } + public byte[] getVerifiedBootKey() { return verifiedBootKey; } diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/BootStateViewHolder.kt b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/BootStateViewHolder.kt index ff6f0cd1..713c2e92 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/BootStateViewHolder.kt +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/BootStateViewHolder.kt @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import android.content.res.ColorStateList import android.view.View import androidx.core.view.isVisible import io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.R -import io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.attestation.RootOfTrust import io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.databinding.HomeHeaderBinding import io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.repository.AttestationData import rikka.core.res.resolveColor @@ -22,39 +21,76 @@ class BootStateViewHolder(itemView: View, binding: HomeHeaderBinding) : override fun onBind() { val context = itemView.context - - val rootOfTrust = data.rootOfTrust - val locked = rootOfTrust?.isDeviceLocked - val bootUnverified = rootOfTrust?.verifiedBootState != RootOfTrust.KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED + val fake = FakeReport.enabled val titleRes: Int - val summaryRes: Int val iconRes: Int val colorAttrRes: Int - if (locked == null) { - titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unknown - iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unknown_24 - colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive - } else if (!locked) { - titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unlocked - iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unlocked_24 - colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning - } else if (bootUnverified) { - titleRes = R.string.bootloader_user - iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 - colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive + if (fake && FakeReport.hasBootOverride) { + // 纯显示层:完全按用户选的那一项渲染,不读 parsed root of trust + when (FakeReport.bootState) { + FakeReport.BOOT_VERIFIED -> { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_locked + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe + } + FakeReport.BOOT_UNLOCKED -> { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unlocked + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unlocked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning + } + FakeReport.BOOT_SELF_SIGNED -> { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_user + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive + } + FakeReport.BOOT_UNVERIFIED -> { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unverified + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unlocked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning + } + FakeReport.BOOT_FAILED -> { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_failed + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorAlert + } + else -> { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unknown + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unknown_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive + } + } } else { - titleRes = R.string.bootloader_locked - iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 - colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe + val rootOfTrust = data.rootOfTrust + val locked = rootOfTrust?.isDeviceLocked + val bootUnverified = + rootOfTrust?.verifiedBootState != io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.attestation.RootOfTrust.KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED + if (locked == null) { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unknown + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unknown_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive + } else if (!locked) { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_unlocked + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_unlocked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning + } else if (bootUnverified) { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_user + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive + } else { + titleRes = R.string.bootloader_locked + iconRes = R.drawable.ic_boot_locked_24 + colorAttrRes = rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe + } } - if (data.isSoftwareLevel) { - summaryRes = R.string.bootloader_summary_sw_level - } else { - summaryRes = 0 - } + val summaryRes = + if (data.isSoftwareLevel && !(fake && FakeReport.hideTampering)) { + R.string.bootloader_summary_sw_level + } else { + 0 + } val color = context.theme.resolveColor(colorAttrRes) diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReport.kt b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReport.kt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc0d2774 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReport.kt @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +package io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.home + +/* + * Entertainment-only display override. + * + * This object holds the in-memory state that makes the home screen render a simulated + * report. Nothing here touches the certificate chain, the keystore, the revocation + * database or any persisted setting: the value lives in memory, so it is gone as soon as + * the process dies, and the user menu can always switch it back off. + * + * 只伪装用户主动选择的那一项,其余一律跟随真实结果或落到"正常"默认值, + * 这样只改一项时不会连带把别的项目也弄成异常。 + */ +object FakeReport { + + /* ---- 根证书 / keybox:-1 表示跟随真实结果 ------------------------------ */ + + const val ROOT_REAL = -1 + const val ROOT_GOOGLE = 0 + const val ROOT_GOOGLE_RKP = 1 + const val ROOT_AOSP = 2 + const val ROOT_KNOX = 3 + const val ROOT_OEM = 4 + const val ROOT_UNKNOWN = 5 + const val ROOT_FAILED = 6 + const val ROOT_NULL = 7 + + /* ---- 引导加载状态:-1 表示跟随真实结果 --------------------------------- */ + + const val BOOT_REAL = -1 + /** Locked, verified boot. */ + const val BOOT_VERIFIED = 0 + /** Unlocked, verified boot. */ + const val BOOT_UNLOCKED = 1 + /** Locked, self-signed (root of trust set by end user). */ + const val BOOT_SELF_SIGNED = 2 + /** Unlocked, unverified boot. */ + const val BOOT_UNVERIFIED = 3 + /** Locked, verified boot failed. */ + const val BOOT_FAILED = 4 + /** No root of trust at all: the app shows "Bootloader status is unknown". */ + const val BOOT_NO_ROOT = 5 + + /* ---- 证书状态:-1 表示跟随真实结果 ------------------------------------- */ + + const val CERT_REAL = -1 + const val CERT_OK = 0 + const val CERT_EXPIRED = 1 + const val CERT_REVOKED = 2 + const val CERT_BAD_SIGNATURE = 3 + + /* ---- 吊销列表:-1 表示跟随真实结果 ------------------------------------- */ + + const val REVOCATION_REAL = -1 + const val REVOCATION_NONE = 0 + const val REVOCATION_PRISTINE = 1 + + /* ---- 整个报告 ---------------------------------------------------------- */ + + /** Normal report: everything is rendered from the parsed data. */ + const val PAGE_REPORT = 0 + /** Nothing can be parsed: the app shows one of the AttestationException cards. */ + const val PAGE_ERROR = 1 + + /** AttestationException.CODE_* values that produce a full error page. */ + val ERROR_CODES = intArrayOf( + /* CODE_CANT_PARSE_CERT */ 2, + /* CODE_OUT_OF_KEYS */ 5, + /* CODE_OUT_OF_KEYS_TRANSIENT */ 6, + /* CODE_UNAVAILABLE */ 0, + /* CODE_UNAVAILABLE_TRANSIENT */ 7, + /* CODE_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED */ 8, + /* CODE_RKP */ 9, + /* CODE_STRONGBOX_UNAVAILABLE */ 3, + /* CODE_DEVICEIDS_UNAVAILABLE */ 4, + /* CODE_ATTEST_RSA_KEY_EC_ONLY */ 10, + /* CODE_ATTEST_EC_KEY_RSA_ONLY */ 11, + /* CODE_INVALID_FILE */ 12, + ) + + @Volatile + var enabled = false + + /** Callbacks used to re-render the visible screen; both are UI only. */ + @Volatile + var onChanged: (() -> Unit)? = null + @Volatile + var onActivityRefresh: (() -> Unit)? = null + + @Volatile + var rootKind = ROOT_REAL + + @Volatile + var bootState = BOOT_REAL + + @Volatile + var certStatus = CERT_REAL + + @Volatile + var revocation = REVOCATION_REAL + + @Volatile + var page = PAGE_REPORT + + /** Index into ERROR_CODES when page == PAGE_ERROR. */ + @Volatile + var errorIndex = 0 + + /** Suppresses the software attestation and verified boot key warning cards. */ + @Volatile + var hideTampering = false + + /** 全部回到"跟随真实结果",即什么都不伪装。 */ + fun reset() { + enabled = false + rootKind = ROOT_REAL + bootState = BOOT_REAL + certStatus = CERT_REAL + revocation = REVOCATION_REAL + page = PAGE_REPORT + errorIndex = 0 + hideTampering = false + } + + /** 开启伪装时调用:保证从"全正常"起步,只改用户选的那一项。 */ + fun resetOverrides() { + rootKind = ROOT_REAL + bootState = BOOT_REAL + certStatus = CERT_REAL + revocation = REVOCATION_REAL + page = PAGE_REPORT + errorIndex = 0 + } + + fun notifyChanged() { + onChanged?.invoke() + } + + val hasRootOverride get() = rootKind != ROOT_REAL + val hasBootOverride get() = bootState != BOOT_REAL + + /** true: locked, false: unlocked, null: the card reports an unknown state. */ + fun locked(): Boolean? = when (bootState) { + BOOT_VERIFIED, BOOT_SELF_SIGNED -> true + BOOT_UNLOCKED, BOOT_UNVERIFIED, BOOT_FAILED -> false + else -> null + } + + /** Mapped to RootOfTrust.KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_* without importing the class. */ + fun bootStateValue(): Int = when (bootState) { + BOOT_VERIFIED -> 0 + BOOT_SELF_SIGNED -> 1 + BOOT_UNVERIFIED, BOOT_UNLOCKED -> 2 + BOOT_FAILED -> 3 + else -> 2 + } + + /** true when the only thing missing is the root of trust itself. */ + fun hidesRootOfTrust(): Boolean = bootState == BOOT_NO_ROOT + + fun errorCode(): Int = ERROR_CODES[errorIndex.coerceIn(0, ERROR_CODES.size - 1)] +} diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReportDialog.kt b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReportDialog.kt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..093c2153 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReportDialog.kt @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +package io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.home + +import android.content.Context +import androidx.appcompat.app.AlertDialog +import io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.R +import io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.lang.AttestationException + +/** + * Dialog for the entertainment-only override. Toggle it from the menu; this dialog only + * lets the user pick which values are shown. Nothing is written to disk. + */ +object FakeReportDialog { + + /** 顶层可见的四个独立伪装项;彼此互不影响。 */ + fun show(context: Context, onApply: () -> Unit) { + val res = context.resources + val entries = arrayOf( + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_keybox_kind), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_boot), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_section), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_page), + ) + AlertDialog.Builder(context) + .setTitle(R.string.menu_fake_report) + .setItems(entries) { _, which -> + when (which) { + 0 -> chooseRoot(context, onApply) + 1 -> chooseBoot(context, onApply) + 2 -> chooseCert(context, onApply) + else -> choosePage(context, onApply) + } + } + .setPositiveButton(android.R.string.ok, null) + .show() + } + + /** 根证书 / keybox 类型:与 RootPublicKey.Status 一一对应。 */ + private fun chooseRoot(context: Context, onApply: () -> Unit) { + val res = context.resources + choose( + context, + R.string.fake_report_keybox_kind, + arrayOf( + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_follow_real), + res.getString(R.string.google_root_cert), + res.getString(R.string.google_root_cert_rkp), + res.getString(R.string.aosp_root_cert), + res.getString(R.string.knox_root_cert), + res.getString(R.string.oem_root_cert), + res.getString(R.string.unknown_root_cert), + res.getString(R.string.cert_chain_not_trusted), + res.getString(R.string.error_remote_key_provisioning), + ), + (FakeReport.rootKind + 1).coerceIn(0, 8) + ) { + FakeReport.rootKind = it - 1 + apply(onApply) + } + } + + /** 引导加载状态:与 RootOfTrust.KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_* 及"无 root of trust"对应。 */ + private fun chooseBoot(context: Context, onApply: () -> Unit) { + val res = context.resources + choose( + context, + R.string.fake_report_boot, + arrayOf( + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_follow_real), + res.getString(R.string.bootloader_locked), + res.getString(R.string.bootloader_unlocked), + res.getString(R.string.bootloader_user), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_boot_unverified), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_boot_failed), + res.getString(R.string.bootloader_unknown), + ), + (FakeReport.bootState + 1).coerceIn(0, 6) + ) { + FakeReport.bootState = it - 1 + apply(onApply) + } + } + + /** 证书状态 + 吊销列表,合并成一个子菜单。 */ + private fun chooseCert(context: Context, onApply: () -> Unit) { + val res = context.resources + val entries = arrayOf( + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_status), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_revocation), + ) + AlertDialog.Builder(context) + .setTitle(R.string.fake_report_cert_section) + .setItems(entries) { _, which -> + if (which == 0) { + choose( + context, + R.string.fake_report_cert_status, + arrayOf( + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_real), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_ok), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_expired), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_revoked), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_cert_bad_signature), + ), + (FakeReport.certStatus + 1).coerceIn(0, 4) + ) { + FakeReport.certStatus = it - 1 + apply(onApply) + } + } else { + choose( + context, + R.string.fake_report_revocation, + arrayOf( + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_revocation_real), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_revocation_none), + res.getString(R.string.fake_report_revocation_pristine), + ), + (FakeReport.revocation + 1).coerceIn(0, 2) + ) { + FakeReport.revocation = it - 1 + apply(onApply) + } + } + } + .setPositiveButton(android.R.string.ok, null) + .show() + } + + /** 整页状态:正常报告,或任一个 AttestationException 错误页。 */ + private fun choosePage(context: Context, onApply: () -> Unit) { + val res = context.resources + val codes = FakeReport.ERROR_CODES + val entries = Array(codes.size + 1) { i -> + if (i == 0) res.getString(R.string.fake_report_page_report) + else res.getString(errorTitle(codes[i - 1])) + } + val checked = if (FakeReport.page == FakeReport.PAGE_ERROR) FakeReport.errorIndex + 1 else 0 + AlertDialog.Builder(context) + .setTitle(R.string.fake_report_page) + .setSingleChoiceItems(entries, checked) { dialog, which -> + FakeReport.page = if (which == 0) FakeReport.PAGE_REPORT else FakeReport.PAGE_ERROR + if (which > 0) FakeReport.errorIndex = which - 1 + dialog.dismiss() + apply(onApply) + } + .setNegativeButton(android.R.string.cancel, null) + .show() + } + + private fun errorTitle(code: Int): Int = + AttestationException(code, null).titleResId + + private fun apply(onApply: () -> Unit) { + onApply() + FakeReport.onActivityRefresh?.invoke() + } + + private fun choose( + context: Context, + titleRes: Int, + entries: Array, + checked: Int, + onChosen: (Int) -> Unit + ) { + AlertDialog.Builder(context) + .setTitle(titleRes) + .setSingleChoiceItems(entries, checked.coerceIn(0, entries.size - 1)) { dialog, which -> + onChosen(which) + dialog.dismiss() + } + .setNegativeButton(android.R.string.cancel, null) + .show() + } +} diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReportState.kt b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReportState.kt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd0eeae1 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/FakeReportState.kt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +package io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.home + +/** + * Value object passed from the rendering layer into an [io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation.attestation.Attestation] + * so that the simulated report can present a chosen boot state and security level. + * + * This is a per-render snapshot; nothing here is stored, persisted or fed back into the + * real attestation data. + */ +class FakeReportState( + /** true: locked, false: unlocked, null: unknown. */ + private val lockedValue: Boolean?, + /** One of the RootOfTrust.KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_* constants. */ + private val bootStateValue: Int, +) { + fun locked(): Boolean? = lockedValue + + fun bootState(): Int = bootStateValue +} diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeAdapter.kt b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeAdapter.kt index ddda0180..6b6932b1 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeAdapter.kt +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeAdapter.kt @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { interface Listener { fun onCommonDataClick(data: Data) + + fun onFakeReportChanged() + + fun onFakeReportConfigure() = onFakeReportChanged() fun onAttestationInfoClick(data: Attestation) fun onRkpHostnameClick(data: String) } @@ -29,7 +33,20 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { fun updateData(baseData: BaseData) { clear() - when (baseData.status) { + val fake = FakeReport.enabled + + // 伪装成解析失败页时,首页没有 keybox 卡片,也没有引导加载状态卡片 + if (fake && FakeReport.page == FakeReport.PAGE_ERROR) { + showErrorPage(AttestationException(FakeReport.errorCode(), null)) + return + } + + val status = if (fake && baseData is AttestationData && FakeReport.hasRootOverride) { + fakeRootStatus(FakeReport.rootKind) + } else { + baseData.status + } + when (status) { RootPublicKey.Status.NULL -> { addItem(HeaderViewHolder.CREATOR, HeaderData( R.string.error_remote_key_provisioning, @@ -87,20 +104,24 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe), ID_CERT_STATUS) } } - var id = ID_CERT_INFO_START + // 不再插入“模拟报告”横幅:开启后应与真实报告看起来一模一样 + val certChainTitle = R.string.cert_chain + val certChainDescription = R.string.cert_chain_description addItem(SubtitleViewHolder.CREATOR, CommonData( - R.string.cert_chain, - R.string.cert_chain_description), id++) + certChainTitle, + certChainDescription), id++) val certsList = baseData.certs - if (!certsList.isNullOrEmpty()) { - val containsEc = certsList.any { it.cert?.publicKey?.algorithm?.equals("EC", ignoreCase = true) == true || it.cert?.publicKey?.algorithm?.equals("ECDSA", ignoreCase = true) == true } + val fakeChain = fake && baseData is AttestationData + val shownCerts = if (fakeChain) fakeCertInfos(certsList) else certsList + if (!shownCerts.isNullOrEmpty()) { + val containsEc = shownCerts.any { it.cert?.publicKey?.algorithm?.equals("EC", ignoreCase = true) == true || it.cert?.publicKey?.algorithm?.equals("ECDSA", ignoreCase = true) == true } // Track unique serial numbers to block duplicates val seenSerials = mutableSetOf() - certsList.forEach { certInfo -> + shownCerts.forEach { certInfo -> val currentAlgo = certInfo.cert?.publicKey?.algorithm val serialNumber = certInfo.cert?.serialNumber?.toString() @@ -160,10 +181,13 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { else -> "" } - val dateDisplay = if (dateStr.isNotEmpty()) { - "$dateStr\n$statusLine" - } else { - statusLine + val dateDisplay = when { + fake && baseData is AttestationData && FakeReport.revocation == FakeReport.REVOCATION_PRISTINE -> + context.getString(R.string.fake_report_revocation_pristine) + fake && baseData is AttestationData && FakeReport.revocation == FakeReport.REVOCATION_NONE -> + context.getString(R.string.fake_report_revocation_none) + dateStr.isNotEmpty() -> "$dateStr\n$statusLine" + else -> statusLine }.trim().ifEmpty { null } addItem(CommonItemViewHolder.COMMON_CREATOR, CommonData( @@ -181,12 +205,14 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { } private fun updateData(attestationData: AttestationData) { + val fake = FakeReport.enabled addItemAt(1, BootStateViewHolder.CREATOR, attestationData, ID_BOOT_STATUS) var id = ID_DESCRIPTION_START val attestation = attestationData.showAttestation ?: return + val hideWarnings = fake && FakeReport.hideTampering - if (attestationData.isSoftwareLevel) { + if (attestationData.isSoftwareLevel && !hideWarnings) { addItemAt(2, HeaderViewHolder.CREATOR, HeaderData( R.string.software_attestation, R.string.software_attestation_summary, @@ -194,7 +220,7 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning), ID_SOFTWARE_STATUS) } - if (attestationData.rootOfTrust?.isVerifiedBootKeySuspicious == true) { + if (attestationData.rootOfTrust?.isVerifiedBootKeySuspicious == true && !hideWarnings) { addItemAt(2, HeaderViewHolder.CREATOR, HeaderData( R.string.verified_boot_key_suspicious, R.string.verified_boot_key_suspicious_summary, @@ -207,14 +233,22 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { R.string.attestation_version_description, R.string.security_level_description, Attestation.attestationVersionToString(attestation.attestationVersion), - attestation.attestationSecurityLevel), id++) + if (hideWarnings) { + Attestation.KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT + } else { + attestation.attestationSecurityLevel + }), id++) addItem(CommonItemViewHolder.SECURITY_LEVEL_CREATOR, SecurityLevelData( R.string.keymaster, R.string.keymaster_version_description, R.string.security_level_description, Attestation.keymasterVersionToString(attestation.keymasterVersion), - attestation.keymasterSecurityLevel), id++) + if (hideWarnings) { + Attestation.KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT + } else { + attestation.keymasterSecurityLevel + }), id++) addItem(CommonItemViewHolder.COMMON_CREATOR, CommonData( R.string.attestation_challenge, @@ -366,6 +400,40 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { fun updateData(e: AttestationException) { clear() + // 只有整页伪装成"解析失败"时才替换;否则照常显示真实失败信息 + val fake = FakeReport.enabled && FakeReport.page == FakeReport.PAGE_ERROR + val status = if (fake) fakeRootStatus(FakeReport.rootKind) else null + if (fake && status != null && FakeReport.hasRootOverride) { + val header = when (status) { + RootPublicKey.Status.NULL -> HeaderData( + R.string.error_remote_key_provisioning, 0, + R.drawable.ic_error_outline_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive) + RootPublicKey.Status.FAILED -> HeaderData( + R.string.cert_chain_not_trusted, R.string.cert_chain_not_trusted_summary, + R.drawable.ic_error_outline_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorAlert) + RootPublicKey.Status.UNKNOWN -> HeaderData( + R.string.unknown_root_cert, R.string.unknown_root_cert_summary, + R.drawable.ic_error_outline_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning) + RootPublicKey.Status.AOSP -> HeaderData( + R.string.aosp_root_cert, R.string.aosp_root_cert_summary, + R.drawable.ic_error_outline_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorWarning) + RootPublicKey.Status.GOOGLE -> HeaderData( + R.string.google_root_cert, R.string.google_root_cert_summary, + R.drawable.ic_trustworthy_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe) + RootPublicKey.Status.GOOGLE_RKP -> HeaderData( + R.string.google_root_cert_rkp, R.string.google_root_cert_rkp_summary, + R.drawable.ic_trustworthy_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe) + RootPublicKey.Status.KNOX -> HeaderData( + R.string.knox_root_cert, R.string.knox_root_cert_summary, + R.drawable.ic_trustworthy_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe) + RootPublicKey.Status.OEM -> HeaderData( + R.string.oem_root_cert, R.string.oem_root_cert_summary, + R.drawable.ic_trustworthy_24, rikka.material.R.attr.colorSafe) + } + addItem(HeaderViewHolder.CREATOR, header, ID_CERT_STATUS) + notifyDataSetChanged() + return + } addItem(HeaderViewHolder.CREATOR, HeaderData( e.titleResId, 0, @@ -376,6 +444,45 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { notifyDataSetChanged() } + + /** 真实的解析失败页:只有错误卡片和详细消息,没有 keybox 与引导加载状态。 */ + private fun showErrorPage(e: AttestationException) { + addItem(HeaderViewHolder.CREATOR, HeaderData( + e.titleResId, + 0, + R.drawable.ic_error_outline_24, + rikka.material.R.attr.colorInactive), ID_ERROR) + addItem(ErrorViewHolder.CREATOR, e, ID_ERROR_MESSAGE) + notifyDataSetChanged() + } + + private fun fakeCertInfos(certs: List?): List { + if (certs.isNullOrEmpty()) return emptyList() + if (FakeReport.certStatus == FakeReport.CERT_REAL) return certs + // 映射到 CertificateInfo 自身的状态常量,其余证书仍沿用真实状态 + val status = when (FakeReport.certStatus) { + FakeReport.CERT_OK -> CertificateInfo.CERT_NORMAL + FakeReport.CERT_EXPIRED -> CertificateInfo.CERT_EXPIRED + FakeReport.CERT_REVOKED -> CertificateInfo.CERT_REVOKED + FakeReport.CERT_BAD_SIGNATURE -> CertificateInfo.CERT_SIGN + else -> -1 + } + if (status < 0) return certs + return certs.map { CertificateInfo(it, status) } + } + + private fun fakeRootStatus(kind: Int): RootPublicKey.Status = when (kind) { + FakeReport.ROOT_GOOGLE_RKP -> RootPublicKey.Status.GOOGLE_RKP + FakeReport.ROOT_AOSP -> RootPublicKey.Status.AOSP + FakeReport.ROOT_KNOX -> RootPublicKey.Status.KNOX + FakeReport.ROOT_OEM -> RootPublicKey.Status.OEM + FakeReport.ROOT_UNKNOWN -> RootPublicKey.Status.UNKNOWN + FakeReport.ROOT_FAILED -> RootPublicKey.Status.FAILED + FakeReport.ROOT_NULL -> RootPublicKey.Status.NULL + else -> RootPublicKey.Status.GOOGLE + } + + fun allowFrameAt(position: Int): Boolean { if (position < 0) return false val id = getItemId(position) @@ -398,6 +505,8 @@ class HomeAdapter(listener: Listener) : IdBasedRecyclerViewAdapter() { companion object { private const val ID_ERROR = 0L + private const val ID_ERROR_DETAIL = -2L + private const val ID_ERROR_CERT_STATUS = -3L private const val ID_CERT_STATUS = 1L private const val ID_BOOT_STATUS = 2L private const val ID_SOFTWARE_STATUS = 3L diff --git a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeFragment.kt b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeFragment.kt index 572fc645..1a4e4eab 100644 --- a/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeFragment.kt +++ b/app/src/main/java/io/github/vvb2060/keyattestation/home/HomeFragment.kt @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ class HomeFragment : AppFragment(), HomeAdapter.Listener, MenuProvider { } override fun onDestroyView() { + FakeReport.onActivityRefresh = null super.onDestroyView() _binding = null } @@ -118,6 +119,8 @@ class HomeFragment : AppFragment(), HomeAdapter.Listener, MenuProvider { binding.list.adapter = adapter binding.list.addItemDecoration(HomeItemDecoration(context)) + FakeReport.onActivityRefresh = { activity?.invalidateOptionsMenu() } + viewModel.getAttestationData().observe(viewLifecycleOwner) { res -> when (res.status) { Status.SUCCESS -> { @@ -140,6 +143,12 @@ class HomeFragment : AppFragment(), HomeAdapter.Listener, MenuProvider { } } + override fun onFakeReportChanged() = renderFakeReport() + + override fun onFakeReportConfigure() { + FakeReportDialog.show(requireContext()) { renderFakeReport() } + } + override fun onAttestationInfoClick(data: Attestation) { val result = viewModel.getAttestationData().value?.data as? AttestationData ?: return result.showAttestation = data @@ -230,6 +239,10 @@ class HomeFragment : AppFragment(), HomeAdapter.Listener, MenuProvider { } override fun onPrepareMenu(menu: Menu) { + menu.findItem(R.id.menu_fake_report)?.title = + getString(if (FakeReport.enabled) R.string.fake_report_disable else R.string.menu_fake_report) + menu.findItem(R.id.menu_fake_report_options)?.isVisible = FakeReport.enabled + menu.findItem(R.id.menu_secret_mode).apply { isVisible = true isChecked = viewModel.secretMode @@ -391,11 +404,42 @@ class HomeFragment : AppFragment(), HomeAdapter.Listener, MenuProvider { showAboutDialog() } + R.id.menu_fake_report -> { + FakeReport.enabled = !FakeReport.enabled + // 关闭时全部复原;开启时从"全正常"起步,只改用户主动选择的那一项 + if (FakeReport.enabled) FakeReport.resetOverrides() else FakeReport.reset() + renderFakeReport() + if (FakeReport.enabled) { + // 打开后立刻给出配置入口,免得用户找不到 + FakeReportDialog.show(requireContext()) { renderFakeReport() } + } + } + + R.id.menu_fake_report_options -> FakeReportDialog.show(requireContext()) { + renderFakeReport() + } + else -> return false } return true } + /** Re-renders the list from the cached data; no keystore call, no disk write. */ + private fun renderFakeReport() { + activity?.invalidateOptionsMenu() + val res = viewModel.getAttestationData().value ?: return + // 整页伪装成错误页时,即使真实数据正常也要走错误页分支 + if (FakeReport.enabled && FakeReport.page == FakeReport.PAGE_ERROR) { + adapter.updateData(AttestationException(FakeReport.errorCode(), null)) + return + } + when (res.status) { + Status.SUCCESS -> adapter.updateData(res.data!!) + Status.ERROR -> adapter.updateData(res.error as AttestationException) + Status.LOADING -> Unit + } + } + private fun showAboutDialog() { val context = requireContext() val text = StringBuilder() diff --git a/app/src/main/res/menu/home.xml b/app/src/main/res/menu/home.xml index 623d6f84..9060f07b 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/menu/home.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/menu/home.xml @@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ android:showAsAction="never" android:title="@string/menu_color" /> + + + + Μη έγκυρο κλειδί Verified Boot Το κλειδί Verified Boot αποτελείται μόνο από μηδενικά, κάτι που αναμένεται μόνο όταν ο bootloader είναι ξεκλείδωτος ή μη επαληθευμένος. Αυτό αποτελεί ισχυρή ένδειξη παραποίησης. + + Ψεύτικη αναφορά (διασκέδαση) + Επιλογές ψεύτικης αναφοράς + Ενεργοποίηση ψεύτικης αναφοράς + Απενεργοποίηση ψεύτικης αναφοράς + Ακολούθησε το πραγματικό αποτέλεσμα + Πιστοποιητικό ρίζας / keybox + Κατάσταση φορτωτή εκκίνησης + Αλυσίδα και ανάκληση + Ολόκληρη η αναφορά + Κανονική αναφορά + Κατάσταση πιστοποιητικού + Ακολούθησε το πραγματικό αποτέλεσμα + Κανονικό + Έληξε + Ανακλήθηκε + Σφάλμα υπογραφής + Ανακλημένα πιστοποιητικά + Ακολούθησε το πραγματικό αποτέλεσμα + Κανένα πιστοποιητικό δεν ανακλήθηκε + Όλα ανακλημένα + Ξεκλείδωτο, μη επαληθευμένη εκκίνηση + Κλειδωμένο, αποτυχία επαληθευμένης εκκίνησης + Ο φορτωτής εκκίνησης είναι ξεκλείδωτος και μη επαληθευμένος + Η επαληθευμένη εκκίνηση απέτυχε Αλυσίδα πιστοποιητικών Η αλυσίδα πιστοποιητικών είναι μια λίστα πιστοποιητικών που χρησιμοποιούνται για τον έλεγχο ταυτότητας ενός κλειδιού. Η αλυσίδα ξεκινά με το πιστοποιητικό που σχετίζεται με αυτό το κλειδί και κάθε πιστοποιητικό υπογράφεται από τον επόμενο στην αλυσίδα. Η αλυσίδα τελειώνει με πιστοποιητικό ρίζας και η αξιοπιστία της βεβαίωσης εξαρτάται από το πιστοποιητικό ρίζας της αλυσίδας. Πληροφορίες πιστοποιητικού diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-fr/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-fr/strings.xml index 249ded80..e6c804c2 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-fr/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-fr/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ La clé du système de démarrage vérifiée est invalide La clé du système de démarrage vérifié est composée uniquement de zéros, ce qui n\'est normal que si le bootloader est déverrouillé ou non vérifié. C\'est un signe évident d\'altération. + + Rapport simulé (amusement) + Options du rapport simulé + Activer le rapport simulé + Désactiver le rapport simulé + Suivre le résultat réel + Certificat racine / keybox + État du chargeur d\'amorçage + Chaîne et révocation + Rapport entier + Rapport normal + État du certificat + Suivre le résultat réel + Normal + Expiré + Révoqué + Erreur de signature + Certificats révoqués + Suivre le résultat réel + Aucun certificat révoqué + Tous révoqués + Déverrouillé, démarrage non vérifié + Verrouillé, échec du démarrage vérifié + Le chargeur d\'amorçage est déverrouillé et non vérifié + Échec du démarrage vérifié Chaîne de certificats Une chaîne de certificats est une liste de certificats utilisés pour authentifier une clé. La chaîne commence par le certificat associé à cette clé, et chaque certificat est signé par le certificat suivant dans la chaîne. La chaîne se termine par un certificat racine, et la fiabilité de l\'attestation dépend du certificat racine de la chaîne. Informations sur le certificat diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-it/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-it/strings.xml index 478346b0..014cbd5b 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-it/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-it/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ Chiave Verified Boot non valida La chiave Verified Boot è composta solo da zeri, condizione prevista solo in caso di bootloader sbloccato o non verificato. È un chiaro segnale di manomissione. + + Report simulato (divertimento) + Opzioni del report simulato + Attiva report simulato + Disattiva report simulato + Segui il risultato reale + Certificato radice / keybox + Stato del bootloader + Catena e revoca + Report completo + Report normale + Stato del certificato + Segui il risultato reale + Normale + Scaduto + Revocato + Errore di firma + Certificati revocati + Segui il risultato reale + Nessun certificato revocato + Tutti revocati + Sbloccato, avvio non verificato + Bloccato, avvio verificato non riuscito + Il bootloader è sbloccato e non verificato + Avvio verificato non riuscito Catena di certificati La catena di certificati è un elenco di certificati utilizzati per autenticare una chiave. La catena inizia con il certificato associato a quella chiave e ogni certificato è firmato dal successivo nella catena. La catena termina con un certificato radice e l\'affidabilità dell\'attestazione dipende dal certificato radice della catena. Info certificato diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-iw/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-iw/strings.xml index 6d96bf27..dd7aa932 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-iw/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-iw/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ מפתח Verified Boot אינו תקין מפתח Verified Boot מורכב מאפסים בלבד, מה שמצופה רק ב-bootloader פתוח או לא מאומת. זהו סימן חזק לזיוף. + + דוח מדומה (לשעשוע) + אפשרויות דוח מדומה + הפעלת דוח מדומה + כיבוי דוח מדומה + לפי התוצאה האמיתית + תעודת שורש / keybox + מצב טוען האתחול + שרשרת אישורים וביטול + הדוח כולו + דוח רגיל + מצב האישור + לפי התוצאה האמיתית + תקין + פג תוקף + בוטל + שגיאת חתימה + אישורים מבוטלים + לפי התוצאה האמיתית + אין אישורים מבוטלים + הכול מבוטל + לא נעול, אתחול לא מאומת + נעול, אימות האתחול נכשל + טוען האתחול אינו נעול ואינו מאומת + אימות האתחול נכשל שרשרת תעודות שרשרת תעודות היא רשימת תעודות המשמשות לאימות מפתח. השרשרת מתחילה בתעודה המשויכת למפתח, וכל תעודה חתומה על ידי הבאה בשרשרת. השרשרת מסתיימת בתעודת שורש, ומהימנות האימות תלויה בתעודת השורש של השרשרת. מידע תעודה diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-pt-rBR/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-pt-rBR/strings.xml index d0ba7e75..6661a39c 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-pt-rBR/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-pt-rBR/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ Chave do Verified Boot inválida A chave do Verified Boot contém apenas zeros, algo esperado apenas quando o bootloader está desbloqueado ou não verificado. Este é um forte sinal de adulteração. + + Relatório falso (diversão) + Opções do relatório falso + Ativar relatório falso + Desativar relatório falso + Seguir o resultado real + Certificado raiz / keybox + Estado do bootloader + Cadeia e revogação + Relatório inteiro + Relatório normal + Estado do certificado + Seguir o resultado real + Normal + Expirado + Revogado + Erro de assinatura + Certificados revogados + Seguir o resultado real + Nenhum certificado revogado + Todos revogados + Desbloqueado, boot não verificado + Bloqueado, boot verificado falhou + O bootloader está desbloqueado e não verificado + A inicialização verificada falhou Cadeia de certificados A cadeia de certificados é uma lista de certificados usados para autenticar uma chave. A cadeia começa com o certificado associado a essa chave, e cada certificado é assinado pelo próximo na cadeia. A cadeia termina com um certificado root, e a confiabilidade do atestado depende do certificado root da cadeia. Informações do certificado diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-uk-rUA/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-uk-rUA/strings.xml index 5f751896..ee55a67c 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-uk-rUA/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-uk-rUA/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ Недійсний ключ Verified Boot Ключ Verified Boot складається лише з нулів, що очікується лише для розблокованого або неперевіреного завантажувача. Це вагома ознака втручання. + + Фальшивий звіт (для розваги) + Параметри фальшивого звіту + Увімкнути фальшивий звіт + Вимкнути фальшивий звіт + За справжнім результатом + Кореневий сертифікат / keybox + Стан завантажувача + Ланцюжок і відкликання + Увесь звіт + Звичайний звіт + Стан сертифіката + За справжнім результатом + Нормальний + Прострочений + Відкликаний + Помилка підпису + Відкликані сертифікати + За справжнім результатом + Жоден сертифікат не відкликано + Усі відкликані + Розблоковано, неперевірене завантаження + Заблоковано, перевірка завантаження не вдалася + Завантажувач розблоковано, перевірки немає + Перевірене завантаження не вдалося Ланцюжок сертифікатів Ланцюжок сертифікатів — це список сертифікатів, що використовуються для автентифікації ключа. Ланцюжок починається з сертифіката, пов\'язаного з цим ключем, і кожен сертифікат підписаний наступним у ланцюжку. Ланцюжок закінчується кореневим сертифікатом, і довіра до атестації залежить від кореневого сертифіката ланцюжка. Інформація про сертифікат diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rCN/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rCN/strings.xml index 3af543cd..14a572dd 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rCN/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rCN/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ Verified Boot 密钥无效 Verified Boot 密钥全部由零组成,这通常只会出现在引导加载程序已解锁或未验证的情况下。这强烈表明设备可能已被篡改。 + + 伪装报告(娱乐) + 伪装报告选项 + 开启伪装报告 + 关闭伪装报告 + 跟随真实结果 + 根证书 / keybox + 引导加载状态 + 证书链与吊销 + 整个报告 + 正常报告 + 证书状态 + 跟随真实结果 + 正常 + 已过期 + 已吊销 + 签名错误 + 证书吊销状态 + 跟随真实结果 + 没有证书被吊销 + 全部被吊销 + 已解锁且未校验 + 已锁定但校验失败 + 引导加载程序已解锁且未校验 + 校验启动失败 证书链 证书链是用于验证密钥的证书列表。从该密钥的证书开始,每个证书均由链中下一个证书签名,到根证书为止。认证的可信度取决于证书链的根证书。 证书信息 diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rTW/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rTW/strings.xml index f42d7052..ac1acc90 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rTW/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values-zh-rTW/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ Verified Boot 金鑰無效 Verified Boot 金鑰全部為零,這通常只會出現在開機載入程式已解除鎖定或未驗證的情況下。這是裝置遭到竄改的強烈跡象。 + + 偽裝報告(娛樂) + 偽裝報告選項 + 開啟偽裝報告 + 關閉偽裝報告 + 跟隨真實結果 + 根憑證 / keybox + 引導載入程式狀態 + 憑證鏈與吊銷 + 整份報告 + 正常報告 + 憑證狀態 + 跟隨真實結果 + 正常 + 已過期 + 已吊銷 + 簽章錯誤 + 憑證吊銷狀態 + 跟隨真實結果 + 沒有憑證被吊銷 + 全部被吊銷 + 已解鎖且未驗證 + 已鎖定但驗證失敗 + 引導載入程式已解鎖且未驗證 + 驗證式啟動失敗 憑證鏈 憑證鏈是用於驗證金鑰的憑證列表。從這個金鑰的憑證開始,每個憑證均由鏈中下一個憑證簽章,到根憑證為止。認證的可信度取決於憑證鏈的根憑證。 憑證資訊 diff --git a/app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml b/app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml index 9b1d2332..0cf4524c 100644 --- a/app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml +++ b/app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml @@ -47,6 +47,31 @@ Verified boot key is invalid The verified boot key is only zeros, which is only expected on an unlocked or unverified bootloader. This is a strong sign of tampering. + Fake report (fun) + Fake report options + Enable fake report + Disable fake report + Follow the real result + Root certificate / keybox + Bootloader state + Certificate chain and revocation + Whole report + Normal report + Certificate status + Follow the real result + Normal + Expired + Revoked + Signature error + Revoked certificates + Follow the real result + No certificate revoked + All revoked + Unlocked, unverified boot + Locked, verified boot failed + Bootloader is unlocked and unverified + Verified boot failed + Certificate chain Certificate chain is a list of certificates used to authenticate a key. The chain starts with the certificate associated with that key, and each certificate is signed by the next in the chain. The chain ends with a root certificate, and the trustworthiness of the attestation depends on the root certificate of the chain. Certificate info