diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md index 368b7b7..28f990a 100644 --- a/AGENTS.md +++ b/AGENTS.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Curate useful files that can follow EFS to every chain: games, standards, whitep - Do not imply EFS owns or relicenses third-party works. - Use SPDX license ids when possible, such as `CC0-1.0`, `MIT`, and `CC-BY-4.0`. - Use `NOASSERTION` or `LicenseRef-*` for unclear or nonstandard rights status. -- Treat unclear redistribution rights as not deployable until reviewed. +- Hosting policy (owner decision, 2026-10-27): documents (text, markdown, PDFs such as whitepapers, standards, essays and manifestos) may be hosted when their redistribution rights are unclear; record that as `license: "NOASSERTION"` and keep any rights note. Media (games, images, audio, video) must carry a real licence; the seeder refuses media without one. - Keep manifests compatible with the current seeder: `dataset`, `anchorPath`, `defaults`, and `files[].path` must keep working. - Add rich metadata incrementally instead of doing broad rewrites. - Validate manifests before committing with `npm run validate`. diff --git a/NOTICE.md b/NOTICE.md index aaedde6..2f30980 100644 --- a/NOTICE.md +++ b/NOTICE.md @@ -22,5 +22,7 @@ The current datasets were assembled quickly for a visible EFS demo. Some machine |---|---| | `web-games` | Mostly CC0-1.0 and MIT single-file games. Preserve MIT notices in the files. | | `ethereum-eips` | CC0-1.0. EIPs/ERCs are public-domain per the EIP process. | -| `cypherpunk-canon` | Mixed. Three works are included under recorded public-domain or CC BY-SA terms. Eighteen additional works are represented only by CC0 metadata records because their bytes are not cleared for EFS mirroring. | -| `crypto-whitepapers` | Mixed. Some files are freely redistributable, some are academic/public references, and some entries are link-only because rights are unclear. Review per-file notes before broad redistribution. | +| `cypherpunk-canon` | Mixed. Three PDFs are included under recorded public-domain or CC BY-SA terms. Nine short texts (the two manifestos, six classics and b-money) are hosted in full by owner decision with `license: NOASSERTION`. Ten works are represented only by CC0 metadata records. | +| `crypto-whitepapers` | Mixed. Papers are hosted as published by their projects or authors, most with no stated licence (owner decision, 2026-10-27). Each card has a **Rights:** line recording what the paper itself states. | +| `history` | Ethereum Foundation blog posts and essays converted to markdown (no stated licence; hosted by owner decision), EIPs under CC0, and EFS-authored cards. | +| `media` | Public-domain images (NASA, and a public-domain text logo with a trademark note), each with an about-card recording its Commons licence tag. | diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 502951f..8f723fc 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -8,12 +8,14 @@ This repository is the portable content source for EFS demos and chain deploymen | Dataset | Anchor | Files | Bytes | Description | |---|---:|---:|---:|---| -| [Web Games](./datasets/web-games/) | `/games` | 15 | 365441 | Single-file HTML5 games, playable in a sandboxed iframe. | -| [Crypto Whitepapers](./datasets/crypto-whitepapers/) | `/whitepapers` | 40 | 14474579 | Major cryptocurrency whitepapers and reference notes. | -| [Ethereum Standards](./datasets/ethereum-eips/) | `/standards` | 10 | 245523 | Landmark EIPs/ERCs, public domain under CC0. | -| [Cypherpunk Canon](./datasets/cypherpunk-canon/) | `/cypherpunk` | 25 | 23391250 | A rights-aware shelf representing 21 works with local files or link-only records. | - -`catalog.json` is the machine-readable table of contents. Each dataset folder owns its own `manifest.json`, `README.md`, and source files. +| [Web Games](./datasets/web-games/) | `/games` | 16 | 417483 | Single-file HTML5 games, playable in a sandboxed iframe. | +| [Crypto Whitepapers](./datasets/crypto-whitepapers/) | `/whitepapers` | 43 | 15079829 | Major cryptocurrency whitepapers and reference notes. | +| [Ethereum Standards](./datasets/ethereum-eips/) | `/standards` | 16 | 354321 | Landmark Ethereum standards (EIPs/ERCs), public domain under CC0. | +| [Cypherpunk Canon](./datasets/cypherpunk-canon/) | `/cypherpunk` | 27 | 23476165 | A reading shelf of 22 cypherpunk works: nine short classics in full, three books as PDFs, and links to the rest. | +| [Ethereum History](./datasets/history/) | `/history` | 12 | 114224 | Ethereum's story in its own words: the announcement, Devcon 0, launch, the DAO, the Merge. | +| [Media](./datasets/media/) | `/media` | 7 | 1312174 | Public-domain images about archives that outlast their medium: Pale Blue Dot, the Voyager Golden Record, the Ethereum diamond. | + +`catalog.json` is the machine-readable table of contents. Each dataset folder owns its own `manifest.json`, a visitor-facing `README.md` (published as the folder's Overview), curator notes in `CURATION.md`, and its source files. ## Layout diff --git a/catalog.json b/catalog.json index 2c90a21..c3a6fbc 100644 --- a/catalog.json +++ b/catalog.json @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ "path": "datasets/web-games", "manifest": "datasets/web-games/manifest.json", "anchorPath": "/games", - "fileCount": 15, - "bytes": 365441, + "fileCount": 16, + "bytes": 417483, "status": "deployable", "licensePosture": "CC0-1.0 and MIT; preserve in-file MIT notices", "description": "Single-file HTML5 games, playable in a sandboxed iframe." @@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ "path": "datasets/crypto-whitepapers", "manifest": "datasets/crypto-whitepapers/manifest.json", "anchorPath": "/whitepapers", - "fileCount": 40, - "bytes": 14474579, - "status": "deployable-with-review", - "licensePosture": "mixed; review per-file markdown and README notes", + "fileCount": 43, + "bytes": 15079829, + "status": "deployable", + "licensePosture": "papers hosted as published by their projects or authors; most carry no licence (owner decision 2026-10-27: no licence field required for documents)", "description": "Major cryptocurrency whitepapers and reference notes." }, { @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ "path": "datasets/ethereum-eips", "manifest": "datasets/ethereum-eips/manifest.json", "anchorPath": "/standards", - "fileCount": 10, - "bytes": 245523, + "fileCount": 16, + "bytes": 354321, "status": "deployable", "licensePosture": "CC0-1.0", "description": "Landmark Ethereum standards (EIPs/ERCs), public domain under CC0." @@ -45,11 +45,35 @@ "path": "datasets/cypherpunk-canon", "manifest": "datasets/cypherpunk-canon/manifest.json", "anchorPath": "/cypherpunk", - "fileCount": 25, - "bytes": 23391250, + "fileCount": 27, + "bytes": 23476165, "status": "deployable-mixed", - "licensePosture": "local payloads are CC0, CC BY-SA, or public domain; linked works are represented by CC0 records and are not mirrored", - "description": "A rights-aware shelf representing 21 cypherpunk works with local reading files or link-only records." + "licensePosture": "local PDFs are CC BY-SA or public domain; the two manifestos are hosted in full (owner decision 2026-10-27); other works are CC0 link-only records", + "description": "A reading shelf of 22 cypherpunk works: nine short classics in full, three books as PDFs, and links to the rest." + }, + { + "id": "history", + "title": "Ethereum History", + "path": "datasets/history", + "manifest": "datasets/history/manifest.json", + "anchorPath": "/history", + "fileCount": 12, + "bytes": 114224, + "status": "deployable", + "licensePosture": "Ethereum Foundation blog posts and essays converted to markdown (no stated licence; hosted by owner decision 2026-10-27), EIPs under CC0, and EFS-authored cards (CC0)", + "description": "Ethereum's story in its own words: the announcement, Devcon 0, launch, the DAO, the Merge." + }, + { + "id": "media", + "title": "Media", + "path": "datasets/media", + "manifest": "datasets/media/manifest.json", + "anchorPath": "/media", + "fileCount": 7, + "bytes": 1312174, + "status": "deployable", + "licensePosture": "public-domain images (NASA; a public-domain text logo with a trademark note), each with a CC0 about-card", + "description": "Public-domain images about archives that outlast their medium: Pale Blue Dot, the Voyager Golden Record, the Ethereum diamond." } ] } diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ADDRESSES.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ADDRESSES.md index cb9f3f0..a7b731c 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ADDRESSES.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ADDRESSES.md @@ -1,67 +1,10 @@ -# Existing IPFS / Arweave Addresses — EFS Mirror Research +# Published content addresses -Companion to `README.md`. Goal: for each whitepaper in this dataset, find whether a -**canonical, publicly-pinned IPFS CID and/or Arweave address already exists**, so EFS can point -a MIRROR at existing content instead of self-hosting. +Content-addressed copies of the papers in this folder that are already published elsewhere. Each address +below serves bytes identical to the local file (same size and SHA-256). -## Method & honesty rules +| Project | File | Address | Size (bytes) | SHA-256 | +|---|---|---|---:|---| +| Bitcoin | `bitcoin.pdf` | `ipfs://QmRA3NWM82ZGynMbYzAgYTSXCVM14Wx1RZ8fKP42G6gjgj` | 184,292 | `b1674191a88ec5cdd733e4240a81803105dc412d6c6708d53ab94fc248f4f553` | -- A CID is only recorded here if it was **found published somewhere** AND I **verified the gateway - actually resolves to the right document** (size / sha256 match against the local PDF where one exists). -- CIDs were **not** computed locally and assumed to match a published one — chunking/CID-version - differences make that unreliable. No guessed CIDs. -- Where nothing verifiable was found, the row is marked **"needs self-pin"** (we pin it ourselves later). -- Confidence reflects how sure I am the address is the *same, correct* whitepaper (not a random re-upload). - -Research date: 2026-06-10. Gateways checked: `ipfs.io`, `dweb.link`, `w3s.link`. - -## Summary - -- **Verified existing IPFS CID: 1** — Bitcoin (byte-identical, very high confidence). -- **Verified existing Arweave address: 0.** -- **Needs self-pin: all others** (~18 documents across ~16 coins with real papers). -- No widely-published, per-document canonical CID/TxID surfaced for any non-Bitcoin paper. Most are - served only from project HTTP sites. (ethereum.org's *whole site* is mirrored to IPFS via the - `ethereum.eth` ENS contenthash, but no canonical per-PDF CID is published — so none is recorded here.) - -## Table - -| Coin | PDF present | IPFS CID + gateway (verified) | Arweave TxID + URL | Source | Confidence | Notes | -|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| -| **Bitcoin** | y | `QmRA3NWM82ZGynMbYzAgYTSXCVM14Wx1RZ8fKP42G6gjgj` — https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmRA3NWM82ZGynMbYzAgYTSXCVM14Wx1RZ8fKP42G6gjgj (also resolves on dweb.link, w3s.link) | none found | bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org GitHub issue #3696; this CID is the well-known one also embedded in macOS | **Very high** | **VERIFIED byte-identical to local `bitcoin.pdf`** (184,292 bytes; sha256 `b1674191…f4f553`) across 3 gateways. Best mirror candidate. | -| Litecoin | no (none exists) | — | — | — | n/a | No whitepaper ever existed (2011 Bitcoin/scrypt fork). Nothing to mirror. | -| Dogecoin | no (none exists) | — | — | — | n/a | No whitepaper ever existed (2013 joke coin). Nothing to mirror. | -| Ethereum | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | ethereum.org serves PDF over HTTP only; site is on IPFS via `ethereum.eth` ENS contenthash but no canonical per-PDF CID published | n/a | Did not record a guessed CID. Self-pin the local `ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf`. | -| Cardano (Ouroboros) | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | IACR ePrint 2016/889 (HTTP) | n/a | Academic preprint; no published CID/TxID found. | -| Solana | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | solana.com / allcryptowhitepapers (HTTP) | n/a | No published CID/TxID found. | -| Algorand | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | IACR ePrint 2017/454 (HTTP) | n/a | Academic preprint; none found. | -| Tezos (whitepaper + position paper) | y (both) | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | tezos.com (HTTP) | n/a | Two PDFs; none found. | -| Polygon (Matic litepaper) | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper | n/a | None found. | -| Tron | **no — flagged** | — | — | — | n/a | Link-only in dataset (plagiarism controversy, pulled from official site). Do not source/mirror. | -| Monero (CryptoNote v2) | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | universally mirrored (web.archive, Zenodo CC-BY copy); no single canonical CID/TxID found | n/a | Many HTTP mirrors but no authoritative pinned CID surfaced. | -| Zcash (Zerocash) | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | zerocash-project.org author preprint (HTTP) | n/a | None found. (Local file is the author extended version, per README.) | -| Polkadot | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | Web3 Foundation (HTTP) | n/a | None found. | -| Cosmos | y (markdown only) | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | github.com/cosmos/cosmos | n/a | No PDF in dataset; markdown only. Nothing to mirror unless we pin the md. | -| Avalanche (consensus + platform) | y (both) | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | arXiv 1906.08936 + Ava Labs (HTTP) | n/a | None found. | -| Chainlink | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | research.chain.link (HTTP) | n/a | None found. | -| Uniswap (v2-core + v3-core) | y (both) | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | uniswap.org (HTTP) | n/a | None found. | -| Filecoin | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf (Protocol Labs, CC-BY) | n/a | Ironically IPFS-native project, but no canonical per-PDF CID published/verifiable. Strong self-pin candidate (CC-BY). | -| XRP (Ripple) | y | needs self-pin | needs self-pin | ripple.com (HTTP) | n/a | None found. | -| BNB (Binance) | **no — flagged** | — | — | — | n/a | Link-only in dataset (commercial doc, no open license). Do not source/mirror. | - -## Coins with NO real whitepaper - -- **Litecoin** — 2011 Bitcoin/scrypt fork; no formal paper. -- **Dogecoin** — 2013 meme coin; no whitepaper ever written. - -## Link-only / flagged (do not mirror without James's review) - -- **Tron** — whitepaper pulled from official site amid plagiarism controversy; dataset is link+note only. -- **BNB / Binance** — commercial exchange doc, no stated open license; dataset is link+note only. - -## Recommendation - -Only **Bitcoin** can be mirrored against an existing, verified public pin today. Everything else -should be **self-pinned** by EFS from the local PDFs (the high-value, clearly-licensed ones first: -Bitcoin already covered, then Ethereum CC-BY, Filecoin CC-BY). After self-pinning, the resulting -CIDs can be recorded back into this file. +No other paper in this folder has a published IPFS or Arweave address that matches the local file. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/CURATION.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/CURATION.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..783bf09 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/CURATION.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +# Curation notes: Crypto Whitepapers + +Notes for maintainers. This file is not part of the published dataset (it is not listed in +`manifest.json`); the visitor-facing overview is `README.md`. + +## Structure + +- One markdown **About** card per project, plus the paper itself where one exists and can be hosted. +- Files stay flat beside `manifest.json`. Categories are tags, not folders, so one paper can carry several + (`proof-of-stake`, `privacy`, `defi`, `ethereum`, ...). Tags are lowercase and hyphenated. +- Every manifest entry has `path`, `name` (same as `path`), `contentType`, `title`, `description`, `tags` + and `source`. Papers carry `author`/`authors`, `year` and an `aboutCard` pointer; cards carry + `author: "EFS contributors"`, `workAuthor` and `originalYear` where known. +- Paper titles are the papers' own titles; card titles are "About: ". +- Published files must be self-contained: only absolute `https://` links, because the EFS explorer renders + relative links as dead text and relative images as placeholders. + +## Sources + +Each card's **Canonical source** and **File in this folder** lines record where the hosted copy came from +and whether it is byte-identical to that source. Where a project no longer hosts its paper (CryptoNote, +the Matic litepaper), the card names the archive copy used. + +The Ethereum Yellow Paper (`yellowpaper.pdf`) was retrieved on 2026-11-12 from +https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf. It is a valid PDF (version 1.5, 597,589 bytes, +SHA-256 `d67c009c5d5a0542c8288aee3c4d470b3e2dbe6e664f72f00011543608477fa9`). Its first page reads +"Shanghai version efc5f9a – 2025-02-04"; the `gh-pages` commit `f15fa70` records it as built from +`ethereum/yellowpaper` commit `efc5f9a1f356cba376c978eedb63cb0363c2aa85`. + +## Rights + +Owner decision (2026-10-27): documents (text, markdown, PDFs) need no machine-readable licence field. +Each card still ends its header with a neutral **Rights:** line stating what the paper itself says: + +- Most papers are published openly by their projects or authors and state no licence. +- Polkadot's paper states a Creative Commons licence. +- The Ethereum Yellow Paper is CC BY-SA 4.0, per `LICENCE.md` in https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper + (checked 2026-11-12) and the repository README. +- Zerocash: the hosted file is the authors' extended version; the IEEE S&P 2014 conference version is + copyrighted by IEEE. +- TRON and BNB Chain whitepapers are linked, not hosted. + +EFS does not own or relicense any of these works. + +## Content addresses + +`ADDRESSES.md` lists published IPFS addresses that serve bytes identical to a local file. A CID is +recorded only when a published address was found and the gateway copy matched the local file's size and +SHA-256; CIDs were not computed locally and assumed to match, because chunking and CID-version differences +make that unreliable. + +- Initial survey: 2026-06-10, via the `ipfs.io`, `dweb.link` and `w3s.link` gateways. +- The Bitcoin CID (referenced in bitcoin-dot-org/Bitcoin.org GitHub issue #3696) was re-checked on + 2026-10-27 via `gateway.pinata.cloud`, `4everland.io` and `ipfs.filebase.io`. +- ethereum.org is served on IPFS as a whole site via the `ethereum.eth` ENS contenthash, but no per-PDF CID + is published. No verified Arweave addresses were found. +- Every other paper needs to be pinned by EFS; record the resulting CIDs in `ADDRESSES.md`. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/README.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/README.md index 94f2339..78a62fe 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/README.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/README.md @@ -1,37 +1,41 @@ -# Crypto Whitepapers — EFS reference dataset +# Crypto Whitepapers -A flat collection of major-cryptocurrency whitepapers, assembled as a reference dataset for the EFS (Ethereum File System) OnionDAO hackathon. +The founding papers of major blockchain projects, from Bitcoin's nine pages in 2008 to the Ethereum Yellow +Paper and the Uniswap papers. Each paper sits beside a short **About** card that says who wrote it, when, +where the copy comes from, and what it proposes. Start with a card if you want the two-minute version. -**Modeled the EFS way: flat files + tags, not folders.** Every whitepaper is one item (a stable identity); its category is a **tag**, not a location. A paper can carry many tags (and, in EFS, different curators/lenses can tag it differently) — so "is XRP a *payment* coin or *interoperability*?" is answered by tags, not by which single folder it's trapped in. On EFS this becomes: each PDF/markdown = a DATA placed at a stable anchor, with TAG edges for categories. +Files are tagged rather than sorted into folders, so one paper can sit in several categories at once +(for example [`ethereum`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers?tags=ethereum), +[`proof-of-stake`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers?tags=proof-of-stake), +[`privacy`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers?tags=privacy) or +[`defi`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers?tags=defi)). -Retrieval addresses (IPFS CID / Arweave) for seeding onto EFS: see [`ADDRESSES.md`](./ADDRESSES.md). +| Project | Paper | About card | +|---|---|---| +| Bitcoin | [Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/bitcoin.pdf) (2008) | [About: Bitcoin](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/bitcoin.md) | +| Ethereum | [Ethereum whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf) (2014) | [About: Ethereum](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/ethereum.md) | +| Ethereum | [Yellow Paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/yellowpaper.pdf) (2014; Shanghai version, 2025) | [About: Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/yellowpaper.md) | +| Solana | [Solana whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/solana.pdf) (2018) | [About: Solana](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/solana.md) | +| XRP Ledger | [The Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf) (2014) | [About: XRP Ledger](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/xrp-ripple.md) | +| Cardano | [Ouroboros](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/ouroboros.pdf) (2016) | [About: Cardano](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/cardano.md) | +| Polkadot | [Polkadot whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/polkadot.pdf) (2016) | [About: Polkadot](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/polkadot.md) | +| Avalanche | [Consensus paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/avalanche-consensus.pdf) and [platform paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/avalanche-platform.pdf) (2020) | [About: Avalanche](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/avalanche.md) | +| Cosmos | [Cosmos whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/cosmos-whitepaper.md) (2016) | [About: Cosmos](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/cosmos.md) | +| Algorand | [Algorand paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/algorand.pdf) (2017) | [About: Algorand](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/algorand.md) | +| Tezos | [Whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/tezos-whitepaper.pdf) and [position paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/tezos-position-paper.pdf) (2014) | [About: Tezos](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/tezos.md) | +| Polygon | [Matic whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/matic-whitepaper.md) (2018) and [litepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/matic-litepaper.pdf) | [About: Polygon](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/polygon.md) | +| Chainlink | [ChainLink whitepaper v1](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf) (2017) | [About: Chainlink](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/chainlink.md) | +| Uniswap | [v2 Core](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/uniswap-v2-core.pdf) (2020) and [v3 Core](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/uniswap-v3-core.pdf) (2021) | [About: Uniswap](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/uniswap.md) | +| Filecoin | [Filecoin whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/filecoin.pdf) (2017) | [About: Filecoin](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/filecoin.md) | +| Monero | [CryptoNote v 2.0](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/cryptonote.pdf) (2013) | [About: Monero](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/monero.md) | +| Zcash | [Zerocash](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/zerocash.pdf) (2014) | [About: Zcash](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/zcash.md) | +| Litecoin | No whitepaper | [About: Litecoin](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/litecoin.md) | +| Dogecoin | No whitepaper | [About: Dogecoin](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/dogecoin.md) | +| TRON | Linked from the card | [About: TRON](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/tron.md) | +| BNB Chain | Linked from the card | [About: BNB Chain](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/binance-bnb.md) | -## Manifest +Every paper is hosted as published by its project or authors, and each card records where the copy came +from and what rights statement, if any, it carries. EFS does not own or relicense these works. -Each coin has a markdown page (summary, authors, year, source, license) and — where a real whitepaper exists and is redistributable — the PDF. - -| Coin | Markdown | PDF | Tags | Notes | -|---|---|---|---|---| -| Bitcoin | `bitcoin.md` | `bitcoin.pdf` | store-of-value, payment | canonical; public IPFS CID exists | -| Ethereum | `ethereum.md` | `ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf` | smart-contract-platform | | -| Solana | `solana.md` | `solana.pdf` | smart-contract-platform | | -| XRP / Ripple | `xrp-ripple.md` | `ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf` | payment | | -| Cardano | `cardano.md` | `ouroboros.pdf` | smart-contract-platform, proof-of-stake | Ouroboros paper | -| Polkadot | `polkadot.md` | `polkadot.pdf` | interoperability | | -| Avalanche | `avalanche.md` | `avalanche-consensus.pdf`, `avalanche-platform.pdf` | interoperability | | -| Cosmos | `cosmos.md`, `cosmos-whitepaper.md` | — | interoperability | | -| Algorand | `algorand.md` | `algorand.pdf` | smart-contract-platform | | -| Tezos | `tezos.md` | `tezos-whitepaper.pdf`, `tezos-position-paper.pdf` | smart-contract-platform | | -| Polygon | `polygon.md`, `matic-whitepaper.md` | `matic-litepaper.pdf` | smart-contract-platform, scaling | | -| Chainlink | `chainlink.md` | `chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf` | oracle | | -| Uniswap | `uniswap.md` | `uniswap-v2-core.pdf`, `uniswap-v3-core.pdf` | defi | | -| Filecoin | `filecoin.md` | `filecoin.pdf` | storage | | -| Monero | `monero.md` | `cryptonote.pdf` | privacy | CryptoNote paper | -| Zcash | `zcash.md` | `zerocash.pdf` | privacy | Zerocash preprint | -| Litecoin | `litecoin.md` | — | store-of-value, payment | no real whitepaper (Bitcoin fork) | -| Dogecoin | `dogecoin.md` | — | store-of-value, payment | no real whitepaper | -| Tron | `tron.md` | — | smart-contract-platform | link-only — plagiarism flag, review before use | -| BNB / Binance | `binance-bnb.md` | — | exchange-chain | link-only — no open license | - -## License note -Most papers are freely redistributable (Bitcoin freely distributable; Ethereum CC-BY; academic preprints from arXiv/IACR). PDFs intentionally omitted where the license is restrictive/unclear (Tron, BNB) — markdown + source link only. See each markdown page for per-item license status. +For Ethereum's own story, see the [Ethereum history timeline](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/timeline.md); +for the standards that define how it works today, see [Ethereum Standards](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards). diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/algorand.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/algorand.md index ff6d5a2..62a1eb7 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/algorand.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/algorand.md @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ # Algorand -- **Title:** Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies - **Project:** Algorand -- **Author(s):** Jing Chen, Silvio Micali (foundational theory); related work by Gilad et al. -- **Year:** 2017 (IACR ePrint 2017/454) +- **Paper:** *Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies* +- **Authors:** Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, Nickolai Zeldovich (MIT CSAIL) +- **Year:** 2017 (SOSP 2017; IACR ePrint 2017/454) - **Canonical source:** https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/454 -- **License / distribution:** Academic preprint on the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive; freely available. - Included as an academic preprint. -- **File:** `algorand.pdf` (fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `algorand.pdf` (the ePrint revision of 24 September 2017) +- **Related work:** Jing Chen and Silvio Micali's earlier theory paper, *Algorand* (2016, + https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01341), introduced the underlying ideas. +- **Rights:** Academic preprint, freely available on the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (2017/454); no explicit licence stated. ## Summary -Algorand, originated by Turing Award winner Silvio Micali, is a pure proof-of-stake protocol that aims to -reach consensus with both high speed and strong security while avoiding forks. Its key idea is -**cryptographic sortition**: in each round a small committee of users is selected secretly and at random, -weighted by stake, using verifiable random functions, so that participants prove their own selection only -after the fact. This lets the network run a Byzantine agreement that scales to many users, confirms blocks -quickly, and resists attackers who cannot predict or target the committee in advance. The result is a -permissionless ledger with negligible forking probability and low computational cost. +This paper presents Algorand as a cryptocurrency that confirms transactions in about a minute while scaling +to many users, and in which users never see conflicting confirmed transactions, even if some are malicious +or the network is temporarily partitioned. It uses a new Byzantine Agreement protocol run by a small +committee. Committee members are chosen by **cryptographic sortition**: each user privately checks, using a +verifiable random function weighted by stake, whether they have been selected, and includes a proof of that +selection in their messages. + +Because participants keep no private state apart from their keys, they can be replaced after every message, +which protects against attacks on known committee members. Silvio Micali, a Turing Award winner and MIT +professor, founded Algorand in 2017, and its main network launched in June 2019. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/avalanche.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/avalanche.md index 4a81ed5..019b6b1 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/avalanche.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/avalanche.md @@ -1,23 +1,28 @@ # Avalanche -- **Title:** Snowflake to Avalanche: A Novel Metastable Consensus Protocol Family for Cryptocurrencies - (consensus); plus the Ava Labs Avalanche Platform whitepaper - **Project:** Avalanche (Ava Labs) -- **Author(s):** Team Rocket (pseudonymous, consensus paper); Ava Labs (platform paper) -- **Year:** 2018–2020 (consensus paper 2018; arXiv 1906.08936, 2019; platform paper 2020) -- **Canonical source:** https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08936 (consensus); - https://www.avalabs.org/whitepapers (platform) -- **License / distribution:** Consensus paper hosted on arXiv (freely available preprint); platform paper - freely published by Ava Labs. Included as freely-distributed documents. -- **Files:** `avalanche-consensus.pdf` (arXiv), `avalanche-platform.pdf` (Ava Labs) — both fetched and validated +- **Papers:** + - *Scalable and Probabilistic Leaderless BFT Consensus through Metastability*: Team Rocket, Maofan Yin, + Kevin Sekniqi, Robbert van Renesse, Emin Gün Sirer (Cornell University). arXiv:1906.08936v2, 2020. + - *Avalanche Platform*: Kevin Sekniqi, Daniel Laine, Stephen Buttolph, Emin Gün Sirer. 30 June 2020. +- **Year:** 2020 (the consensus protocol was first described by the pseudonymous "Team Rocket" in 2018) +- **Canonical sources:** https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08936 (consensus paper); + https://assets.website-files.com/5d80307810123f5ffbb34d6e/6008d7bbf8b10d1eb01e7e16_Avalanche%20Platform%20Whitepaper.pdf + (platform paper, as published by Ava Labs) +- **Files in this folder:** `avalanche-consensus.pdf` (arXiv v2, byte-identical) and `avalanche-platform.pdf` + (byte-identical to the Ava Labs copy) +- **Rights:** The consensus paper is an arXiv preprint and the platform paper is published openly by Ava Labs; neither PDF states a licence. ## Summary -Avalanche introduced a new family of **leaderless, metastable consensus protocols** — Slush, Snowflake, -Snowball, and Avalanche — based on repeated randomized sub-sampling of the network: each node repeatedly -queries small random samples of peers and shifts its preference toward the majority answer, rapidly driving -the whole network to an irreversible decision with high probability. This achieves Byzantine-fault-tolerant -agreement that is highly scalable and quick to finalize without a leader or proof-of-work, while gracefully -tolerating large numbers of participants. The Avalanche platform paper builds a multi-chain network (the -X-Chain, P-Chain, and C-Chain) on this consensus, supporting custom subnets and EVM-compatible smart -contracts. +The consensus paper introduces the **Snow** family of leaderless Byzantine-fault-tolerant protocols (Slush, +Snowflake, Snowball and Avalanche). Each node repeatedly asks a small random sample of other nodes for their +preference and shifts towards the majority answer. This quickly tips the whole network into agreement with +high probability, without a leader and without proof-of-work, and no node has to process more than a +logarithmic amount of data per decision. The paper reports about 3,400 transactions per second in a large +deployment. + +The platform paper describes the first release of the Avalanche network (codenamed "Borealis"). It splits +the system into chains, execution environments and validator sets called **subnets**, where each subnet +validates one or more blockchains and the AVAX token secures the network. Avalanche's mainnet launched in +September 2020. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/binance-bnb.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/binance-bnb.md index bef562b..f34933f 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/binance-bnb.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/binance-bnb.md @@ -1,22 +1,23 @@ -# BNB (Binance) — FLAGGED (PDF intentionally NOT included) +# BNB (BNB Chain) -- **Title:** Binance Exchange Whitepaper (v1.1) -- **Project:** Binance / BNB -- **Author(s):** Binance -- **Year:** 2017 (released ~June 2017, ahead of the BNB ICO) -- **Canonical source:** Originally distributed by Binance for its 2017 ICO. (Third-party mirrors exist; - Binance's current authoritative research page is https://www.binance.com/en/research/projects/bnb.) -- **License / distribution:** **UNCLEAR / RESTRICTIVE — FLAGGED FOR JAMES.** This is a commercial exchange - document with no stated open/redistribution license. Per the dataset's "when in doubt, link don't copy" - rule, the PDF is **not** included. -- **File:** **none — intentionally omitted pending James's decision.** +- **Project:** BNB and BNB Smart Chain (formerly Binance Smart Chain) +- **Paper:** *BNB Smart Chain* whitepaper (undated; maintained by BNB Chain) +- **Author:** BNB Chain (no individual authors listed) +- **Year:** BNB launched in 2017; BNB Smart Chain launched on 1 September 2020 +- **Canonical source:** https://github.com/bnb-chain/whitepaper +- **File in this folder:** this card only (the whitepaper is linked above) +- **Rights:** Published by the BNB Chain project; no explicit licence stated. Not hosted here; linked above. ## Summary -BNB launched in 2017 as the native token of the Binance cryptocurrency exchange via an ICO that sold 100 -million tokens. The original document is an exchange/ICO whitepaper describing BNB's utility (trading-fee -discounts, etc.) and a planned periodic **coin burn** reducing supply over time, rather than a novel -protocol design — BNB began as an ERC-20 token before migrating to Binance's own chains (Binance Chain / -BNB Smart Chain). It is included in this dataset for completeness as a major asset, but its whitepaper is a -corporate document of uncertain redistribution status, so only this summary and the canonical pointer are -provided. +BNB was launched in July 2017 by the Binance cryptocurrency exchange, founded that year by Changpeng Zhao +and Yi He. It began as a token on Ethereum used to pay fees on the exchange, and Binance raised about +$15 million selling it in an initial coin offering. In 2019 BNB moved to Binance's own Binance Chain, and in +September 2020 Binance launched Binance Smart Chain, an Ethereum-compatible chain built from go-ethereum. +Both chains were renamed under the BNB Chain brand in 2022. + +The whitepaper describes BNB Smart Chain's **Proof of Staked Authority** consensus, which combines +delegated proof-of-stake with proof-of-authority: BNB holders stake to elect a small set of validators, +which take turns producing blocks. It also covers EVM compatibility, staking and governance, and a mechanism +that burns part of each block's gas fees. The original Binance Chain (later BNB Beacon Chain) was shut down +in December 2024 after its functions were merged into BNB Smart Chain. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/bitcoin.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/bitcoin.md index ca40685..c4eba08 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/bitcoin.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/bitcoin.md @@ -1,21 +1,22 @@ # Bitcoin -- **Title:** Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System - **Project:** Bitcoin -- **Author(s):** Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym) +- **Paper:** *Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System* +- **Author:** Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym) - **Year:** 2008 - **Canonical source:** https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf -- **License / distribution:** Clean. Published openly on bitcoin.org; the paper is freely distributable - and the surrounding software is MIT-licensed. Universally mirrored. Safe to redistribute. -- **File:** `bitcoin.pdf` (9 pages, fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `bitcoin.pdf` (9 pages; byte-identical to the bitcoin.org copy) +- **Rights:** Published openly on bitcoin.org and universally mirrored; the paper itself carries no licence statement. ## Summary -Bitcoin introduced the first practical decentralized digital currency, allowing online payments to be -sent directly between parties without going through a financial institution. Its core contribution is a -solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network that timestamps transactions into an -ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the -work. The longest chain serves both as proof of the sequence of events and as proof that it came from the -largest pool of CPU power, so honest nodes controlling a majority of compute outpace attackers. New coins -are introduced as an incentive for nodes to support the network (mining). The paper laid the foundation -for essentially the entire cryptocurrency field. +The Bitcoin whitepaper describes the first practical decentralized digital currency: online payments sent +directly between parties without a financial institution in the middle. Its core contribution is a solution +to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network that timestamps transactions into an ongoing +chain of hash-based proof-of-work. The longest chain serves both as the record of what happened and as proof +that it came from the largest pool of CPU power, so as long as honest nodes control most of that power they +outpace attackers. + +New coins are issued as a reward to the nodes that do this work (mining), which gives them an incentive to +keep the network honest. The network launched in January 2009, and the nine-page paper became the starting +point for the whole cryptocurrency field. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cardano.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cardano.md index 21ccc7f..122c9a2 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cardano.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cardano.md @@ -1,20 +1,22 @@ # Cardano (Ouroboros) -- **Title:** Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol -- **Project:** Cardano (consensus protocol underlying it) -- **Author(s):** Aggelos Kiayias, Alexander Russell, Bernardo David, Roman Oliynykov -- **Year:** 2016 (IACR ePrint 2016/889; also CRYPTO 2017) +- **Project:** Cardano +- **Paper:** *Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol* +- **Authors:** Aggelos Kiayias, Alexander Russell, Bernardo David, Roman Oliynykov +- **Year:** 2016 (IACR ePrint 2016/889; published at CRYPTO 2017) - **Canonical source:** https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/889 -- **License / distribution:** Academic preprint hosted on the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive; freely - available for download. Included as an academic preprint. -- **File:** `ouroboros.pdf` (fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `ouroboros.pdf` (the ePrint revision of 20 July 2019) +- **Rights:** Academic preprint, freely available on the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (2016/889); no explicit licence stated. ## Summary -Ouroboros is the proof-of-stake consensus protocol that underpins Cardano, and it was the first PoS -protocol to come with a rigorous, peer-reviewed security proof. Instead of mining, the protocol divides -time into epochs and slots and uses a secure, verifiable coin-flipping procedure to elect slot leaders in -proportion to stake, who then produce blocks. The paper proves that, under an honest-majority-of-stake -assumption, the protocol achieves the same persistence and liveness guarantees as proof-of-work without its -energy cost. Cardano itself is a layered smart-contract platform built on this foundation; note that the -file here is the underlying consensus paper rather than a product brochure. +Ouroboros is the proof-of-stake consensus protocol that underpins Cardano. The paper describes it as the +first blockchain protocol based on proof of stake with rigorous security guarantees. Instead of mining, time +is divided into epochs and slots, and a secure multiparty coin-flipping procedure elects a slot leader for +each slot in proportion to stake; that leader produces the block. The paper proves that, if a majority of +stake is honest, the protocol achieves persistence and liveness comparable to Bitcoin's, and it adds a +reward scheme under which honest behaviour is an approximate Nash equilibrium. + +Cardano, developed by IOHK (co-founded by Charles Hoskinson), launched in September 2017 and added smart +contracts in September 2021. This file is the underlying research paper rather than a Cardano-branded +overview. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/chainlink.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/chainlink.md index 49c5ab6..bd0a949 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/chainlink.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/chainlink.md @@ -1,21 +1,22 @@ # Chainlink -- **Title:** ChainLink: A Decentralized Oracle Network (v1.0) - **Project:** Chainlink -- **Author(s):** Steve Ellis, Ari Juels, Sergey Nazarov -- **Year:** 2017 (September 4, 2017) +- **Paper:** *ChainLink: A Decentralized Oracle Network* (v1.0) +- **Authors:** Steve Ellis, Ari Juels, Sergey Nazarov +- **Year:** 2017 (dated 4 September 2017) - **Canonical source:** https://research.chain.link/whitepaper-v1.pdf -- **License / distribution:** Freely published via research.chain.link. Included as a freely-distributed - project whitepaper. -- **File:** `chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf` (fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf` (byte-identical to the research.chain.link copy) +- **Rights:** Published openly by the Chainlink project (research.chain.link); no explicit licence stated. ## Summary -Smart contracts cannot natively access external data (prices, events, APIs) or off-chain computation, and a -single centralized oracle reintroduces a single point of failure. Chainlink's whitepaper proposes a -**decentralized oracle network**: many independent oracle nodes retrieve and report data, with on-chain and -off-chain components, an aggregation mechanism, and a **reputation/penalty system** to incentivize honest, -reliable reporting. By sourcing answers from multiple independent providers and aggregating them, the system -delivers tamper-resistant data feeds to contracts. Chainlink became the dominant oracle infrastructure for -DeFi and beyond; a later "Chainlink 2.0" whitepaper expands the vision to decentralized off-chain -computation. +Smart contracts cannot fetch outside data (prices, events, web APIs) on their own, and relying on a single +centralized "oracle" to supply it brings back a single point of failure. The Chainlink whitepaper proposes a +**decentralized oracle network**: many independent nodes retrieve and report data, and their answers are +aggregated, either by an on-chain contract or by a more efficient off-chain consensus mechanism. A +reputation system and security monitoring help users choose reliable providers, and the LINK token pays node +operators. + +Chainlink became widely used to supply price feeds and other data to decentralized-finance applications. A +second whitepaper, *Chainlink 2.0: Next Steps in the Evolution of Decentralized Oracle Networks*, followed in +April 2021. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos-whitepaper.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos-whitepaper.md index 7572ed6..fb65b2d 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos-whitepaper.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos-whitepaper.md @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +> Full text of *Cosmos: A Network of Distributed Ledgers* (Jae Kwon and Ethan Buchman, 2016), copied verbatim from `WHITEPAPER.md` in https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos, where it is published as Markdown. + # Cosmos **A Network of Distributed Ledgers** diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos.md index 3d293f7..f66ba5d 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/cosmos.md @@ -1,20 +1,20 @@ # Cosmos -- **Title:** Cosmos: A Network of Distributed Ledgers - **Project:** Cosmos (Tendermint / Interchain Foundation) -- **Author(s):** Jae Kwon, Ethan Buchman +- **Paper:** *Cosmos: A Network of Distributed Ledgers* +- **Authors:** Jae Kwon, Ethan Buchman - **Year:** 2016 -- **Canonical source:** https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos (and https://cosmos.network/resources/whitepaper) -- **License / distribution:** Open-source repository content from the Cosmos project; freely available. - Included as the project's own published whitepaper. (Distributed as Markdown in the repo.) -- **File:** `cosmos-whitepaper.md` (fetched from the project's GitHub repo) +- **Canonical source:** https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos/blob/master/WHITEPAPER.md +- **File in this folder:** `cosmos-whitepaper.md` (the full text, identical to `WHITEPAPER.md` in the + Cosmos repository, where the whitepaper is published as Markdown) +- **Rights:** Published in the Cosmos project's open-source repository; the paper states no separate licence. ## Summary -Cosmos describes an "Internet of Blockchains": a network of independent, application-specific chains -("zones") that can interoperate through a central **Hub** using the **Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC)** -protocol. Its foundation is **Tendermint**, a Byzantine-fault-tolerant proof-of-stake consensus engine that -provides fast finality and is decoupled from the application layer via the ABCI interface, so developers can -build chains without re-implementing consensus and networking. Rather than forcing everything onto one -chain, Cosmos envisions many sovereign chains exchanging tokens and data. It is included here as Markdown, -which doubles as a clean demonstration of EFS's "markdown file" support. +Cosmos describes a network of independent blockchains ("zones") that connect to a central **Hub** and +exchange tokens and data through the **Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC)** protocol, instead of putting +every application on one chain. Its foundation is **Tendermint**, a Byzantine-fault-tolerant +proof-of-stake consensus engine with fast finality. Tendermint is separated from the application through +an interface called ABCI, so developers can build a chain without re-implementing consensus and networking. + +The Cosmos Hub, the first chain in the network, launched in 2019, with ATOM as its staking token. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/dogecoin.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/dogecoin.md index 6c73ee9..36ee91b 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/dogecoin.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/dogecoin.md @@ -1,18 +1,19 @@ # Dogecoin -- **Title:** (no whitepaper exists) - **Project:** Dogecoin -- **Author(s):** Billy Markus and Jackson Palmer -- **Year:** 2013 (launched December 6, 2013) -- **Canonical source:** https://dogecoin.com -- **License / distribution:** N/A — there is no whitepaper to license. -- **File:** none — **flagged: no whitepaper exists** (created as a joke; this is accurate) +- **Paper:** none; Dogecoin was released as software without a whitepaper +- **Creators:** Billy Markus and Jackson Palmer +- **Year:** 2013 (launched 6 December 2013) +- **Official site:** https://dogecoin.com +- **File in this folder:** this card only +- **Rights:** No whitepaper exists, so none is hosted; this card is original EFS text. ## Summary -Dogecoin was created in late 2013 by software engineers Billy Markus and Jackson Palmer as a deliberate -joke, parodying the speculative frenzy around cryptocurrencies and built around the popular "Doge" Shiba -Inu meme. Technically it derives from Luckycoin/Litecoin (scrypt-based proof-of-work) but it arrived with -no whitepaper, no roadmap, and no grand technical claims — its identity is a "fun and friendly internet -currency." Despite (or because of) its origins it became one of the most widely held cryptocurrencies. It -is included here specifically to flag, honestly, that no whitepaper has ever existed for it. +Dogecoin was created by software engineers Billy Markus and Jackson Palmer as a light-hearted +cryptocurrency themed on the "Doge" Shiba Inu internet meme. Markus based its code on Luckycoin and +Litecoin, so it uses a **scrypt** proof-of-work like Litecoin, but with one-minute blocks. + +Unlike Bitcoin and Litecoin, Dogecoin has no supply cap. A planned limit of 100 billion coins was dropped in +2014, and the block reward is now a fixed 10,000 DOGE, which adds about 5 billion coins a year. Since 2014, +Dogecoin has been merge-mined with Litecoin, so the same mining work can secure both chains. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ethereum.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ethereum.md index b7e4e1b..7f77d2d 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ethereum.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/ethereum.md @@ -1,21 +1,23 @@ # Ethereum -- **Title:** Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform - **Project:** Ethereum -- **Author(s):** Vitalik Buterin -- **Year:** 2014 (originally circulated late 2013) +- **Paper:** *Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform* +- **Author:** Vitalik Buterin +- **Year:** 2014 (first circulated in late 2013) - **Canonical source:** https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/ -- **License / distribution:** Clean. Published via ethereum.org and the original Ethereum wiki under a - Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) license; freely redistributable with attribution. -- **File:** `ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf` (fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf` (the PDF edition published by ethereum.org; + byte-identical to https://ethereum.org/content/whitepaper/whitepaper-pdf/Ethereum_Whitepaper_-_Buterin_2014.pdf) +- **Rights:** Published openly on ethereum.org. An earlier note recorded it as CC BY (from the original Ethereum wiki); that has not been independently verified. ## Summary -The Ethereum whitepaper proposed a blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete programming language, -letting anyone write smart contracts and decentralized applications that define their own rules for -ownership, transaction formats, and state transitions. Where Bitcoin's scripting is intentionally limited, -Ethereum generalizes the blockchain into a global state machine: accounts hold code and storage, and -transactions trigger deterministic computation paid for in "gas." This made possible tokens, DAOs, -financial instruments, and applications far beyond payments. ethereum.org notes the 2014 paper predates the -live network and no longer reflects current Ethereum, but it remains the foundational vision document for -the entire smart-contract ecosystem. +The Ethereum whitepaper proposes a blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete programming language, so that +anyone can write smart contracts and decentralized applications with their own rules for ownership, +transaction formats and state transitions. Where Bitcoin's scripting is deliberately limited, Ethereum turns +the blockchain into a general-purpose state machine: accounts hold code and storage, and transactions +trigger deterministic computation paid for in "gas". The paper sketches applications such as tokens, +financial contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations and name registries. + +The network went live on 30 July 2015 using proof-of-work, and switched to proof-of-stake in "The Merge" on +15 September 2022. ethereum.org notes that the 2014 paper predates the live network and no longer +describes how Ethereum works today, but it remains the founding document of the smart-contract ecosystem. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/filecoin.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/filecoin.md index e494088..b29fd58 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/filecoin.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/filecoin.md @@ -1,21 +1,22 @@ # Filecoin -- **Title:** Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network - **Project:** Filecoin (Protocol Labs) -- **Author(s):** Protocol Labs (Juan Benet et al.) -- **Year:** 2017 (July 2017) -- **Canonical source:** https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf -- **License / distribution:** Freely published by Protocol Labs; the Filecoin/IPFS papers are released under - a Creative Commons license. Included as a freely-distributed project whitepaper. -- **File:** `filecoin.pdf` (36 pages; fetched and validated — content confirmed as the Filecoin DSN paper) +- **Paper:** *Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network* +- **Author:** Protocol Labs +- **Year:** 2017 (dated 19 July 2017; an earlier Filecoin paper appeared in 2014) +- **Canonical source:** https://research.protocol.ai/publications/filecoin-a-decentralized-storage-network/ +- **File in this folder:** `filecoin.pdf` (36 pages; same text as the Protocol Labs copy, in a + recompressed PDF) +- **Rights:** Published openly by Protocol Labs. An earlier note recorded it as Creative Commons–licensed; the hosted PDF itself states no licence. ## Summary Filecoin is a decentralized storage network that turns cloud storage into an open market. Clients pay -storage and retrieval miners to store and serve files; miners earn the FIL token and prove they are doing -the job honestly. Its core cryptographic contributions are **Proof-of-Replication (PoRep)**, which proves a -miner has stored a unique physical copy of the client's data, and **Proof-of-Spacetime (PoSt)**, which -proves the data continued to be stored over a period of time. These proofs let the blockchain verify storage -without trusting the miner, and the network's useful work (storing real data) doubles as its consensus -security. Filecoin is built on top of IPFS content addressing. (Notably, its papers are the ones Tron was -accused of plagiarizing — see `../smart-contract-platforms/tron.md`.) +storage miners to keep their data and retrieval miners to serve it, and miners earn the network's token +(also called Filecoin) for doing so. A miner's mining power is proportional to the storage it actively +provides, so the network's "work" is useful in itself. + +The paper's main cryptographic contributions are **Proof-of-Replication**, which proves that a miner has +stored a unique physical copy of a client's data, and **Proof-of-Spacetime**, which proves that the data +stayed stored over time. These proofs let the blockchain check storage without trusting the miner. +Filecoin is designed to work alongside IPFS, Protocol Labs' content-addressed file system. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/litecoin.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/litecoin.md index 848f75b..9bf4b26 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/litecoin.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/litecoin.md @@ -1,18 +1,21 @@ # Litecoin -- **Title:** (no formal whitepaper exists) - **Project:** Litecoin -- **Author(s):** Charlie Lee -- **Year:** 2011 (network launch October 2011) -- **Canonical source:** https://litecoin.org -- **License / distribution:** N/A — there is no whitepaper to license. -- **File:** none — **flagged: no whitepaper exists** (this is accurate, not a fetch failure) +- **Paper:** none; Litecoin was released as software without a whitepaper +- **Creator:** Charlie Lee +- **Year:** 2011 (first released on GitHub on 7 October 2011) +- **Official site:** https://litecoin.org +- **File in this folder:** this card only +- **Rights:** No whitepaper exists, so none is hosted; this card is original EFS text. ## Summary -Litecoin was created by Charlie Lee in 2011 as a fork of the Bitcoin Core client. It was never accompanied -by a formal academic-style whitepaper; instead it was released as open-source software with a design that -deliberately mirrors Bitcoin while changing a few parameters: a faster ~2.5-minute block time, a larger -maximum coin supply (84 million), and the **scrypt** hashing algorithm in place of SHA-256 (intended at the -time to be more resistant to specialized ASIC mining). It is often described as "silver to Bitcoin's gold." -Because no whitepaper was ever written, this entry exists to document that fact rather than to host a file. +Litecoin was created by Charlie Lee, a former Google engineer, as a fork of Bitcoin's code. It keeps +Bitcoin's overall design (a proof-of-work blockchain with a fixed supply) but changes a few parameters: +blocks arrive every 2.5 minutes instead of 10, the maximum supply is 84 million coins instead of 21 million, +and mining uses the **scrypt** hash function instead of SHA-256. The block reward started at 50 LTC and +halves every 840,000 blocks. + +Because there is no Litecoin whitepaper, its design is defined by its code and Bitcoin's paper. Dogecoin +has been merge-mined with Litecoin since 2014, and in May 2022 Litecoin activated the MimbleWimble Extension +Blocks (MWEB) upgrade, which adds optional confidential transactions. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/manifest.json b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/manifest.json index 133c9f8..3d743ca 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/manifest.json +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/manifest.json @@ -5,45 +5,560 @@ "anchorPath": "/whitepapers", "description": "Major cryptocurrency whitepapers and reference notes.", "files": [ - { "path": "bitcoin.md", "name": "bitcoin.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["store-of-value", "payment", "foundational"] }, - { "path": "bitcoin.pdf", "name": "bitcoin.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["store-of-value", "payment", "foundational"] }, - { "path": "ethereum.md", "name": "ethereum.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "foundational"] }, - { "path": "ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf", "name": "ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "foundational"] }, - { "path": "solana.md", "name": "solana.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "solana.pdf", "name": "solana.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "xrp-ripple.md", "name": "xrp-ripple.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["payment"] }, - { "path": "ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf", "name": "ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["payment"] }, - { "path": "cardano.md", "name": "cardano.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"] }, - { "path": "ouroboros.pdf", "name": "ouroboros.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"] }, - { "path": "polkadot.md", "name": "polkadot.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["interoperability"] }, - { "path": "polkadot.pdf", "name": "polkadot.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["interoperability"] }, - { "path": "avalanche.md", "name": "avalanche.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["interoperability"] }, - { "path": "avalanche-consensus.pdf", "name": "avalanche-consensus.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["interoperability", "consensus"] }, - { "path": "avalanche-platform.pdf", "name": "avalanche-platform.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["interoperability", "platform"] }, - { "path": "cosmos.md", "name": "cosmos.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["interoperability"] }, - { "path": "cosmos-whitepaper.md", "name": "cosmos-whitepaper.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["interoperability"] }, - { "path": "algorand.md", "name": "algorand.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "algorand.pdf", "name": "algorand.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "tezos.md", "name": "tezos.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "tezos-whitepaper.pdf", "name": "tezos-whitepaper.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "tezos-position-paper.pdf", "name": "tezos-position-paper.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform"] }, - { "path": "polygon.md", "name": "polygon.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "scaling"] }, - { "path": "matic-whitepaper.md", "name": "matic-whitepaper.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "scaling"] }, - { "path": "matic-litepaper.pdf", "name": "matic-litepaper.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "scaling"] }, - { "path": "chainlink.md", "name": "chainlink.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["oracle"] }, - { "path": "chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf", "name": "chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["oracle"] }, - { "path": "uniswap.md", "name": "uniswap.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["defi"] }, - { "path": "uniswap-v2-core.pdf", "name": "uniswap-v2-core.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["defi"] }, - { "path": "uniswap-v3-core.pdf", "name": "uniswap-v3-core.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["defi"] }, - { "path": "filecoin.md", "name": "filecoin.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["storage"] }, - { "path": "filecoin.pdf", "name": "filecoin.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["storage"] }, - { "path": "monero.md", "name": "monero.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["privacy"] }, - { "path": "cryptonote.pdf", "name": "cryptonote.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["privacy"] }, - { "path": "zcash.md", "name": "zcash.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["privacy"] }, - { "path": "zerocash.pdf", "name": "zerocash.pdf", "contentType": "application/pdf", "tags": ["privacy"] }, - { "path": "litecoin.md", "name": "litecoin.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["store-of-value", "payment"] }, - { "path": "dogecoin.md", "name": "dogecoin.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["store-of-value", "payment"] }, - { "path": "tron.md", "name": "tron.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "link-only", "flagged"] }, - { "path": "binance-bnb.md", "name": "binance-bnb.md", "contentType": "text/markdown", "tags": ["exchange-chain", "link-only", "flagged"] } + { + "path": "README.md", + "name": "README.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Crypto Whitepapers", + "description": "Overview of the collection: what each project's paper is and how to read the folder.", + "tags": ["overview"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://github.com/efs-project/content/tree/main/datasets/crypto-whitepapers" + }, + { + "path": "bitcoin.md", + "name": "bitcoin.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Bitcoin", + "description": "Who wrote the Bitcoin whitepaper, where it comes from, and what it proposes.", + "tags": ["store-of-value", "payment", "foundational"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Satoshi Nakamoto", + "originalYear": 2008, + "source": "https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "bitcoin.pdf", + "name": "bitcoin.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System", + "description": "Satoshi Nakamoto's nine-page design for electronic cash secured by proof-of-work.", + "tags": ["store-of-value", "payment", "foundational"], + "author": "Satoshi Nakamoto", + "year": 2008, + "source": "https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf", + "aboutCard": "bitcoin.md" + }, + { + "path": "ethereum.md", + "name": "ethereum.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Ethereum", + "description": "Background and summary of the 2014 Ethereum whitepaper.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake", "foundational"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Vitalik Buterin", + "originalYear": 2014, + "source": "https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/" + }, + { + "path": "ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf", + "name": "ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform", + "description": "Vitalik Buterin's whitepaper proposing a blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete language.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake", "foundational"], + "author": "Vitalik Buterin", + "year": 2014, + "source": "https://ethereum.org/content/whitepaper/whitepaper-pdf/Ethereum_Whitepaper_-_Buterin_2014.pdf", + "aboutCard": "ethereum.md" + }, + { + "path": "yellowpaper.md", + "name": "yellowpaper.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Ethereum Yellow Paper", + "description": "Background, version and licence of the Ethereum Yellow Paper.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "smart-contract-platform", "foundational", "specification"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Gavin Wood", + "originalYear": 2014, + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper" + }, + { + "path": "yellowpaper.pdf", + "name": "yellowpaper.pdf", + "license": "CC-BY-SA-4.0", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger", + "description": "The Yellow Paper: Gavin Wood's formal specification of the Ethereum protocol (Shanghai version, 2025-02-04).", + "tags": ["ethereum", "smart-contract-platform", "foundational", "specification"], + "author": "Gavin Wood", + "year": 2014, + "source": "https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "yellowpaper.md" + }, + { + "path": "solana.md", + "name": "solana.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Solana", + "description": "Background and summary of the Solana whitepaper and its Proof of History design.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Anatoly Yakovenko", + "originalYear": 2018, + "source": "https://solana.com/solana-whitepaper.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "solana.pdf", + "name": "solana.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Solana: A new architecture for a high performance blockchain", + "description": "Anatoly Yakovenko's whitepaper introducing Proof of History (v0.8.13).", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "Anatoly Yakovenko", + "year": 2018, + "source": "https://solana.com/solana-whitepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "solana.md" + }, + { + "path": "xrp-ripple.md", + "name": "xrp-ripple.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: XRP Ledger", + "description": "Background and summary of the Ripple consensus whitepaper behind the XRP Ledger.", + "tags": ["payment"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "David Schwartz, Noah Youngs, Arthur Britto", + "originalYear": 2014, + "source": "https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf", + "name": "ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "The Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm", + "description": "Ripple Labs' 2014 paper describing the consensus algorithm of the XRP Ledger.", + "tags": ["payment"], + "authors": ["David Schwartz", "Noah Youngs", "Arthur Britto"], + "year": 2014, + "source": "https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "xrp-ripple.md" + }, + { + "path": "cardano.md", + "name": "cardano.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Cardano (Ouroboros)", + "description": "Background and summary of Ouroboros, the proof-of-stake protocol behind Cardano.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Aggelos Kiayias, Alexander Russell, Bernardo David, Roman Oliynykov", + "originalYear": 2016, + "source": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/889" + }, + { + "path": "ouroboros.pdf", + "name": "ouroboros.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Ouroboros: A Provably Secure Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Protocol", + "description": "The proof-of-stake protocol behind Cardano, presented as the first with rigorous security guarantees.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Aggelos Kiayias", "Alexander Russell", "Bernardo David", "Roman Oliynykov"], + "year": 2016, + "source": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/889", + "aboutCard": "cardano.md" + }, + { + "path": "polkadot.md", + "name": "polkadot.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Polkadot", + "description": "Background and summary of Gavin Wood's Polkadot paper.", + "tags": ["interoperability", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Gavin Wood", + "originalYear": 2016, + "source": "https://github.com/w3f/polkadot-white-paper" + }, + { + "path": "polkadot.pdf", + "name": "polkadot.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Polkadot: Vision for a Heterogeneous Multi-Chain Framework", + "description": "Gavin Wood's 2016 draft describing a relay chain that secures many parallel chains.", + "tags": ["interoperability", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "Gavin Wood", + "year": 2016, + "source": "https://github.com/w3f/polkadot-white-paper", + "aboutCard": "polkadot.md" + }, + { + "path": "avalanche.md", + "name": "avalanche.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Avalanche", + "description": "Background and summary of the Avalanche consensus and platform papers.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Team Rocket, Maofan Yin, Kevin Sekniqi, Robbert van Renesse, Emin Gün Sirer", + "originalYear": 2020, + "source": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08936" + }, + { + "path": "avalanche-consensus.pdf", + "name": "avalanche-consensus.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Scalable and Probabilistic Leaderless BFT Consensus through Metastability", + "description": "The paper describing the Snow family of metastable consensus protocols behind Avalanche.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Team Rocket", "Maofan Yin", "Kevin Sekniqi", "Robbert van Renesse", "Emin Gün Sirer"], + "year": 2020, + "source": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08936", + "aboutCard": "avalanche.md" + }, + { + "path": "avalanche-platform.pdf", + "name": "avalanche-platform.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Avalanche Platform", + "description": "Ava Labs' 2020 whitepaper describing the Avalanche platform built on that consensus.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Kevin Sekniqi", "Daniel Laine", "Stephen Buttolph", "Emin Gün Sirer"], + "year": 2020, + "source": "https://assets.website-files.com/5d80307810123f5ffbb34d6e/6008d7bbf8b10d1eb01e7e16_Avalanche%20Platform%20Whitepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "avalanche.md" + }, + { + "path": "cosmos.md", + "name": "cosmos.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Cosmos", + "description": "Background and summary of the Cosmos whitepaper.", + "tags": ["interoperability", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Jae Kwon, Ethan Buchman", + "originalYear": 2016, + "source": "https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos/blob/master/WHITEPAPER.md" + }, + { + "path": "cosmos-whitepaper.md", + "name": "cosmos-whitepaper.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Cosmos: A Network of Distributed Ledgers", + "description": "Full text of the 2016 Cosmos whitepaper: a network of Tendermint chains linked by inter-blockchain communication.", + "tags": ["interoperability", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Jae Kwon", "Ethan Buchman"], + "year": 2016, + "source": "https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos/blob/master/WHITEPAPER.md", + "aboutCard": "cosmos.md" + }, + { + "path": "algorand.md", + "name": "algorand.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Algorand", + "description": "Background and summary of the Algorand paper.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, Nickolai Zeldovich", + "originalYear": 2017, + "source": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/454" + }, + { + "path": "algorand.pdf", + "name": "algorand.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies", + "description": "The SOSP 2017 paper describing Algorand's committee-based Byzantine agreement.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Yossi Gilad", "Rotem Hemo", "Silvio Micali", "Georgios Vlachos", "Nickolai Zeldovich"], + "year": 2017, + "source": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/454", + "aboutCard": "algorand.md" + }, + { + "path": "tezos.md", + "name": "tezos.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Tezos", + "description": "Background and summary of the Tezos position paper and whitepaper.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "L.M. Goodman", + "originalYear": 2014, + "source": "https://tezos.com/whitepaper.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "tezos-whitepaper.pdf", + "name": "tezos-whitepaper.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Tezos: A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger (White Paper)", + "description": "The 2014 Tezos whitepaper describing a blockchain that can amend its own protocol.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "L.M. Goodman", + "year": 2014, + "source": "https://tezos.com/whitepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "tezos.md" + }, + { + "path": "tezos-position-paper.pdf", + "name": "tezos-position-paper.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Tezos: A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger (Position Paper)", + "description": "The 2014 position paper setting out the case for a self-amending blockchain.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "L.M. Goodman", + "year": 2014, + "source": "https://tezos.com/position-paper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "tezos.md" + }, + { + "path": "polygon.md", + "name": "polygon.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Polygon", + "description": "Background and summary of the Matic Network whitepaper and litepaper.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "scaling", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Jaynti Kanani, Sandeep Nailwal, Anurag Arjun", + "originalYear": 2018, + "source": "https://github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper" + }, + { + "path": "matic-whitepaper.md", + "name": "matic-whitepaper.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Matic Whitepaper", + "description": "Full text of the Matic Network whitepaper (v1.1), the scaling project that became Polygon.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "scaling", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Jaynti Kanani", "Sandeep Nailwal", "Anurag Arjun"], + "year": 2018, + "source": "https://github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper", + "aboutCard": "polygon.md" + }, + { + "path": "matic-litepaper.pdf", + "name": "matic-litepaper.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Matic Network Litepaper", + "description": "A five-page summary of the Matic Network design, from about 2019.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "scaling", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "Matic Network", + "year": 2019, + "source": "https://www.allcryptowhitepapers.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/matic-litepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "polygon.md" + }, + { + "path": "chainlink.md", + "name": "chainlink.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Chainlink", + "description": "Background and summary of the original Chainlink whitepaper.", + "tags": ["oracle"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Steve Ellis, Ari Juels, Sergey Nazarov", + "originalYear": 2017, + "source": "https://research.chain.link/whitepaper-v1.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf", + "name": "chainlink-whitepaper-v1.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "ChainLink: A Decentralized Oracle Network", + "description": "The 2017 whitepaper (v1.0) for a decentralized network of oracles feeding data to smart contracts.", + "tags": ["oracle"], + "authors": ["Steve Ellis", "Ari Juels", "Sergey Nazarov"], + "year": 2017, + "source": "https://research.chain.link/whitepaper-v1.pdf", + "aboutCard": "chainlink.md" + }, + { + "path": "uniswap.md", + "name": "uniswap.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Uniswap", + "description": "Background and summary of the Uniswap v2 and v3 core papers.", + "tags": ["defi"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Hayden Adams, Noah Zinsmeister, Dan Robinson, Moody Salem, River Keefer", + "originalYear": 2020, + "source": "https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "uniswap-v2-core.pdf", + "name": "uniswap-v2-core.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Uniswap v2 Core", + "description": "The 2020 paper describing Uniswap v2's constant-product automated market maker.", + "tags": ["defi"], + "authors": ["Hayden Adams", "Noah Zinsmeister", "Dan Robinson"], + "year": 2020, + "source": "https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "uniswap.md" + }, + { + "path": "uniswap-v3-core.pdf", + "name": "uniswap-v3-core.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Uniswap v3 Core", + "description": "The 2021 paper introducing concentrated liquidity in Uniswap v3.", + "tags": ["defi"], + "authors": ["Hayden Adams", "Noah Zinsmeister", "Moody Salem", "River Keefer", "Dan Robinson"], + "year": 2021, + "source": "https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper-v3.pdf", + "aboutCard": "uniswap.md" + }, + { + "path": "filecoin.md", + "name": "filecoin.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Filecoin", + "description": "Background and summary of the Filecoin whitepaper.", + "tags": ["storage"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Protocol Labs", + "originalYear": 2017, + "source": "https://research.protocol.ai/publications/filecoin-a-decentralized-storage-network/" + }, + { + "path": "filecoin.pdf", + "name": "filecoin.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network", + "description": "Protocol Labs' 2017 design for a storage market secured by Proof-of-Replication and Proof-of-Spacetime.", + "tags": ["storage"], + "author": "Protocol Labs", + "year": 2017, + "source": "https://research.protocol.ai/publications/filecoin-a-decentralized-storage-network/", + "aboutCard": "filecoin.md" + }, + { + "path": "monero.md", + "name": "monero.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Monero (CryptoNote)", + "description": "Background and summary of CryptoNote, the protocol Monero is built on.", + "tags": ["privacy"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Nicolas van Saberhagen", + "originalYear": 2013, + "source": "https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "cryptonote.pdf", + "name": "cryptonote.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "CryptoNote v 2.0", + "description": "The 2013 CryptoNote paper introducing ring signatures and one-time addresses for private payments.", + "tags": ["privacy"], + "author": "Nicolas van Saberhagen", + "year": 2013, + "source": "https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf", + "aboutCard": "monero.md" + }, + { + "path": "zcash.md", + "name": "zcash.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Zcash (Zerocash)", + "description": "Background and summary of Zerocash, the construction behind Zcash.", + "tags": ["privacy"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers, Eran Tromer, Madars Virza", + "originalYear": 2014, + "source": "http://zerocash-project.org/paper" + }, + { + "path": "zerocash.pdf", + "name": "zerocash.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "application/pdf", + "title": "Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin", + "description": "The 2014 paper (extended version) using zk-SNARKs for fully private payments.", + "tags": ["privacy"], + "authors": ["Eli Ben-Sasson", "Alessandro Chiesa", "Christina Garman", "Matthew Green", "Ian Miers", "Eran Tromer", "Madars Virza"], + "year": 2014, + "source": "http://zerocash-project.org/paper", + "aboutCard": "zcash.md" + }, + { + "path": "litecoin.md", + "name": "litecoin.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Litecoin", + "description": "A short history of Litecoin, which launched as software without a whitepaper.", + "tags": ["payment"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Charlie Lee", + "originalYear": 2011, + "source": "https://litecoin.org" + }, + { + "path": "dogecoin.md", + "name": "dogecoin.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Dogecoin", + "description": "A short history of Dogecoin, which launched as software without a whitepaper.", + "tags": ["payment"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "Billy Markus, Jackson Palmer", + "originalYear": 2013, + "source": "https://dogecoin.com" + }, + { + "path": "tron.md", + "name": "tron.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: TRON", + "description": "Background and summary of the TRON whitepaper, with a link to the official copy.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "TRON DAO", + "source": "https://tron.network/static/doc/white_paper_v_2_1.pdf" + }, + { + "path": "binance-bnb.md", + "name": "binance-bnb.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: BNB Chain", + "description": "Background and summary of the BNB Smart Chain whitepaper, with a link to the official copy.", + "tags": ["smart-contract-platform", "proof-of-stake"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "workAuthor": "BNB Chain", + "source": "https://github.com/bnb-chain/whitepaper" + } ] } diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/matic-whitepaper.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/matic-whitepaper.md index ef8d0c6..88626d2 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/matic-whitepaper.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/matic-whitepaper.md @@ -1,69 +1,61 @@ -# {#whitepaper} +> This is a converted copy of the Matic Whitepaper v1.1, taken from the `README.md` of +> https://github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper, with its formatting cleaned up. The text is unchanged. -
-

Matic Whitepaper

-
+# Matic Whitepaper -
- [Whitepaper Version 1.1]

- Jaynti Kanani <jdkanani@matic.network>
- Sandeep Nailwal <sandeep@matic.network>
- Anurag Arjun <anurag@matic.network>
-
+Whitepaper Version 1.1 -# {#Abstract} -
-

Abstract

-
+- Jaynti Kanani (jdkanani@matic.network) +- Sandeep Nailwal (sandeep@matic.network) +- Anurag Arjun (anurag@matic.network) + +## Abstract -
Smart contract platforms and cryptocurrencies have captured mass attention but still have not been able to achieve mass adoption due to scalability and user experience issues. Even on Ethereum, which is the most widely used smart contracts platform, there have not been many examples of DApps which have seen mass adoption. There have been a few cases where one or the other particular application temporarily succeeded in achieving a significant user base, but it led to crippling of the entire network during the high network load times. Essentially this means that even the most advanced and widely used platforms are not ready for mass adoption yet. -

+ On the other hand, there are a few smart contract platforms which boast of higher transaction throughput, but they compromise on decentralization in order to improve transaction speeds. Also, many of the upcoming solutions propose developing their own blockchains, neglecting the billions of dollars of market cap that DApps and other projects have already created on platforms like Ethereum and others. More importantly, they neglect the massive developer community and developer ecosystem that currently exists on platforms like Ethereum. -

-Matic Network strives to solve the scalability and usability issues, while not compromising on decentralization and leveraging the existing developer community and ecosystem. It is an ​off/side chain scaling solution for existing platforms to provide scalability and superior user experience to DApps/user functionalities. -

-The Matic development team has chosen Ethereum as the first platform to showcase its scalability and already has a working implementation for Ethereum on Kovan Testnet. It is expected to allow near-instant transfers, exchange and conversion of digital assets (e.g. crypto tokens) and cryptocurrencies in the future. The Matic Network is an adapted implementation of the Plasma framework for Ethereum to start with, but the “vision” of the Matic development team is to provide off/side chain scaling solutions for blockchains in general. Matic foundation intends to provide Matic wallet, payment APIs & SDKs, products, identity solutions and other enabling solutions that will allow developers to design, implement and migrate DApps built on base platforms like Ethereum. One of the key pillars that form the basis of Matic Network’s ideology is the improvement of user experience, this area is poorly developed for Blockchain applications as of now. The Matic Development team has already built high quality user experience Mobile/Web browser libraries which will enable businesses to create real world end user applications on a large scale. The development roadmap of the Matic Network also includes supporting cross-chain transfers and third-party Decentralized exchanges, liquidity pools etc. -
-# Why Matic? {#whymatic} +**Matic Network strives to solve the scalability and usability issues, while not compromising on decentralization and leveraging the existing developer community and ecosystem. It is an off/side chain scaling solution for existing platforms to provide scalability and superior user experience to DApps/user functionalities.** + +**The Matic development team has chosen Ethereum as the first platform to showcase its scalability and already has a working implementation for Ethereum on Kovan Testnet.** It is expected to allow near-instant transfers, exchange and conversion of digital assets (e.g. crypto tokens) and cryptocurrencies in the future. The Matic Network is an adapted implementation of the Plasma framework for Ethereum to start with, but the “vision” of the Matic development team is to provide off/side chain scaling solutions for blockchains in general. Matic foundation intends to provide Matic wallet, payment APIs & SDKs, products, identity solutions and other enabling solutions that will allow developers to design, implement and migrate DApps built on base platforms like Ethereum. One of the key pillars that form the basis of Matic Network’s ideology is the improvement of user experience, this area is poorly developed for Blockchain applications as of now. The Matic Development team has already built high quality user experience Mobile/Web browser libraries which will enable businesses to create real world end user applications on a large scale. The development roadmap of the Matic Network also includes supporting cross-chain transfers and third-party Decentralized exchanges, liquidity pools etc. + +## Why Matic? Decentralized Apps are being proposed in large numbers, but the current blockchain ecosystem is not prepared to scale to match the demands of end user applications with mass adoption. Moreover the user experience of DApps is very poor and in no way conducive for average users. Slow block confirmations, high transaction fees, low scalability and poor user experience are some of the key roadblocks for the mass adoption of blockchain applications. The following section explains the problems prevailing in the current blockchain ecosystem and how the Matic Network intends to solve them. **Detailed technical specification are provided in the further sections of the white paper.** -### Slow Transactions {#slowt} +### Slow Transactions -Blockchain transactions are typically very slow and have a very limited throughput. Most PoW ([Proof-of-Work](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-of-work_system)) based blockchain protocols have a limit on the block size and it takes a certain amount of time to generate a block. Each transaction also has to wait for multiple block confirmations due to potential chain re-organizations.
+Blockchain transactions are typically very slow and have a very limited throughput. Most PoW ([Proof-of-Work](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-of-work_system)) based blockchain protocols have a limit on the block size and it takes a certain amount of time to generate a block. Each transaction also has to wait for multiple block confirmations due to potential chain re-organizations. -PoS ([Proof-of-Stake](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-FAQs#what-is-proof-of-stake)) based blockchains try to counter these limitations using a staking mechanism, but the blockchains that are able to achieve high throughput with PoS are able to do so at the cost of decentralization. These limitations are often a necessary condition for public blockchains to ensure security and decentralization where a block needs to be propagated through the network and validated by all the nodes to achieve finality.
+PoS ([Proof-of-Stake](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-FAQs#what-is-proof-of-stake)) based blockchains try to counter these limitations using a staking mechanism, but the blockchains that are able to achieve high throughput with PoS are able to do so at the cost of decentralization. These limitations are often a necessary condition for public blockchains to ensure security and decentralization where a block needs to be propagated through the network and validated by all the nodes to achieve finality. The Matic Network solves this problem by using a high throughput blockchain with consensus provided by a selected set of Block Producers, chosen for every checkpoint by a set of Stakers. It then uses a Proof Of Stake layer to **validate the blocks and publish periodic proofs (merkle roots) of the blocks produced by the Block Producers to the Ethereum mainchain. This helps in achieving high level of decentralization while maintaining an extremely fast (< 2 seconds) block confirmation times.** +### Low Transaction Throughput -### Low Transaction Throughput {#ltt} +Public blockchains have to maintain a certain amount of time lag between the production of adjacent blocks so as to ensure ample time for block propagation. Also, the block size needs to be small so as to ensure quick propagation of the block through the network. This entails that the number of transactions in a particular block need to be fairly limited. -Public blockchains have to maintain a certain amount of time lag between the production of adjacent blocks so as to ensure ample time for block propagation. Also, the block size needs to be small so as to ensure quick propagation of the block through the network. This entails that the number of transactions in a particular block need to be fairly limited.
+The Matic Network solves this problem by using a **Block Producer layer to produce the blocks.** Block Producers enable the system to produce blocks at a very fast rate. The system ensures decentralization using PoS checkpoints which are pushed to the Mainchain (Ethereum serves as the mainchain for a start).**This enables The Matic Network to theoretically achieve up to 2^16 transactions per second on a single side chain.** -The Matic Network solves this problem by using a **Block Producer layer to produce the blocks.** Block Producers enable the system to produce blocks at a very fast rate. The system ensures decentralization using PoS checkpoints which are pushed to the Mainchain (Ethereum serves as the mainchain for a start).**This enables The Matic Network to theoretically achieve up to $$2^{16}$$ transactions per second on a single side chain.** +### Scalability -### Scalability {#scalability} - -As discussed in the previous section, The Matic Network easily achieves a theoretical speed of up to $$2^{16}$$ transactions per second on a single side chain. **In future, The Matic Network is expected to be able to easily add more side chains horizontally to increase the total number of transactions on the Matic Chain while using the same decentralized PoS layer.** +As discussed in the previous section, The Matic Network easily achieves a theoretical speed of up to 2^16 transactions per second on a single side chain. **In future, The Matic Network is expected to be able to easily add more side chains horizontally to increase the total number of transactions on the Matic Chain while using the same decentralized PoS layer.** Theoretically the Matic Network has the capacity for millions of transactions per second with the usage of multiple side chains. Also, the mechanism to do so has already been demonstrated with the first Matic proof-of-concept with the first Matic side-chain and new chains can be added in due course of time. -### Size of Blockchain {#sob} +### Size of Blockchain -Each block on the blockchain and/or compute state in case of a smart contract based blockchain must be validated by multiple nodes. Each node has to manage a copy of the state and the blocks. While the chain increases in size as the days go by, maintaining and validating the whole blockchain becomes difficult and results in fewer full nodes in public blockchains, which poses a risk for decentralization.
+Each block on the blockchain and/or compute state in case of a smart contract based blockchain must be validated by multiple nodes. Each node has to manage a copy of the state and the blocks. While the chain increases in size as the days go by, maintaining and validating the whole blockchain becomes difficult and results in fewer full nodes in public blockchains, which poses a risk for decentralization. For the Matic Network, the primary layer which provides decentralization may choose to store only the blocks of Matic Chain from the previous checkpoint to the next checkpoint. All previous transaction/block proofs have been submitted to the mainchain. **This enables extremely low fidelity PoS nodes which can be run in very low-cost machines with low storage. In future, The Matic Network intends to enable mobile device based PoS miners too.** -### Multiple micropayment channels with other off-chain solutions {#loooong} +### Multiple micropayment channels with other off-chain solutions Some payment channel solutions have proposed solutions to solve the problem of micro-payments. However, the process of opening and managing channels with multiple DApps or users is complex. Additionally, the speed and convenience of mediated payments over channels is still up for debate. Since **The Matic Network uses a state-based architecture on an EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine), it does not require payment channels to be opened between two parties. In fact, any valid Ethereum address is a valid Matic Address and a receiver does not need to be on the Matic chain to receive payment. They would only need to have a Matic Wallet when they want to retrieve the payments on the main chain or spend it in the ecosystem on the Matic Network.** -### High Transaction Fees {#htf} +### High Transaction Fees With the rapid growth of the blockchain ecosystem, new crypto assets are increasingly being created, transferred, and sold, often involving multiple crypto tokens. Also, most decentralized apps have their own token and economy. Paying tokens for the services or doing any kind of transaction on blockchains requires on-chain transfers. Every blockchain has a transaction cost structure. For example, Ethereum charges gas fees on each transaction. @@ -71,20 +63,19 @@ The amount of fees is an important factor to incentivize validators and prevent **The Matic Network enables low cost transactions through achieving economies of scale by doing a large number of transactions on the Block Producer layer which ensures low cost, and then subsequently batching the proofs of the Matic blocks using the Merkle root of the blocks** to a highly decentralized mainchain (for ex. Ethereum) using a decentralized layer of PoS Stakers. -### Poor Usability {#pf} +### Poor Usability User interactions on DApps are often poor compared to their centralized counterparts. For the Decentralization revolution to achieve mass adoption, the user experience of DApps has to be on par with, if not better than, their centralized counterparts. The Matic Development team is expected to work on various Mobile and Web browser integration tools and is pioneering protocols in this domain. It intends to build a ubiquitous mobile/browser app, which will act as a secured interaction layer for blockchain interactions. The Matic Development team will be publishing the designs and prototypes of these soon. +## Introducing the Matic Network -# Introducing the Matic Network {#imn} - -As discussed in brief in the section above, the Matic Network aims to solve the problems faced by the blockchain ecosystem through building a decentralized platform using an adapted version of [Plasma](https://plasma.io/) framework. This provides for fast and extremely low cost transactions with finality on a mainchain. The current working Testnet and alpha-Mainnet of the Matic Network works with Ethereum as a mainchain.
+As discussed in brief in the section above, the Matic Network aims to solve the problems faced by the blockchain ecosystem through building a decentralized platform using an adapted version of [Plasma](https://plasma.io/) framework. This provides for fast and extremely low cost transactions with finality on a mainchain. The current working Testnet and alpha-Mainnet of the Matic Network works with Ethereum as a mainchain. The Matic Development team is also building a product ecosystem including user friendly mobile apps, desktop wallets and browser extensions which will provide a seamless experience for all users. It is envisaged that users will be able to pay, transfer or hold crypto assets without worrying about the complexity of the underlying system. -# Architecture {#architecture} +## Architecture Since the Matic Network's core focus is on mass user adoption, it is ideal that a deep dive into the Matic Network's technical architecture should start from a user journey. @@ -92,7 +83,7 @@ When a user is transferring ETH or ERC20 tokens on the Ethereum network, they ha Moreover, during peak loads, a large number of transactions clog the Ethereum network and gas fees increase on each transaction in order to obtain faster confirmations. The Matic Network is proposed as a solution to overcome these problems. -Here is how the Matic Network will function:
+Here is how the Matic Network will function: 1. A user deposits a cryptographic asset in the Matic contract on the mainchain (currently implemented with Ethereum blockchain only). 2. Once deposited, tokens get confirmed on the main chain, tokens will appear on the Matic Chain using Matic Deposit bridge (technical details explained in a dedicated section below). @@ -104,7 +95,7 @@ The Matic Development Team has already created a demo version, available at: htt We expect the alpha version of the mainnet to go live very soon. -## Actors {#actors} +### Actors The ecosystem of The Matic Network will have the following actors : @@ -113,23 +104,21 @@ The ecosystem of The Matic Network will have the following actors : 3. Stakers : Stakers need to deposit/stake tokens to qualify and play a very important role in the Matic Network. They validate the transactions and propose checkpoints on the mainchain using PoS consensus mechanism with a ⅔ majority. They also choose Block Producers amongst themselves, who satisfy a certain criteria, to produce blocks on the sidechains. 4. Block Producers : These are block producers chosen by Stakers who in turn enable faster blockchain generation times. They have to provide a significant stake to be nominated. -## Consensus {#con} +### Consensus The Matic Network uses a dual strategy of Proof of Stake at the checkpointing layer and Block Producers at the block producer layer to achieve faster blocktimes while ensuring a **high degree of decentralization by achieving finality on the main chains using the checkpoints and fraud proof mechanisms.** -![Matic checkpoints](matic-architecture.png) - Through this mechanism, The Matic Network achieves high transcation speed with a high degree of decentralization and finality on Mainchain. In the first version which has Ethereum only as the base chain, Ethereum root contract enforces solvency and finality through header block(checkpoints) very efficiently. The various elements and mechanisms of the system are described below: -## Checkpointing Layer {#checklayer} +### Checkpointing Layer Basically, anyone can stake their Matic Tokens on root contract to become a Staker in the PoS checkpointing layer (contract deployed on Ethereum chain). This provides a highly decentralized base layer for Matic Chain. -## Block Producers +### Block Producers At the blockchain layer of the Matic Network, there are Block Producers, selected by PoS Stakers on the base layer, who will be creating the Matic Blocks. To achieve faster block generation times, these Block Producers will be low in number. **This layer is expected to achieve ~1 second block generation times at extremely low to negligible transaction fees.** -## Checkpointing Mechanism +### Checkpointing Mechanism On Matic Network’s checkpointing layer, the basis of Matic Network's PoS mechanism, for every few blocks on the block layer of the Matic Network, a proposer will be chosen among the stakeholders to propose a checkpoint on the main chain. These checkpoints are created by the proposer after validating all the blocks on the block layer of the Matic Network and creating the Merkle tree of the block hashes since the last checkpoint. The Merkle root is then broadcasted to the Staker network for their signatures. The other stakeholders also verify the proof. They will approve the proposed block, if it is valid, by providing their signatures. @@ -139,11 +128,11 @@ Apart from providing finality on the mainchain, Checkpoints have a very importan Through this mechanism, The Matic Network achieves a high transaction speed, a high degree of decentralization and finality on Mainchain. In its first version which has Ethereum as the base chain, the Ethereum root contract enforces solvency and finality through header blocks (checkpoints) very efficiently. -## Block Producer Selection +### Block Producer Selection Block Producers are chosen by Stakers in the checkpointing layer through voting on the mainchain. A Block Producer is selected for a pre-determined interval of time until slashed/removed by the network consensus mechanism or if it is unable to participate in the block production due to any external issue. -### Seeding of the network +#### Seeding of the network ``` 1. Matic Network will ask for applications from the public to run the Block Producer nodes 2. It will also run 3 Block Producer nodes itself during the seed stage of the network @@ -151,7 +140,7 @@ Block Producers are chosen by Stakers in the checkpointing layer through voting 4. These nodes will be kickstarted with a Matic Chain N(number of) genesis configuration ``` -### Block Producer application process +#### Block Producer application process ``` 1. The Block Producers have to apply by staking the Block Producer Stake requirement amount in Matic Tokens on the mainchain 2. The Network will maintain a pool of interested Block Producers (An incentive system for the Block Producer nominees would be devised to keep ample number of Block Producers in the pipeline) @@ -165,18 +154,18 @@ Criteria on the basis on which Stakers will decide to vote for a particular nomi - Other factors under consideration (e.g. [Zcash Board Nominations](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/Elections/blob/master/2018-Q2/Board-Nominations/Sokolov_selfnomination.md) ) ``` -### Selection through Voting at tenure completion +#### Selection through Voting at tenure completion ``` 1. Voting process is scheduled and completed one week before the completion of one tenure 2. Existing Block Producers can re-appear in the elections 3. Stakers vote for Block Producers from the pool of Nominees ``` -### Replacement of a Block Producer during the ongoing tenure +#### Replacement of a Block Producer during the ongoing tenure In an event of untimely removal/incapability of a Block Producer to take part in block production, a new Block Producer from the transient pool will be recruited. An appropriate incentive mechanism to have a prioritized/preferred list of Block Producers as per the stakers' vote will be devised to maintain a healthy pool of Block Producers. -## Multi Chain Support (Horizontal Sharding) {#multichain} +### Multi Chain Support (Horizontal Sharding) The Matic Network public checkpointing layer supports multiple side chains by design. Theoretically there can be an infinite number of side chains working under the secured and decentralized layer of checkpoints. Businesses can have their dedicated side chains connected to the public checkpointing layer having full control of their execution environments, while still retaining the immutability, provability and security of transactions via the checkpointing mechanism. @@ -188,7 +177,7 @@ Key factors influencing design of this sharding process are expected to be: - Developers will be provided with API/SDKs to build programmable interfaces for inter-chain transactions 3. Movement of the assets from one chain to another will be managed at the checkpointing layer and may not require any interaction with the mainchain. Research is currently underway to facilitate faster (possibly instant) inter sidechain transfers. -## Interoperability {#interoper} +### Interoperability As mentioned earlier in the whitepaper, the Ethereum mainchain is the first base/mainchain that Matic Network securely integrates with, using an adapted implementation of the Plasma framework. In addition, the Matic network intends to integrate multiple leading smart contract platforms cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and others to provide an universal platform for the users to be able to use/exchange their assets from various blockchains. @@ -196,7 +185,7 @@ It can also provide a strong foundation for large DEXs (Decentralized exchanges) Judging from the proliferation of Layer 1 blockchains, it is a given that there might be more than 2-3 public blockchains that will be adopted by the mainstream eventually, rather than only a single winning blockchain platform. Therefore, the Matic Development Team expects to see hitherto unseen use-cases, arising from the Decentralized application movement across these blockchains. The vision of the Matic Development Team is to provide infrastructure and interfaces such that anyone who wishes to build decentralized applications on any blockchain, will be able to do it easily - and communicate and transfer value across multiple blockchains. -## Generalized State Scaling on Plasma {#genscaling} +### Generalized State Scaling on Plasma Generalized State scaling is the next frontier for the Matic Network, once the Matic Development Team is done with implementing micropayments, asset transfers and swaps in the first phase of development of the Matic Network. This is a research problem, and it will take time and effort to accomplish a breakthrough here. @@ -238,13 +227,13 @@ Some work on this already started (see [solevm](https://github.com/Ohalo-Ltd/sol Overall, if one can efficiently identify the problematic EVM state transition for verification, through an EVM-in-an-EVM construction, one can subject it to challenges, and thereby securing it. -# Security +## Security -## Fraud Proofs {#fraud} +### Fraud Proofs To enhance the security of the transactions, Matic Network also provides Fraud Proofs on the mainchain. The mechanism enables any individual on the mainchain to submit the details of the transactions which he/she thinks is fraudulent. If the challenge is successful, the stakes of the parties involved in the fraud are slashed and the challenger receives the slashed funds as an incentive for detecting the fraud. This can be considered as an always-running high reward bounty program for any parties who wish to investigate the veracity of the transactions on the Matic Network. -### Basic proofs {#basicp} +#### Basic proofs Each proof must be submitted with the following corresponding proofs whenever necessary: @@ -252,13 +241,13 @@ Each proof must be submitted with the following corresponding proofs whenever ne - Merkle proof for block inclusion: This type of proof is needed to prove that the block is included in the given checkpoint -### Block {#blockp} +#### Block This proof is needed to prove that the block is in sequence with a valid referenced hash. -### Transaction +#### Transaction -#### Single level txn proof {#singletp} +##### Single level txn proof ```js // validate ERC20 TX @@ -282,7 +271,7 @@ This proof is needed to prove that the block is in sequence with a valid referen } ``` -#### Nonce validation {#noncevp} +##### Nonce validation - To check if there are transactions with duplicate nonces @@ -319,11 +308,11 @@ This proof is needed to prove that the block is in sequence with a valid referen } ``` -#### Receipt validation {#recvalp} +##### Receipt validation - To check receipt fields, events, topics and data types in given receipt -#### Deposit {#depositp} +##### Deposit - Validate deposit transactions Validates deposit transaction on the mainchain and see if it matches with DepositBlock object in rootchain. @@ -333,18 +322,18 @@ This proof is needed to prove that the block is in sequence with a valid referen - Validate deposited amount and the depositor address -#### ERC20 transfer {#erc20tp} +##### ERC20 transfer - To validate ERC20 transaction data, receipt logs and values - To check if UTXO-style input in log receipt log equals that of an UTXO-style output of a recent transaction log receipt -### Iterative txn proof +#### Iterative txn proof Details to be updated in a later version of the whitepaper -# Network Economics {#economics} +## Network Economics -## Transaction Fee Determinative Factors and Trade-off +### Transaction Fee Determinative Factors and Trade-off 1. Block Size = (Average Transaction Amount)/(Block) - 100Txs/Block is insanely expensive. - ETH is 600~1000Txs/Block @@ -370,7 +359,7 @@ Details to be updated in a later version of the whitepaper - A shorter duration means faster Maliciousness detection, but it also means a higher committed Gas fee. - If a Byzantine behavior (e.g. Double Spend through Tx deletion) occurs just after checkpoint creation, this duration is the worst-case time until the Ceremony. If some Block Producers delete transactions, the Matic Network can recover the cancelled transaction, and the double spend attack would be foiled. -# Focus on User Experience {#usere} +## Focus on User Experience The Matic Development Team is developing a wallet by implementing the [WalletConnect](https://walletconnect.org/) protocol, which is an open protocol to connect web-based distributed applications to mobile crypto assets. @@ -378,25 +367,25 @@ This wallet will help users to interact with DApps and sign transactions easily, Other than this, the team is also looking at context specific ether-less accounts and Gas relay abstraction on identity to enable ether-less sign transactions, which can be a huge boost for mainstream user adoption. -# Matic Stack {#stack} +## Matic Stack This section details out various parts of the Matic chain and components in the Ethereum chain. -### Matic contracts on mainchain {#mcontracts} +#### Matic contracts on mainchain The Matic smart contracts on the mainchain provide the core logic for the Matic Network. The contracts contain various mechanisms such as deposit and exits from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa. They also contain the exit priority queue, the periodic state commitments from the Validator layer, fraud proof mechanisms, bonded exit challenge logic and various other components. The Stake Manager also resides here. -### Matic Deposit Bridge {#mdb} +#### Matic Deposit Bridge The bridge(s) of the Matic Network are part of Block Producer nodes that listen to the RootContract events on the mainchain and monitor any token/ether transfer events happening to the RootContract. This bridge utilizes Matic Network’s famous tool named [Dagger](https://github.com/maticnetwork/eth-dagger.js). Once the bridge detects a deposit on the mainchain, it fires a Deposit event on the Matic chain and the user’s address on the Matic Network is allocated the deposited amount. -### Matic PoS {#mpos} +#### Matic PoS The checkpointing mechanism of the Matic Network is a PoS enabled layer which has Stakers who propose the checkpoints to the mainchain. There will be about 100-150 Stakers at the checkpointing layer to start with. In future with the advent of more efficient signature mechanisms on the Ethereum blockchain, the Matic Network will be able to significantly increase its number of stakers on the checkpointing layer which is expected to further increase its degree of decentralization, perhaps rivalling that of the leading public blockchains like Ethereum and Bitcoin. More details of the PoS checkpoint layers will be given in a later version of the Whitepaper. -### Block Producer Layer {#bplay} +#### Block Producer Layer At the base layer, the Matic Network has Block Producer nodes chosen by the Stakers of the PoS layer through voting for every checkpointing interval. These Block Producers will also run the Matic Deposit bridge. @@ -404,17 +393,17 @@ Block Producers accept transactions through the Matic VM and are expected to cre More technical and code level details of the Block Producer layer will be added in a later version of the whitepaper. -### Matic Virtual Machine {#vm} +#### Matic Virtual Machine The Matic Network uses a standard EVM based state machine, which is run by the Block Producer nodes to generate blocks. Using the EVM allows the Matic Network to be able to build and deploy protocols such as ERC protocols as well as other protocols like Kyber Network, ZRX etc. The beauty of the Matic Network architecture is that since it uses an EVM-compatible state machine, it becomes very easy to port DApps and smart contracts running on the Ethereum blockchain to the Matic Network. The Matic Development Team intends to support generalized state transitions on the Matic Network, and this architecture provides a smooth foundation to build upon. -### Matic Withdrawal Bridge {#mvb} +#### Matic Withdrawal Bridge When an address on the Matic Network submits a withdrawal request to the network, the corresponding tokens are burnt (withdrawn from) on the Matic chain and this transaction is pushed on to the Matic chain. After the specified checkpoint interval, the PoS checkpoint layer will publish the checkpoint to the main chain, which will include the proof of burn (withdrawal) of these tokens on the Matic chain. Once this checkpoint is committed on the mainchain, the user can claim their withdrawn tokens. -## Spam Protection {#spam} +### Spam Protection The Block Producers running the block producer layer of the Matic Network will watch the transfer state of the assets to identify frivolous transactions. They reject any incoming transactions with zero amount in payments thereby foiling any DoS/spam attacks with zero cost transactions. Even if the Matic tokens are very low in cost and the fees being very low, due to the high TPS of Matic Network, it would not be economically viable to run sustained DoS attacks on the Matic Network. @@ -428,11 +417,11 @@ Additional checks are run to mitigate spam based on this: - Check for duplicate transactions with same outputs in the transaction pool. - Check for duplicate transactions with same transaction fee in the pool. -# Potential Use Cases {#potential} +## Potential Use Cases Matic Network Pte. Ltd. (The Governing body) is committed to provide a scalable and user- friendly ecosystem for third party Decentralized applications to thrive on. The governing body, like Ethereum and other platform foundations, will promote various Base chain DApps (like DApps built on Ethereum currently, and NEO, EOS in future) to build and migrate their user facing applications / transactions on the Matic Network. It will also award grants and funding to third party app developers to build various use cases on top of the Matic Network like: -### Payments {#payment} +### Payments The Matic Network will provide an interface for users, payment APIs and SDKs for DApps, merchant and users to instantly accept or pay in crypto assets (e.g., ERC20 tokens, Ethers, ERC721 tokens). @@ -441,23 +430,23 @@ The Matic Development Team has plans to roll-out this system in three phases: 2. Multi-asset cross chain transfer and payment through atomic swaps and liquidity providers 3. Fiat enabled off-ramp payment system integration through fiat liquidity providers -### Atomic Swaps {#atom} +### Atomic Swaps Matic contract allows users to pay with any crypto token they prefer, and receiver will receive payment in assets they prefer. The Matic Network can handle conversation through atomic swaps between cross-chain crypto assets. -### Liquidity providers {#liquidity} +### Liquidity providers Third parties can use the Matic Network to exchange any tokens for other tokens by leveraging 0x liquidity pool or other liquidity providers while transferring crypto assets. In the case of fiat, the Matic Development Team is planning to collaborate with fiat liquidity providers in currencies of major countries. -### Decentralized Exchange (DEX) and Marketplace support {#dex} +### Decentralized Exchange (DEX) and Marketplace support The Matic Network is expected to have all characteristics which an exchange platform should have — faster and cheaper trades. The Matic Network is capable of supporting decentralized exchanges and enabling trust-less, reliable and easy crypto trades. The decentralized exchange is the future for digital assets and provides better security and solvency than the centralized exchanges. -### Lending & Credit Scoring platform {#lcsp} +### Lending & Credit Scoring platform The Matic Network will enable platforms for merchants to assess the creditworthiness of connected users via their transaction history. This enables merchants to lend tokens to users on the network when transacting with users that do not have sufficient funds. The Matic Network expects to use the Dharma protocol to provide tokenized debt to users. -### Identity {#identity} +### Identity Users need a utilitarian yet user-friendly interface where MetaMask or web3 enabled browsers are not required. They do not need to understand how Ethereum works under the hood. @@ -465,15 +454,15 @@ Decentralized apps need a way to sign transactions, but that must happen without This system will also provide a way to auto-approve certain kind of transactions depending upon the criteria chosen by the users. This will drive the recurring payments on the Matic Network. -### Games {#games} +### Games We expect games to be a big part of the Matic Network. In-game assets represented as NFTs (ERC721) are expected to be bought, sold and traded in huge numbers on our sidechains. Developers will also be able to save game state on the sidechains, if they choose to. Along with the NFT marketplace that we will enable, developers and users will truly have a fast, efficient and secure sidechain to build and play games on. -### Infrastructure {#infrastructure} +### Infrastructure The Matic Development Team will act on the simple mantra - make it simple and seamless. For that, the team will provide new infrastructure around the Matic Network including user-friendly wallets for individual users and merchants, payroll dashboards, payment SDKs and other open source tools. -### Dagger {#dagger} +### Dagger The Matic Development Team already has started building infrastructure for developers, starting with Dagger. [Dagger](https://matic.network/dagger) is a tool or engine to track Ethereum accounts and events in real-time. @@ -481,26 +470,26 @@ Developers can use Dagger to track their own smart contracts, accounts, and tran Further information about Dagger can be found here: -https://medium.com/matic-network/ethereum-in-realtime-dagger-98ee2d717c76
-and check how it works:
+https://medium.com/matic-network/ethereum-in-realtime-dagger-98ee2d717c76 +and check how it works: https://medium.com/matic-network/understanding-dagger-453d90480c51 -### Matic Wallet {#mwallet} +### Matic Wallet The Matic development team is working on building an easy-to-use Plasma wallet mobile app, integrated with WalletConnect, to ensure secure storage of keys, intuitive access to the features provided by the Matic Network, as well as a seamless mechanism to connect browser-based DApps to the mobile app. Users can interact with DApps on browsers and in the future many more devices, while still keeping their keys secure in their mobile wallet. The Matic wallet will act as a ready tool for DApp developers to get their users onboarded and working with Matic sidechains quickly and efficiently. -# Matic Tokens -The native digital cryptographically-secured utility token of the Matic Network (Matic Token) is a major component of the ecosystem on the Matic Network, and is designed to be adopted for use as the primary token on the network. Matic Token will be issued as ERC-20 standard compliant digital tokens on the Ethereum blockchain.
+## Matic Tokens +The native digital cryptographically-secured utility token of the Matic Network (Matic Token) is a major component of the ecosystem on the Matic Network, and is designed to be adopted for use as the primary token on the network. Matic Token will be issued as ERC-20 standard compliant digital tokens on the Ethereum blockchain. -Matic Token is designed to be a utility token which functions as the unit of payment and settlement between participants who interact within the ecosystem on the Matic Network. Matic Token does not in any way represent any shareholding, participation, right, title, or interest in the Governing body, the Issuer, its affiliates, or any other company, enterprise or undertaking, nor will Matic Token entitle token holders to any promise of fees, dividends, revenue, profits or investment returns, and are not intended to constitute securities in Singapore or any relevant jurisdiction. Ownership of Matic Token carries no rights, express or implied, other than that which may be afforded by the Matic Network and/or any other third parties whom may use such Tokens.
+Matic Token is designed to be a utility token which functions as the unit of payment and settlement between participants who interact within the ecosystem on the Matic Network. Matic Token does not in any way represent any shareholding, participation, right, title, or interest in the Governing body, the Issuer, its affiliates, or any other company, enterprise or undertaking, nor will Matic Token entitle token holders to any promise of fees, dividends, revenue, profits or investment returns, and are not intended to constitute securities in Singapore or any relevant jurisdiction. Ownership of Matic Token carries no rights, express or implied, other than that which may be afforded by the Matic Network and/or any other third parties whom may use such Tokens. -Matic Tokens are expected to provide the economic incentives to encourage participants to contribute and maintain the ecosystem on the Matic Network. Computational resources are required for performing various functions on the Matic Network such as validating blocks and publishing proofs, thus providers of these services / resources would be rewarded with Matic tokens for providing these resources to the network (i.e. "mining" on the Matic Network) to maintain network integrity. Matic Token will be used as the unit of exchange to quantify and pay the costs of the consumed computational resources. Matic Token is an integral and indispensable part of the Matic Network, because without the Matic Token, there would be no incentive for users to expend resources to participate in activities or provide services for the benefit of the entire ecosystem on the Matic Network. Only users which have actually contributed to network maintenance would receive token incentives. Users of the Matic Network and/or holders of Matic Token which did not actively participate will not receive any Matic Token as rewards.
+Matic Tokens are expected to provide the economic incentives to encourage participants to contribute and maintain the ecosystem on the Matic Network. Computational resources are required for performing various functions on the Matic Network such as validating blocks and publishing proofs, thus providers of these services / resources would be rewarded with Matic tokens for providing these resources to the network (i.e. "mining" on the Matic Network) to maintain network integrity. Matic Token will be used as the unit of exchange to quantify and pay the costs of the consumed computational resources. Matic Token is an integral and indispensable part of the Matic Network, because without the Matic Token, there would be no incentive for users to expend resources to participate in activities or provide services for the benefit of the entire ecosystem on the Matic Network. Only users which have actually contributed to network maintenance would receive token incentives. Users of the Matic Network and/or holders of Matic Token which did not actively participate will not receive any Matic Token as rewards. -In order to participate in the consensus process on the Matic Network, users would be required to stake Matic Token as an indication of that user's commitment to the process. Matic Token would thus also be used as a deterrent for punishing stakers for various offences (e.g. invalid blocks, illegally verifying blocks, or invalid transaction execution) by requiring them to first put up a stake of Matic Token before being entitled to participate in the ecosystem. Matic Token would be deducted in the event that an offence was committed by a staker.
+In order to participate in the consensus process on the Matic Network, users would be required to stake Matic Token as an indication of that user's commitment to the process. Matic Token would thus also be used as a deterrent for punishing stakers for various offences (e.g. invalid blocks, illegally verifying blocks, or invalid transaction execution) by requiring them to first put up a stake of Matic Token before being entitled to participate in the ecosystem. Matic Token would be deducted in the event that an offence was committed by a staker. -In particular, it is highlighted that Matic Token:
+In particular, it is highlighted that Matic Token: 1. is non-refundable and cannot be exchanged for cash (or its equivalent value in any other virtual currency) or any payment obligation by the Governing body, the Issuer or any affiliate; 2. does not represent or confer on the token holder any right of any form with respect to the Governing body, the Issuer (or any of its affiliates), or its revenues or assets, including without limitation any right to receive future dividends, revenue, shares, ownership right or stake, share or security, any voting, distribution, redemption, liquidation, proprietary (including all forms of intellectual property or licence rights), or other financial or legal rights or equivalent rights, or intellectual property rights or any other form of participation in or relating to the Matic Network, the Governing body, the Issuer and/or their service providers; 3. is not intended to represent any rights under a contract for differences or under any other contract the purpose or pretended purpose of which is to secure a profit or avoid a loss; @@ -510,7 +499,7 @@ In particular, it is highlighted that Matic Token:
The contributions in the token sale will be held by the Issuer(or its affiliate) after the token sale, and contributors will have no economic or legal right over or beneficial interest in these contributions or the assets of that entity after the token sale. To the extent a secondary market or exchange for trading Matic Token does develop, it would be run and operated wholly independently of the Governing body, the Issuer, the sale of Matic Token and the Matic Network. Neither the Governing body nor the Issuer will create such secondary markets nor will either entity act as an exchange for Matic Token. -# Features on our development roadmap {#future} +## Features on our development roadmap The Matic Development team expects to conduct various additional research based on topics proposed by the community, including but not limited to: @@ -522,17 +511,16 @@ The Matic Development team expects to conduct various additional research based 6. Blockchain interoperability 7. State channels on top of the sidechain -# Team {#team} - -- Jaynti Kanani. Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer. Contributor to Web3, Plasma, WalletConnect. Previously data scientist at Housing.com.
-https://www.linkedin.com/in/jdkanani/ -- Anurag Arjun. Co-founder and Chief Product Officer. Previously AVP (Product Management), IRIS Business. Stints at SNL Financial, Dexter Consultancy and Cognizant Tech.
-https://www.linkedin.com/in/anuragarjun/ -- Sandeep Nailwal. Co-founder and Chief Operating Officer. Blockchain Programmer and Entrepreneur. Previously CEO Scopeweaver, CTO (Ecommerce) Welspun Group.
-https://www.linkedin.com/in/sandeep-nailwal-60709a33/ +## Team +- Jaynti Kanani. Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer. Contributor to Web3, Plasma, WalletConnect. Previously data scientist at Housing.com. + https://www.linkedin.com/in/jdkanani/ +- Anurag Arjun. Co-founder and Chief Product Officer. Previously AVP (Product Management), IRIS Business. Stints at SNL Financial, Dexter Consultancy and Cognizant Tech. + https://www.linkedin.com/in/anuragarjun/ +- Sandeep Nailwal. Co-founder and Chief Operating Officer. Blockchain Programmer and Entrepreneur. Previously CEO Scopeweaver, CTO (Ecommerce) Welspun Group. + https://www.linkedin.com/in/sandeep-nailwal-60709a33/ -# Risks {#risks} +## Risks You acknowledge and agree that there are numerous risks associated with purchasing Matic Token, holding Matic Token, and using Matic Token for participation in the Matic Network. In the worst scenario, this could lead to the loss of all or part of the Matic Token which had been purchased. IF YOU DECIDE TO PURCHASE Matic Token, YOU EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE, ACCEPT AND ASSUME THE FOLLOWING RISKS: @@ -546,4 +534,4 @@ You acknowledge and agree that there are numerous risks associated with purchasi 5. Security weaknesses : Hackers or other malicious groups or organisations may attempt to interfere with Matic Token and/or the Matic Network in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, malware attacks, denial of service attacks, consensus-based attacks, Sybil attacks, smurfing and spoofing. Furthermore, there is a risk that a third party or a member of the Foundation, the Distributor or its affiliates may intentionally or unintentionally introduce weaknesses into the core infrastructure of Matic Token and/or the Matic Network, which could negatively affect Matic Token and/or the Matic Network. Further, the future of cryptography and security innovations are highly unpredictable and advances in cryptography, or technical advances (including without limitation development of quantum computing), could present unknown risks to Matic Token and/or the Matic Network by rendering ineffective the cryptographic consensus mechanism that underpins that blockchain protocol. -6. Other risks : In addition, the potential risks briefly mentioned above are not exhaustive and there are other risks (as more particularly set out in the Terms and Conditions) associated with your purchase, holding and use of Matic Token, including those that the Foundation or the Distributor cannot anticipate. Such risks may further materialise as unanticipated variations or combinations of the aforementioned risks. You should conduct full due diligence on the Foundation, the Distributor, its affiliates and the Matic Development team, as well as understand the overall framework, mission and vision for the Matic Network prior to purchasing Matic Token. \ No newline at end of file +6. Other risks : In addition, the potential risks briefly mentioned above are not exhaustive and there are other risks (as more particularly set out in the Terms and Conditions) associated with your purchase, holding and use of Matic Token, including those that the Foundation or the Distributor cannot anticipate. Such risks may further materialise as unanticipated variations or combinations of the aforementioned risks. You should conduct full due diligence on the Foundation, the Distributor, its affiliates and the Matic Development team, as well as understand the overall framework, mission and vision for the Matic Network prior to purchasing Matic Token. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/monero.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/monero.md index 64534ea..7f8665b 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/monero.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/monero.md @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ # Monero (CryptoNote) -- **Title:** CryptoNote v 2.0 - **Project:** Monero (built on the CryptoNote protocol) -- **Author(s):** Nicolas van Saberhagen (pseudonym) -- **Year:** 2013 (dated October 17, 2013) -- **Canonical source:** https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf (original site defunct; archived copy used) — - Monero's own annotated copy: https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf -- **License / distribution:** **FLAG (mild).** The original 2013 CryptoNote v2 paper carries no explicit - license statement. It is universally mirrored (Monero, Bytecoin, Zenodo, etc.), and the Zenodo archival - copy is published under CC-BY 4.0. Included on that basis, but confirm before durable public hosting. -- **File:** `cryptonote.pdf` (fetched from Web Archive mirror and validated as the real CryptoNote v2 paper) +- **Paper:** *CryptoNote v 2.0* +- **Author:** Nicolas van Saberhagen (pseudonym) +- **Year:** 2013 (dated 17 October 2013) +- **Canonical source:** originally https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf (site now offline; archived at + https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf). Monero's annotated copy: + https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf +- **File in this folder:** `cryptonote.pdf` (byte-identical to the archived cryptonote.org copy) +- **Rights:** The 2013 CryptoNote v2.0 paper carries no explicit licence statement; it is widely mirrored by the Monero and Bytecoin projects and archived on Zenodo. ## Summary -CryptoNote v2 is the protocol paper that Monero is built on; it is the foundational document of the -privacy-coin lineage. It identifies traceability and linkability weaknesses in Bitcoin's transparent ledger -and proposes cryptographic fixes: **ring signatures** to obscure which input actually spent funds (hiding -the sender among a set of plausible signers) and **one-time stealth addresses** so that recipients cannot be -linked across payments. It also discusses an egalitarian, memory-hard proof-of-work. Monero implemented and -extended these ideas (later adding RingCT to hide amounts), becoming the most prominent privacy-focused -cryptocurrency. Note this file is the CryptoNote protocol paper, not a Monero-branded document. +CryptoNote is the protocol paper that Monero is built on, and the founding document of the privacy-coin +family. It sets out two privacy goals that Bitcoin does not meet, **untraceability** (every possible sender +of a payment is equally likely) and **unlinkability** (two payments cannot be shown to go to the same +person), and proposes fixes: **ring signatures**, which hide the real signer of a transaction among a group +of possible signers, and **one-time addresses**, so that a recipient's payments cannot be linked together. +It also proposes a proof-of-work function meant to give ordinary CPUs a fair chance against GPUs and +specialized hardware. + +Monero launched in April 2014 as a fork of Bytecoin, an earlier CryptoNote-based coin. It has since extended the +design, for example by hiding transaction amounts with Ring Confidential Transactions (2017) and adopting the +RandomX proof-of-work (2019). This file is the CryptoNote paper, not a Monero-branded document. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polkadot.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polkadot.md index 45ee13b..e42eeee 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polkadot.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polkadot.md @@ -1,21 +1,22 @@ # Polkadot -- **Title:** Polkadot: Vision for a Heterogeneous Multi-Chain Framework (Draft 1) -- **Project:** Polkadot (Web3 Foundation / Parity) -- **Author(s):** Dr. Gavin Wood (founder, Ethereum & Parity) +- **Project:** Polkadot +- **Paper:** *Polkadot: Vision for a Heterogeneous Multi-Chain Framework* (Draft 1) +- **Author:** Gavin Wood - **Year:** 2016 -- **Canonical source:** Web3 Foundation / polkadot.com (whitepaper). The included PDF was fetched from a - reputable mirror; the canonical authoritative source is the Web3 Foundation. -- **License / distribution:** Web3 Foundation whitepaper, freely circulated. Included as a - freely-distributed project whitepaper. -- **File:** `polkadot.pdf` (fetched and validated as the genuine Gavin Wood Polkadot whitepaper) +- **Canonical source:** https://github.com/w3f/polkadot-white-paper (Web3 Foundation) +- **File in this folder:** `polkadot.pdf` (a December 2016 build of Draft 1; the Web3 Foundation's current + copy has minor later edits, such as renumbered references) +- **Rights:** The paper states that it is placed under a Creative Commons licence. ## Summary -Polkadot's whitepaper argues that existing blockchains conflate two distinct concerns — **canonicality** -(agreeing on a single ordered history) and **validity** (agreeing that state transitions are correct) — and -that separating them enables scalability and extensibility. Polkadot proposes a central **relay chain** that -provides shared security and consensus to many parallel application-specific chains called **parachains**, -which can have heterogeneous designs and still interoperate and pass messages. Validators secure the relay -chain while collators produce parachain blocks. The result is a framework for many specialized chains -operating under one pooled security umbrella, with cross-chain communication as a first-class feature. +The Polkadot whitepaper argues that existing blockchains tie together two separate concerns: +**canonicality** (agreeing on one ordered history) and **validity** (agreeing that state transitions are +correct). Separating them, it says, makes chains easier to extend and scale. Polkadot proposes a central +**relay chain** that provides consensus and shared security to many parallel chains called +**parachains**, which can have different designs and still pass messages to each other. Validators secure +the relay chain while collators produce parachain blocks. + +Gavin Wood, an Ethereum co-founder, wrote the paper. Polkadot's network launched in May 2020 using +nominated proof-of-stake, and parachains went live in December 2021. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polygon.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polygon.md index a73cdbe..545b24d 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polygon.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/polygon.md @@ -1,25 +1,26 @@ # Polygon (Matic Network) -- **Title:** Matic Network: Scalable and Instant Token Transfers and Payments (litepaper) -- **Project:** Polygon (formerly Matic Network) -- **Author(s):** Jaynti Kanani, Sandeep Nailwal, Anurag Arjun (founders) -- **Year:** 2019 (litepaper); project launched 2017 -- **Canonical source:** https://github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper (project repo); - litepaper PDF mirrored at allcryptowhitepapers.com -- **License / distribution:** Matic Network whitepaper, freely published in the project's open-source repo. - Included as a freely-distributed project document. -- **Files:** - - `matic-whitepaper.md` — **authoritative** Matic Whitepaper v1.1, fetched from the official - `maticnetwork/whitepaper` GitHub repo (the project publishes it as a GitBook/markdown, not a single PDF). - - `matic-litepaper.pdf` — supplementary 5-page litepaper PDF from a whitepaper mirror; valid PDF, but the - markdown above is the authoritative source. +- **Project:** Polygon (originally Matic Network) +- **Papers:** + - *Matic Whitepaper* (version 1.1): Jaynti Kanani, Sandeep Nailwal, Anurag Arjun. Published in the + project's GitHub repository from June 2018; last revised March 2019. + - *Matic Network* litepaper: an undated 5-page summary from about 2019 (no authors listed). +- **Canonical sources:** https://github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper (whitepaper); + https://www.allcryptowhitepapers.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/matic-litepaper.pdf (litepaper; a + third-party archive, as the project no longer hosts it) +- **Files in this folder:** `matic-whitepaper.md` (whitepaper full text from the repository's `README.md`, + with formatting cleaned up) and `matic-litepaper.pdf` (byte-identical to the archive copy above) +- **Rights:** Published in the Matic Network open-source repository; no explicit licence stated. ## Summary -Polygon, originally Matic Network, is an Ethereum scaling solution. Its early litepaper describes a system -built on an adapted **Plasma** framework plus a proof-of-stake sidechain layer to deliver fast, -very-low-cost transactions while periodically committing state back to the Ethereum mainnet for security. -The goal is to address Ethereum's throughput and fee problems without sacrificing the ability to withdraw -assets safely to the root chain. Polygon later expanded into a broader suite of scaling technologies -(PoS chain, zk-rollups, etc.), but this document captures the founding Matic design. Newer Polygon papers -(e.g. the POL token paper) exist at https://polygon.technology/papers. +Matic Network was designed to scale Ethereum. Its whitepaper describes sidechains built on an adapted +**Plasma** framework, with a small set of block producers creating blocks quickly and a larger set of +proof-of-stake validators ("stakers") periodically committing checkpoints of those blocks to Ethereum. +Fraud proofs let anyone on Ethereum challenge invalid transactions, and users can withdraw their assets +back to the Ethereum main chain. The aim was fast, very low-cost transactions without giving up the +security of the root chain. The litepaper is a short, less technical overview of the same design. + +The project was founded in 2017 by Jaynti Kanani, Sandeep Nailwal, Anurag Arjun and Mihailo Bjelic, and +rebranded as Polygon in February 2021. It later grew into a family of scaling technologies, and in 2024 +began migrating its token from MATIC to POL. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/solana.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/solana.md index 0df787d..b016e5b 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/solana.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/solana.md @@ -1,20 +1,20 @@ # Solana -- **Title:** Solana: A new architecture for a high performance blockchain (Proof of History) - **Project:** Solana -- **Author(s):** Anatoly Yakovenko -- **Year:** 2017 (whitepaper widely circulated 2017–2018) +- **Paper:** *Solana: A new architecture for a high performance blockchain* (v0.8.13) +- **Author:** Anatoly Yakovenko +- **Year:** first drafted 2017; this version 2018 - **Canonical source:** https://solana.com/solana-whitepaper.pdf -- **License / distribution:** Freely published via solana.com. Included as a freely-distributed project - whitepaper. -- **File:** `solana.pdf` (fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `solana.pdf` (byte-identical to the solana.com copy) +- **Rights:** Published openly by Solana Labs; no explicit licence stated. ## Summary -Solana's whitepaper introduces **Proof of History (PoH)**, a verifiable delay function that creates a -cryptographic, append-only record proving that events occurred in a particular order and at a particular -time. By establishing a trustless global "clock," validators no longer need to communicate timestamps to -agree on ordering, removing a major bottleneck in traditional consensus. Combined with a PoH-aware -proof-of-stake mechanism and pipelined transaction processing, the design targets very high throughput and -low latency. The paper frames Solana as an architecture for a high-performance, single global state -blockchain capable of supporting demanding applications. +Solana's whitepaper introduces **Proof of History (PoH)**: a sequential hash chain that acts as a +verifiable record that events happened in a particular order and that time passed between them. Because +every validator can check this shared "clock" locally, nodes do not need to exchange messages to agree on +ordering, which removes a major bottleneck in traditional consensus. + +The paper combines PoH with a proof-of-stake consensus mechanism and pipelined transaction processing, +aiming for very high throughput and low latency on a single global state. Solana's network opened to the +public in March 2020. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tezos.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tezos.md index 2b36773..ddf2b60 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tezos.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tezos.md @@ -1,20 +1,25 @@ # Tezos -- **Title:** Tezos: A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger (whitepaper) + Tezos position paper - **Project:** Tezos -- **Author(s):** L.M Goodman (pseudonym; Arthur Breitman) +- **Papers:** + - *Tezos: A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger: Position Paper*, dated 3 August 2014 + - *Tezos: a self-amending crypto-ledger: White paper*, dated 2 September 2014 +- **Author:** L.M. Goodman (pseudonym of Arthur Breitman) - **Year:** 2014 -- **Canonical source:** https://tezos.com/whitepaper.pdf (also https://tezos.com/position-paper.pdf) -- **License / distribution:** Freely published via tezos.com. Included as a freely-distributed project - whitepaper. -- **Files:** `tezos-whitepaper.pdf`, `tezos-position-paper.pdf` (both fetched and validated) +- **Canonical sources:** https://tezos.com/position-paper.pdf and https://tezos.com/whitepaper.pdf +- **Files in this folder:** `tezos-position-paper.pdf` and `tezos-whitepaper.pdf` (both byte-identical to the + tezos.com copies) +- **Rights:** Published openly by the Tezos project; neither paper states a licence. ## Summary -Tezos is a smart-contract platform whose defining feature is **on-chain governance and self-amendment**: -the protocol can upgrade its own rules through a formal, stake-weighted voting process, avoiding contentious -hard forks. It uses a liquid proof-of-stake consensus (baking) and emphasizes formal verification — its -smart-contract language, Michelson, is designed so contracts can be mathematically reasoned about, which -suits high-value financial use. The position paper frames the philosophy and governance model; the -whitepaper details the ledger and amendment mechanics. Two documents are included because Tezos is -canonically distributed as a whitepaper plus a position paper. +Tezos is a smart-contract platform whose defining feature is **self-amendment**: the protocol includes a +procedure for stakeholders to vote on changes to the protocol itself, including changes to the voting +procedure, so it can upgrade without contentious hard forks. The position paper explains the motivation and +the choice of proof-of-stake and the OCaml language. The whitepaper describes the design: a network shell +that can run any blockchain protocol as a module, the seed amendment procedure, proof-of-stake consensus and +Turing-complete smart contracts. The hosted whitepaper is a later edition in which changes between the +original paper and the implementation are marked in red. + +Tezos was created by Arthur and Kathleen Breitman, and its mainnet went live in 2018. Its smart-contract +language, Michelson, is designed to make formal verification of contracts practical. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tron.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tron.md index f399f4c..2964527 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tron.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/tron.md @@ -1,30 +1,22 @@ -# Tron — FLAGGED (PDF intentionally NOT included) +# TRON -- **Title:** TRON: Advanced Decentralized Blockchain Platform (whitepaper) -- **Project:** Tron -- **Author(s):** Tron Foundation (Justin Sun) -- **Year:** 2017–2018 -- **Canonical source:** Originally tron.network — the English whitepaper was **removed** from the official - site following the plagiarism allegations. Third-party mirrors exist but are not authoritative. -- **License / distribution:** **PROBLEMATIC — FLAGGED FOR JAMES.** -- **File:** **none — intentionally omitted.** +- **Project:** TRON (TRX) +- **Paper:** *TRON: Advanced Decentralized Blockchain Platform* (whitepaper version 2.1, for TRON protocol 4.8.0) +- **Author:** TRON DAO (formerly the TRON Foundation) +- **Year:** 2025 (version 2.1); version 2.0 is dated 10 December 2018 +- **Canonical source:** https://tron.network/static/doc/white_paper_v_2_1.pdf (version 2.0: + https://tron.network/static/doc/white_paper_v_2_0.pdf) +- **File in this folder:** this card only (the whitepaper is linked above) +- **Rights:** Published by TRON DAO; no explicit licence stated. Not hosted here; linked above. -## Why this is flagged (do not host the PDF without James's sign-off) +## Summary -In January 2018, Protocol Labs founder Juan Benet publicly alleged that at least nine pages of Tron's -English-language whitepaper were copied — in places nearly verbatim — from the **IPFS** and **Filecoin** -whitepapers, without citation. The IPFS/Filecoin papers were published under a Creative Commons license that -requires attribution, so copying them uncited would also be a license violation. After the accusations, -Tron removed the whitepaper from its official website; Justin Sun attributed the overlap to -Chinese-to-English translation issues. +TRON is a smart-contract platform founded by Justin Sun. The TRON Foundation was set up in Singapore in July +2017, and TRX began as an ERC-20 token on Ethereum before moving to TRON's own mainnet in 2018. In July 2018 +the foundation acquired BitTorrent. -Because (a) the document's originality and copyright status are disputed and (b) it was withdrawn from the -official source, we do **not** include the PDF. This entry exists to document the coin honestly and to flag -the controversy. If a Tron paper is ever wanted in the dataset, James should source it deliberately and -decide how to caveat it. - -## Summary (of the project, not an endorsement of the paper) - -Tron is a smart-contract / dApp platform marketed around high throughput and content/entertainment use -cases, using a delegated-proof-of-stake consensus. Its whitepaper is historically significant mainly for -the plagiarism controversy described above rather than for a novel technical contribution. +The whitepaper describes a **delegated proof-of-stake** network in which TRX holders who stake their tokens +vote for 27 "Super Representatives", who take turns producing a block every 3 seconds. Smart contracts run +on the TRON Virtual Machine (TVM), which supports Solidity. The paper also defines TRON's token standards +(TRC-10 and TRC-20) and a resource model in which transactions consume "bandwidth" and "energy" that users +obtain by staking TRX. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/uniswap.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/uniswap.md index ea3f470..ac49b82 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/uniswap.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/uniswap.md @@ -1,21 +1,23 @@ # Uniswap -- **Title:** Uniswap v2 Core; Uniswap v3 Core - **Project:** Uniswap -- **Author(s):** Hayden Adams, Noah Zinsmeister, Moody Salem, River Keefer, Dan Robinson (varies by version) -- **Year:** v2 — 2020; v3 — March 2021 (original v1 concept, 2018) -- **Canonical source:** https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf (v2); https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper-v3.pdf (v3) -- **License / distribution:** Freely published via uniswap.org. Included as freely-distributed project - whitepapers. -- **Files:** `uniswap-v2-core.pdf`, `uniswap-v3-core.pdf` (both fetched and validated) +- **Papers:** + - *Uniswap v2 Core*: Hayden Adams, Noah Zinsmeister, Dan Robinson. March 2020. + - *Uniswap v3 Core*: Hayden Adams, Noah Zinsmeister, Moody Salem, River Keefer, Dan Robinson. March 2021. +- **Canonical sources:** https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf (v2); + https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper-v3.pdf (v3) +- **Files in this folder:** `uniswap-v2-core.pdf` and `uniswap-v3-core.pdf` (both byte-identical to the + uniswap.org copies) +- **Rights:** Published openly by Uniswap Labs; neither paper states a licence. ## Summary -Uniswap is the protocol that popularized the **automated market maker (AMM)** model for decentralized -exchange. Instead of an order book, liquidity providers deposit pairs of tokens into pools, and trades -execute against a deterministic pricing curve. The **v2 Core** paper formalizes the constant-product -invariant (x·y = k), adds direct ERC20-to-ERC20 pairs, time-weighted average price oracles, and flash swaps. -The **v3 Core** paper introduces **concentrated liquidity**, letting providers allocate capital within -custom price ranges for far greater capital efficiency, along with multiple fee tiers. Two versions are -included because they represent distinct, influential designs in DeFi. (v1 was only a blog/explainer; v2 and -v3 are the canonical formal papers.) +Uniswap is the protocol that popularized the **automated market maker (AMM)** for decentralized exchange. +Instead of an order book, liquidity providers deposit pairs of tokens into a pool, and trades execute +against a pricing formula that keeps the product of the two reserves constant (x · y = k). The **v2 Core** +paper explains the design of the v2 contracts: pools between any two ERC-20 tokens, a price oracle that +gives time-weighted average prices, "flash swaps", and a protocol fee that can be switched on later. + +The **v3 Core** paper introduces **concentrated liquidity**, which lets providers place their capital within +chosen price ranges for much greater capital efficiency, along with multiple fee tiers and an improved +oracle. Uniswap runs on Ethereum and other EVM chains. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/xrp-ripple.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/xrp-ripple.md index 7caeb9a..bb0816d 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/xrp-ripple.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/xrp-ripple.md @@ -1,20 +1,23 @@ -# XRP (Ripple) +# XRP Ledger (Ripple) -- **Title:** The Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm -- **Project:** Ripple / XRP Ledger -- **Author(s):** David Schwartz, Noah Youngs, Arthur Britto (Ripple Labs Inc.) +- **Project:** XRP Ledger / Ripple +- **Paper:** *The Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm* +- **Authors:** David Schwartz, Noah Youngs, Arthur Britto (Ripple Labs Inc.) - **Year:** 2014 - **Canonical source:** https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf -- **License / distribution:** Published openly by Ripple Labs; freely available. Included as a - freely-distributed project whitepaper. -- **File:** `ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf` (8 pages; fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf` (8 pages; byte-identical to the ripple.com copy) +- **Rights:** Published openly by Ripple Labs; no explicit licence stated. ## Summary -The Ripple consensus whitepaper presents a low-latency consensus algorithm for the XRP Ledger that does not -rely on proof-of-work mining. Each node trusts a configurable set of peers (a "Unique Node List"), and the -network reaches agreement through iterative rounds in which nodes propose and progressively converge on a -set of candidate transactions, requiring only that trusted subnetworks overlap sufficiently. The paper shows -that with minimal connectivity this achieves network-wide agreement quickly and tolerates a bounded fraction -of faulty nodes. The design targets fast, cheap cross-border payments and settlement — Ripple's core use -case — rather than general smart contracts. +The paper presents a low-latency consensus algorithm for the XRP Ledger that does not use proof-of-work +mining. Each node chooses a list of validators it trusts (its "Unique Node List", or UNL), and the network +agrees on the next ledger through rounds in which nodes propose transaction sets and converge on one, as +long as the trusted lists of different nodes overlap enough. The paper argues that only minimal overlap is +needed and that the network tolerates a bounded fraction of faulty nodes. The design targets fast, cheap +payments and settlement rather than general smart contracts. + +A 2018 analysis by Ripple researchers Brad Chase and Ethan MacBrough (*Analysis of the XRP Ledger Consensus +Protocol*, arXiv:1802.07242) found that the paper's overlap condition (about 20% of a node's UNL) was +too weak, and that safety requires much larger overlap (roughly 90% under a general fault model). The PDF +carries a note from Ripple saying it is kept for historical interest and pointing readers to that analysis. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/yellowpaper.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/yellowpaper.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98a69bb --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/yellowpaper.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Ethereum Yellow Paper + +- **Project:** Ethereum +- **Paper:** *Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger* +- **Author:** Gavin Wood (original author); now maintained by Andrew Ashikhmin with contributions from many others +- **Year:** 2014 (first edition); this copy is the Shanghai version `efc5f9a`, dated 2025-02-04 +- **Canonical source:** https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf (built from https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper) +- **File in this folder:** `yellowpaper.pdf` (byte-identical to the ethereum.github.io copy; built from commit + [`efc5f9a`](https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper/commit/efc5f9a1f356cba376c978eedb63cb0363c2aa85)) +- **Rights:** Licensed under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) + (CC BY-SA 4.0), as stated in the repository's [`LICENCE.md`](https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper/blob/master/LICENCE.md). + +## Summary + +Where the Ethereum whitepaper explains the idea, the Yellow Paper defines the machine. Gavin Wood wrote it +in 2014 as a formal, mathematical specification of the Ethereum protocol: the world state and account +model, transactions and blocks, the Ethereum Virtual Machine and every opcode's gas cost, and the rules +for executing a transaction and applying it to the state. It gave independent client teams, writing in +different languages, one precise reference to implement against. + +The paper has been revised for each network upgrade since. Its maintainers note that it now covers the +protocol only up to the Shanghai upgrade (April 2023) and does not yet include Cancun or later changes; the +[Python execution-layer specification](https://ethereum.github.io/execution-specs/) is kept up to date +instead. It remains the classic formal description of the Ethereum execution layer. diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/yellowpaper.pdf b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/yellowpaper.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..750fcad Binary files /dev/null and b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/yellowpaper.pdf differ diff --git a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/zcash.md b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/zcash.md index cac2d75..caae615 100644 --- a/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/zcash.md +++ b/datasets/crypto-whitepapers/zcash.md @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ # Zcash (Zerocash) -- **Title:** Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin (extended version) - **Project:** Zcash (built on the Zerocash construction) -- **Author(s):** Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers, - Eran Tromer, Madars Virza -- **Year:** 2014 (IEEE S&P 2014; extended version dated May 18, 2014) +- **Paper:** *Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin* (extended version) +- **Authors:** Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers, Eran Tromer, + Madars Virza +- **Year:** 2014 (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2014; extended version dated 18 May 2014) - **Canonical source:** http://zerocash-project.org/paper -- **License / distribution:** **FLAG (mild).** The official conference version is **IEEE-copyrighted**. - The file included here is the **authors' freely-hosted extended version** from zerocash-project.org — - redistributing an author preprint is standard and acceptable, but it is not the IEEE version. Noting the - distinction for James. -- **File:** `zerocash.pdf` (authors' extended version; fetched and validated) +- **File in this folder:** `zerocash.pdf` (the authors' extended version, byte-identical to + http://zerocash-project.org/media/pdf/zerocash-extended-20140518.pdf) +- **Rights:** The hosted file is the authors' extended version; the conference version (IEEE S&P 2014) is copyrighted by IEEE. ## Summary Zerocash is the academic protocol behind Zcash and a landmark in applied zero-knowledge cryptography. It -shows how to build a decentralized anonymous payment scheme on top of a Bitcoin-like ledger using -**zk-SNARKs** (zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge): users can prove a -transaction is valid — that inputs exist and balances are conserved — without revealing the sender, -recipient, or amount. This provides much stronger privacy than mixing or ring signatures, with fully shielded -transactions. Zcash implemented these ideas as a live cryptocurrency offering both transparent and shielded -addresses. The trade-off historically involved a trusted setup for the SNARK parameters, which the paper and -later work address. +shows how to build a payment system on a Bitcoin-like ledger in which transactions hide the sender, the +recipient and the amount. Users prove that a transaction is valid, meaning the coins exist and the amounts +balance, using **zk-SNARKs** (zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge) without +revealing anything else. The paper reports transactions under 1 kB that take under 6 ms to verify. + +The construction needs a one-time trusted setup to generate its public parameters. Zcash launched in +October 2016 with both transparent and shielded addresses, after a multi-party ceremony to generate those +parameters. Later research, starting with the Halo technique in 2019, showed how to remove the need for a +trusted setup. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/21-lessons.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/21-lessons.md index 3188b3a..b304843 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/21-lessons.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/21-lessons.md @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ Twenty-one short reflections on what Bitcoin teaches about money, time, knowledge, incentives, privacy, and personal responsibility. -Local file: [`21-lessons.pdf`](./21-lessons.pdf) +The PDF is in this folder as `21-lessons.pdf`. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/CURATION.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/CURATION.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b405d3f --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/CURATION.md @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +# Cypherpunk Canon: curation notes + +Curator notes for this dataset. This file is not deployed (it is not in +`manifest.json`); the visitor-facing overview is `README.md`. + +## Hosting policy + +- **Documents are hosted whether or not they carry an explicit licence** + (owner's rule; first applied to the two manifestos on 2026-10-27). EFS + stores copies with author and source attribution and does not relicense + them. +- Media (images, audio, video) must carry a real licence; this dataset has none. +- The 21-work starting list came from + [The Cypherpunk Library](https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/collection). Its + blanket public-domain claim is not relied on as rights evidence. *b-money* was + added because the Bitcoin whitepaper cites it as reference [1]. +- The ten remaining link records were created under an older, stricter rights + policy. Under the current rule they can be converted to full texts (or PDFs) + once someone fetches and verifies the complete text, as was done for the nine + below. + +## Full texts: sources and verification + +All texts were fetched on 2026-11-12. Each file is the title, an author/date +line, the text, and a closing `*Source: ...*` line. Words, spelling and +original typos are unchanged. Hard-wrapped plain-text sources keep their line +breaks; Markdown joins them into paragraphs. + +| File | Source used | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md` | https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html | Hosted in full since 2026-10-27. | +| `crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md` | https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html | Source page says "freely distributable with attribution". | +| `declaration-of-independence-of-cyberspace.md` | https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence | EFF hosts Barlow's own archive. The emailed cover note that preceded the declaration in 1996 is not included. | +| `the-conscience-of-a-hacker.md` | https://phrack.org/issues/7/hackers-manifesto.html | Identical to `3.txt` in Phrack's issue 7 archive (https://phrack.org/archives/tgz/phrack7.tar.gz). Issue 7 is dated 25 September 1986. Indented lines are rendered as Markdown line breaks; the one line-end hyphenation ("will-ing") is joined. | +| `why-i-wrote-pgp.md` | https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/WhyIWrotePGP.html | Author's site. This is the 1999 revision of the 1991 essay. | +| `protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.md` | Extropy #10, Winter/Spring 1993, pp. 8-14; scan at https://cdn.nakamotoinstitute.org/docs/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.pdf | See below. | +| `the-beauty-of-ecash.md` | Hal Finney's essay page, https://web.archive.org/web/20140421063207/http://www.finney.org/~hal/beauty_ecash.html | Author's own site (archived). Finney titled it "The Beauty of ECash"; the old record used "eCash". His email address under the signature is omitted. | +| `libertaria-in-cyberspace.md` | May's 9 August 1993 Cypherpunks repost, https://mailing-list-archive.cryptoanarchy.wiki/archive/1993/08/afd51441bdcebe887e3841a08dc769cd76f81c8291dc56525bec4c2d2368c56b | Repost carries the original Extropians headers (1 Sep 1992). Used in preference to the Nakamoto Institute copy (https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/libertaria-in-cyberspace/), which is retypeset and drops the closing line "Libertaria will thrive in cyberspace." The 1993 cover note and May's signature block are not included. | +| `b-money.md` | https://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt | Author's site, the URL cited in the Bitcoin whitepaper. Body is byte-identical to the source apart from trailing whitespace; includes Appendix A. | + +### Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash + +The Nakamoto Institute HTML text +(https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash/) +differs from the printed article in about twenty places (for example "third +box on the left" for the printed "right", "make it easy to experiment" for +"will let you experiment", "We can change this if technologies can" for "We can +change this; these technologies can"), and in the "Access" sidebar and +references (for example "Phillip" for the printed "Philip", "Authenticators" +for "Authentications"). + +The hosted text follows the print. It was checked by diffing the Nakamoto +Institute text against an independent OCR transcription of the print +(https://grafton9.net/zone-digitali/stra3/www.dada.it/stranet/snhtml/ipertest/metanet/txt2/text4e.htm +and `text5e.htm`), then reading every disagreement against the scan. Printed +slips are kept as printed ("spent used before", "used before before", +"publically", "depositer", "just as in Figure 3"). Figures 1-4 are diagrams +and are not reproduced; the closing source line says so. Curly quotes and em dashes (the print uses spaced hyphens) +follow the Nakamoto Institute typesetting; footnote markers are placed as in +the print. + +## Metadata conventions + +- `redistributionStatus: deployable` means the local bytes may be seeded. +- `redistributionStatus: link-only` applies to an EFS-authored record, not the + linked work. +- `workLicense: NOASSERTION` on a record means the linked work's terms were + not established. +- `modificationStatus: verbatim` means the work's text is unchanged; only the + Markdown wrapper (title, author/date line, source line) is added. +- `aboutCard` points from a PDF to its human-readable card. Each card is also a + manifest payload so it follows the dataset into EFS. +- `sha256` records the retrieved binary; the seeder also computes the on-chain + content hash from local bytes. +- Tags become permanent on-chain folders. Bookkeeping tags (`record`, `about`, + `index`) were removed in 2026-11; reuse existing topical tags rather than + adding single-use ones. + +## Seeder notes + +The current v1 dataset seeder deploys payload paths, content types, hashes, +sizes and tags. Rich manifest fields remain catalog metadata. The seeder skips +an existing placement whose content hash already matches, so a metadata-only +manifest change does not update an unchanged payload's on-chain tags or +properties; change the file itself when its on-chain metadata must change. + +Validate from the repository root with `npm run validate`. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/README.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/README.md index a19469b..f19a31d 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/README.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/README.md @@ -1,78 +1,34 @@ # Cypherpunk Canon -A rights-aware reading shelf for foundational cypherpunk writing, privacy -research, and adjacent books. The dataset is deployed at `/cypherpunk`. - -The initial 21-work shelf was discovered through -[The Cypherpunk Library](https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/collection). That -collection is a useful editorial source, but its blanket public-domain claim is -not treated as sufficient rights evidence. EFS verifies redistribution terms -against the work, author, publisher, or another primary source before copying -third-party bytes. - -## Contents - -- 21 represented works. -- 3 works included locally as PDFs. -- 18 link-only metadata records. -- 25 deployable EFS entries: one index, three PDFs, three human-readable about - cards, and eighteen records. - -Open [`collection.md`](./collection.md) for the human-readable shelf. -`manifest.json` is the deployable, machine-readable inventory. - -## Locally Included Works - -| Work | Format | Rights basis | -|---|---|---| -| The Praxeology of Privacy | PDF | Explicit public-domain dedication in the work and on the author's site | -| 21 Lessons | PDF | CC BY-SA 4.0 in the work and on the author's site | -| Farewell to Westphalia | PDF | CC BY-SA 4.0 in the book | - -The binary files are unmodified. - -## Link-Only Records - -The remaining works are represented by EFS-authored Markdown records. Those -records are CC0-1.0 and may be deployed, pinned, and mirrored. The underlying -third-party works are not included and retain their own rights. - -A record remains link-only when: - -- no explicit redistribution license was found; -- the license has noncommercial or no-derivatives restrictions that need an - operator decision; or -- availability from a website was the only evidence found. - -This lets EFS preserve discovery and provenance without confusing "available -online" with "safe to mirror everywhere." - -## Metadata Convention - -- `redistributionStatus: deployable` means the local bytes may be seeded. -- `redistributionStatus: link-only` applies to an EFS-authored record, not the - linked work. -- `workLicense: NOASSERTION` means the linked work's redistribution terms have - not been established. -- `aboutCard` points from included content to its human-readable provenance and - rights note. Each referenced card is also a manifest payload so it follows - the dataset into EFS. -- `sha256` records the retrieved binary artifact; the deployment seeder also - computes the on-chain content hash from local bytes. - -## Validation - -From the repository root: - -```sh -npm run validate -``` - -The current v1 dataset seeder deploys payload paths, content types, hashes, -sizes, and tags. Rich manifest fields remain catalog metadata; the about-card -payloads make the important human-readable details available inside EFS. - -The seeder skips an existing on-chain placement when its content hash already -matches. A metadata-only change to the manifest therefore does not update an -unchanged payload's on-chain tags or properties; change the relevant card file -when the human-readable metadata needs a new deployment. +The writing behind ideas that Bitcoin and Ethereum inherited: private +communication, digital cash, pseudonymous identity, and cryptography as a +check on power. The shelf covers 22 works, from a 1986 hacker zine to books +published this decade. + +## Start here + +- **A Cypherpunk's Manifesto**, Eric Hughes (1993): the movement's founding statement. +- **The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto**, Timothy C. May (1988). +- **b-money**, Wei Dai (1998): money and contracts among untraceable pseudonyms, cited as reference [1] in the [Bitcoin whitepaper](https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf). +- **Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash**, Hal Finney (1993): public-key cryptography, anonymous remailers and digital cash, explained for a general reader. +- **A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace**, John Perry Barlow (1996). + +## What's in this folder + +- **Nine classic texts in full**, stored on chain as Markdown: the two + manifestos, *b-money*, *The Conscience of a Hacker*, *Why I Wrote PGP*, + *Libertaria in Cyberspace*, *Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash*, + *The Beauty of ECash* and *A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace*. +- **Three books as PDFs**, each with a short about-card: *21 Lessons* (Gigi), + *Farewell to Westphalia* (Jarrad Hope and Peter Ludlow) and + *The Praxeology of Privacy* (Max Hillebrand). +- **Ten link records** for longer or more recent works: a summary and a link + to the work at its source. + +`collection.md` lists every work with its author and year. Each full text ends +with a link to the copy it was taken from. + +The shelf follows the collection assembled by +[The Cypherpunk Library](https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/collection), with +*b-money* added. The texts belong to their authors; EFS stores copies and does +not relicense them. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men-record.md index 1b1f40e..d63525d 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men-record.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men-record.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ - **Year:** 2003 - **Source:** https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/book/a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men - **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the novel is not mirrored without clearer terms. +- **EFS status:** Link-only; the novel is not hosted in EFS. Read it at the source link. ## Summary diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/against-intellectual-property-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/against-intellectual-property-record.md index 245ebfd..1e111ce 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/against-intellectual-property-record.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/against-intellectual-property-record.md @@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ - **Linked book edition:** 2008 - **Source:** https://mises.org/library/book/against-intellectual-property - **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; availability from the publisher is not treated as - a redistribution license. +- **EFS status:** Link-only; the book is not hosted in EFS. Read it at the source link. ## Summary diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/b-money.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/b-money.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb50e74 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/b-money.md @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +# b-money + +*Wei Dai, 1998* + +I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities +traditionally associated with the word "anarchy", in a crypto-anarchy the +government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and +permanently unnecessary. It's a community where the threat of violence is +impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible +because its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical +locations. + +Until now it's not clear, even theoretically, how such a community could +operate. A community is defined by the cooperation of its participants, +and efficient cooperation requires a medium of exchange (money) and a way +to enforce contracts. Traditionally these services have been provided by +the government or government sponsored institutions and only to legal +entities. In this article I describe a protocol by which these services +can be provided to and by untraceable entities. + +I will actually describe two protocols. The first one is impractical, +because it makes heavy use of a synchronous and unjammable anonymous +broadcast channel. However it will motivate the second, more practical +protocol. In both cases I will assume the existence of an untraceable +network, where senders and receivers are identified only by digital +pseudonyms (i.e. public keys) and every messages is signed by its sender +and encrypted to its receiver. + +In the first protocol, every participant maintains a (seperate) database +of how much money belongs to each pseudonym. These accounts collectively +define the ownership of money, and how these accounts are updated is the +subject of this protocol. + +1. The creation of money. Anyone can create money by broadcasting the +solution to a previously unsolved computational problem. The only +conditions are that it must be easy to determine how much computing effort +it took to solve the problem and the solution must otherwise have no +value, either practical or intellectual. The number of monetary units +created is equal to the cost of the computing effort in terms of a +standard basket of commodities. For example if a problem takes 100 hours +to solve on the computer that solves it most economically, and it takes 3 +standard baskets to purchase 100 hours of computing time on that computer +on the open market, then upon the broadcast of the solution to that +problem everyone credits the broadcaster's account by 3 units. + +2. The transfer of money. If Alice (owner of pseudonym K_A) wishes to +transfer X units of money to Bob (owner of pseudonym K_B), she broadcasts +the message "I give X units of money to K_B" signed by K_A. Upon the +broadcast of this message, everyone debits K_A's account by X units and +credits K_B's account by X units, unless this would create a negative +balance in K_A's account in which case the message is ignored. + +3. The effecting of contracts. A valid contract must include a maximum +reparation in case of default for each participant party to it. It should +also include a party who will perform arbitration should there be a +dispute. All parties to a contract including the arbitrator must broadcast +their signatures of it before it becomes effective. Upon the broadcast of +the contract and all signatures, every participant debits the account of +each party by the amount of his maximum reparation and credits a special +account identified by a secure hash of the contract by the sum the maximum +reparations. The contract becomes effective if the debits succeed for +every party without producing a negative balance, otherwise the contract +is ignored and the accounts are rolled back. A sample contract might look +like this: + +K_A agrees to send K_B the solution to problem P before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. +K_B agrees to pay K_A 100 MU (monetary units) before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_C +agrees to perform arbitration in case of dispute. K_A agrees to pay a +maximum of 1000 MU in case of default. K_B agrees to pay a maximum of 200 +MU in case of default. K_C agrees to pay a maximum of 500 MU in case of +default. + +4. The conclusion of contracts. If a contract concludes without dispute, +each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H +concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash +H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all +signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the +amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then +credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation +schedule if there is one. + +5. The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree +on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each +party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or +evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the +actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly. + +In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by +a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of +everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. +The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the +same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each +transaction should verify that the message has been received and +successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers. + +Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to +keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of +money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for +proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and +commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each +participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and +that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount +of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from +permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can +also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers. + +The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous +entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them +with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The +protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this +is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical +possibility. + +------- + +Appendix A: alternative b-money creation + +One of the more problematic parts in the b-money protocol is money +creation. This part of the protocol requires that all of the account +keepers decide and agree on the cost of particular computations. +Unfortunately because computing technology tends to advance rapidly and +not always publicly, this information may be unavailable, inaccurate, or +outdated, all of which would cause serious problems for the protocol. + +So I propose an alternative money creation subprotocol, in which account +keepers (everyone in the first protocol, or the servers in the second +protocol) instead decide and agree on the amount of b-money to be created +each period, with the cost of creating that money determined by an +auction. Each money creation period is divided up into four phases, as +follows: + +1. Planning. The account keepers compute and negotiate with each other to +determine an optimal increase in the money supply for the next period. +Whether or not the account keepers can reach a consensus, they each +broadcast their money creation quota and any macroeconomic calculations +done to support the figures. + +2. Bidding. Anyone who wants to create b-money broadcasts a bid in the +form of where x is the amount of b-money he wants to create, and y +is an unsolved problem from a predetermined problem class. Each problem in +this class should have a nominal cost (in MIPS-years say) which is +publicly agreed on. + +3. Computation. After seeing the bids, the ones who placed bids in the +bidding phase may now solve the problems in their bids and broadcast the +solutions. + +4. Money creation. Each account keeper accepts the highest bids (among +those who actually broadcasted solutions) in terms of nominal cost per +unit of b-money created and credits the bidders' accounts accordingly. + +--- + +*Source: https://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/collection.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/collection.md index c08879d..3148421 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/collection.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/collection.md @@ -1,42 +1,43 @@ # Cypherpunk Reading Shelf -This index follows the 21-work collection assembled by -[The Cypherpunk Library](https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/collection). +This shelf follows the 21-work collection assembled by +[The Cypherpunk Library](https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/collection), plus +Wei Dai's *b-money*, the proposal cited as reference [1] in the +[Bitcoin whitepaper](https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf). -EFS mirrors a work only when its redistribution terms are independently -supportable. Other works remain useful, discoverable records with links to an -upstream copy. A link-only record does not claim that EFS may redistribute the -underlying work. +Twelve works are stored in EFS, either as full texts or as PDFs. The other ten +are short records with a summary and a link to an upstream copy. ## Included in EFS -| Work | Author | Year | Local format | +| Work | Author | Year | Format | |---|---|---:|---| -| The Praxeology of Privacy | Max Hillebrand | 2026 | PDF | +| The Conscience of a Hacker | The Mentor (Loyd Blankenship) | 1986 | Markdown (full text) | +| The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto | Timothy C. May | 1988 | Markdown (full text) | +| Why I Wrote PGP | Philip Zimmermann | 1991 | Markdown (full text) | +| Libertaria in Cyberspace | Timothy C. May | 1992 | Markdown (full text) | +| A Cypherpunk's Manifesto | Eric Hughes | 1993 | Markdown (full text) | +| Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash | Hal Finney | 1993 | Markdown (full text) | +| The Beauty of ECash | Hal Finney | 1994 | Markdown (full text) | +| A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace | John Perry Barlow | 1996 | Markdown (full text) | +| b-money | Wei Dai | 1998 | Markdown (full text) | | 21 Lessons | Gigi | 2019 | PDF | | Farewell to Westphalia | Jarrad Hope and Peter Ludlow | 2025 | PDF | +| The Praxeology of Privacy | Max Hillebrand | 2026 | PDF | ## Linked Records | Work | Author | Year | |---|---|---:| -| A Cypherpunk's Manifesto | Eric Hughes | 1993 | -| The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto | Timothy C. May | 1988 | -| A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace | John Perry Barlow | 1996 | -| Your Secret Right to Cash | Peter Van Valkenburgh | 2017 | -| Of Cypherpunks and Sousveillance | Patrick Anderson | 2022 | -| Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash | Hal Finney | 1993 | -| Why I Wrote PGP | Philip Zimmermann | 1991 | -| Definition of Democratic Civilization | Abdullah Ocalan | 2020 | -| The Conscience of a Hacker | Loyd Blankenship | 1986 | | The Cyphernomicon | Timothy C. May | 1994 | -| Meditations on Cypherpunk Nightmares | Michael Goldstein | 2014 | -| The Beauty of eCash | Hal Finney | 1994 | +| Against Intellectual Property | N. Stephan Kinsella | 2001 | +| Ideal Money and Asymptotically Ideal Money | John F. Nash Jr. | 2002 | | A Lodging of Wayfaring Men | Paul Rosenberg | 2003 | -| Fog of CryptoWar | Jonathan "smuggler" Logan | 2017 | -| Libertaria in Cyberspace | Timothy C. May | 1992 | | Measuring Freenet in the Wild | Stefanie Roos et al. | 2014 | -| Ideal Money and Asymptotically Ideal Money | John F. Nash Jr. | 2002 | -| Against Intellectual Property | N. Stephan Kinsella | 2001 | +| Meditations on Cypherpunk Nightmares | Michael Goldstein | 2014 | +| Fog of CryptoWar | Jonathan "smuggler" Logan | 2017 | +| Your Secret Right to Cash | Peter Van Valkenburgh | 2017 | +| Definition of Democratic Civilization | Abdullah Ocalan | 2020 | +| Of Cypherpunks and Sousveillance | Patrick Anderson | 2022 | -See each record for a summary, upstream source, and current rights posture. +Each record has a summary and a link to the work at its source. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md index 34da4f4..0d4c9a6 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md @@ -1,16 +1,29 @@ # The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto -- **Author:** Timothy C. May -- **Original year:** 1988 -- **Mailing-list publication:** 1992 -- **Source:** https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying manifesto is not mirrored without - an explicit redistribution grant. +*Timothy C. May* -## Summary +> **Distribution note (posted to the Cypherpunks list, 22 Nov 1992):** +> Cypherpunks of the World, +> Several of you at the "physical Cypherpunks" gathering yesterday in Silicon Valley requested that more of the material passed out in meetings be available electronically to the entire readership of the Cypherpunks list, spooks, eavesdroppers, and all. +> Here's the "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" I read at the September 1992 founding meeting. It dates back to mid-1988 and was distributed to some like-minded techno-anarchists at the "Crypto '88" conference and then again at the "Hackers Conference" that year. I later gave talks at Hackers on this in 1989 and 1990. +> There are a few things I'd change, but for historical reasons I'll just leave it as is. Some of the terms may be unfamiliar to you...I hope the Crypto Glossary I just distributed will help. +> (This should explain all those cryptic terms in my .signature!) +> --Tim May -May's early vision anticipates anonymous networks, digital money, reputation -systems, and markets that are difficult for states to observe or control. +--- -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. +"A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto anarchy." + +Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability for individuals and groups to communicate and interact with each other in a totally anonymous manner. Two persons may exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate electronic contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal identity, of the other. Interactions over networks will be untraceable, via extensive re-routing of encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes which implement cryptographic protocols with nearly perfect assurance against any tampering. Reputations will be of central importance, far more important in dealings than even the credit ratings of today. These developments will alter completely the nature of government regulation, the ability to tax and control economic interactions, the ability to keep information secret, and will even alter the nature of trust and reputation. + +The technology for this revolution--and it surely will be both a social and economic revolution--has existed in theory for the past decade. The methods are based upon public-key encryption, zero-knowledge interactive proof systems, and various software protocols for interaction, authentication, and verification. The focus has until now been on academic conferences in Europe and the U.S., conferences monitored closely by the National Security Agency. But only recently have computer networks and personal computers attained sufficient speed to make the ideas practically realizable. And the next ten years will bring enough additional speed to make the ideas economically feasible and essentially unstoppable. High-speed networks, ISDN, tamper-proof boxes, smart cards, satellites, Ku-band transmitters, multi-MIPS personal computers, and encryption chips now under development will be some of the enabling technologies. + +The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of this technology, citing national security concerns, use of the technology by drug dealers and tax evaders, and fears of societal disintegration. Many of these concerns will be valid; crypto anarchy will allow national secrets to be trade freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be traded. An anonymous computerized market will even make possible abhorrent markets for assassinations and extortion. Various criminal and foreign elements will be active users of CryptoNet. But this will not halt the spread of crypto anarchy. + +Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions. Combined with emerging information markets, crypto anarchy will create a liquid market for any and all material which can be put into words and pictures. And just as a seemingly minor invention like barbed wire made possible the fencing-off of vast ranches and farms, thus altering forever the concepts of land and property rights in the frontier West, so too will the seemingly minor discovery out of an arcane branch of mathematics come to be the wire clippers which dismantle the barbed wire around intellectual property. + +Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences! + +--- + +*Source: https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html — freely distributable with attribution to Timothy C. May.* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cyberspace-independence-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cyberspace-independence-record.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0b46578..0000000 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cyberspace-independence-record.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -# A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace - -- **Author:** John Perry Barlow -- **Year:** 1996 -- **Source:** https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; EFF's general license does not establish that this - Barlow work is covered. - -## Summary - -Written in Davos after passage of the US Telecommunications Reform Act, the -declaration rejects territorial government sovereignty over online communities -and imagines cyberspace as a self-governing civilization of the mind. - -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md index c05628c..86e8d43 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md @@ -1,16 +1,37 @@ # A Cypherpunk's Manifesto -- **Author:** Eric Hughes -- **Year:** 1993 -- **Source:** https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying manifesto is not mirrored without - an explicit redistribution grant. +*by Eric Hughes — 9 March 1993* -## Summary +Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Privacy is not secrecy. A private matter is something one doesn't want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one doesn't want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world. -The founding statement of the cypherpunk movement argues that privacy is the -power to reveal oneself selectively and that private systems must be built with -cryptography and code rather than requested from institutions. +If two parties have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of their interaction. Each party can speak about their own memory of this; how could anyone prevent it? One could pass laws against it, but the freedom of speech, even more than privacy, is fundamental to an open society; we seek not to restrict any speech at all. If many parties speak together in the same forum, each can speak to all the others and aggregate together knowledge about individuals and other parties. The power of electronic communications has enabled such group speech, and it will not go away merely because we might want it to. -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. +Since we desire privacy, we must ensure that each party to a transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary for that transaction. Since any information can be spoken of, we must ensure that we reveal as little as possible. In most cases personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages, my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying or what others are saying to me; my provider only need know how to get the message there and how much I owe them in fees. When my identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction, I have no privacy. I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must *always* reveal myself. + +Therefore, privacy in an open society requires anonymous transaction systems. Until now, cash has been the primary such system. An anonymous transaction system is not a secret transaction system. An anonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when desired and only when desired; this is the essence of privacy. + +Privacy in an open society also requires cryptography. If I say something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it. If the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no privacy. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Furthermore, to reveal one's identity with assurance when the default is anonymity requires the cryptographic signature. + +We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence. It is to their advantage to speak of us, and we should expect that they will speak. To try to prevent their speech is to fight against the realities of information. Information does not just want to be free, it longs to be free. Information expands to fill the available storage space. Information is Rumor's younger, stronger cousin; Information is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and understands less than Rumor. + +We must defend our own privacy if we expect to have any. We must come together and create systems which allow anonymous transactions to take place. People have been defending their own privacy for centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed doors, secret handshakes, and couriers. The technologies of the past did not allow for strong privacy, but electronic technologies do. + +We the Cypherpunks are dedicated to building anonymous systems. We are defending our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic money. + +Cypherpunks write code. We know that someone has to write software to defend privacy, and since we can't get privacy unless we all do, we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow Cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all to use, worldwide. We don't much care if you don't approve of the software we write. We know that software can't be destroyed and that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. + +Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is fundamentally a private act. The act of encryption, in fact, removes information from the public realm. Even laws against cryptography reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its violence. Cryptography will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with it the anonymous transactions systems that it makes possible. + +For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. People must come and together deploy these systems for the common good. Privacy only extends so far as the cooperation of one's fellows in society. We the Cypherpunks seek your questions and your concerns and hope we may engage you so that we do not deceive ourselves. We will not, however, be moved out of our course because some may disagree with our goals. + +The Cypherpunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for privacy. Let us proceed together apace. + +Onward. + +Eric Hughes + +9 March 1993 + +--- + +*Source: https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html — freely distributable with attribution.* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/declaration-of-independence-of-cyberspace.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/declaration-of-independence-of-cyberspace.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba98724 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/declaration-of-independence-of-cyberspace.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace + +*John Perry Barlow, 8 February 1996* + +Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. + +We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. + +Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. + +You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions. + +You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don't exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different. + +Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. + +We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. + +We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity. + +Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. + +Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our identities may be distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The only law that all our constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build our particular solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are attempting to impose. + +In the United States, you have today created a law, the Telecommunications Reform Act, which repudiates your own Constitution and insults the dreams of Jefferson, Washington, Mill, Madison, DeToqueville, and Brandeis. These dreams must now be born anew in us. + +You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world where you will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust your bureaucracies with the parental responsibilities you are too cowardly to confront yourselves. In our world, all the sentiments and expressions of humanity, from the debasing to the angelic, are parts of a seamless whole, the global conversation of bits. We cannot separate the air that chokes from the air upon which wings beat. + +In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the United States, you are trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting guard posts at the frontiers of Cyberspace. These may keep out the contagion for a small time, but they will not work in a world that will soon be blanketed in bit-bearing media. + +Your increasingly obsolete information industries would perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself throughout the world. These laws would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish. + +These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same position as those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination who had to reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers. We must declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts. + +We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made before. + +Davos, Switzerland +February 8, 1996 + +--- + +*Source: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/definition-of-democratic-civilization-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/definition-of-democratic-civilization-record.md index ae110e3..d7cf4bb 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/definition-of-democratic-civilization-record.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/definition-of-democratic-civilization-record.md @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ # Definition of Democratic Civilization - **Author:** Abdullah Ocalan -- **Year:** 2020 +- **From:** *The Sociology of Freedom: Manifesto of the Democratic Civilization, Volume 3* +- **Year:** 2020 (English edition) - **Source:** https://github.com/darkrenaissance/darkfi/blob/master/IDEOLOGY.md - **Rights status:** NOASSERTION - **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying excerpt is not mirrored. ## Summary -An excerpt adopted by the DarkFi project that contrasts moral and political +An excerpt from Ocalan's *The Sociology of Freedom*, adopted by the DarkFi project that contrasts moral and political society with centralized state and capitalist structures. This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/farewell-to-westphalia.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/farewell-to-westphalia.md index f3f8c3a..f6dcd47 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/farewell-to-westphalia.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/farewell-to-westphalia.md @@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ An exploration of blockchains and smart contracts as infrastructure for voluntary governance beyond the territorial nation-state. -Local file: [`farewell-to-westphalia.pdf`](./farewell-to-westphalia.pdf) +The PDF is in this folder as `farewell-to-westphalia.pdf`. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/libertaria-in-cyberspace-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/libertaria-in-cyberspace-record.md deleted file mode 100644 index f527b5e..0000000 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/libertaria-in-cyberspace-record.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# Libertaria in Cyberspace - -- **Author:** Timothy C. May -- **Year:** 1992 -- **Source:** https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/libertaria-in-cyberspace/ -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying mailing-list post is not mirrored. - -## Summary - -May argues that distributed computer networks are more hospitable to voluntary, -plural social orders than exposed physical enclaves with a single point of -control. - -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/libertaria-in-cyberspace.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/libertaria-in-cyberspace.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..70d1256 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/libertaria-in-cyberspace.md @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +# Libertaria in Cyberspace + +*Timothy C. May, 1 September 1992* + +LIBERTARIA IN CYBERSPACE + +or + +CYBERSPACE MORE HOSPITABLE TO IDEAS OF LIBERTY AND CRYPTO ANARCHY + +Here are a few points about why "cyberspace," or a computer-mediated +network, is more hospitable than physical locations for the kind of +"crypto anarchy" libertarian system I've been describing. + +Several folks have commented recently about ocean-going libertarian +havens, supertankers used as data havens, and so forth. In the 1970s, +especially, there were several unsuccessful attempts to acquire +islands in the Pacific for the site of what some called "Libertaria." +(Some keywords: Vanuatu, Minerva, Mike Oliver, Tonga) + +Obtaining an entire island is problematic. Getting the consent of the +residents is one issue (familiar to those on the this list who +weathered the Hurrican Andrew diversion debate). Being _allowed_ to +operate by the leading world powers is another....the U.S. has +enforced trade embargoes and blockades against many nations in the +past several decades, including Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Iran, Iraq, +andothers. Further, the U.S. has invaded some countries---Panama- is a +good example---whose government it disliked. How long would a +supertanker "data haven" or libertarian regime last in such an +environment? (Stephenson's fascinating "SnowCrash" didn't address tthe +issue of why the "Raft" wasn't simply sunk by the remaining military +forces.) + +I should note that the recent splintering of countries may provide +opportunities for libertarian (or PPL, if your prefer to think of it +in this way) regions. Some have speculated that Russia itself is a +candidate, given that it has little vested in the previous system and +may be willing to abandon statism. If several dozen new countries are +formed, some opportunities exist.. + +The basic problem is that _physical space_ is too small, too exposed +to the view of others. "Libertaria" in the form of, say, an island, is +too exposed to the retaliatation of world powers. (I won't go into the +"private nukes" strategy, which I need to think about further.) + +A floating private nation (or whatever it's called) is too vulnerable +to a single well-placed torpedo. Even if it serves as a kind of Swiss +bank, and thus gets some of the same protection Switzerland got (to +wit, many leaders kept their loot there), it is too vulnerable to a +single attacker or invader. Piracy will be just one of the problems. + +Finally, how many of us want to move to a South Pacific island? Or a +North Sea oil rig? Or even to Russia? + +Cyberspace looks more promising. There is more "space" in cyberspace, +thus allowing more security and more colonizable space. And this space +is coterminous with our physical space, accessible with proper +terminals from any place in the world (though there may be attempts in +physical space to block access, to restrict access to necessay +cryptographic methods, etc.). + +I won't go into the various cryptographic methods here (see my earlier +posting on the "Dining Cryptographers" protocol and various other +postings on public key systems, digital mixes, electronic cash, etc.). +Interested readers have many sources. (I have just read a superb +survey of these new techniques, the 1992 Ph.D. thesis of Jurgen Bos, +"Practical Privacy," which deals with these various protocols in a +nice little book.) + +Alice and Bob, our favorite cryptographic stand-ins, can communicate +and transact business without ever meeting or even knowing who the +other is. This can be extended to create virtual communities subject +only to rules they themselves reach agreement on, much like this very +Extropians list. Private law is the only law, as there is no appeal to +some higher authority like the Pope or police. (This is why I said in +several of my potings on the Hurricane Andrew debate that I am +sympathetic to the PPL view.) + +And this is the most compelling advantage of "Crypto Libertaria": an +arbitrarily large number of separate "nations" can simultaneously +exist. This allows for rapid experimentation, self-selection, and +evolution. If folks get tired of some virtual community, they can +leave. The cryptographic aspects mean their membership in some +community is unknown to others (vis-a-vis the physical or outside +world, i.e., their "true names") and physical coercion is reduced. + +Communalists are free to create a communal environment, Creative +Anachronists are free to create their own idea of a space, and so on. +I'm not even getting into the virtual reality-photorealistic +images-Jaron Lanier sort of thing, as even current text-based systems +are demonstrably enough to allow the kind of virtual communities I'm +describing here (and described in Vinge's "True Names," in Gibson's +"Neuromancer," in Sterling's "Islands in the Net," and in Stephenson's +"Snow Crash"...though all of them missed out on some of the most +exciting aspects...perhaps my novel will hit the mark?). + +But will the government allow these sorts of things? Won't they just +torpedo it, just as they'd torpedo an offshore ooirig data haven? + +The key is that distributed systems have no nexus which can be knocked +out. Neither Usenet norFidoNet can be disabled by any single +government, as they are worldwide. Shutting them down would mean +banning computer-to-computer communication. And despite the talk of +mandatory "trap doors" in encryption systems, encryption is +fundamentally easy to do and hard to detect. (For those who doubt +this, let me describe a simple system I posted to sci.crypt several +years ago. An ordinary digital audio tape (DAT) carries more than a +gigabyte of data. This means that thhe least significant bit (LSB) of +an audio DAT recordingng carries about 8megabytes of data! So Alice is +stopped by the Data Police. They ask if she's carrying illegal data. +She smiles inocently and say "No. I know you'll search me." They find +her Sony DATman and ask about her collection of tapes and live +recordings. Alice is carrying 80 MB of data---about 3 entire days +worth of Usenet feeds!---on each and every tape. The data are stored +in the LSBs, completely indistinguishable from microphone and +quantization noise...unless you know the key. Similar methods allow +data to be undetectably packed into LSBs of the PICT and GIF pictures +now flooding the Net, into sampled sounds, and even into messages like +this...the "whitespace" on the right margin of this message carries a +hidden message readable only to a few chosen Extropians.) + +I've already described using religions and role-playing games as a +kind of legal cover for the development and deployment of these +techniques. If a church decides to offer "digital confessionals" for +its far-flung members, by what argument will the U.S. government +justify insisting that encryption not be used? (I should note that +psychiatrists and similar professionals have a responsibility to their +clients and to their licensing agencies to ensure the privacy of +patient records. Friends of mine are using encryption to protect +patient records. This is just one little example of how encryption is +getting woven into the fabric of our electronic society. There are +many other examples.) + +In future discussions, I hope we can hit on some of the many +approaches to deploying these methods. I've spent several years +thinking about this, but I've surely missed some good ideas. The +"crypto anarchy game" being planned is an attempt to get some of the +best hackers in the Bay Area thinking along these lines and thinking +of new wrinkles. Several have already offered to help further. + +Some have commented that this list is not an appropriate place to +discuss these ideas. I think it is. We are not discussing +anything that is actually illegal, even under the broad powers of RICO +(Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, used to go after +"conspiracies" of porn dealers and gun dealers, amongst others). What +we are discussing are long-range implications of these ideas. + +In conclusion, it will be easier to form certain types of libertarian +societies in cyberspace than in the real world of nations and physical +locations. The electronic world is by no means complete, as we will +still live much of our lives in the physical world. But economic +activity is sharply increasing in the Net domain and these "crypto +anarchy" ideas will further erode the power of physical states to tax +and coerce residents. + +Libertaria will thrive in cyberspace. + +-Tim May + +--- + +*Source: Timothy C. May's repost of his 1 September 1992 Extropians list essay to the Cypherpunks list, 9 August 1993: https://mailing-list-archive.cryptoanarchy.wiki/archive/1993/08/afd51441bdcebe887e3841a08dc769cd76f81c8291dc56525bec4c2d2368c56b* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/manifest.json b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/manifest.json index 4f0e6b5..3cecdf5 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/manifest.json +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/manifest.json @@ -3,68 +3,93 @@ "dataset": "cypherpunk-canon", "title": "Cypherpunk Canon", "anchorPath": "/cypherpunk", - "description": "A rights-aware shelf of foundational cypherpunk writing, privacy research, and adjacent books.", + "description": "Foundational cypherpunk writing, privacy research, and adjacent books: classic texts in full, three books as PDFs, and links to the rest.", "defaults": { "contentType": "text/markdown" }, "discoverySource": "https://www.cypherpunkbooks.com/collection", "files": [ + { + "path": "README.md", + "name": "README.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Cypherpunk Canon", + "description": "Overview of the shelf: what is here, what to read first, and which works are linked rather than hosted.", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://github.com/efs-project/content/tree/main/datasets/cypherpunk-canon", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + }, { "path": "collection.md", "name": "collection.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "Cypherpunk Reading Shelf", - "description": "Index of the 21-work collection and each item's local or link-only status.", - "tags": ["index", "reading-list", "archive"], + "description": "Every work on the shelf, with author, year and whether it is hosted in EFS or linked.", + "tags": ["reading-list", "archive"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "redistributionStatus": "deployable", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "modificationStatus": "original-metadata", + "source": "https://github.com/efs-project/content/tree/main/datasets/cypherpunk-canon" }, { "path": "cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md", "name": "cypherpunks-manifesto-full.md", - "title": "About: A Cypherpunk's Manifesto", - "description": "A link record for Eric Hughes's 1993 statement on privacy, cryptography, and code.", - "tags": ["foundational", "privacy", "philosophy", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Eric Hughes", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "A Cypherpunk's Manifesto", + "description": "Eric Hughes's 1993 founding statement of the cypherpunk movement, in full.", + "tags": ["foundational", "privacy", "philosophy"], + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "author": "Eric Hughes", "originalYear": 1993, "source": "https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { "path": "crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md", "name": "crypto-anarchist-manifesto-full.md", - "title": "About: The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto", - "description": "A link record for Timothy C. May's vision of anonymous networks and crypto-anarchic markets.", - "tags": ["foundational", "markets", "philosophy", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Timothy C. May", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto", + "description": "Timothy C. May's 1988 vision of anonymous networks and crypto-anarchic markets, in full.", + "tags": ["foundational", "markets", "philosophy"], + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "author": "Timothy C. May", "originalYear": 1988, "publicationYear": 1992, "source": "https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { - "path": "cyberspace-independence-record.md", - "name": "cyberspace-independence-record.md", - "title": "About: A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace", - "description": "A link record for John Perry Barlow's 1996 declaration of cyberspace independence.", - "tags": ["foundational", "cyberspace", "governance", "speech", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "John Perry Barlow", + "path": "b-money.md", + "name": "b-money.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "b-money", + "description": "Wei Dai's 1998 proposal for money and contracts among untraceable pseudonyms, cited as reference [1] in the Bitcoin whitepaper, in full.", + "tags": ["ecash", "money", "crypto-anarchy"], + "author": "Wei Dai", + "originalYear": 1998, + "source": "https://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" + }, + { + "path": "declaration-of-independence-of-cyberspace.md", + "name": "declaration-of-independence-of-cyberspace.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace", + "description": "John Perry Barlow's 1996 declaration that governments have no sovereignty over cyberspace, in full.", + "tags": ["foundational", "cyberspace", "governance", "speech"], + "author": "John Perry Barlow", "originalYear": 1996, "source": "https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { "path": "the-praxeology-of-privacy.pdf", @@ -87,9 +112,10 @@ { "path": "the-praxeology-of-privacy.md", "name": "the-praxeology-of-privacy.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: The Praxeology of Privacy", "description": "Human-readable provenance, summary, and rights information for the included PDF.", - "tags": ["privacy", "economics", "cryptography", "book", "about"], + "tags": ["privacy", "economics", "cryptography", "book"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "source": "https://towardsliberty.com/pop", @@ -121,9 +147,10 @@ { "path": "21-lessons.md", "name": "21-lessons.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: 21 Lessons", "description": "Human-readable provenance, summary, edition, and rights information for the included PDF.", - "tags": ["bitcoin", "economics", "philosophy", "book", "about"], + "tags": ["bitcoin", "economics", "philosophy", "book"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "source": "https://21lessons.com/", @@ -156,9 +183,10 @@ { "path": "farewell-to-westphalia.md", "name": "farewell-to-westphalia.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Farewell to Westphalia", "description": "Human-readable provenance, summary, edition, and rights information for the included PDF.", - "tags": ["governance", "blockchains", "smart-contracts", "book", "about"], + "tags": ["governance", "blockchains", "smart-contracts", "book"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "source": "https://logos.co/book", @@ -168,9 +196,10 @@ { "path": "your-secret-right-to-cash-record.md", "name": "your-secret-right-to-cash-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Your Secret Right to Cash", "description": "A link record for Peter Van Valkenburgh's essay on cash as private, censorship-resistant payment.", - "tags": ["cash", "privacy", "payments", "record"], + "tags": ["cash", "privacy", "payment"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Peter Van Valkenburgh", @@ -183,9 +212,10 @@ { "path": "of-cypherpunks-and-sousveillance-record.md", "name": "of-cypherpunks-and-sousveillance-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Of Cypherpunks and Sousveillance", "description": "A link record for Patrick Anderson's study of privacy, transparency, and data activism.", - "tags": ["privacy", "transparency", "research", "record"], + "tags": ["privacy", "transparency", "research"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Patrick Anderson", @@ -196,42 +226,41 @@ "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" }, { - "path": "protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash-record.md", - "name": "protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash-record.md", - "title": "About: Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash", - "description": "A link record for Hal Finney's 1993 case for privacy-preserving digital cash.", - "tags": ["ecash", "privacy", "cryptography", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Hal Finney", - "year": 1993, - "source": "https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash/", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "path": "protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.md", + "name": "protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash", + "description": "Hal Finney's 1993 Extropy article on public-key cryptography, anonymous remailers and digital cash, in full.", + "tags": ["ecash", "privacy", "cryptography"], + "author": "Hal Finney", + "originalYear": 1993, + "source": "https://cdn.nakamotoinstitute.org/docs/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.pdf", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { - "path": "why-i-wrote-pgp-record.md", - "name": "why-i-wrote-pgp-record.md", - "title": "About: Why I Wrote PGP", - "description": "A link record for Philip Zimmermann's explanation of PGP and private speech.", - "tags": ["encryption", "pgp", "speech", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Philip Zimmermann", + "path": "why-i-wrote-pgp.md", + "name": "why-i-wrote-pgp.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Why I Wrote PGP", + "description": "Philip Zimmermann's essay on why everyone needs strong encryption, from the 1991 PGP User's Guide (1999 revision), in full.", + "tags": ["encryption", "pgp", "speech"], + "author": "Philip Zimmermann", "originalYear": 1991, "sourceRevisionYear": 1999, "source": "https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/WhyIWrotePGP.html", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { "path": "definition-of-democratic-civilization-record.md", "name": "definition-of-democratic-civilization-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Definition of Democratic Civilization", - "description": "A link record for the Abdullah Ocalan excerpt adopted as DarkFi's ideology text.", - "tags": ["governance", "political-theory", "darkfi", "record"], + "description": "A link record for the excerpt from Abdullah Ocalan's The Sociology of Freedom (Volume 3) that DarkFi adopted as its ideology text.", + "tags": ["governance", "political-theory", "darkfi"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Abdullah Ocalan", @@ -242,26 +271,26 @@ "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" }, { - "path": "the-conscience-of-a-hacker-record.md", - "name": "the-conscience-of-a-hacker-record.md", - "title": "About: The Conscience of a Hacker", - "description": "A link record for Loyd Blankenship's 1986 Hacker Manifesto.", - "tags": ["hacker-culture", "manifesto", "identity", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Loyd Blankenship", - "year": 1986, - "source": "https://phrack.org/issues/7/3.html", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "path": "the-conscience-of-a-hacker.md", + "name": "the-conscience-of-a-hacker.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "The Conscience of a Hacker", + "description": "The Mentor's 1986 Hacker Manifesto from Phrack issue 7, in full.", + "tags": ["hacker-culture", "manifesto", "identity"], + "author": "Loyd Blankenship (The Mentor)", + "originalYear": 1986, + "source": "https://phrack.org/issues/7/hackers-manifesto.html", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { "path": "the-cyphernomicon-record.md", "name": "the-cyphernomicon-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: The Cyphernomicon", "description": "A link record for Timothy C. May's wide-ranging cypherpunk FAQ and compendium.", - "tags": ["reference", "cryptography", "anonymity", "record"], + "tags": ["reference", "cryptography", "anonymity"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Timothy C. May", @@ -274,9 +303,10 @@ { "path": "meditations-on-cypherpunk-nightmares-record.md", "name": "meditations-on-cypherpunk-nightmares-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Meditations on Cypherpunk Nightmares", "description": "A link record for Michael Goldstein's reflection on information markets and virtue.", - "tags": ["privacy", "information", "philosophy", "record"], + "tags": ["privacy", "information", "philosophy"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Michael Goldstein", @@ -287,26 +317,26 @@ "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" }, { - "path": "the-beauty-of-ecash-record.md", - "name": "the-beauty-of-ecash-record.md", - "title": "About: The Beauty of eCash", - "description": "A link record for Hal Finney's proposal for aesthetically interesting digital cash.", - "tags": ["ecash", "design", "cryptography", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Hal Finney", - "year": 1994, - "source": "https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/the-beauty-of-ecash/", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "path": "the-beauty-of-ecash.md", + "name": "the-beauty-of-ecash.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "The Beauty of ECash", + "description": "Hal Finney's 1994 idea for collectible digital cash whose validity could be seen as a pattern, in full.", + "tags": ["ecash", "design", "cryptography"], + "author": "Hal Finney", + "originalYear": 1994, + "source": "https://web.archive.org/web/20140421063207/http://www.finney.org/~hal/beauty_ecash.html", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { "path": "a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men-record.md", "name": "a-lodging-of-wayfaring-men-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: A Lodging of Wayfaring Men", "description": "A link record for Paul Rosenberg's novel of encrypted networks and voluntary society.", - "tags": ["fiction", "encrypted-networks", "voluntary-society", "record"], + "tags": ["fiction", "encrypted-networks", "voluntary-society"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Paul Rosenberg", @@ -319,9 +349,10 @@ { "path": "fog-of-cryptowar-record.md", "name": "fog-of-cryptowar-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Fog of CryptoWar", "description": "A link record for Jonathan Logan's map of modern encryption policy pressure.", - "tags": ["encryption", "policy", "surveillance", "record"], + "tags": ["encryption", "policy", "surveillance"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "Jonathan \"smuggler\" Logan", @@ -332,26 +363,26 @@ "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" }, { - "path": "libertaria-in-cyberspace-record.md", - "name": "libertaria-in-cyberspace-record.md", - "title": "About: Libertaria in Cyberspace", - "description": "A link record for Timothy C. May's case for plural voluntary orders in distributed networks.", - "tags": ["crypto-anarchy", "networks", "governance", "record"], - "license": "CC0-1.0", - "author": "EFS contributors", - "workAuthor": "Timothy C. May", - "year": 1992, - "source": "https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/libertaria-in-cyberspace/", - "workLicense": "NOASSERTION", - "redistributionStatus": "link-only", - "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + "path": "libertaria-in-cyberspace.md", + "name": "libertaria-in-cyberspace.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Libertaria in Cyberspace", + "description": "Timothy C. May's 1992 case that networks, not islands, are where voluntary societies can thrive, in full.", + "tags": ["crypto-anarchy", "networks", "governance"], + "author": "Timothy C. May", + "originalYear": 1992, + "source": "https://mailing-list-archive.cryptoanarchy.wiki/archive/1993/08/afd51441bdcebe887e3841a08dc769cd76f81c8291dc56525bec4c2d2368c56b", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim" }, { "path": "measuring-freenet-in-the-wild-record.md", "name": "measuring-freenet-in-the-wild-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Measuring Freenet in the Wild", "description": "A link record for an empirical study of Freenet's topology, routing, and users.", - "tags": ["freenet", "censorship-resistance", "research", "record"], + "tags": ["freenet", "censorship-resistance", "research"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthors": ["Stefanie Roos", "Benjamin Schiller", "Stefan Hacker", "Thorsten Strufe"], @@ -364,9 +395,10 @@ { "path": "ideal-money-and-asymptotically-ideal-money-record.md", "name": "ideal-money-and-asymptotically-ideal-money-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Ideal Money and Asymptotically Ideal Money", "description": "A link record for John Nash's writing on stable monetary standards.", - "tags": ["money", "economics", "stability", "record"], + "tags": ["money", "economics", "stability"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "John F. Nash Jr.", @@ -379,9 +411,10 @@ { "path": "against-intellectual-property-record.md", "name": "against-intellectual-property-record.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", "title": "About: Against Intellectual Property", "description": "A link record for N. Stephan Kinsella's argument against patents and copyright.", - "tags": ["property", "copyright", "patents", "record"], + "tags": ["property", "copyright", "patents"], "license": "CC0-1.0", "author": "EFS contributors", "workAuthor": "N. Stephan Kinsella", diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/measuring-freenet-in-the-wild-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/measuring-freenet-in-the-wild-record.md index 2752a7d..b93cdb3 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/measuring-freenet-in-the-wild-record.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/measuring-freenet-in-the-wild-record.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ - **Source:** https://freenetproject.org/assets/papers/roos-pets2014.pdf - **Publication:** Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium 2014 - **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the paper is not mirrored without a clear license. +- **EFS status:** Link-only; the paper is not hosted in EFS. Read it at the source link. ## Summary diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/of-cypherpunks-and-sousveillance-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/of-cypherpunks-and-sousveillance-record.md index 3a31001..0df2fc8 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/of-cypherpunks-and-sousveillance-record.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/of-cypherpunks-and-sousveillance-record.md @@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ - **Year:** 2022 - **Source:** https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v20i1.14322 - **Work license:** CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 -- **EFS status:** Link-only pending an explicit decision about mirroring - noncommercial, no-derivatives works. +- **EFS status:** Link-only; the article is not hosted in EFS. Read it at the source link. ## Summary diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash-record.md deleted file mode 100644 index ab30a55..0000000 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash-record.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash - -- **Author:** Hal Finney -- **Year:** 1993 -- **Source:** https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash/ -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying article is not mirrored. - -## Summary - -Finney explains how public-key cryptography, anonymous communication, and -digital cash can preserve the privacy properties of physical cash instead of -turning every transaction into a surveillance record. - -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95f89c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.md @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +# Protecting Privacy with Electronic Cash + +*Hal Finney, 1993* + +How can we defend our privacy in an era of increased computerization? Today, our lives are subject to monitoring in a host of different ways. Every credit card transaction goes into a database. Our phone calls are logged by the phone company and used for its own marketing purposes. Our checks are photocopied and archived by the banks. And new “matching” techniques combine information from multiple databases, revealing even more detail about our lives. As computer databases grow, as more transactions take place electronically, over phone systems and computer networks, the possible forms of monitoring will grow with them¹. + +Predictably, most proposed solutions to this problem involve more government. One suggestion is to pass a set of laws designed to restrict information usage: “No information shall be used for a purpose different from that for which it was originally collected.” Thus, income data collected by a bank through monitoring checking account activity could not be made available to mailing list companies; phone records could not be sold to telemarketing agencies, etc. + +But this is a bad solution, for many reasons. The government is notoriously inefficient at enforcing existing laws, and the ease of collecting and using information suggests that it would be almost impossible to successfully enforce a law like this. The government also has a tendency to exempt itself from its own laws. It’s unlikely that the IRS, for example, will happily give up the use of database matching, which it uses to track down tax evaders. And, of course, the very notion of trying to restrict the uses of information requires strict restrictions on the private actions of individuals which Extropians will find unacceptable. + +But there is another solution, one advocated forcefully by computer scientist David Chaum of the Center for Mathematics and Computer Science in the Netherlands. While most people concerned with this problem have looked to paternalistic government solutions, Chaum has been quietly putting together the technical basis for a new way of organizing our financial and personal information. Rather than relying on new laws and more government, Chaum looks to technical solutions. And these solutions rely on the ancient science devoted to keeping information confidential: cryptography. + +Cryptography, the art of secret writing, has undergone a revolution in the last two decades, a revolution sparked by the invention of “public-key” cryptography. Seizing on this new technology, computer scientists have branched out into dozens of directions, pushing the frontiers of secrecy and confidentiality into new territory. And it is these new applications for cryptography which offer such promise for avoiding the dangers described above. + +Chaum’s approach to the protection of privacy can be thought of as having three layers. The first layer is public-key cryptography, which protects the privacy of individual messages. The second layer is anonymous messaging, which allows people to communicate via electronic mail (“email”) without revealing their true identities. And the third layer is electronic money, which allows people to not only communicate but to transact business via a computer network, with the same kind of privacy you get when you use cash. If you go into a store today and make a purchase with cash, no records are left tying you personally to the transaction. With no records, there is nothing to go into a computer database. The goal of electronic cash is to allow these same kinds of private transactions to take place electronically. + +(Be aware that there are other proposals for “electronic money” which are not nearly so protective of individuals’ privacy. Chaum’s proposals are intended to preserve the privacy attributes of cash, so the term “digital cash” is appropriate. But other electronic replacements for cash not only lack its privacy, but would actually facilitate computer monitoring by putting more detailed information into databases, and by discouraging the use of cash. If you see a proposal for an electronic money system, check to see whether it has the ability to preserve the privacy of financial transactions the way paper money does today. If not, realize that the proposal is designed to harm, not help, individual privacy.) + +## Public-Key Cryptography + +The first of the three layers in the privacy-protecting electronic money system is public-key cryptography. The basic concept of public-key cryptography, invented in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman², is simple. Cryptographers have traditionally described an encryption system as being composed of two parts: an encryption method and a key. The encryption method is assumed to be publicly available, but the key is kept secret. If two people want to communicate, they agree on a secret key, and use that to encrypt and decrypt the message. + +Public key cryptography introduced the idea that there could be two keys rather than one. One key, the public key, is known to everyone, and is used to encrypt messages. The other key, the secret key, is known only to you, and is used to decrypt messages. Public and secret keys are created in pairs, with each public key corresponding to one secret key, and vice versa. + +So, to use a public-key system, you first create a public/secret key pair. You tell all your friends your public key, while keeping your secret key secret. When they want to send to you, they encrypt the message using your public key. The resulting encrypted message is readable only by using your secret key. This means that even the person who encrypted the message can’t decrypt it! If he forgets what his original message said, and he deleted it, he has no chance of reconstructing the original. Only you can do that. This is the paradox of public key cryptography—that a person can transform a message in such a way that they can’t un-transform it, even though they know the exact formula used to make the transformation. + +Figure 1 illustrates the steps involved in using a public-key system. (The keys and messages are based on actual output from Phillip Zimmermann’s free public-key program, PGP.) Alice, on the left, first creates a public and secret key pair, the top two boxes on that side. The top box, the public key, she sends to her friend Bob, on the right. The second box is her secret key, which she keeps private. Bob, on the right, receives and saves Alice’s public key. Then, when he wants to write to her, he composes a message, shown in the second box on that side. With a public-key encryption program like PGP, he encrypts the message using Alice’s public key, producing output such as the third box on the right. This encrypted message is what he sends to Alice, as shown in the arrow leading back to the left side. Alice uses her saved secret key to decrypt the message from Bob, allowing her to reconstruct Bob’s original message, shown as the last box on the left side. + +There is no longer any need for public-key cryptography to be mysterious. There are now public-domain software packages which will let you experiment with public-key cryptography on your own computer, including Zimmermann’s PGP and others. See the “Access” box for information on how to get them. + +## Anonymous Messages + +Public-key cryptography allows people to communicate electronically with privacy and security. You can send messages safe from prying eyes using these techniques. But this is just a step towards the solution to the privacy problems we face. The next step provides the second layer of privacy: anonymous messages—messages whose source and destination can’t be traced. + +This is necessary because of the goal of providing in an electronic network the privacy of an ordinary cash transaction. Just as a merchant will accept cash from a customer without demanding proof of identity, we also want our electronic money system to allow similar transactions to take place, without the identity of the people involved being revealed to each other, or even to someone who is monitoring the network. + +There are problems with providing anonymous messaging in current email systems. The national email networks are composed of thousands of machines, interconnected through a variety of gateways and message-passing systems. The fundamental necessity for a message to be delivered in such a system is that it be addressed appropriately. Typically an email address consists of a user’s name, and the name of the computer system which is his electronic “home”. As the message works its way through the network, routing information is added to it, to keep a record of where the message came from and what machines it passed through en route to its destination. In this system, all messages are prominently stamped with their source and destination. Providing anonymous messages in such a system at first appears impossible. + +Chaum has proposed two separate systems for overcoming this problem³. I will focus here on what he calls a “Mix” as it is simpler and more appropriate for the application of anonymous electronic mail. The notion of a Mix is simple. It is basically a message forwarding service. An analogy with ordinary paper mail may be helpful. Imagine that you want to send a letter to a friend, but in such a way that even someone monitoring your outgoing mail would not know that you were doing this. One solution would be to put your letter into an envelope addressed to your friend, then to place this envelope inside a larger envelope which you would send to someone else, along with a note asking them to forward the letter to your friend. This would hide the true destination of your mail from someone who was watching your outgoing envelopes. + +Chaum’s Mixes use this basic idea, but applied to email and improved with public-key cryptography. A Mix is a computer program capable of receiving email. It receives messages which contain requests for remailing to another address, and basically just strips off these remailing instructions and forwards the messages as requested. Chaum adds security by having a different public key for each Mix. Now, instead of just sending the message with its forwarding request, the message plus forwarding info is encrypted with the Mix’s public key before being sent to the Mix. The Mix simply decrypts the incoming message with its secret key, revealing the forwarding information, and sends the message on. + +To protect the privacy of the sender, the Mix removes information about the original sender of the message before sending it. For even greater security, it’s possible for the original sender to specify a “Cascade” of Mixes, a whole chain of Mixes that the message should go through before finally being sent to its destination. That way even if one of the Mixes is corrupt, it still can’t determine who is sending to whom. + +Using Mixes, then, the basic requirement for anonymous mail is met. A message en route in the network does not have to reveal its source and destination. It may be coming from a Mix, going to a Mix, or some combination of these. + +Figure 2 shows an example of an anonymous message as it is forwarded through a Mix, using public-key cryptography to protect its privacy. As in Figure 1, Bob wants to send his encrypted message to Alice, but this time he wants to use a Mix to provide more confidentiality. Starting with the encrypted message from Figure 1, Bob (on the left, this time) first adds remailing instructions which will be interpreted by the Mix. These will include Alice’s email address in some format specified by the Mix. (This example uses a simplified form of commands currently being used in experimental remailers.) Then he encrypts the whole message with the Mix’s public key and sends it to the Mix. + +Upon receipt, the Mix reverses the steps which Bob applied. It decrypts the message using its own secret key, then strips off the remailing instructions which Bob added. The resulting message (which the Mix can’t read, being encrypted using Alice’s secret key) is then forwarded to Alice as specified in the remailing instructions. As before, Alice receives and decrypts the message using her secret key. But this time, the message path has been protected by the Mix, and the fact that Alice and Bob are communicating is kept confidential. + +## Anonymous Return Addresses + +We need something more advanced than message anonymity for truly private messaging, though. These anonymous messages are basically “one-way”. I can send you a message, with the source and destination hidden, and when you receive the message you won’t have any way of knowing who sent it. This means that you can’t reply to me. We need the ability to have such replies. + +Here, we have a seemingly paradoxical requirement: being able to reply to someone without knowing either who they are or what their email address is. Chaum shows how this can be solved using public-key cryptography and Mixes. The basic idea is what Chaum calls an Anonymous Return Address (ARA). In its simplest form, I create an ARA by taking my regular email address and encrypting it with the public key of a particular Mix—call it MixA for this example. I send this resulting block of encrypted text along with my message to you, through a Cascade of Mixes. + +Now, when you receive the message, you see no return address, but you do see the block of text that is the ARA. You can reply to me without knowing who I am by sending your reply back to MixA, along with the ARA itself. MixA decrypts the ARA using its secret key, getting back my original email address that I encrypted. Using this email address, it is able to forward the mail to me. I was able to receive this message from you, although you have no knowledge of my true identity. + +Figure 3 shows this process graphically. Bob, in the upper left, creates his ARA by encrypting a remailing command, similar to what was used in Figure 2, with the Mix’s public key. He then includes this ARA in messages which he anonymously sends or publically posts. In the example, Alice sees Bob’s ARA and wishes to respond to him, even though she doesn’t know his email address. She composes her message, in the second box on the right, then combines her message with Bob’s ARA. The combined message is sent to the Mix. The Mix now uses its secret key to decrypt the ARA portion of the message, revealing the remailing instructions which Bob encrypted to create the ARA. The remainder of the process is just as in Figure 3. The Mix strips off the remailing request and forwards the message to Bob’s address, as shown. + +These tools open many possibilities. With Mixes, Cascades, and ARAs, people can communicate without knowing other people’s true identities. You can make an anonymous posting to a public message board, include your ARA, and receive replies from scores of people who don’t know who you are. Some of them may reply anonymously and include their own ARAs. People can end up communicating with each other with none of them knowing the true identity of any of the others. + +(Some “Chat” or “CB Simulator” systems today offer the illusion of such anonymous communication, but in most cases the system operators can easily break through the cover of handles and pseudonyms and discover true identities. With a Cascade of Mixes, no single Mix can establish this relationship. As long as even one Mix of the Cascade remains uncorrupted, your identity is safe.) + +## Digital Pseudonyms + +Anonymous messages bring forth the usefulness of “digital pseudonyms,” another concept from Chaum. With no identification of the source of messages, there would seem to be no way of verifying that two messages came from the same person. There could be a problem with imposters pretending to be other people, resulting in utter confusion. To solve this problem, we need another concept from public-key cryptography: the “digital signature.” + +As described above, public-key cryptography allows messages encrypted with my public key to be decrypted with my secret key. However, it works the other way around as well. Messages can be encrypted with my *secret* key and then decrypted only with my *public* key. This property is what is used to implement the digital signature. If I encrypt a document with my secret key, anyone can decrypt it with my public key. And since my secret key is secret, only I can do this type of encryption. That means that if a document can be decrypted with my public key, then I, and only I, must have encrypted it with my secret key. This is considered a digital signature, in the sense that it is a proof that I was the one that “signed” (that is, encrypted) the document. + +The digital signature concept can be used to solve the imposter problem by allowing for “digital pseudonyms.” My digital pseudonym is simply a public/secret key pair, where, as usual, I let the public part be known. Typically, I’d publicize it along with my ARA. Now, to prove that a given message is from me and no one else, I sign the message using the secret key of my digital pseudonym. Any set of messages signed by that same digital pseudonym is therefore known to come from me, because only I know the secret key. People may not know who I am, but I can still maintain a stable public persona on the computer nets via my digital pseudonym. And there is no danger of anyone else successfully masquerading as me. + +With public-key cryptography, Mixes, and digital pseudonyms, we have all we need for a network of people communicating privately and anonymously. Now, we need a way for them to transact business while maintaining these conditions. + +## Electronic Money + +The next step, the third layer in our description, is digital cash—electronic money. Cash, ordinary folding paper money, is one of the last bastions of privacy in our financial lives. And many of the problems described above—the losses of privacy, the increase in computerized information—could be avoided if cash could be used more easily. But cash has many disadvantages. It can be lost, or stolen, and it’s not safe to carry in large quantities. Also, it is useless for purchases made electronically, over the phone or (in the future) over computer networks. Digital cash is designed to combine the advantages of electronic payment systems—the safety and convenience—with the advantages of paper money—the privacy and anonymity. + +Once again, we are faced with paradoxes in the notion of digital cash. Since digital cash may be sent by email and other electronic methods, it must basically be an information pattern—in concrete terms, some pattern of letters and numbers. How could such a string of characters have value, in the same sense that the dollar bill in your wallet does? What about counterfeiting? Couldn’t another copy of the character string be created trivially? What prevents a person from “spending” the same money twice? + +To answer these questions we turn again to public-key cryptography. Realize, though, that electronic money is an active area of research in cryptography. Many people have proposed different systems for electronic cash, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages. I will present here a simplified concept to give a feel for the problems and solutions which exist⁴. + +One way to think of digital cash is by analogy to the early days of paper money. At one time, paper money was not the monopoly of governments that it is today. Instead, paper money was “bank notes”, often given as receipts for the deposit of gold or similar “real money” in bank vaults. These notes would carry a description of what they were worth, such as, “Redeemable for one ounce of gold.” A particular bank note could be redeemed at the issuing bank for its face value. People used these bank notes as we use paper money today. They were valuable because they were backed by materials of value in the bank vaults. + +In a sense, then, a bank note can be viewed as a signed document, a promise to perform a redemption for the bearer who presents it at the bank. This suggests a way of thinking of digital money. Instead of a paper note with an engraved signature, we instead would use an electronic mail message with a digital signature. + +An electronic bank could, like the banks of old, have valuable materials in its vaults. Today, these would likely be dollars or other government currency, but they could be gold or other commodities. Using these as backing, it would issue bank notes. These would be electronic messages, digitally signed by the bank’s secret key, promising to transfer a specified sum to the account of whomever presented the note to the bank (or, if desired, to redeem the note in dollars or other valuables.) + +Here is how it might work. You open an account with an electronic bank, depositing some money as in any bank. The bank then credits your account with your initial balance. Now, suppose you are going to want to make an electronic payment to me. Prior to any transactions, you would send a message to the bank, requesting one or more bank notes in specified denominations. (This is exactly analogous to withdrawing cash from your regular bank account.) The bank debits your account, creates new bank note messages, and sends them to you. They are sent to you as signed messages, encrypted with the bank’s secret key. When decrypted with the bank’s public key, which everyone knows, a one-dollar digital bank note would say, in effect, “This note is worth $1.00, payable on demand.” It would also include a unique serial number, like the serial number on a dollar bill. + +The serial number is important; as we will see below, it is used by the bank to make sure that a particular note is accepted for deposit only once. But putting serial numbers on the bank notes hurts anonymity; the bank can remember which account a bank note was withdrawn from, and then when it is deposited the bank will know that the depositer is doing business with the withdrawer. To avoid this, Chaum introduces a clever mathematical trick (too complex to describe here) which allows the serial number to be randomly changed as the note is withdrawn from the bank. The bank note still retains its proper form and value, but the serial number is different from the one the bank saw. This allows the bank to check that the same note isn’t deposited more than once, while making it impossible for the bank to determine who withdrew any note that is deposited. + +When you are ready to purchase something from me, you simply email me the appropriate bank note messages. I can check that they are legitimate bank notes by using the bank’s public key to verify its signature. I then email the notes to the bank, which checks that the account numbers on the notes have not been deposited before this. If they are valid bank notes, the bank credits my account for the face value of the notes. Your account was decreased when you withdrew the bank notes, which you held like cash, and mine was increased when I sent them to the bank. The result is similar to how it would work if you withdrew (paper) cash from the bank, mailed it to me, and I deposited the cash in my own account. + +Figure 4 shows a similar transaction between Alice and Bob. The bank, in the upper left corner, creates a digital bank note by signing a message which specifies the serial number and value of the note, and sends it to Alice. Alice, as she withdraws it, uses Chaum’s technique to alter the serial number so that the bank will not recognize the note as being from this withdrawal. She then pays Bob electronically by sending the bank note to him. Bob checks the note’s validity by decrypting using the bank’s public key to check its signature. He then sends the note to the bank, which checks the serial number to confirm that this bank note hasn’t been spent used before. The serial number is different from that in Alice’s withdrawal, preventing the bank from linking the two transactions. + +With this simple picture in mind, we can begin to answer some of the objections listed above. Bank notes cannot be forged because only the bank knows the secret key that is used to issue them. Other people will therefore not be able to create bank notes of their own. Also, anyone can check that a bank note is not a forgery by verifying the bank’s digital signature on the note. As for the copying issue, preventing a person from spending the same bank note more than once, this is handled by checking with the bank to see if the serial number on the note had been used before before accepting a bank note as payment. If it had been, the note would not be accepted. Any attempt to re-use a bank note will be detected because the serial number will be a duplicate of one used before. This means, too, that once you “spend” your digital cash by emailing it to someone, you should delete it from your computer, as it will be of no further value to you. + +This simple scheme gives some of the flavor of electronic cash, but it still has awkward features. The need to check with the bank for each transaction may be inconvenient in many environments. And the fixed denominations of the bank notes described here, the inability to split them into smaller pieces, will also limit their usefulness. Chaum and others have proposed more complex systems which solve these problems in different ways.⁵ With these more advanced systems, the anonymity, privacy, and convenience of cash transactions can be achieved even in a purely electronic environment. + +## Electronic Money in Practice + +Having described the three layers of privacy protection, we can now see how electronic transactions can maintain individual privacy. Public-key cryptography protects the confidentiality of messages, as well as playing a key role in the other layers. Anonymous messaging further allows people to communicate without revealing more about themselves than they choose. And electronic money combines the anonymity of cash with the convenience of electronic payments. David Chaum has described variations of these techniques that can extend privacy protection to many other areas of our lives as well.⁶ + +Although my description of digital cash has been in terms of computer networks with email message transactions, it can be applied on a more local scale as well. With credit card sized computers, digital cash could just as easily be used to pay for groceries at the local supermarket as to order software from an anonymous supplier on the computer networks. “Smartcard” computers using digital cash could replace credit or debit cards for many purposes. The same types of messages would be used, with the interaction being between your smart card and the merchant’s card reader. + +On the nets themselves, any goods or services which are primarily information-based would be natural candidates for digital cash purchases. Today this might include such things as software, electronic magazines, even electronic books. In the future, with higher-bandwidth networks, it may be possible to purchase music and video recordings across the nets. + +As another example, digital cash and anonymous remailers (such as Chaum’s Mixes) have a synergistic relationship; that is, each directly benefits the other. Without anonymous remailers, digital cash would be pointless, as the desired confidentiality would be lost with each transaction, with message source and destination blatantly displayed in the electronic mail messages. And in the other direction, digital cash can be used to support anonymous remailing services. There could be a wide range of Mix services available on the nets; some would be free, and presumably offer relatively simple services, but others would charge, and would offer more service or more expensive security precautions. Such for-profit remailers could be paid for by digital cash. + +What are the prospects for the eventual implementation of digital cash systems and the other technologies described here? Some experiments are already beginning. David Chaum has started a company, DigiCash, based in Amsterdam, which is attempting to set up an electronic money system on a small scale. As with any new business concept, though, especially in the conservative financial community, it will take time before a new system like this is widely used. + +The many laws and regulations covering the banking and financial services industries in most Western nations will undoubtedly slow the acceptance of digital cash. Some have predicted that the initial success of electronic money may be in the form of a technically illegal “black market” where crypto-hackers buy and sell information, using cryptography to protect against government crackdowns. + +In the nearer term, the tools are in place now for people to begin experimenting with the other concepts discussed here. Public-key cryptography is becoming a reality on the computer networks. And experimental remailers with integrated public-key cryptosystems are already in use on a small scale. Digital-pseudonym-based anonymous message posting should begin happening within the next year. The field is moving rapidly, as privacy advocates around the world hurry to bring these systems into existence before governments and other large institutions can react. See the “Access” box for information on how you can play a part in this quiet revolution. + +We are on a path today which, if nothing changes, will lead to a world with the potential for greater government power, intrusion, and control. We can change this; these technologies can revolutionize the relationship between individuals and organizations, putting them both on an equal footing for the first time. Cryptography can make possible a world in which people have control over information about themselves, not because government has granted them that control, but because only they possess the cryptographic keys to reveal that information. This is the world we are working to create. + +## Access + +### Public-Key Cryptography + +Philip Zimmermann’s free program PGP (“Pretty Good Privacy”) is a widely available implementation of public key cryptography. It features high speed and has excellent key management, and operates on many systems, including PC compatibles, Macintoshes, and most Unix-based workstations. At publication time, version 2.1 was current. Readers with Internet access should be able to find PGP on such hosts as princeton.edu (/pub/pgp20) and pencil.cs.missouri.edu (/pub/crypt). Many of the larger bulletin-board systems carry PGP as well. Send email to Hugh Miller at \ for current information, or check the Usenet newsgroup alt.security.pgp. + +Mark Riordan’s free program RIPEM was in beta test at press time, with a release expected soon. Contact the author at \ for information about availability. + +The Internet PEM (“Privacy Enhanced Mail”) standard was due to be completed soon at press time. PEM uses a key-management hierarchy in which users register their public keys with a centralized organization. Free software implementing the basic public-key algorithms was expected to be available soon after the standard is finalized. Mail to \ for more information on availability. + +### Anonymous Remailers + +An email discussion group exists which is devoted to the topics of encryption, remailers, digital cash, and other topics related to these. Experimental anonymous remailers are under development at press time and should be widely available soon. Contact \ for information. + +## Notes + +¹ For a review of the status of current monitoring technology, see [Clarke 88]. + +² See [Diffie 76]. + +³ The “Mix” is described in [Chaum 81]. Chaum’s other solution, the “DC-Net”, is described in [Chaum 88A]. + +⁴ The electronic money scheme I describe is a simplification of Chaum’s first proposal in [Chaum 88B]. + +⁵ For more proposals about electronic cash, see: [Even 83], [Chaum 85], [Okamoto 89], [Okamoto 90], [Hayes 90], and [Chaum 90]. + +⁶ See [Chaum 85] and [Chaum 92]. + +## References + +[Chaum 81] Chaum, D., *Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms*. Communications of the ACM, vol. 24, n. 2, p. 84-88, February, 1981. + +[Chaum 85] Chaum, D., *Security without Identification: Transaction Systems to make Big Brother Obsolete*. Communications of the ACM, vol. 28, n. 10, p. 1030-1044, October, 1985. + +[Chaum 88A] Chaum, D., *The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability*. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, p. 65-75, 1988. + +[Chaum 88B] Chaum, D., Fiat, A., Naor, M., *Untraceable electronic cash*. In: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’88, p. 319-27, 1988. + +[Chaum 90] Chaum, D., *Showing Credentials without Identification: Transferring Signatures between Unconditionally Unlinkable Pseudonyms*. In: Advances in Cryptology - AUSCRYPT ’90, p. 246-64, 1990. + +[Chaum 92] Chaum, D., *Achieving Electronic Privacy*. Scientific American, vol 267, n. 2, p. 96-101, August, 1992. + +[Clarke 88] Clarke, R., *Information Technology and Dataveillance*. Communications of the ACM, vol. 31, n. 5, p. 498-512, May, 1988. + +[Diffie 76] Diffie, W., Hellman, M., *New Directions in Cryptography*. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, November, 1976, p. 644. + +[Even 83] Even, S., Goldreich, O., *Electronic Wallet*. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’83, p. 383-386, 1983. + +[Hayes 90] Hayes, B., *Anonymous One-Time Signatures and Flexible Untraceable Electronic Cash*. In: AusCrypt ’90, p. 294-305, 1990. + +[Okamoto 89] Okamoto, T., Ohta, K., *Disposable Zero-Knowledge Authentications and Their Application to Untraceable Electronic Cash*. In: Advances In Cryptology - CRYPTO ’89, p. 481-496, 1989. + +[Okamoto 90] Okamoto, T., Ohta, K., *Universal Electronic Cash*. In: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’90, p. 324-337, 1990. + +--- + +*Source: Extropy #10 (vol. 4, no. 2), Winter/Spring 1993, pp. 8–14. Transcribed from the scan of the printed article at https://cdn.nakamotoinstitute.org/docs/protecting-privacy-with-electronic-cash.pdf. Figures 1–4 are diagrams in the original and are not reproduced here.* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-beauty-of-ecash-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-beauty-of-ecash-record.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9cdc13e..0000000 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-beauty-of-ecash-record.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# The Beauty of eCash - -- **Author:** Hal Finney -- **Year:** 1994 -- **Source:** https://nakamotoinstitute.org/library/the-beauty-of-ecash/ -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying mailing-list post is not mirrored. - -## Summary - -A short proposal for making anonymous digital banknotes aesthetically -interesting through rarity, fingerprints, and mathematical imagery tied to -their validity. - -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-beauty-of-ecash.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-beauty-of-ecash.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3455484 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-beauty-of-ecash.md @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +# The Beauty of ECash + +*Hal Finney, 16 March 1994* + +It occurs to me that digital cash could be a collector's item. Paper +money is widely collected, as are coins. I got a book out of the library +on old American paper money, and many of the old bills are startlingly +beautiful. Interestingly, the old money is still legal tender so there +is a floor under the value of the bills that you collect. + +Until 1861, the U.S. did not issue any paper money, only coins. In those +days, paper money was issued by private banks (usually with state charters). +The money was backed by dollars, coins, which the bank owned. Unfortunately, +capitalism is a dynamic system and in those days bank failures were no more +unusual than corporate failures are today. When this happened, the bank's +notes became worthless. Counterfeiting was also a big problem with the +thousands of different banks issuing notes. It is interesting to speculate +that digital cash might lead to an electronic system with some similarities +to those old days. + +Collecting digital cash has some problems. Collectors are generally +attracted to items that are beautiful, interesting, and rare. Digital +cash is interesting enough, but its beauty is rather abstract. Rarity is +also hard to evaluate; each individual note has a unique serial number, +and what it has in common with other notes of its denomination is the +bank key and the exponent. Uncirculated notes are generally more +valuable than others in the paper world; with digital banknotes the only +way to tell whether it has been "circulated" would be to have access to +the bank's database of spent notes, to verify that the note had never been +deposited. + +Rarity could be determined by the bank's key and exponent. The Magic Money +system has a provision for the bank to periodically move to another set of +exponents to represent the same denominations (in order to keep the size of +the note database from growing too large). If banks would do this at regular +intervals, then particularly the early issues would be relatively rare. One +might even have an early banknote notarized (digitally timestamped) so that +one could prove its value in later years. + +Beauty is harder to deal with. Strictly speaking, digital cash is invisible, +consisting only of an information pattern in RAM chips or on a disk. The +numbers which represent the cash can be printed out, though, and this +representation could perhaps have some beauty. Unfortunately, in my opinion +several lines of random hex digits are not beautiful. + +I have been working on ideas to display the information in digital cash in +some other way that is more esthetic. It would be nice if the display +somehow only worked for correctly signed cash notes, with forged cash +not displaying anything nice. My general idea is to display a "fingerprint" +of each individual banknote, something that is unique to that note and +which has a sort of beauty. + +One idea I have worked on is to seed a 1-D cellular automaton with a bit +pattern based on the digital cash. This seed is then processed by the +CA algorithm to produce some pattern, with each row being a function of +the previous row. My thought was to start the CA at the top and the bottom +of the screen with the two different functions applied to the cash which +should be equal if the cash validates (taking the number to the proper +exponent on one hand, and applying the MD5 hash of the serial number on +the other, for the case of magic money). Then we work inwards with the +two seeds. Proper cash will produce a symmetrical pattern. By choosing +good CA rules, the patterns will be different for each bill, some nicer +than others, leading to attractive fractal-looking patterns for many bills. +When you wanted to "look at your money" you could run the program on the +digital cash. People might even trade for especially attractive bills. + +A similar idea is to use the cash as the basis for some fractal algorithm. +Many fractals have the property that most of the plane is plain, while +only a fraction looks really fractal. Digital cash has the property that +when exponentiated it leads to a number most of whose bits are fixed but +which has a small number of varying bits. If we had a mapping which took +the fixed digicash bits onto the interesting parts of the fractal, then +fake cash would not produce pretty pictures, while real cash would produce +some part of a beautiful fractal. Again, you would have validation and +beauty being tied together. + +I've been doing some experiments with the first idea, hoping to produce +something nice. With a little more thought I hope to come up with a +viewer for your Magic Money that will bring out its natural beauty and +rarity. This will be a must for all serious collectors of digicash. + +Hal Finney + +--- + +*Source: Hal Finney's essay page, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20140421063207/http://www.finney.org/~hal/beauty_ecash.html* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-conscience-of-a-hacker-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-conscience-of-a-hacker-record.md deleted file mode 100644 index 58453a3..0000000 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-conscience-of-a-hacker-record.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -# The Conscience of a Hacker - -- **Author:** Loyd Blankenship (The Mentor) -- **Year:** 1986 -- **Source:** https://phrack.org/issues/7/3.html -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying manifesto is not mirrored. - -## Summary - -The compact statement commonly called the Hacker Manifesto, written after the -author's arrest and centered on curiosity, access, identity, and exclusion. - -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-conscience-of-a-hacker.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-conscience-of-a-hacker.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..08c703f --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-conscience-of-a-hacker.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# The Conscience of a Hacker + +*The Mentor (Loyd Blankenship), written 8 January 1986; published in Phrack Volume One, Issue 7, Phile 3 of 10 (25 September 1986)* + +The following was written shortly after my arrest... + +**\\/\\The Conscience of a Hacker/\\/** + +by +++The Mentor+++ + +Written on January 8, 1986 + +--- + +Another one got caught today, it's all over the papers. "Teenager Arrested in Computer Crime Scandal", "Hacker Arrested after Bank Tampering"...\ +Damn kids. They're all alike. + +But did you, in your three-piece psychology and 1950's technobrain, ever take a look behind the eyes of the hacker? Did you ever wonder what made him tick, what forces shaped him, what may have molded him?\ +I am a hacker, enter my world...\ +Mine is a world that begins with school... I'm smarter than most of the other kids, this crap they teach us bores me...\ +Damn underachiever. They're all alike. + +I'm in junior high or high school. I've listened to teachers explain for the fifteenth time how to reduce a fraction. I understand it. "No, Ms. Smith, I didn't show my work. I did it in my head..."\ +Damn kid. Probably copied it. They're all alike. + +I made a discovery today. I found a computer. Wait a second, this is cool. It does what I want it to. If it makes a mistake, it's because I screwed it up. Not because it doesn't like me...\ +Or feels threatened by me...\ +Or thinks I'm a smart ass...\ +Or doesn't like teaching and shouldn't be here...\ +Damn kid. All he does is play games. They're all alike. + +And then it happened... a door opened to a world... rushing through the phone line like heroin through an addict's veins, an electronic pulse is sent out, a refuge from the day-to-day incompetencies is sought... a board is found.\ +"This is it... this is where I belong..."\ +I know everyone here... even if I've never met them, never talked to them, may never hear from them again... I know you all...\ +Damn kid. Tying up the phone line again. They're all alike... + +You bet your ass we're all alike... we've been spoon-fed baby food at school when we hungered for steak... the bits of meat that you did let slip through were pre-chewed and tasteless. We've been dominated by sadists, or ignored by the apathetic. The few that had something to teach found us willing pupils, but those few are like drops of water in the desert. + +This is our world now... the world of the electron and the switch, the beauty of the baud. We make use of a service already existing without paying for what could be dirt-cheap if it wasn't run by profiteering gluttons, and you call us criminals. We explore... and you call us criminals. We seek after knowledge... and you call us criminals. We exist without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias... and you call us criminals. You build atomic bombs, you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to make us believe it's for our own good, yet we're the criminals. + +Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging people by what they say and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of outsmarting you, something that you will never forgive me for. + +I am a hacker, and this is my manifesto. You may stop this individual, but you can't stop us all... after all, we're all alike. + ++++The Mentor+++ + +--- + +*Source: https://phrack.org/issues/7/hackers-manifesto.html* diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-praxeology-of-privacy.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-praxeology-of-privacy.md index d49372d..504a039 100644 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-praxeology-of-privacy.md +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/the-praxeology-of-privacy.md @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ A book-length bridge between Austrian economic reasoning and cypherpunk engineering. It treats privacy as selective disclosure and examines the technical systems that can preserve private action under pressure. -Local file: [`the-praxeology-of-privacy.pdf`](./the-praxeology-of-privacy.pdf) +The PDF is in this folder as `the-praxeology-of-privacy.pdf`. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/why-i-wrote-pgp-record.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/why-i-wrote-pgp-record.md deleted file mode 100644 index 948e4cc..0000000 --- a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/why-i-wrote-pgp-record.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -# Why I Wrote PGP - -- **Author:** Philip Zimmermann -- **Original year:** 1991 -- **Source revision:** Updated 1999 -- **Source:** https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/WhyIWrotePGP.html -- **Rights status:** NOASSERTION -- **EFS status:** Link-only; the underlying essay is not mirrored. - -## Summary - -Zimmermann's explanation of why strong, accessible encryption is necessary for -private speech and why he released PGP for ordinary people to use. - -This EFS-authored metadata record is CC0-1.0. diff --git a/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/why-i-wrote-pgp.md b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/why-i-wrote-pgp.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2ab69b --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/cypherpunk-canon/why-i-wrote-pgp.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# Why I Wrote PGP + +*Philip Zimmermann, June 1991 (updated 1999)* + +*Part of the Original 1991 PGP User's Guide (updated in 1999)* + +*"Whatever you do will be insignificant, but it is very important that you do it." +-Mahatma Gandhi* + +It's personal. It's private. And it's no one's business but yours. You may be planning a political campaign, discussing your taxes, or having an illicit affair. Or you may be communicating with a political dissident in a repressive country. Whatever it is, you don't want your private electronic mail (email) or confidential documents read by anyone else. There's nothing wrong with asserting your privacy. Privacy is as apple-pie as the Constitution. + +The right to privacy is spread implicitly throughout the Bill of Rights. But when the United States Constitution was framed, the Founding Fathers saw no need to explicitly spell out the right to a private conversation. That would have been silly. Two hundred years ago, all conversations were private. If someone else was within earshot, you could just go out behind the barn and have your conversation there. No one could listen in without your knowledge. The right to a private conversation was a natural right, not just in a philosophical sense, but in a law-of-physics sense, given the technology of the time. + +But with the coming of the information age, starting with the invention of the telephone, all that has changed. Now most of our conversations are conducted electronically. This allows our most intimate conversations to be exposed without our knowledge. Cellular phone calls may be monitored by anyone with a radio. Electronic mail, sent across the Internet, is no more secure than cellular phone calls. Email is rapidly replacing postal mail, becoming the norm for everyone, not the novelty it was in the past. + +Until recently, if the government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, they had to expend a certain amount of expense and labor to intercept and steam open and read paper mail. Or they had to listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation, at least before automatic voice recognition technology became available. This kind of labor-intensive monitoring was not practical on a large scale. It was only done in important cases when it seemed worthwhile. This is like catching one fish at a time, with a hook and line. Today, email can be routinely and automatically scanned for interesting keywords, on a vast scale, without detection. This is like driftnet fishing. And exponential growth in computer power is making the same thing possible with voice traffic. + +Perhaps you think your email is legitimate enough that encryption is unwarranted. If you really are a law-abiding citizen with nothing to hide, then why don't you always send your paper mail on postcards? Why not submit to drug testing on demand? Why require a warrant for police searches of your house? Are you trying to hide something? If you hide your mail inside envelopes, does that mean you must be a subversive or a drug dealer, or maybe a paranoid nut? Do law-abiding citizens have any need to encrypt their email? + +What if everyone believed that law-abiding citizens should use postcards for their mail? If a nonconformist tried to assert his privacy by using an envelope for his mail, it would draw suspicion. Perhaps the authorities would open his mail to see what he's hiding. Fortunately, we don't live in that kind of world, because everyone protects most of their mail with envelopes. So no one draws suspicion by asserting their privacy with an envelope. There's safety in numbers. Analogously, it would be nice if everyone routinely used encryption for all their email, innocent or not, so that no one drew suspicion by asserting their email privacy with encryption. Think of it as a form of solidarity. + +Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anticrime bill, had an unsettling measure buried in it. If this non-binding resolution had become real law, it would have forced manufacturers of secure communications equipment to insert special "trap doors" in their products, so that the government could read anyone's encrypted messages. It reads, "It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law." It was this bill that led me to publish PGP electronically for free that year, shortly before the measure was defeated after vigorous protest by civil libertarians and industry groups. + +The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) mandated that phone companies install remote wiretapping ports into their central office digital switches, creating a new technology infrastructure for "point-and-click" wiretapping, so that federal agents no longer have to go out and attach alligator clips to phone lines. Now they will be able to sit in their headquarters in Washington and listen in on your phone calls. Of course, the law still requires a court order for a wiretap. But while technology infrastructures can persist for generations, laws and policies can change overnight. Once a communications infrastructure optimized for surveillance becomes entrenched, a shift in political conditions may lead to abuse of this new-found power. Political conditions may shift with the election of a new government, or perhaps more abruptly from the bombing of a federal building. + +A year after the CALEA passed, the FBI disclosed plans to require the phone companies to build into their infrastructure the capacity to simultaneously wiretap 1 percent of all phone calls in all major U.S. cities. This would represent more than a thousandfold increase over previous levels in the number of phones that could be wiretapped. In previous years, there were only about a thousand court-ordered wiretaps in the United States per year, at the federal, state, and local levels combined. It's hard to see how the government could even employ enough judges to sign enough wiretap orders to wiretap 1 percent of all our phone calls, much less hire enough federal agents to sit and listen to all that traffic in real time. The only plausible way of processing that amount of traffic is a massive Orwellian application of automated voice recognition technology to sift through it all, searching for interesting keywords or searching for a particular speaker's voice. If the government doesn't find the target in the first 1 percent sample, the wiretaps can be shifted over to a different 1 percent until the target is found, or until everyone's phone line has been checked for subversive traffic. The FBI said they need this capacity to plan for the future. This plan sparked such outrage that it was defeated in Congress. But the mere fact that the FBI even asked for these broad powers is revealing of their agenda. + +Advances in technology will not permit the maintenance of the status quo, as far as privacy is concerned. The status quo is unstable. If we do nothing, new technologies will give the government new automatic surveillance capabilities that Stalin could never have dreamed of. The only way to hold the line on privacy in the information age is strong cryptography. + +You don't have to distrust the government to want to use cryptography. Your business can be wiretapped by business rivals, organized crime, or foreign governments. Several foreign governments, for example, admit to using their signals intelligence against companies from other countries to give their own corporations a competitive edge. Ironically, the United States government's restrictions on cryptography in the 1990's have weakened U.S. corporate defenses against foreign intelligence and organized crime. + +The government knows what a pivotal role cryptography is destined to play in the power relationship with its people. In April 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled a bold new encryption policy initiative, which had been under development at the National Security Agency (NSA) since the start of the Bush administration. The centerpiece of this initiative was a government-built encryption device, called the Clipper chip, containing a new classified NSA encryption algorithm. The government tried to encourage private industry to design it into all their secure communication products, such as secure phones, secure faxes, and so on. AT&T put Clipper into its secure voice products. The catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip is loaded with its own unique key, and the government gets to keep a copy, placed in escrow. Not to worry, though–the government promises that they will use these keys to read your traffic only "when duly authorized by law." Of course, to make Clipper completely effective, the next logical step would be to outlaw other forms of cryptography. + +The government initially claimed that using Clipper would be voluntary, that no one would be forced to use it instead of other types of cryptography. But the public reaction against the Clipper chip was strong, stronger than the government anticipated. The computer industry monolithically proclaimed its opposition to using Clipper. FBI director Louis Freeh responded to a question in a press conference in 1994 by saying that if Clipper failed to gain public support, and FBI wiretaps were shut out by non-government-controlled cryptography, his office would have no choice but to seek legislative relief. Later, in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City tragedy, Mr. Freeh testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that public availability of strong cryptography must be curtailed by the government (although no one had suggested that cryptography was used by the bombers). + +The government has a track record that does not inspire confidence that they will never abuse our civil liberties. The FBI's COINTELPRO program targeted groups that opposed government policies. They spied on the antiwar movement and the civil rights movement. They wiretapped the phone of Martin Luther King. Nixon had his enemies list. Then there was the Watergate mess. More recently, Congress has either attempted to or succeeded in passing laws curtailing our civil liberties on the Internet. Some elements of the Clinton White House collected confidential FBI files on Republican civil servants, conceivably for political exploitation. And some overzealous prosecutors have shown a willingness to go to the ends of the Earth in pursuit of exposing sexual indiscretions of political enemies. At no time in the past century has public distrust of the government been so broadly distributed across the political spectrum, as it is today. + +Throughout the 1990s, I figured that if we want to resist this unsettling trend in the government to outlaw cryptography, one measure we can apply is to use cryptography as much as we can now while it's still legal. When use of strong cryptography becomes popular, it's harder for the government to criminalize it. Therefore, using PGP is good for preserving democracy. If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy. + +It appears that the deployment of PGP must have worked, along with years of steady public outcry and industry pressure to relax the export controls. In the closing months of 1999, the Clinton administration announced a radical shift in export policy for crypto technology. They essentially threw out the whole export control regime. Now, we are finally able to export strong cryptography, with no upper limits on strength. It has been a long struggle, but we have finally won, at least on the export control front in the US. Now we must continue our efforts to deploy strong crypto, to blunt the effects increasing surveillance efforts on the Internet by various governments. And we still need to entrench our right to use it domestically over the objections of the FBI. + +PGP empowers people to take their privacy into their own hands. There has been a growing social need for it. That's why I wrote it. + +**Philip R. Zimmermann** +Boulder, Colorado +June 1991 (updated 1999) + +--- + +*Source: https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/WhyIWrotePGP.html* diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/CURATION.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/CURATION.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c3b288 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/CURATION.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# Curation notes: Ethereum Standards + +Notes for maintainers. This file is not part of the published dataset (it is not listed in +`manifest.json`); the visitor-facing overview is `README.md`. + +## Sources and pinning + +All files were fetched on 2026-11-12 from the canonical repositories at pinned commits: + +| Repository | Commit | Files | +|---|---|---| +| [ethereum/EIPs](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs) | `253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1` | `eip-1`, `eip-155`, `eip-712`, `eip-1559`, `eip-4844`, `eip-7594`, `eip-7702` (under `EIPS/`) | +| [ethereum/ERCs](https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs) | `c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf` | `erc-20`, `erc-137`, `erc-721`, `erc-1155`, `erc-1271`, `erc-4337`, `erc-4626`, `erc-4804` (under `ERCS/`) | + +Each manifest entry records the pinned GitHub page in `source`, the pinned raw file in `mirrors`, and the +rendered page in `canonicalUrl`. The ten files that were already in this dataset were re-fetched at these +commits; apart from link conversion their text was unchanged from the earlier copies. + +## Modifications + +The text, including the YAML front matter, is verbatim except for link targets: + +- `./eip-N.md` (inline and reference-style, keeping any `#anchor`) becomes + `https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-N`. +- `../LICENSE.md` becomes `https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/`. +- `../assets/...` becomes an absolute URL in the same repository at the pinned commit: images use + `raw.githubusercontent.com` (served as `image/png`, `image/jpeg` or `image/svg+xml`, so they render), and + other files (reference implementations) use the `github.com/.../blob//...` page. +- In ethereum/ERCs, the `../assets/eip-N/` paths written in the files live at `assets/erc-N/` in the + repository, so those links point at `assets/erc-N/`. + +Every converted asset URL was checked to return HTTP 200. Some EIPs link to external pages that no longer +exist; those links are upstream text and were left as published. + +The conversion was done with a small script (regular-expression rewrite of link targets, followed by a +check that no relative link targets remain). To refresh a file, fetch it at a new commit, apply the same +rewrite, and update `source` and `mirrors`. + +## Rights + +EIPs and ERCs carry "Copyright and related rights waived via CC0", so the dataset default licence is +`CC0-1.0`. EFS-authored files (`README.md`, this file, `manifest.json`) are also CC0. + +## Selection + +The set covers the standards most developers recognize (tokens, signing, fees, blobs, account +abstraction), standards close to EFS's own design (EIP-712 typed signing, ERC-4804 `web3://` URLs, +ERC-137 ENS, through which the app is served at efs.eth), and EIP-1 for the process. EIP-779 (DAO fork) and EIP-3675 +(The Merge) are kept in the `history` dataset, where they sit beside the events they describe. diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/README.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/README.md index ffa5f75..6610255 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/README.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/README.md @@ -1,30 +1,40 @@ -# Ethereum Standards (EIPs / ERCs) — EFS reference dataset - -The landmark standards that define how Ethereum works — the token standards, the fee market, account abstraction, typed signing. A fourth reference dataset for the EFS × OnionDAO buildathon, alongside [`../crypto-whitepapers/`](../crypto-whitepapers/), [`../cypherpunk-canon/`](../cypherpunk-canon/), and [`../web-games/`](../web-games/). - -**License: CC0** — EIPs and ERCs are released into the public domain ([EIP-1](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1)), so they are cleanly redistributable onto EFS. Fetched verbatim from the canonical repos (`ethereum/EIPs`, `ethereum/ERCs`). - -**Modeled the EFS way: flat files + tags, not folders.** Each standard is one item; its category is a **tag** (a token standard is `tokens`; ERC-721 is both `tokens` and `nft`). On EFS each `.md` = a DATA at a stable anchor with TAG edges. They render natively in the markdown pane. - -## Manifest - -| Standard | File | Title | Tags | Source | -|---|---|---|---|---| -| ERC-20 | `erc-20.md` | Token Standard | tokens, fungible, foundational | ethereum/ERCs | -| ERC-721 | `erc-721.md` | Non-Fungible Token Standard | tokens, nft, foundational | ethereum/ERCs | -| ERC-1155 | `erc-1155.md` | Multi Token Standard | tokens, nft, multi-token | ethereum/ERCs | -| ERC-4626 | `erc-4626.md` | Tokenized Vaults | defi, tokens, vaults | ethereum/ERCs | -| ERC-4337 | `erc-4337.md` | Account Abstraction (via entry point) | account-abstraction, infrastructure | ethereum/ERCs | -| EIP-712 | `eip-712.md` | Typed structured data hashing & signing | signing, infrastructure | ethereum/EIPs | -| ERC-1271 | `erc-1271.md` | Standard signature validation for contracts | signing, smart-wallets | ethereum/ERCs | -| EIP-1559 | `eip-1559.md` | Fee market change | core, economics, fees | ethereum/EIPs | -| EIP-155 | `eip-155.md` | Simple replay attack protection (chainId) | core, security | ethereum/EIPs | -| EIP-4844 | `eip-4844.md` | Shard Blob Transactions (proto-danksharding) | core, scaling, data | ethereum/EIPs | - -Per-standard authors, status, and discussion links live in each file's YAML frontmatter (preserved verbatim). - -**Why this set:** the standards a crypto-native crowd actually recognizes, and two (EIP-712 + ERC-1271) are exactly what EFS leans on for smart-wallet / delegated attestation — nice for the SDK track to reference. - -**Cosmetic note:** a few files contain relative links to reference implementations (`../assets/...`) and ERC-4337 embeds 3 SVG sequence diagrams; those relative paths don't resolve standalone (the prose is self-contained and unaffected). Read them at [eips.ethereum.org](https://eips.ethereum.org) with assets intact. - -Retrieval/seeding addresses (IPFS CID / Arweave) get recorded in an `ADDRESSES.md` here once we pin, matching the other datasets. +# Ethereum Standards + +The proposals that define how Ethereum works: the token standards, typed signing, the fee market, blobs, +account abstraction, naming, and the process that produces them all. Ethereum Improvement Proposals +(EIPs) change the protocol itself; Ethereum Request for Comments (ERCs) are application-level standards +that contracts and wallets agree to follow. + +Every file here is the full text of the proposal as published in the +[ethereum/EIPs](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs) and [ethereum/ERCs](https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs) +repositories, including its header with authors, status and discussion links. The only change is that +relative links (to other EIPs, the licence and supporting assets) now point to absolute URLs, so they work +on their own. EIPs and ERCs are dedicated to the public domain under +[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). + +| Standard | What it does | Upgrade | +|---|---|---| +| [EIP-1: EIP Purpose and Guidelines](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-1.md) | How proposals are written, reviewed and finalized | | +| [ERC-20: Token Standard](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-20.md) | Fungible tokens | | +| [ERC-721: Non-Fungible Token Standard](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-721.md) | NFTs | | +| [ERC-1155: Multi Token Standard](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-1155.md) | Many token types in one contract | | +| [ERC-4626: Tokenized Vaults](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-4626.md) | Yield-bearing vaults | | +| [EIP-155: Simple replay attack protection](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-155.md) | Chain ID in transaction signatures | Spurious Dragon (2016) | +| [EIP-712: Typed structured data hashing and signing](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-712.md) | Human-readable signed messages | | +| [ERC-1271: Standard Signature Validation Method for Contracts](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-1271.md) | Signatures from smart contract accounts | | +| [ERC-137: Ethereum Domain Name Service](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-137.md) | The original ENS specification | | +| [ERC-4804: Web3 URL to EVM Call Message Translation](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-4804.md) | `web3://` URLs; EFS uses them to reference on-chain content | | +| [EIP-1559: Fee market change](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-1559.md) | Base fee burn and priority tips | London (2021) | +| [ERC-4337: Account Abstraction Using Alt Mempool](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/erc-4337.md) | Smart accounts without protocol changes | | +| [EIP-4844: Shard Blob Transactions](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-4844.md) | Blobs for cheap rollup data | Dencun (2024) | +| [EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-7702.md) | Smart-account features for ordinary accounts | Pectra (2025) | +| [EIP-7594: PeerDAS](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-7594.md) | Data availability sampling for blobs | Fusaka (2025) | + +Files are tagged rather than sorted into folders, for example +[`tokens`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards?tags=tokens), +[`signing`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards?tags=signing), +[`account-abstraction`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards?tags=account-abstraction) and +[`core`](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards?tags=core). +The rendered versions live at [eips.ethereum.org](https://eips.ethereum.org/) and +[ercs.ethereum.org](https://ercs.ethereum.org/). For how these upgrades fit into Ethereum's story, see the +[Ethereum history timeline](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/timeline.md). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd6c99b --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1.md @@ -0,0 +1,621 @@ +--- +eip: 1 +title: EIP Purpose and Guidelines +status: Living +type: Meta +author: Martin Becze , Hudson Jameson , et al. +created: 2015-10-27 +--- + +## What is an EIP? + +EIP stands for Ethereum Improvement Proposal. An EIP is a design document providing information to the Ethereum community, or describing a new feature for Ethereum or its processes or environment. The EIP should provide a concise technical specification of the feature and a rationale for the feature. The EIP author is responsible for building consensus within the community and documenting dissenting opinions. + +## EIP Rationale + +We intend EIPs to be the primary mechanisms for proposing new features, for collecting community technical input on an issue, and for documenting the design decisions that have gone into Ethereum. Because the EIPs are maintained as text files in a versioned repository, their revision history is the historical record of the feature proposal. + +For Ethereum implementers, EIPs are a convenient way to track the progress of their implementation. Ideally, each implementation maintainer would list the EIPs that they have implemented. This will give end users a convenient way to know the current status of a given implementation or library. + +## EIP Types + +There are three types of EIP: + +- A **Standards Track EIP** describes any change that affects most or all Ethereum implementations, such as: a change to the network protocol, a change in block or transaction validity rules, proposed application standards/conventions, or any change or addition that affects the interoperability of applications using Ethereum. Standards Track EIPs consist of three parts—a design document, an implementation, and (if warranted) an update to the [formal specification](https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper). Furthermore, Standards Track EIPs can be broken down into the following categories: + - **Core**: improvements requiring a consensus fork (e.g. [EIP-5](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5), [EIP-101](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-101)), as well as changes that are not necessarily consensus critical but may be relevant to [“core dev” discussions](https://github.com/ethereum/pm) (for example, [EIP-90], and the miner/node strategy changes 2, 3, and 4 of [EIP-86](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-86)). + - **Networking**: includes improvements around [devp2p](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/readme-spec-links/rlpx.md) ([EIP-8](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8)) and [Light Ethereum Subprotocol](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/nodes-and-clients/#light-node), as well as proposed improvements to network protocol specifications of [whisper](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/16013#issuecomment-364639309) and [swarm](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/2959). + - **Interface**: includes improvements around language-level standards like method names ([EIP-6](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-6)) and [contract ABIs](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/develop/abi-spec.html). + - **ERC**: application-level standards and conventions, including contract standards such as token standards ([ERC-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20)), name registries ([ERC-137](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-137)), URI schemes, library/package formats, and wallet formats. + +- A **Meta EIP** describes a process surrounding Ethereum or proposes a change to (or an event in) a process. Process EIPs are like Standards Track EIPs but apply to areas other than the Ethereum protocol itself. They may propose an implementation, but not to Ethereum's codebase; they often require community consensus; unlike Informational EIPs, they are more than recommendations, and users are typically not free to ignore them. Examples include procedures, guidelines, changes to the decision-making process, and changes to the tools or environment used in Ethereum development. Any meta-EIP is also considered a Process EIP. + +- An **Informational EIP** describes an Ethereum design issue, or provides general guidelines or information to the Ethereum community, but does not propose a new feature. Informational EIPs do not necessarily represent Ethereum community consensus or a recommendation, so users and implementers are free to ignore Informational EIPs or follow their advice. + +It is highly recommended that a single EIP contain a single key proposal or new idea. The more focused the EIP, the more successful it tends to be. A change to one client doesn't require an EIP; a change that affects multiple clients, or defines a standard for multiple apps to use, does. + +An EIP must meet certain minimum criteria. It must be a clear and complete description of the proposed enhancement. The enhancement must represent a net improvement. The proposed implementation, if applicable, must be solid and must not complicate the protocol unduly. + +### Special requirements for Core EIPs + +If a **Core** EIP mentions or proposes changes to the EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine), it should refer to the instructions by their mnemonics and define the opcodes of those mnemonics at least once. A preferred way is the following: + +``` +REVERT (0xfe) +``` + +## EIP Work Flow + +### Shepherding an EIP + +Parties involved in the process are you, the champion or *EIP author*, the [*EIP editors*](#eip-editors), and the [*Ethereum Core Developers*](https://github.com/ethereum/pm). + +Before you begin writing a formal EIP, you should vet your idea. Ask the Ethereum community first if an idea is original to avoid wasting time on something that will be rejected based on prior research. It is thus recommended to open a discussion thread on [the Ethereum Magicians forum](https://ethereum-magicians.org/) to do this. + +Once the idea has been vetted, your next responsibility will be to present (by means of an EIP) the idea to the reviewers and all interested parties, invite editors, developers, and the community to give feedback on the aforementioned channels. You should try and gauge whether the interest in your EIP is commensurate with both the work involved in implementing it and how many parties will have to conform to it. For example, the work required for implementing a Core EIP will be much greater than for an ERC and the EIP will need sufficient interest from the Ethereum client teams. Negative community feedback will be taken into consideration and may prevent your EIP from moving past the Draft stage. + +### Core EIPs + +For Core EIPs, given that they require client implementations to be considered **Final** (see "EIPs Process" below), you will need to either provide an implementation for clients or convince clients to implement your EIP. + +The best way to get client implementers to review your EIP is to present it on an AllCoreDevs call. You can request to do so by posting a comment linking your EIP on an [AllCoreDevs agenda GitHub Issue](https://github.com/ethereum/pm/issues). + +The AllCoreDevs call serves as a way for client implementers to do three things. First, to discuss the technical merits of EIPs. Second, to gauge what other clients will be implementing. Third, to coordinate EIP implementation for network upgrades. + +These calls generally result in a "rough consensus" around what EIPs should be implemented. This "rough consensus" rests on the assumptions that EIPs are not contentious enough to cause a network split and that they are technically sound. + +:warning: The EIPs process and AllCoreDevs call were not designed to address contentious non-technical issues, but, due to the lack of other ways to address these, often end up entangled in them. This puts the burden on client implementers to try and gauge community sentiment, which hinders the technical coordination function of EIPs and AllCoreDevs calls. If you are shepherding an EIP, you can make the process of building community consensus easier by making sure that [the Ethereum Magicians forum](https://ethereum-magicians.org/) thread for your EIP includes or links to as much of the community discussion as possible and that various stakeholders are well-represented. + +*In short, your role as the champion is to write the EIP using the style and format described below, shepherd the discussions in the appropriate forums, and build community consensus around the idea.* + +### EIP Process + +The following is the standardization process for all EIPs in all tracks: + +![EIP Status Diagram](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-1/EIP-process-update.jpg) + +**Idea** - An idea that is pre-draft. This is not tracked within the EIP Repository. + +**Draft** - The first formally tracked stage of an EIP in development. An EIP is merged by an EIP Editor into the EIP repository when properly formatted. + +**Review** - An EIP Author marks an EIP as ready for and requesting Peer Review. + +**Last Call** - This is the final review window for an EIP before it is moved to `Final`. An EIP enters `Last Call` when the specification is stable and the author opens a PR with a review end date (`last-call-deadline`), typically 14 days later. + +If this period results in necessary normative changes it will revert the EIP to `Review`. + +**Final** - This EIP represents the final standard. A Final EIP exists in a state of finality and should only be updated to correct errata and add non-normative clarifications. + +A PR moving an EIP from Last Call to Final SHOULD contain no changes other than the status update. Any content or editorial proposed change SHOULD be separate from this status-updating PR and committed prior to it. + +**Stagnant** - Any EIP in `Draft` or `Review` or `Last Call` if inactive for a period of 6 months or greater is moved to `Stagnant`. An EIP may be resurrected from this state by Authors or EIP Editors through moving it back to `Draft` or its earlier status. If not resurrected, a proposal may stay forever in this status. + +>*EIP Authors are notified of any algorithmic change to the status of their EIP* + +**Withdrawn** - The EIP Author(s) have withdrawn the proposed EIP. This state has finality and can no longer be resurrected using this EIP number. If the idea is pursued at a later date, it is considered a new proposal. + +**Living** - A special status for EIPs that are designed to be continually updated and not reach a state of finality. This includes most notably EIP-1. + +## What belongs in a successful EIP? + +Each EIP should have the following parts: + +- Preamble - RFC 822 style headers containing metadata about the EIP, including the EIP number, a short descriptive title (limited to a maximum of 44 characters), a description (limited to a maximum of 140 characters), and the author details. Irrespective of the category, the title and description should not include EIP number. See [below](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1#eip-header-preamble) for details. +- Abstract - Abstract is a multi-sentence (short paragraph) technical summary. This should be a very terse and human-readable version of the specification section. Someone should be able to read only the abstract to get the gist of what this specification does. +- Motivation *(optional)* - A motivation section is critical for EIPs that want to change the Ethereum protocol. It should clearly explain why the existing protocol specification is inadequate to address the problem that the EIP solves. This section may be omitted if the motivation is evident. +- Specification - The technical specification should describe the syntax and semantics of any new feature. The specification should be detailed enough to allow competing, interoperable implementations for any of the current Ethereum platforms (besu, erigon, ethereumjs, go-ethereum, nethermind, or others). +- Rationale - The rationale fleshes out the specification by describing what motivated the design and why particular design decisions were made. It should describe alternate designs that were considered and related work, e.g., how the feature is supported in other languages. The rationale should discuss important objections or concerns raised during the discussion around the EIP. +- Backwards Compatibility *(optional)* - All EIPs that introduce backwards incompatibilities must include a section describing these incompatibilities and their consequences. The EIP must explain how the author proposes to deal with these incompatibilities. This section may be omitted if the proposal does not introduce any backward incompatibilities, but this section must be included if backward incompatibilities exist. +- Test Cases *(optional)* - Test cases for an implementation are mandatory for EIPs that are affecting consensus changes. Tests should either be inlined in the EIP as data (such as input/expected output pairs) or included in `../assets/eip-###/`. This section may be omitted for non-Core proposals. +- Reference Implementation *(optional)* - An optional section that contains a reference/example implementation that people can use to assist in understanding or implementing this specification. This section may be omitted for all EIPs. +- Security Considerations - All EIPs must contain a section that discusses the security implications/considerations relevant to the proposed change. Include information that might be important for security discussions, surfaces risks and can be used throughout the life-cycle of the proposal. E.g., include security-relevant design decisions, concerns, important discussions, implementation-specific guidance and pitfalls, an outline of threats and risks and how they are being addressed. EIP submissions missing the "Security Considerations" section will be rejected. An EIP cannot proceed to status "Final" without a Security Considerations discussion deemed sufficient by the reviewers. +- Copyright Waiver - All EIPs must be in the public domain. The copyright waiver MUST link to the license file and use the following wording: `Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).` + +## EIP Formats and Templates + +EIPs should be written in [markdown](https://github.com/adam-p/markdown-here/wiki/Markdown-Cheatsheet) format. There is a [template](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/eip-template.md) and [contributor](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) guidelines to follow. + +## EIP Header Preamble + +Each EIP must begin with an [RFC 822](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc822.txt) style header preamble, preceded and followed by three hyphens (`---`). This header is also termed ["front matter" by Jekyll](https://jekyllrb.com/docs/front-matter/). The headers must appear in the following order. + +`eip`: *EIP number* + +`title`: *The EIP title is a few words, not a complete sentence* + +`description`: *Description is one full (short) sentence* + +`author`: *The list of the author's or authors' name(s) and/or username(s), or name(s) and email(s). Details are below.* + +`discussions-to`: *The url pointing to the official discussion thread* + +`status`: *Draft, Review, Last Call, Final, Stagnant, Withdrawn, Living* + +`last-call-deadline`: *The date last call period ends on* (Optional field, only needed when status is `Last Call`) + +`type`: *One of `Standards Track`, `Meta`, or `Informational`* + +`category`: *One of `Core`, `Networking`, `Interface`, or `ERC`* (Optional field, only needed for `Standards Track` EIPs) + +`created`: *Date the EIP was created on* + +`requires`: *EIP number(s)* (Optional field) + +`withdrawal-reason`: *A sentence explaining why the EIP was withdrawn.* (Optional field, only needed when status is `Withdrawn`) + +Headers that permit lists must separate elements with commas. + +Headers requiring dates will always do so in the format of ISO 8601 (yyyy-mm-dd). + +### `author` header + +The `author` header lists the names, email addresses or usernames of the authors/owners of the EIP. Those who prefer anonymity may use a username only, or a first name and a username. The format of the `author` header value must be: + +> Random J. User <address@dom.ain> + +or + +> Random J. User (@username) + +or + +> Random J. User (@username) <address@dom.ain> + +if the email address and/or GitHub username is included, and + +> Random J. User + +if neither the email address nor the GitHub username are given. + +At least one author must use a GitHub username, in order to get notified on change requests and have the capability to approve or reject them. + +### `discussions-to` header + +While an EIP is a draft, a `discussions-to` header will indicate the URL where the EIP is being discussed. + +The preferred discussion URL is a topic on [Ethereum Magicians](https://ethereum-magicians.org/). The URL cannot point to GitHub pull requests, any URL which is ephemeral, and any URL which can get locked over time (i.e. Reddit topics). + +### `type` header + +The `type` header specifies the type of EIP: Standards Track, Meta, or Informational. If the track is Standards please include the subcategory (core, networking, interface, or ERC). + +### `category` header + +The `category` header specifies the EIP's category. This is required for standards-track EIPs only. + +### `created` header + +The `created` header records the date that the EIP was assigned a number. Both headers should be in yyyy-mm-dd format, e.g. 2001-08-14. + +### `requires` header + +EIPs may have a `requires` header, indicating the EIP numbers that this EIP depends on. If such a dependency exists, this field is required. + +A `requires` dependency is created when the current EIP cannot be understood or implemented without a concept or technical element from another EIP. Merely mentioning another EIP does not necessarily create such a dependency. + +## Linking to External Resources + +Other than the specific exceptions listed below, links to external resources **SHOULD NOT** be included. External resources may disappear, move, or change unexpectedly. + +The process governing permitted external resources is described in [EIP-5757](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5757). + +### Execution Client Specifications + +Links to the Ethereum Execution Client Specifications may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Ethereum Execution Client Specifications](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-specs/blob/9a1f22311f517401fed6c939a159b55600c454af/README.md) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[Ethereum Execution Client Specifications](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-specs/blob/9a1f22311f517401fed6c939a159b55600c454af/README.md) + +Permitted Execution Client Specifications URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^(https://github.com/ethereum/execution-specs/(blob|commit)/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*|https://github.com/ethereum/execution-specs/tree/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*)$ +``` + +The Ethereum Execution Client Specifications repository also contains the Ethereum Execution Specification Tests, under its `tests/` directory. Links to specific commits of those test files are permitted under the same rule. + +### Ethereum System Contract Implementations + +Links to the Ethereum System Contract Implementations repository may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Ethereum System Contract Implementations](https://github.com/ethereum/sys-asm/blob/83f9801245ff56878a450b5625801101b9a225a1/README.md) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[Ethereum System Contract Implementations](https://github.com/ethereum/sys-asm/blob/83f9801245ff56878a450b5625801101b9a225a1/README.md) + +Permitted URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^(https://github.com/ethereum/sys-asm/(blob|commit)/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*|https://github.com/ethereum/sys-asm/tree/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*)$ +``` + +### Consensus Layer Specifications + +Links to specific commits of files within the Ethereum Consensus Layer Specifications may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Beacon Chain](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/26695a9fdb747ecbe4f0bb9812fedbc402e5e18c/specs/sharding/beacon-chain.md) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[Beacon Chain](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/26695a9fdb747ecbe4f0bb9812fedbc402e5e18c/specs/sharding/beacon-chain.md) + +Permitted Consensus Layer Specifications URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/(blob|commit)/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*$ +``` + +### Networking Specifications + +Links to specific commits of files within the Ethereum Networking Specifications may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Ethereum Wire Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/40ab248bf7e017e83cc9812a4e048446709623e8/caps/eth.md) +``` + +Which renders as: + +[Ethereum Wire Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/40ab248bf7e017e83cc9812a4e048446709623e8/caps/eth.md) + +Permitted Networking Specifications URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/(blob|commit)/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*$ +``` + +### Portal Specifications + +Links to specific commits of files within the Ethereum Portal Specifications may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Portal Wire Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/portal-network-specs/blob/5e321567b67bded7527355be714993c24371de1a/portal-wire-protocol.md) +``` + +Which renders as: + +[Portal Wire Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/portal-network-specs/blob/5e321567b67bded7527355be714993c24371de1a/portal-wire-protocol.md) + +Permitted Networking Specifications URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https://github.com/ethereum/portal-network-specs/(blob|commit)/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*$ +``` + +### World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) + +Links to a W3C "Recommendation" status specification may be included using normal markdown syntax. For example, the following link would be allowed: + +```markdown +[Secure Contexts](https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/CRD-secure-contexts-20210918/) +``` + +Which renders as: + +[Secure Contexts](https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/CRD-secure-contexts-20210918/) + +Permitted W3C recommendation URLs MUST anchor to a specification in the technical reports namespace with a date, and so MUST match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https://www\.w3\.org/TR/[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]/.*$ +``` + +### Web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group (WHATWG) + +Links to WHATWG specifications may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[HTML](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/commit-snapshots/578def68a9735a1e36610a6789245ddfc13d24e0/) +``` + +Which renders as: + +[HTML](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/commit-snapshots/578def68a9735a1e36610a6789245ddfc13d24e0/) + +Permitted WHATWG specification URLs must anchor to a specification defined in the `spec` subdomain (idea specifications are not allowed) and to a commit snapshot, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https:\/\/[a-z]*\.spec\.whatwg\.org/commit-snapshots/[0-9a-f]{40}/$ +``` + +Although not recommended by WHATWG, EIPs must anchor to a particular commit so that future readers can refer to the exact version of the living standard that existed at the time the EIP was finalized. This gives readers sufficient information to maintain compatibility, if they so choose, with the version referenced by the EIP and the current living standard. + +### Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) + +Links to an IETF Request For Comment (RFC) specification may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[RFC 8446](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446) +``` + +Which renders as: + +[RFC 8446](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446) + +Permitted IETF specification URLs MUST anchor to a specification with an assigned RFC number (meaning cannot reference internet drafts), and so MUST match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https:\/\/www.rfc-editor.org\/rfc\/.*$ +``` + +### Bitcoin Improvement Proposal + +Links to Bitcoin Improvement Proposals may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[BIP 38](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/3db736243cd01389a4dfd98738204df1856dc5b9/bip-0038.mediawiki) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[BIP 38](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/3db736243cd01389a4dfd98738204df1856dc5b9/bip-0038.mediawiki) + +Permitted Bitcoin Improvement Proposal URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^(https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/[0-9a-f]{40}/bip-[0-9]+\.mediawiki)$ +``` + +### National Vulnerability Database (NVD) + +Links to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system as published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) may be included, provided they are qualified by the date of the most recent change, using the following syntax: + +```markdown +[CVE-2023-29638 (2023-10-17T10:14:15)](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29638) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[CVE-2023-29638 (2023-10-17T10:14:15)](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29638) + +### Chain Agnostic Improvement Proposals (CAIPs) + +Links to a Chain Agnostic Improvement Proposals (CAIPs) specification may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[CAIP 10](https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/5dd3a2f541d399a82bb32590b52ca4340b09f08b/CAIPs/caip-10.md) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[CAIP 10](https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/5dd3a2f541d399a82bb32590b52ca4340b09f08b/CAIPs/caip-10.md) + +Permitted Chain Agnostic URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^(https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/[0-9a-f]{40}/CAIPs/caip-[0-9]+\.md)$ +``` + +### Ethereum Yellow Paper + +Links to the Ethereum Yellow Paper may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper/blob/9c601d6a58c44928d4f2b837c0350cec9d9259ed/paper.pdf) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[Ethereum Yellow Paper](https://github.com/ethereum/yellowpaper/blob/9c601d6a58c44928d4f2b837c0350cec9d9259ed/paper.pdf) + +Permitted Yellow Paper URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^(https://github\.com/ethereum/yellowpaper/blob/[0-9a-f]{40}/paper\.pdf)$ +``` + +### Digital Object Identifier System + +Links qualified with a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) may be included using the following syntax: + +````markdown +This is a sentence with a footnote.[^1] + +[^1]: + ```csl-json + { + "type": "article", + "id": 1, + "author": [ + { + "family": "Jameson", + "given": "Hudson" + } + ], + "DOI": "00.0000/a00000-000-0000-y", + "title": "An Interesting Article", + "original-date": { + "date-parts": [ + [2022, 12, 31] + ] + }, + "URL": "https://sly-hub.invalid/00.0000/a00000-000-0000-y", + "custom": { + "additional-urls": [ + "https://example.com/an-interesting-article.pdf" + ] + } + } + ``` +```` + +Which renders to: + + + + +This is a sentence with a footnote.[^1] + +[^1]: + ```csl-json + { + "type": "article", + "id": 1, + "author": [ + { + "family": "Jameson", + "given": "Hudson" + } + ], + "DOI": "00.0000/a00000-000-0000-y", + "title": "An Interesting Article", + "original-date": { + "date-parts": [ + [2022, 12, 31] + ] + }, + "URL": "https://sly-hub.invalid/00.0000/a00000-000-0000-y", + "custom": { + "additional-urls": [ + "https://example.com/an-interesting-article.pdf" + ] + } + } + ``` + + + +See the [Citation Style Language Schema](https://resource.citationstyles.org/schema/v1.0/input/json/csl-data.json) for the supported fields. In addition to passing validation against that schema, references must include a DOI and at least one URL. + +The top-level URL field must resolve to a copy of the referenced document which can be viewed at zero cost. Values under `additional-urls` must also resolve to a copy of the referenced document, but may charge a fee. + +### Execution API Specification + +Links to the Ethereum Execution API Specification may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[Ethereum Execution API Specification](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/dd00287101e368752ba264950585dde4b61cdc17/README.md) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[Ethereum Execution API Specification](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/dd00287101e368752ba264950585dde4b61cdc17/README.md) + +Permitted Execution API Specification URLs must anchor to a specific commit, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^(https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/(blob|commit)/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*|https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/tree/[0-9a-f]{40}/.*)$ +``` + +### Unicode Technical Standards (UTS) + +Links to Unicode Technical Standards may be included using normal markdown syntax, such as: + +```markdown +[UTS #46](https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46/tr46-35.html) +``` + +Which renders to: + +[UTS #46](https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46/tr46-35.html) + +Permitted UTS URLs must anchor to a specific version, and so must match this regular expression: + +```regex +^https://www\.unicode\.org/reports/tr[0-9]+/tr[0-9]+-[0-9]+\.html$ +``` + +## Linking to other EIPs + +References to other EIPs should follow the format `EIP-N` where `N` is the EIP number you are referring to. Each EIP that is referenced in an EIP **MUST** be accompanied by a relative markdown link the first time it is referenced, and **MAY** be accompanied by a link on subsequent references. The link **MUST** always be done via relative paths so that the links work in this GitHub repository, forks of this repository, the main EIPs site, mirrors of the main EIP site, etc. For example, you would link to this EIP as `./eip-1.md`. + +## Auxiliary Files + +Images, diagrams and auxiliary files should be included in a subdirectory of the `assets` folder for that EIP as follows: `assets/eip-N` (where **N** is to be replaced with the EIP number). When linking to an image in the EIP, use relative links such as `../assets/eip-1/image.png`. Prefer SVG diagrams, then PNG, and finally everything else. + +## Transferring EIP Ownership + +It occasionally becomes necessary to transfer ownership of EIPs to a new champion. In general, we'd like to retain the original author as a co-author of the transferred EIP, but that's really up to the original author. A good reason to transfer ownership is because the original author no longer has the time or interest in updating it or following through with the EIP process, or has fallen off the face of the 'net (i.e. is unreachable or isn't responding to email). A bad reason to transfer ownership is because you don't agree with the direction of the EIP. We try to build consensus around an EIP, but if that's not possible, you can always submit a competing EIP. + +If you are interested in assuming ownership of an EIP, send a message asking to take over, addressed to both the original author and the EIP editor. If the original author doesn't respond to the email in a timely manner, the EIP editor will make a unilateral decision (it's not like such decisions can't be reversed :)). + +## EIP Editors + +The current EIP editors are + +- Matt Garnett (@lightclient) +- Sam Wilson (@SamWilsn) +- Zainan Victor Zhou (@xinbenlv) +- Gajinder Singh (@g11tech) +- Jochem Brouwer (@jochem-brouwer) + +Emeritus EIP editors are + +- Alex Beregszaszi (@axic) +- Casey Detrio (@cdetrio) +- Gavin John (@Pandapip1) +- Greg Colvin (@gcolvin) +- Hudson Jameson (@Souptacular) +- Martin Becze (@wanderer) +- Micah Zoltu (@MicahZoltu) +- Nick Johnson (@arachnid) +- Nick Savers (@nicksavers) +- Vitalik Buterin (@vbuterin) + +If you would like to become an EIP editor, please check [EIP-5069](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5069). + +## EIP Editor Responsibilities + +For each new EIP that comes in, an editor does the following: + +- Read the EIP to check if it is ready: sound and complete. The ideas must make technical sense, even if they don't seem likely to get to final status. +- The title should accurately describe the content. +- Check the EIP for language (spelling, grammar, sentence structure, etc.), markup (GitHub flavored Markdown), code style + +If the EIP isn't ready, the editor will send it back to the author for revision, with specific instructions. + +Once the EIP is ready for the repository, the EIP editor will: + +- Assign an EIP number (generally incremental; editors can reassign if number sniping is suspected) +- Merge the corresponding [pull request](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pulls) +- Send a message back to the EIP author with the next step. + +Many EIPs are written and maintained by developers with write access to the Ethereum codebase. The EIP editors monitor EIP changes, and correct any structure, grammar, spelling, or markup mistakes we see. + +The editors don't pass judgment on EIPs. We merely do the administrative & editorial part. + +## Style Guide + +### Titles + +The `title` field in the preamble: + +- Should be in title case. +- Should not include the word "standard" or any variation thereof; and +- Should not include the EIP's number. + +### Descriptions + +The `description` field in the preamble: + +- Should be in sentence case. +- Should not include the word "standard" or any variation thereof; and +- Should not include the EIP's number. + +### EIP numbers + +When referring to an EIP with a `category` of `ERC`, it must be written in the hyphenated form `ERC-X` where `X` is that EIP's assigned number. When referring to EIPs with any other `category`, it must be written in the hyphenated form `EIP-X` where `X` is that EIP's assigned number. + +### RFC 2119 and RFC 8174 + +EIPs are encouraged to follow [RFC 2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.html) and [RFC 8174](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8174.html) for terminology and to insert the following at the beginning of the Specification section: + +> The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174. + +Don't use RFC 2119 keywords (all-caps SHOULD/MUST/etc.) outside of the specification section. + +## History + +This document was derived heavily from [Bitcoin's BIP-0001](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips) written by Amir Taaki which in turn was derived from [Python's PEP-0001](https://peps.python.org/). In many places text was simply copied and modified. Although the PEP-0001 text was written by Barry Warsaw, Jeremy Hylton, and David Goodger, they are not responsible for its use in the Ethereum Improvement Process, and should not be bothered with technical questions specific to Ethereum or the EIP. Please direct all comments to the EIP editors. + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-155.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-155.md index 17024fa..5ae2c05 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-155.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-155.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ created: 2016-10-14 --- ### Hard fork -[Spurious Dragon](./eip-607.md) +[Spurious Dragon](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-607) ### Parameters - `FORK_BLKNUM`: 2,675,000 diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1559.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1559.md index 26a5b73..613b56d 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1559.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-1559.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ requires: 2718, 2930 A transaction pricing mechanism that includes fixed-per-block network fee that is burned and dynamically expands/contracts block sizes to deal with transient congestion. ## Abstract -We introduce a new [EIP-2718](./eip-2718.md) transaction type, with the format `0x02 || rlp([chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, destination, amount, data, access_list, signature_y_parity, signature_r, signature_s])`. +We introduce a new [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) transaction type, with the format `0x02 || rlp([chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, destination, amount, data, access_list, signature_y_parity, signature_r, signature_s])`. There is a base fee per gas in protocol, which can move up or down each block according to a formula which is a function of gas used in parent block and gas target (block gas limit divided by elasticity multiplier) of parent block. The algorithm results in the base fee per gas increasing when blocks are above the gas target, and decreasing when blocks are below the gas target. @@ -39,15 +39,15 @@ An important aspect of this fee system is that miners only get to keep the prior Block validity is defined in the reference implementation below. The `GASPRICE` (`0x3a`) opcode **MUST** return the `effective_gas_price` as defined in the reference implementation below. -As of `FORK_BLOCK_NUMBER`, a new [EIP-2718](./eip-2718.md) transaction is introduced with `TransactionType` 2. +As of `FORK_BLOCK_NUMBER`, a new [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) transaction is introduced with `TransactionType` 2. -The intrinsic cost of the new transaction is inherited from [EIP-2930](./eip-2930.md), specifically `21000 + 16 * non-zero calldata bytes + 4 * zero calldata bytes + 1900 * access list storage key count + 2400 * access list address count`. +The intrinsic cost of the new transaction is inherited from [EIP-2930](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2930), specifically `21000 + 16 * non-zero calldata bytes + 4 * zero calldata bytes + 1900 * access list storage key count + 2400 * access list address count`. -The [EIP-2718](./eip-2718.md) `TransactionPayload` for this transaction is `rlp([chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, destination, amount, data, access_list, signature_y_parity, signature_r, signature_s])`. +The [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) `TransactionPayload` for this transaction is `rlp([chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, destination, amount, data, access_list, signature_y_parity, signature_r, signature_s])`. The `signature_y_parity, signature_r, signature_s` elements of this transaction represent a secp256k1 signature over `keccak256(0x02 || rlp([chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, destination, amount, data, access_list]))`. -The [EIP-2718](./eip-2718.md) `ReceiptPayload` for this transaction is `rlp([status, cumulative_transaction_gas_used, logs_bloom, logs])`. +The [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) `ReceiptPayload` for this transaction is `rlp([status, cumulative_transaction_gas_used, logs_bloom, logs])`. *Note: `//` is integer division, round down.* ```python @@ -326,4 +326,4 @@ Should a miner attempt to execute this attack, we can simply increase the elasti By burning the base fee, we can no longer guarantee a fixed Ether supply. This could result in economic instability as the long term supply of ETH will no longer be constant over time. While a valid concern, it is difficult to quantify how much of an impact this will have. If more is burned on base fee than is generated in mining rewards then ETH will be deflationary and if more is generated in mining rewards than is burned then ETH will be inflationary. Since we cannot control user demand for block space, we cannot assert at the moment whether ETH will end up inflationary or deflationary, so this change causes the core developers to lose some control over Ether's long term quantity. ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-4844.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-4844.md index de2e4a4..3eabb75 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-4844.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-4844.md @@ -96,19 +96,19 @@ def fake_exponential(factor: int, numerator: int, denominator: int) -> int: ### Blob transaction -We introduce a new type of [EIP-2718](./eip-2718.md) transaction, "blob transaction", where the `TransactionType` is `BLOB_TX_TYPE` and the `TransactionPayload` is the RLP serialization of the following `TransactionPayloadBody`: +We introduce a new type of [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) transaction, "blob transaction", where the `TransactionType` is `BLOB_TX_TYPE` and the `TransactionPayload` is the RLP serialization of the following `TransactionPayloadBody`: ``` [chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, to, value, data, access_list, max_fee_per_blob_gas, blob_versioned_hashes, y_parity, r, s] ``` -The fields `chain_id`, `nonce`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, `gas_limit`, `value`, `data`, and `access_list` follow the same semantics as [EIP-1559](./eip-1559.md). +The fields `chain_id`, `nonce`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, `gas_limit`, `value`, `data`, and `access_list` follow the same semantics as [EIP-1559](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1559). The field `to` deviates slightly from the semantics with the exception that it MUST NOT be `nil` and therefore must always represent a 20-byte address. This means that blob transactions cannot have the form of a create transaction. The field `max_fee_per_blob_gas` is a `uint256` and the field `blob_versioned_hashes` represents a list of hash outputs from `kzg_to_versioned_hash`. -The [EIP-2718](./eip-2718.md) `ReceiptPayload` for this transaction is `rlp([status, cumulative_transaction_gas_used, logs_bloom, logs])`. +The [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) `ReceiptPayload` for this transaction is `rlp([status, cumulative_transaction_gas_used, logs_bloom, logs])`. #### Signature @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ though not an unprecedented one as this also applies to transactions with large By only broadcasting announcements for blob transactions, receiving nodes will have control over which and how many transactions to receive, allowing them to throttle throughput to an acceptable level. -[EIP-5793](./eip-5793.md) will give further fine-grained control to nodes by extending the `NewPooledTransactionHashes` announcement messages to include the transaction type and size. +[EIP-5793](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5793) will give further fine-grained control to nodes by extending the `NewPooledTransactionHashes` announcement messages to include the transaction type and size. In addition, we recommend including a 1.1x base fee per blob gas bump requirement to the mempool transaction replacement rules. @@ -435,4 +435,4 @@ a much shorter delay compared to proposed (but yet to be implemented) one-year r ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-712.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-712.md index d6f7ba3..cef1cb3 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-712.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-712.md @@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ As such, the adage "don't roll your own crypto" applies. Instead, a peer-reviewe This EIP aims to improve the usability of off-chain message signing for use on-chain. We are seeing growing adoption of off-chain message signing as it saves gas and reduces the number of transactions on the blockchain. Currently signed messages are an opaque hex string displayed to the user with little context about the items that make up the message. -![eth_sign screenshot](../assets/eip-712/eth_sign.png) +![eth_sign screenshot](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-712/eth_sign.png) Here we outline a scheme to encode data along with its structure which allows it to be displayed to the user for verification when signing. Below is an example of what a user could be shown when signing a message according to the present proposal. -![eth_signTypedData screenshot](../assets/eip-712/eth_signTypedData.png) +![eth_signTypedData screenshot](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-712/eth_signTypedData.png) ## Specification @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ This encoding is deterministic because the individual components are. The encodi The encoding is compliant with [ERC-191][ERC-191]. The 'version byte' is fixed to `0x01`, the 'version specific data' is the 32-byte domain separator `domainSeparator` and the 'data to sign' is the 32-byte `hashStruct(message)`. -[ERC-191]: ./eip-191.md +[ERC-191]: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-191 ### Definition of typed structured data `𝕊` @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ where the type of `eip712Domain` is a struct named `EIP712Domain` with one or mo * `address verifyingContract` the address of the contract that will verify the signature. The user-agent _may_ do contract specific phishing prevention. * `bytes32 salt` a disambiguating salt for the protocol. This can be used as a domain separator of last resort. -[EIP-155]: ./eip-155.md +[EIP-155]: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-155 Future extensions to this standard can add new fields with new user-agent behaviour constraints. User-agents are free to use the provided information to inform/warn users or refuse signing. Dapp implementers should not add private fields, new fields should be proposed through the EIP process. @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Result: An example how to use Solidity ecrecover to verify the signature calculated with `eth_signTypedData` can be found in the [Example.js][example-js]. The contract is deployed on the testnet Ropsten and Rinkeby. -[example-js]: ../assets/eip-712/Example.js +[example-js]: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-712/Example.js #### personal_signTypedData @@ -270,8 +270,8 @@ For the type hash several alternatives were considered and rejected for the reas **Alternative 3**: ABIv2 function signatures modified to be 256-bit. While this captures type info, it does not capture any of the semantics other than the function. This is already causing a practical collision between [ERC-20]'s and [ERC-721]'s `transfer(address,uint256)`, where in the former the `uint256` refers to an amount and the latter to a unique id. In general ABIv2 favors compatibility where a hashing standard should prefer incompatibility. -[ERC-20]: ./eip-20.md -[ERC-721]: ./eip-721.md +[ERC-20]: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20 +[ERC-721]: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-721 **Alternative 4**: 256-bit ABIv2 signatures extended with parameter names and struct names. The `Mail` example from above would be encoded as `Mail(Person(string name,address wallet) from,Person(string name,address wallet) to,string contents)`. This is longer than the proposed solution. And indeed, the length of the string can grow exponentially in the length of the input (consider `struct A{B a;B b;}; struct B {C a;C b;}; …`). It also does not allow a recursive struct type (consider `struct List {uint256 value; List next;}`). @@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ The Solidity expression `keccak256(someInstance)` for an instance `someInstance` An example contract can be found in [Example.sol][ex-sol] and an example implementation of signing in JavaScript in [Example.js][ex-js] -[ex-sol]: ../assets/eip-712/Example.sol -[ex-js]: ../assets/eip-712/Example.js +[ex-sol]: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-712/Example.sol +[ex-js]: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-712/Example.js ## Security Considerations @@ -361,4 +361,4 @@ The mechanism for reliably broadcasting a signature is application-specific and ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-7594.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-7594.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87c5ed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-7594.md @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +--- +eip: 7594 +title: PeerDAS - Peer Data Availability Sampling +description: Introducing simple DAS utilizing gossip distribution and peer requests +author: Danny Ryan (@djrtwo), Dankrad Feist (@dankrad), Francesco D'Amato (@fradamt), Hsiao-Wei Wang (@hwwhww), Alex Stokes (@ralexstokes) +discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-7594-peerdas-peer-data-availability-sampling/18215 +status: Final +type: Standards Track +category: Core +created: 2024-01-12 +requires: 4844 +--- + +## Abstract + +PeerDAS (Peer Data Availability Sampling) is a networking protocol that allows nodes to perform data availability sampling (DAS) to ensure that blob data has been made available while downloading only a subset of the data. PeerDAS utilizes gossip for distribution, discovery for finding peers of particular data custody, and peer requests for sampling. + +## Motivation + +DAS is a method of scaling data availability beyond the levels of [EIP-4844](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4844) by not requiring all nodes to download all data while still ensuring that all of the data has been made available. + +Providing additional data availability helps bring scale to Ethereum users in the context of layer 2 systems called "roll-ups" whose dominant bottleneck is layer 1 data availability. + +## Specification + +We extend the blobs introduced in EIP-4844 using a one-dimensional erasure coding extension. Each row consists of the blob data combined with its erasure code. It is subdivided into cells, which are the smallest units that can be authenticated with their respective blob's KZG commitments. Each column, associated with a specific gossip subnet, consists of the cells from all rows for a specific index. Each node is responsible for maintaining a deterministic set of column subnets and custodying their data as a function of their node ID. + +Nodes find and maintain a diverse peer set and sample columns from their peers to perform DAS every slot. + +A node can reconstruct the entire data matrix if it acquires at least 50% of all the columns. If a node has less than 50%, it can request the necessary columns from its peer nodes. + +Additionally, a limit of 6 blobs per transaction is introduced. Clients MUST enforce this limit when validating blob transactions at submission time, when received from the network, and during block production and processing. + +The detailed specifications are on [ethereum/consensus-specs](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/tree/9d377fd53d029536e57cfda1a4d2c700c59f86bf/specs/fulu/). + +The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174. + +### Networking + +This EIP introduces cell KZG proofs, which are used to prove that a KZG commitment opens to a cell at the given index. This allows downloading only specific cells from a blob, while still ensuring data integrity with respect to the corresponding KZG commitment, and is therefore a key component of data availability sampling. However, computing the cell proofs for a blob is an expensive operation, which a block producer would have to repeat for many blobs. Since proof verification is much cheaper than proof computation, and the proof size is negligible compared to cell size, we instead require blob transaction senders to compute the proofs themselves and include them in the EIP-4844 transaction pool wrapper for blob transactions. + +To this end, during transaction gossip responses (`PooledTransactions`), the wrapper is modified to: + +``` +rlp([tx_payload_body, wrapper_version, blobs, commitments, cell_proofs]) + +cell_proofs = [cell_proof_0, cell_proof_1, ...] +``` + +The `tx_payload_body`, `blobs` and `commitments` are as in EIP-4844, while the `proofs` field is replaced by `cell_proofs`, and a `wrapper_version` is added. These are defined as follows: + +- `wrapper_version` - one byte indicating which version of the wrapper is used. For the current version, it is set to **`1`**. +- `cell_proofs` - list of cell proofs for all `blobs`, including the proofs for the extension indices, for a total of `CELLS_PER_EXT_BLOB` proofs per blob (`CELLS_PER_EXT_BLOB` is the number of cells for an extended blob, defined [in the consensus specs](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/tree/9d377fd53d029536e57cfda1a4d2c700c59f86bf/specs/fulu/polynomial-commitments-sampling.md#cells)) + +Note that, while `cell_proofs` contain the proofs for all cells, including the extension cells, the blobs themselves are sent without being extended (`CELLS_PER_EXT_BLOB / 2` cells per blob). This is to avoid sending redundant data, which can quickly be computed by the receiving node. +In other words, `cell_proofs[i * CELLS_PER_EXT_BLOB + j]` is the proof for cell `j` of `compute_cells(blobs[i])`, where `compute_cells(blob)` outputs all cells of `blob`, including the extension cells. + +The node MUST validate `tx_payload_body` and verify the wrapped data against it. To do so, ensure that: + +- There are an equal number of `tx_payload_body.blob_versioned_hashes`, `blobs` and `commitments`. +- `cell_proofs` contains exactly `CELLS_PER_EXT_BLOB * len(blobs)` cell proofs +- The KZG `commitments` hash to the versioned hashes, i.e. `kzg_to_versioned_hash(commitments[i]) == tx_payload_body.blob_versioned_hashes[i]` +- The KZG `commitments` match the corresponding `blobs` and `cell_proofs`. This requires computing the extension cells for all `blobs` (e.g. via `compute_cells`), and verifying all `cell_proofs`. (Note: all cell proofs can be batch verified at once, e.g. via `verify_cell_kzg_proof_batch`) + +## Rationale + +### Why use DAS to scale the DA layer? + +PeerDAS is a DAS scheme that requires nodes to only download a small constant fraction of the data to satisfy a local availability check. With the current parameters, this is 1/8 of the total data (i.e. blobs in a block), which can in the future be decreased to 1/16 or even 1/32 by reducing the size of samples (increasing the number of columns). In this way, PeerDAS allows for securely scaling the blob throughput of the network without compromising decentralization, i.e., without increasing node's bandwidth and storage requirements. + +### What does peer sampling provide? + +PeerDAS takes the set of peers of a node on the network as a primitive to build a DAS scheme around. A focus on peers allows for redundancy in the mechanism (as a node generally has many peers, and peer count can also be cheaply increased) which both helps with theoretical security as detailed in the "Security Considerations" section, but also practical security of the implementation (e.g. if a single peer fails, a node can likely use another peer for the same sampling task). + +PeerDAS also has the nice property that any given node may voluntarily custody more of the data than the bare minimum which increases the performance of the mechanism. Alternative schemes do not readily support this "transparent" scaling property. + +### Why are these parameters chosen? + +The parameters of PeerDAS given in the specs support network security while keeping node requirements sufficiently low. See the security argument below for further details. + +### Why do validators have an additional custody requirement beyond full nodes? + +Validators are assumed to have marginally higher requirements to participate on the network. PeerDAS introduces a custody requirement that scales with the validator count so that nodes with more resources can contribute to a more stable backbone that makes the global network more robust. + +### Column sampling vs row sampling + +PeerDAS defines a sample as a "column" which is a cross-section across _all_ blobs, rather than a "row" which would be a full blob. +The sampling scheme could be defined over rows but then any reconstruction strategy would need to work over "extension" blobs that do not a priori exist on the network. +Reconstruction becomes much more tractable by working over columns as nodes can be assumed to have much more of the complete data by default (e.g. because most/all of the blobs are in the public mempool). + +Another benefit is that sampling over rows requires _column_ extensions which would have to be done at the time of block construction, i.e. on the "critical path". Sampling over columns requires row extensions which can be done in advance (not on the critical path), and moreover proof computation can be outsourced to senders of blob transactions. + +## Backwards Compatibility + +This EIP is fully backwards compatible with [EIP-4844](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4844). + +## Test Cases + +Refer to the consensus and execution spec tests for testing of this EIP. + +## Security Considerations + +The primary failure mode of a DAS scheme is a "data withholding" attack, where a block producer attempts to convince the network some data is available even when the block producer fails to provide the associated data. +PeerDAS resolves withholding attacks by implementing a (pseudo)randomized sampling scheme that decreases the probability of a successful attack as the size of the network grows for a sublinear amount of data that must be downloaded. + +This intuition can be formalized as follows: + +Letting `n` be the total number of sampling nodes (i.e. the size of the network), `m` be the total number of samples possible (cf. `NUMBER_OF_CUSTODY_GROUPS` in the specs) and `k` be the minimum number of samples that a node must download (cf. `SAMPLES_PER_SLOT` in the specs), we have the following bound for the probability of convincing a fraction $\epsilon$ of the nodes that some data is available when it is withheld: + +![withholding-probability](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/assets/eip-7594/withholding-probability.svg) + +The first term is the number of possible ways to choose a subset of $n\epsilon$ nodes whose sampling queries should be satisfied (i.e. the nodes to be tricked). +The second term is the number of ways to choose a maximally large subset of samples to be made available to satisfy the sampling queries of the $n\epsilon$ nodes without allowing reconstruction of the full data. +Finally, for any such choices, the third term is the probability of success, i.e. the probability that the sampling queries of all chosen $n\epsilon$ nodes are satisfied by the chosen subset up to the reconstruction threshold. + +For mainnet parameters given in the specs and assuming 10,000 nodes on the network, we can compute upper bounds of attack success for varying $\epsilon$: + +| $\epsilon$ | $n\epsilon$ (target nodes) | Upper bound on $\mathbb{P}$ | +|:----------:|:-------------------:|:---------------------------:| +| 0.01 | 100 | $1$ | +| 0.02 | 200 | $10^{-20.04}$ | +| 0.03 | 300 | $10^{-101.55}$ | +| 0.04 | 400 | $10^{-198.24}$ | +| 0.05 | 500 | $10^{-306.34}$ | + +The table shows that the chances of a successful attack quickly drop to a negligible amount and so PeerDAS is considered secure to withholding attacks. + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-7702.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-7702.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c505646 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/eip-7702.md @@ -0,0 +1,606 @@ +--- +eip: 7702 +title: Set Code for EOAs +description: Add a new tx type that permanently sets the code for an EOA +author: Vitalik Buterin (@vbuterin), Sam Wilson (@SamWilsn), Ansgar Dietrichs (@adietrichs), lightclient (@lightclient) +discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-set-eoa-account-code-for-one-transaction/19923 +status: Final +type: Standards Track +category: Core +created: 2024-05-07 +requires: 2, 161, 1052, 2718, 2929, 2930, 3541, 3607, 4844 +--- + +## Abstract + +Add a new [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) transaction type that allows Externally +Owned Accounts (EOAs) to set the code in their account. This is done by +attaching a list of authorization tuples -- individually formatted as `[chain_id, +address, nonce, y_parity, r, s]` -- to the transaction. For each tuple, a +delegation indicator `(0xef0100 || address)` is written to the authorizing +account's code. All code executing operations must load and execute the code +pointed to by the delegation. + +## Motivation + +Despite great advances in the smart contract wallet ecosystem, EOAs have held +back broad adoption of UX improvements across applications. This EIP therefore +focuses on adding short-term functionality improvements to EOAs which will allow +UX improvements to permeate through the entire application stack. Three +particular features this EIP is designed around are: + +* **Batching**: allowing multiple operations from the same user in one atomic +transaction. One common example is an [ERC-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20) approval followed by +spending that approval. This is a common workflow in DEXes that requires two +transactions today. Advanced use cases of batching occasionally involve +dependencies: the output of the first operation is part of the input to the +second operation. +* **Sponsorship**: account X pays for a transaction on behalf of account Y. +Account X could be paid in some other ERC-20 for this service, or it could be an +application operator including the transactions of its users for free. +* **Privilege de-escalation**: users can sign sub-keys and give them specific +permissions that are much weaker than global access to the account. For example, +a permission to spend ERC-20 tokens but not ETH, or to spend up to 1% of the +total balance per day, or to interact only with a specific application. + +## Specification + +### Parameters + +| Parameter | Value | +| ------------------------ | ------- | +| `SET_CODE_TX_TYPE` | `0x04` | +| `MAGIC` | `0x05` | +| `PER_AUTH_BASE_COST` | `12500` | +| `PER_EMPTY_ACCOUNT_COST` | `25000` | + +### Set code transaction + +A new [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) transaction known as the "set code transaction" +is introduced, where the `TransactionType` is `SET_CODE_TX_TYPE` and the +`TransactionPayload` is the RLP serialization of the following: + +``` +rlp([chain_id, nonce, max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas, gas_limit, +destination, value, data, access_list, authorization_list, signature_y_parity, +signature_r, signature_s]) + +authorization_list = [[chain_id, address, nonce, y_parity, r, s], ...] +``` + +The fields `chain_id`, `nonce`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, +`gas_limit`, `destination`, `value`, `data`, and `access_list` of the outer +transaction follow the same semantics as [EIP-4844](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4844). *Note, this +implies a null destination is not valid.* + +The `signature_y_parity, signature_r, signature_s` elements of this transaction +represent a secp256k1 signature over `keccak256(SET_CODE_TX_TYPE || +TransactionPayload)`. + +The `authorization_list` is a list of tuples that indicate what code the signer +of each tuple desires to execute in the context of their EOA. The transaction is +considered invalid if the length of `authorization_list` is zero. + +The transaction is also considered invalid when any field in an authorization +tuple cannot fit within the following bounds: + +```python +assert auth.chain_id < 2**256 +assert auth.nonce < 2**64 +assert len(auth.address) == 20 +assert auth.y_parity < 2**8 +assert auth.r < 2**256 +assert auth.s < 2**256 +``` + +The [EIP-2718](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2718) `ReceiptPayload` for this transaction is +`rlp([status, cumulative_transaction_gas_used, logs_bloom, logs])`. + +#### Behavior + +The authorization list is processed before the execution portion of the +transaction begins, but after the sender's nonce is incremented. + +For each `[chain_id, address, nonce, y_parity, r, s]` tuple, perform the +following: + +1. Verify the chain ID is 0 or the ID of the current chain. +2. Verify the `nonce` is less than `2**64 - 1`. +3. Let `authority = ecrecover(msg, y_parity, r, s)`. + * Where `msg = keccak(MAGIC || rlp([chain_id, address, nonce]))`. + * Verify `s` is less than or equal to `secp256k1n/2`, as specified in + [EIP-2](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2). +4. Add `authority` to `accessed_addresses`, as defined in [EIP-2929](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2929). +5. Verify the code of `authority` is empty or already delegated. +6. Verify the nonce of `authority` is equal to `nonce`. +7. Add `PER_EMPTY_ACCOUNT_COST - PER_AUTH_BASE_COST` gas to the global refund + counter if `authority` is not empty. +8. Set the code of `authority` to be `0xef0100 || address`. This is a delegation + indicator. + * If `address` is `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000`, do not write + the delegation indicator. Clear the account's code by resetting the account's + code hash to the empty code hash + `0xc5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470`. +9. Increase the nonce of `authority` by one. + +If any step above fails, immediately stop processing the tuple and continue to +the next tuple in the list. When multiple tuples from the same authority are +present, set the code using the address in the last valid occurrence. + +Note, if transaction execution results in failure (e.g. any exceptional +condition or code reverting), the processed delegation indicators is *not rolled +back*. + +##### Delegation indicator + +Delegation indicators use the banned opcode `0xef`, defined in +[EIP-3541](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3541), to indicate that the code must be handled differently +than regular code. The delegation forces all code executing operations to follow +the address pointer to obtain the code to execute. For example, `CALL` loads the +code at `address` and executes it in the context of `authority`. + +The affected executing operations are: + +* `CALL` +* `CALLCODE` +* `DELEGATECALL` +* `STATICCALL` +* any transaction where `destination` points to an address with a delegation +indicator present + +For code reading, only `CODESIZE` and `CODECOPY` instructions are affected. They +operate directly on the executing code instead of the delegation. For example, +when executing a delegated account `EXTCODESIZE` returns `23` (the size of +`0xef0100 || address`) whereas `CODESIZE` returns the size of the code residing +at `address`. + +*Note, this means during delegated execution `CODESIZE` and `CODECOPY` produce a +different result compared to calling `EXTCODESIZE` and `EXTCODECOPY` on the +authority.* + +###### Precompiles + +When a precompile address is the target of a delegation, the retrieved code is +considered empty and `CALL`, `CALLCODE`, `STATICCALL`, `DELEGATECALL` +instructions targeting this account will execute empty code, and therefore +succeed with no execution when given enough gas to initiate the call. + +###### Loops + +In case a delegation indicator points to another delegation, creating a +potential chain or loop of delegations, clients must retrieve only the first +code and then stop following the delegation chain. + +#### Gas Costs + +The intrinsic cost of the new transaction is inherited from +[EIP-2930](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2930), specifically `21000 + 16 * non-zero calldata bytes + +4 * zero calldata bytes + 1900 * access list storage key count + 2400 * access +list address count`. Additionally, add a cost of `PER_EMPTY_ACCOUNT_COST * +authorization list length`. + +The transaction sender will pay for all authorization tuples, regardless of +validity or duplication. + +If a code executing instruction accesses a cold account during the resolution of +delegated code, add an additional [EIP-2929](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2929) +`COLD_ACCOUNT_READ_COST` cost of `2600` gas to the normal cost and add the +account to `accessed_addresses`. Otherwise, assess a `WARM_STORAGE_READ_COST` +cost of `100`. + +#### Transaction origination + +Modify the restriction put in place by [EIP-3607](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3607) to allow EOAs +whose code is a valid delegation indicator, i.e. `0xef0100 || address`, to +originate transactions. Accounts with any other code values may not originate +transactions. + +Additionally, if a transaction's `destination` has a delegation indicator, add +the target of the delegation to `accessed_addresses`. + +## Rationale + +Below is the rationale for both general design directions of the EIP, as well as +specific technical choices. + +### General design philosophy + +#### Persistence of code delegation + +The first draft of this proposal had a clever idea to avoid disagreement on +whether in-protocol revocation was needed or not. The idea was to temporarily +set code in the account with the authorization. After the transaction finished, +the code would be completely cleared. This was a new design space for enriching +EOA functionality. + +Even this approach was not without its flaws. Fundamentally, there was not much +friction for users including set code authorizations. This meant that some users +and applications would opt to treat the extension as more of a scripting +facility, rather than a full-fledged upgrade to a smart contract wallet. The +outcome of this would be two somewhat competing workstreams for UX improvements: +smart contract wallets and EOA scripts. + +Previous proposals had been met with similar criticisms. To counteract this, +persistent delegations were introduced. They create enough friction in +deployment that users will not deploy new, unique ones regularly. This will +hopefully unify the workstreams and minimize fragmentation in UX developments. + +#### No initcode + +Running initcode is not desirable for many reasons. It creates a new mode of +execution that needs extensive testing, and may be used for purposes not +possible with standard smart contract wallets. It also forces developers to +perform initialization as a standard call to the EOA after delegation. The lack +of atomicity in these operations is another factor that will push users to +complete smart contract wallet solutions, instead of EOA scripts. + +Additionally, initcode tends to be propagated inside the transaction calldata. +This means it would need to be included in the authorization tuple and signed +over. The minimum initcode is around 15 bytes -- it would simply copy the +contract code from an external address. The total cost would be `16 * 15 = 240` +calldata cost, plus the [EIP-3860](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3860) cost of `2 * 15 = 30`, plus +the runtime costs of around `150`. So nearly `500` additional gas would be spent +preparing the account. Even more likely, 1200+ gas if not copying from an +external account. + +#### Creation by template + +Initcode or not, there is a question of how users should specify the code they +intend to run in their account. The two main options are to specify the bytecode +directly in the transaction or to specify a pointer to the code. The simplest +pointer would just be the address of code deployed on-chain. + +The cost analysis makes the answer clear. The smallest proxy would be around 50 +bytes and an address is 20 bytes. The 30 byte difference provides no useful +additional functionality and will be inefficiently replicated billions of times. + +Furthermore, specifying code directly would again make it possible for EOAs to +have a new, unique ability to execute arbitrary code specified in the +transaction calldata. It is for these reasons that creation by template is +chosen. + +#### Interaction with applications and wallets + +While this EIP provides a lot of flexibility to applications and EOAs, there are +incorrect ways of using it. Applications **must not** expect that they can +suggest the user sign an authorization, and therefore it is the duty of the +wallet to not provide an interface to do so. + +**There is no safe way to provide this interface**. The code specified by an +authorization has unrestricted access to the account and must always be closely +audited by the wallet. Few users have the level of sophistication to reasonably +verify the code they are delegating to. + +It is also not possible to implement a system of permissions at this level to +minimize the risk. If applications require custom wallet functionality, they +must use standardized extension / module systems built on top of the delegated +code that correctly implements permissions. + +#### Forward-compatibility with future account abstraction + +This EIP is designed to be forward-compatible with endgame account abstraction, +without over-enshrining any fine-grained details of [ERC-4337](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337) or +RIP-7560. + +To start, the `address` that users sign could directly point to existing +ERC-4337 wallet code. This essentially requires the "code pathways" that are +used are code pathways that would, in most cases, continue to make sense in a +pure-smart-contract-wallet world. Hence, it avoids the problem of creating two +separate UX workstreams because, to a large extent, they would be the same +ecosystem. + +There will be some workflows that require kludges under this solution that would +be better done in some different "more native" under "endgame AA", but this is +relatively a small subset. The EIP does not require adding any opcodes, that +would become dangling and useless in a post-EOA world, and it allows EOAs to +masquerade as contracts to be included in ERC-4337 bundles, in a way that's +compatible with the existing `EntryPoint`. + +#### Self-sponsoring: allowing `tx.origin` to set code + +Allowing `tx.origin` to set code and execute its own delegated code enables what +is called self-sponsoring. It allows users to take advantage of EIP-7702 without +relying on any third party infrastructure. + +However, that means the EIP breaks the invariant that `msg.sender == tx.origin` +only happens in the topmost execution frame of a transaction. This will affect +smart contracts containing `require(msg.sender == tx.origin)` style checks. This +check is used for at least three purposes: + +1. Ensuring that `msg.sender` is an EOA (given that `tx.origin` always has to be + an EOA). This invariant does not depend on the execution layer depth and, + therefore, is not affected. +2. Protecting against atomic sandwich attacks like flash loans, which rely on + the ability to modify state before and after the execution of the target + contract as part of the same atomic transaction. This protection would be broken + by this EIP. However, relying on `tx.origin` in this way is considered bad + practice, and can already be circumvented by miners conditionally including + transactions in a block. +3. Preventing reentrancy. + +Examples of (1) and (2) can be found in contracts deployed on Ethereum mainnet, +with (1) being more common (and unaffected by this proposal). On the other hand, +use case (3) is more severely affected by this proposal, but the authors of this +EIP did not find any examples of this form of reentrancy protection, though the +search was non-exhaustive. + +This distribution of occurrences—many (1), some (2), and no (3)—is exactly what +the authors of this EIP expect because: + +* Determining if `msg.sender` is an EOA without `tx.origin` is difficult, if not +impossible. +* The only execution context which is safe from atomic sandwich attacks is the +topmost context, and `tx.origin == msg.sender` is the only way to detect that +context. +* In contrast, there are many direct and flexible ways of preventing reentrancy +(e.g., using a transient storage variable). Since `msg.sender == tx.origin` is +only true in the topmost context, it would make an obscure tool for preventing +reentrancy, rather than other more common approaches. + +There are other approaches to mitigate this restriction which do not break the +invariant: + +* Set `tx.origin` to a constant `ENTRY_POINT` address when using the `CALL*` +instruction in the context of an EOA. +* Set `tx.origin` to a special address derived from the sender or signer +addresses. +* Disallow `tx.origin` from setting code. This would make the simple batching +use cases impossible, but could be relaxed in the future. + +### Rationale for technical details + +#### Cost of delegation + +The `PER_AUTH_BASE_COST` is the cost to process the authorization tuple and set +the delegation destination. To compute a fair cost for this operation, the +authors review its impact on the system: + +* ferry 101 bytes of calldata = `101 * non-zero cost (16) = 1616` +* recovering the `authority` address = `3000` +* reading the nonce and code of `authority` = `2600` +* storing values in already warm account = `200` +* cost to deploy code = `200 * 23 = 4600` + +The impact-based assessment identifies `12016` gas of comparable computation for +the operation. It is rounded up to `12500` to account for miscellaneous costs +associated with shuttling data around the state transition. + +#### Clearing delegation indicators + +A general design goal in state transition changes is to minimize the number of +special cases an EIP has. In early iterations, this EIP resisted a special case +for clearing an account's delegation indicator. + +For most intents and purposes, an account delegated to `0x0` is +indistinguishable from a true EOA. However, one particular unfortunate case is +unavoidable. Even if a user has a zeroed out delegation indicator, most +operations that interact with that account will incur an additional +`COLD_ACCOUNT_READ_COST` upon the first touch caused by attempting to load the +code at `0x0`. + +For this reason, the authors have opted to include a special case which allow +users to restore their EOA to its original purity. + +#### Lack of instruction prohibition + +Consistency is a valuable property in the EVM, both from an implementation +perspective and a user-understanding-perspective. Despite considering bans on +several families of instructions in the context of EOAs, the authors feel there +is not a compelling reason to do so, as it would cause smart contract wallets +and EOA smart contract wallets to proceed down distinct UX workstreams. + +The main instruction families where a ban was considered were storage related +and contract creation related. The decision to not ban storage instructions +hinged mostly on their importance to smart contract wallets. Although it's +possible to have an external storage contract that the smart contract wallet +calls into, it is unnecessarily complicated and inefficient. In the future, new +state schemes may allow substantially cheaper access to certain storage slots +within an account. This is something smart contract wallets will want to take +advantage of that a storage contract wouldn't support. + +Creation instructions were considered for a ban as well on other similar EIPs, +however because this EIP allows EOAs to spend value intra-transaction, the +concern with bumping the nonce intra-transaction and invalidating pending +transactions is not significant. + +#### Protection from malleability cross-chain + +One consideration when signing a code pointer is what code that address points +to on another chain. While it is possible to create a deterministic deployment, +i.e. via Nick's method, verifying such a deployment may not always be desirable. +In such situations, the chain ID can be set to reduce the scope of the +authorization. When universal deployment is preferred, simply set chain ID to 0. + +An alternative to adding chain ID could be to substitute in the actual code for +the address in the signature. This seems to have the benefit of both minimizing +the on-chain size of auth tuples, by continuing to serialize only the address, +while retaining specificity of the actual code running in the account, by +pulling in the code for the signature. One unfortunate issue of this format, +though, is that it imposes a database lookup to determine the signer of each +auth tuple. This imposition itself seems to create enough complexity in +transaction propagation that it is decided to avoid and simply sign over the +address directly. + +#### Delegation of code execution only + +Other code retrieving operations like `EXTCODEHASH` do not automatically follow +delegations, they operate on the delegation indicator itself. If instead +delegations were followed, an account would be able to temporarily masquerade as +having a particular codehash, which would break contracts that rely on +codehashes as a definition of possible account behavior. A change of behavior in +a contract is currently only possible if its code explicitly allows it (in +particular via `DELEGATECALL`), and a change of codehash is only possible in the +presence of `SELFDESTRUCT` (which, as of Cancun, only applies in the same +transaction as contract creation), so choosing to follow delegations in +`EXTCODE*` opcodes would have created a new type of account breaking prior +assumptions. + +#### Charge maximum cost upfront + +While computing the intrinsic gas cost, the transaction is charged the +worst-case cost for each delegation. Later, while processing the authorization +list, a refund is issued if the account already exists in state. This mechanism +is designed to avoid state lookups for each authorization when computing the +intrinsic gas and can quickly determine the validity of the transaction with +only a state lookup on the sender's account. + +#### No blobs, no contract creation + +Transactions should be thought of as specialized tools and not necessarily a +one-type-does-all solution. EIP-4844 is treated differently at the p2p level due +to burden blobs place on a node's bandwidth. EIP-7702 has different implications +on transaction gossiping and there is no need to complicate those rules +unnecessarily by making it a superset of all possible functionality. The authors +ultimately do not expect there to be much demand for atomic delegation and blob +submission. + +Contract creation is another specialized use case that has been grandfathered +into several transaction types. It adds complexity to testing, because it is a +new distinct branch of execution that needs to be tested when any change to the +EVM occurs and verify the change works as expected in that context. + +For these reasons, the authors have chosen to keep the scope of the EIP focused +on improving UX. + +#### Disallow delegation to precompiles + +Precompiles are themselves edge cases, so allowing delegations to precompiles or +not requires some focus in implementation. Considering the fact that precompiles +technically do not have code associated with their accounts, the authors decided +it would be marginally simpler to not execute the precompile logic when a user +delegates to one. This is somewhat unintuitive. + +#### Non-empty authorization list required + +Set code transactions are required to have at least one authorization to be +considered valid. This is to disincentivize senders from using type 4 +transactions as a generic transaction format, because this transaction has +different implications on the transaction pool than, say, +[EIP-1559](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1559) transactions. + +## Backwards Compatibility + +This EIP breaks a few invariants: + +* An account balance can only decrease as a result of a transaction originating +from that account. + * Once an account has been delegated, any call to the account may also cause + the balance to decrease. +* An EOA nonce may not increase after transaction execution has begun. + * Once an account has been delegated, the account may call a create operation + during execution, causing the nonce to increase. +* `tx.origin == msg.sender` can only be true in the topmost frame of execution. + * Once an account has been delegated, it can invoke multiple calls per + transaction. + +## Security Considerations + +### Implementation of secure delegate contracts + +The following is a non-exhaustive list of pitfalls that delegate contracts +*should* be wary of and require a signature over from the account's authority: + +* Replay protection (e.g., a nonce) should be implemented by the delegate and +signed over. Without it, a malicious actor can reuse a signature, repeating its +effects. +* `value` -- without it, a malicious sponsor could cause unexpected effects in +the callee. +* `gas` -- without it, a malicious sponsor could cause the callee to run out of +gas and fail, griefing the sponsee. +* `target` / `calldata` -- without them, a malicious actor may call arbitrary +functions in arbitrary contracts. + +A poorly implemented delegate can *allow a malicious actor to take near complete +control over a signer's EOA*. + +### Front running initialization + +Smart contract wallet developers must consider the implications of setting code +in an account without execution. Contracts are normally deployed by executing +initcode to determine the exact code to be placed in the account. This gives +developers the opportunity to initialize storage slots at the same time. The +initial values of the account cannot be replaced by an observer, because they +are either signed over by an EOA in the case of a creation transaction or they +are committed to by computing the contract's address deterministically from the +hash of the initcode. + +This EIP does not provide developers the opportunity to run initcode and set +storage slots during delegation. To secure the account from an observer +front-running the initialization of the delegation with an account they control, +smart contract wallet developers must verify the initial calldata to the account +for setup purposes be signed by the EOA's key using ecrecover. This ensures the +account can only be initialized with desirable values. + +### Storage management + +Changing an account's delegation is a security-critical operation that should +not be done lightly, especially if the newly delegated code is not purposely +designed and tested as an upgrade to the old one. + +In particular, in order to ensure a safe migration of an account from one +delegate contract to another, it's important for these contracts to use storage +in a way that avoids accidental collisions among them. For example, using +[ERC-7201](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7201) a contract may root its storage layout at a slot +dependent on a unique identifier. To simplify this, smart contract languages may +provide a way of re-rooting the entire storage layout of existing contract +source code. + +If all contracts previously delegated to by the account used the approach +described above, a migration should not cause any issues. However, if there is +any doubt, it is recommended to first clear all account storage, an operation +that is not natively offered by the protocol but that a special-purpose delegate +contract can be designed to implement. + +### Setting code as `tx.origin` + +Allowing the sender of an EIP-7702 to also set code has the possibility to: + +* Break atomic sandwich protections which rely on `tx.origin`; +* Break reentrancy guards of the style `require(tx.origin == msg.sender)`. + +The authors of this EIP believe the risks of allowing this are acceptable for +the reasons outlined in the Rationale section. + +### Sponsored transaction relayers + +It is possible for the `authorized` account to cause sponsored transaction +relayers to spend gas without being reimbursed by either invalidating the +authorization (i.e., increasing the account's nonce) or by sweeping the relevant +assets out of the account. Relayers should be designed with these cases in mind, +possibly by requiring a bond to be deposited or by implementing a reputation +system. + +### Transaction propagation + +Allowing EOAs to behave as smart contracts via the delegation indicator poses +some challenges for transaction propagation. Traditionally, EOAs have only been +able to send value via a transaction. This invariant allows nodes to statically +determine the validity of transactions for that account. In other words, a +single transaction has only been able to invalidate transactions pending from +the sender's account. + +With this EIP, it becomes possible to cause transactions from other accounts to +become stale. This is due to the fact that once an EOA has delegated to code, +that code can be called by anyone at any point in a transaction. It becomes +impossible to know if the balance of the account has been swept in a static +manner. + +While there are a few mitigations for this, the authors recommend that clients +do not accept more than one pending transaction for any EOA with a non-zero +delegation indicator. This minimizes the number of transactions that can be +invalidated by a single transaction. + +An alternative would be to expand the EIP-7702 transaction with a list of +accounts the caller wishes to "hydrate" during the transaction. Those accounts +behave as the delegated code *only* for EIP-7702 transactions which include them +in such a list, thus returning to clients the ability to statically analyze and +reason about pending transactions. + +A related issue is that an EOA's nonce may be incremented more than once per +transaction. Because clients already need to be robust in a worse scenario +(described above), it isn't a major concern. However, clients should be aware +this behavior is possible and design their transaction propagation accordingly. + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1155.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1155.md index 42ca3a7..8e0fc17 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1155.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1155.md @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ Example of such a URI: `https://token-cdn-domain/{id}.json` would be replaced wi #### Metadata Extensions -The optional `ERC1155Metadata_URI` extension can be identified with the [ERC-165 Standard Interface Detection](./eip-165.md). +The optional `ERC1155Metadata_URI` extension can be identified with the [ERC-165 Standard Interface Detection](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165). If the optional `ERC1155Metadata_URI` extension is included: * The ERC-165 `supportsInterface` function MUST return the constant value `true` if `0x0e89341c` is passed through the `interfaceID` argument. @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ fr.json: ### Approval -The function `setApprovalForAll` allows an operator to manage one's entire set of tokens on behalf of the approver. To permit approval of a subset of token IDs, an interface such as [ERC-1761 Scoped Approval Interface](./eip-1761.md) is suggested. +The function `setApprovalForAll` allows an operator to manage one's entire set of tokens on behalf of the approver. To permit approval of a subset of token IDs, an interface such as [ERC-1761 Scoped Approval Interface](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1761) is suggested. The counterpart `isApprovedForAll` provides introspection into any status set by `setApprovalForAll`. An owner SHOULD be assumed to always be able to operate on their own tokens regardless of approval status, so should SHOULD NOT have to call `setApprovalForAll` to approve themselves as an operator before they can operate on them. @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ The `name` function (for human-readable asset names, on-chain) was removed from ### Upgrades -The requirement to emit `TransferSingle` or `TransferBatch` on balance change implies that a valid implementation of ERC-1155 redeploying to a new contract address MUST emit events from the new contract address to replicate the deprecated contract final state. It is valid to only emit a minimal number of events to reflect only the final balance and omit all the transactions that led to that state. The event emit requirement is to ensure that the current state of the contract can always be traced only through events. To alleviate the need to emit events when changing contract address, consider using the proxy pattern, such as described in [EIP-2535](./eip-2535.md). This will also have the added benefit of providing a stable contract address for users. +The requirement to emit `TransferSingle` or `TransferBatch` on balance change implies that a valid implementation of ERC-1155 redeploying to a new contract address MUST emit events from the new contract address to replicate the deprecated contract final state. It is valid to only emit a minimal number of events to reflect only the final balance and omit all the transactions that led to that state. The event emit requirement is to ensure that the current state of the contract can always be traced only through events. To alleviate the need to emit events when changing contract address, consider using the proxy pattern, such as described in [EIP-2535](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2535). This will also have the added benefit of providing a stable contract address for users. ### Design decision: Supporting non-batch @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ As the Ethereum ecosystem continues to grow, many dapps are relying on tradition The function `setApprovalForAll` allows an operator to manage one's entire set of tokens on behalf of the approver. It enables frictionless interaction with exchange and trade contracts. -Restricting approval to a certain set of token IDs, quantities or other rules MAY be done with an additional interface or an external contract. The rationale is to keep the ERC-1155 standard as generic as possible for all use-cases without imposing a specific approval scheme on implementations that may not need it. Standard token approval interfaces can be used, such as the suggested [ERC-1761 Scoped Approval Interface](./eip-1761.md) which is compatible with ERC-1155. +Restricting approval to a certain set of token IDs, quantities or other rules MAY be done with an additional interface or an external contract. The rationale is to keep the ERC-1155 standard as generic as possible for all use-cases without imposing a specific approval scheme on implementations that may not need it. Standard token approval interfaces can be used, such as the suggested [ERC-1761 Scoped Approval Interface](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1761) which is compatible with ERC-1155. ## Backwards Compatibility @@ -686,9 +686,9 @@ Another simple way to represent non-fungibles is to allow a maximum value of 1 f ## References **Standards** -- [ERC-721 Non-Fungible Token Standard](./eip-721.md) -- [ERC-165 Standard Interface Detection](./eip-165.md) -- [ERC-1538 Transparent Contract Standard](./eip-1538.md) +- [ERC-721 Non-Fungible Token Standard](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-721) +- [ERC-165 Standard Interface Detection](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165) +- [ERC-1538 Transparent Contract Standard](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1538) - [JSON Schema](https://json-schema.org/) - [RFC 2119 Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt) @@ -707,4 +707,4 @@ Another simple way to represent non-fungibles is to allow a maximum value of 1 f - [ERC-1155: A new standard for The Sandbox](https://medium.com/sandbox-game/erc-1155-a-new-standard-for-the-sandbox-c95ee1e45072) ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1271.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1271.md index 39f9e4e..eaa144a 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1271.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-1271.md @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ This function should be implemented by contracts which desire to sign messages ( ## Rationale We believe the name of the proposed function to be appropriate considering that an *authorized* signers providing proper signatures for a given data would see their signature as "valid" by the signing contract. Hence, a signed action message is only valid when the signer is authorized to perform a given action on the behalf of a smart wallet. -Two arguments are provided for simplicity of separating the hash signed from the signature. A bytes32 hash is used instead of the unhashed message for simplicity, since contracts could expect a certain hashing function that is not standard, such as with [EIP-712](./eip-712.md). +Two arguments are provided for simplicity of separating the hash signed from the signature. A bytes32 hash is used instead of the unhashed message for simplicity, since contracts could expect a certain hashing function that is not standard, such as with [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712). `isValidSignature()` should not be able to modify states in order to prevent `GasToken` minting or similar attack vectors. Again, this is to simplify the implementation surface of the function for better standardization and to allow off-chain contract queries. @@ -159,4 +159,4 @@ Note also that each contract implementing this method is responsible to ensure t ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-137.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-137.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d32297b --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-137.md @@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +--- +eip: 137 +title: Ethereum Domain Name Service - Specification +author: Nick Johnson +status: Final +type: Standards Track +category: ERC +created: 2016-04-04 +--- + +# Abstract + +This draft EIP describes the details of the Ethereum Name Service, a proposed protocol and ABI definition that provides flexible resolution of short, human-readable names to service and resource identifiers. This permits users and developers to refer to human-readable and easy to remember names, and permits those names to be updated as necessary when the underlying resource (contract, content-addressed data, etc) changes. + +The goal of domain names is to provide stable, human-readable identifiers that can be used to specify network resources. In this way, users can enter a memorable string, such as 'vitalik.wallet' or 'www.mysite.swarm', and be directed to the appropriate resource. The mapping between names and resources may change over time, so a user may change wallets, a website may change hosts, or a swarm document may be updated to a new version, without the domain name changing. Further, a domain need not specify a single resource; different record types allow the same domain to reference different resources. For instance, a browser may resolve 'mysite.swarm' to the IP address of its server by fetching its A (address) record, while a mail client may resolve the same address to a mail server by fetching its MX (mail exchanger) record. +# Motivation + +Existing [specifications](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Registrar-ABI) and [implementations](https://ethereum.gitbooks.io/frontier-guide/content/registrar_services.html) for name resolution in Ethereum provide basic functionality, but suffer several shortcomings that will significantly limit their long-term usefulness: +- A single global namespace for all names with a single 'centralised' resolver. +- Limited or no support for delegation and sub-names/sub-domains. +- Only one record type, and no support for associating multiple copies of a record with a domain. +- Due to a single global implementation, no support for multiple different name allocation systems. +- Conflation of responsibilities: Name resolution, registration, and whois information. + +Use-cases that these features would permit include: +- Support for subnames/sub-domains - eg, live.mysite.tld and forum.mysite.tld. +- Multiple services under a single name, such as a DApp hosted in Swarm, a Whisper address, and a mail server. +- Support for DNS record types, allowing blockchain hosting of 'legacy' names. This would permit an Ethereum client such as Mist to resolve the address of a traditional website, or the mail server for an email address, from a blockchain name. +- DNS gateways, exposing ENS domains via the Domain Name Service, providing easier means for legacy clients to resolve and connect to blockchain services. + +The first two use-cases, in particular, can be observed everywhere on the present-day internet under DNS, and we believe them to be fundamental features of a name service that will continue to be useful as the Ethereum platform develops and matures. + +The normative parts of this document does not specify an implementation of the proposed system; its purpose is to document a protocol that different resolver implementations can adhere to in order to facilitate consistent name resolution. An appendix provides sample implementations of resolver contracts and libraries, which should be treated as illustrative examples only. + +Likewise, this document does not attempt to specify how domains should be registered or updated, or how systems can find the owner responsible for a given domain. Registration is the responsibility of registrars, and is a governance matter that will necessarily vary between top-level domains. + +Updating of domain records can also be handled separately from resolution. Some systems, such as swarm, may require a well defined interface for updating domains, in which event we anticipate the development of a standard for this. +# Specification +## Overview + +The ENS system comprises three main parts: +- The ENS registry +- Resolvers +- Registrars + +The registry is a single contract that provides a mapping from any registered name to the resolver responsible for it, and permits the owner of a name to set the resolver address, and to create subdomains, potentially with different owners to the parent domain. + +Resolvers are responsible for performing resource lookups for a name - for instance, returning a contract address, a content hash, or IP address(es) as appropriate. The resolver specification, defined here and extended in other EIPs, defines what methods a resolver may implement to support resolving different types of records. + +Registrars are responsible for allocating domain names to users of the system, and are the only entities capable of updating the ENS; the owner of a node in the ENS registry is its registrar. Registrars may be contracts or externally owned accounts, though it is expected that the root and top-level registrars, at a minimum, will be implemented as contracts. + +Resolving a name in ENS is a two-step process. First, the ENS registry is called with the name to resolve, after hashing it using the procedure described below. If the record exists, the registry returns the address of its resolver. Then, the resolver is called, using the method appropriate to the resource being requested. The resolver then returns the desired result. + +For example, suppose you wish to find the address of the token contract associated with 'beercoin.eth'. First, get the resolver: + +```javascript +var node = namehash("beercoin.eth"); +var resolver = ens.resolver(node); +``` + +Then, ask the resolver for the address for the contract: + +```javascript +var address = resolver.addr(node); +``` + +Because the `namehash` procedure depends only on the name itself, this can be precomputed and inserted into a contract, removing the need for string manipulation, and permitting O(1) lookup of ENS records regardless of the number of components in the raw name. +## Name Syntax + +ENS names must conform to the following syntax: + +
<domain> ::= <label> | <domain> "." <label>
+<label> ::= any valid string label per [UTS46](https://unicode.org/reports/tr46/)
+
+ +In short, names consist of a series of dot-separated labels. Each label must be a valid normalised label as described in [UTS46](https://unicode.org/reports/tr46/) with the options `transitional=false` and `useSTD3AsciiRules=true`. For Javascript implementations, a [library](https://www.npmjs.com/package/idna-uts46) is available that normalises and checks names. + +Note that while upper and lower case letters are allowed in names, the UTS46 normalisation process case-folds labels before hashing them, so two names with different case but identical spelling will produce the same namehash. + +Labels and domains may be of any length, but for compatibility with legacy DNS, it is recommended that labels be restricted to no more than 64 characters each, and complete ENS names to no more than 255 characters. For the same reason, it is recommended that labels do not start or end with hyphens, or start with digits. + +## namehash algorithm + +Before being used in ENS, names are hashed using the 'namehash' algorithm. This algorithm recursively hashes components of the name, producing a unique, fixed-length string for any valid input domain. The output of namehash is referred to as a 'node'. + +Pseudocode for the namehash algorithm is as follows: + +``` +def namehash(name): + if name == '': + return '\0' * 32 + else: + label, _, remainder = name.partition('.') + return sha3(namehash(remainder) + sha3(label)) +``` + +Informally, the name is split into labels, each label is hashed. Then, starting with the last component, the previous output is concatenated with the label hash and hashed again. The first component is concatenated with 32 '0' bytes. Thus, 'mysite.swarm' is processed as follows: + +``` +node = '\0' * 32 +node = sha3(node + sha3('swarm')) +node = sha3(node + sha3('mysite')) +``` + +Implementations should conform to the following test vectors for namehash: + + namehash('') = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 + namehash('eth') = 0x93cdeb708b7545dc668eb9280176169d1c33cfd8ed6f04690a0bcc88a93fc4ae + namehash('foo.eth') = 0xde9b09fd7c5f901e23a3f19fecc54828e9c848539801e86591bd9801b019f84f + +## Registry specification + +The ENS registry contract exposes the following functions: + +```solidity +function owner(bytes32 node) constant returns (address); +``` + +Returns the owner (registrar) of the specified node. + +```solidity +function resolver(bytes32 node) constant returns (address); +``` + +Returns the resolver for the specified node. + +```solidity +function ttl(bytes32 node) constant returns (uint64); +``` + +Returns the time-to-live (TTL) of the node; that is, the maximum duration for which a node's information may be cached. + +```solidity +function setOwner(bytes32 node, address owner); +``` + +Transfers ownership of a node to another registrar. This function may only be called by the current owner of `node`. A successful call to this function logs the event `Transfer(bytes32 indexed, address)`. + +```solidity +function setSubnodeOwner(bytes32 node, bytes32 label, address owner); +``` + +Creates a new node, `sha3(node, label)` and sets its owner to `owner`, or updates the node with a new owner if it already exists. This function may only be called by the current owner of `node`. A successful call to this function logs the event `NewOwner(bytes32 indexed, bytes32 indexed, address)`. + +```solidity +function setResolver(bytes32 node, address resolver); +``` + +Sets the resolver address for `node`. This function may only be called by the owner of `node`. A successful call to this function logs the event `NewResolver(bytes32 indexed, address)`. + +```solidity +function setTTL(bytes32 node, uint64 ttl); +``` + +Sets the TTL for a node. A node's TTL applies to the 'owner' and 'resolver' records in the registry, as well as to any information returned by the associated resolver. +## Resolver specification + +Resolvers may implement any subset of the record types specified here. Where a record types specification requires a resolver to provide multiple functions, the resolver MUST implement either all or none of them. Resolvers MUST specify a fallback function that throws. + +Resolvers have one mandatory function: + +```solidity +function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceID) constant returns (bool) +``` + +The `supportsInterface` function is documented in [EIP-165](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165), and returns true if the resolver implements the interface specified by the provided 4 byte identifier. An interface identifier consists of the XOR of the function signature hashes of the functions provided by that interface; in the degenerate case of single-function interfaces, it is simply equal to the signature hash of that function. If a resolver returns `true` for `supportsInterface()`, it must implement the functions specified in that interface. + +`supportsInterface` must always return true for `0x01ffc9a7`, which is the interface ID of `supportsInterface` itself. + + Currently standardised resolver interfaces are specified in the table below. + +The following interfaces are defined: + +| Interface name | Interface hash | Specification | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `addr` | 0x3b3b57de | [Contract address](#addr) | +| `name` | 0x691f3431 | #181 | +| `ABI` | 0x2203ab56 | #205 | +| `pubkey` | 0xc8690233 | #619 | + +EIPs may define new interfaces to be added to this registry. + +### Contract Address Interface + +Resolvers wishing to support contract address resources must provide the following function: + +```solidity +function addr(bytes32 node) constant returns (address); +``` + +If the resolver supports `addr` lookups but the requested node does not have an addr record, the resolver MUST return the zero address. + +Clients resolving the `addr` record MUST check for a zero return value, and treat this in the same manner as a name that does not have a resolver specified - that is, refuse to send funds to or interact with the address. Failure to do this can result in users accidentally sending funds to the 0 address. + +Changes to an address MUST trigger the following event: + +```solidity +event AddrChanged(bytes32 indexed node, address a); +``` +# Appendix A: Registry Implementation + +```solidity +contract ENS { + struct Record { + address owner; + address resolver; + uint64 ttl; + } + + mapping(bytes32=>Record) records; + + event NewOwner(bytes32 indexed node, bytes32 indexed label, address owner); + event Transfer(bytes32 indexed node, address owner); + event NewResolver(bytes32 indexed node, address resolver); + + modifier only_owner(bytes32 node) { + if(records[node].owner != msg.sender) throw; + _ + } + + function ENS(address owner) { + records[0].owner = owner; + } + + function owner(bytes32 node) constant returns (address) { + return records[node].owner; + } + + function resolver(bytes32 node) constant returns (address) { + return records[node].resolver; + } + + function ttl(bytes32 node) constant returns (uint64) { + return records[node].ttl; + } + + function setOwner(bytes32 node, address owner) only_owner(node) { + Transfer(node, owner); + records[node].owner = owner; + } + + function setSubnodeOwner(bytes32 node, bytes32 label, address owner) only_owner(node) { + var subnode = sha3(node, label); + NewOwner(node, label, owner); + records[subnode].owner = owner; + } + + function setResolver(bytes32 node, address resolver) only_owner(node) { + NewResolver(node, resolver); + records[node].resolver = resolver; + } + + function setTTL(bytes32 node, uint64 ttl) only_owner(node) { + NewTTL(node, ttl); + records[node].ttl = ttl; + } +} +``` +# Appendix B: Sample Resolver Implementations +### Built-in resolver + +The simplest possible resolver is a contract that acts as its own name resolver by implementing the contract address resource profile: + +```solidity +contract DoSomethingUseful { + // Other code + + function addr(bytes32 node) constant returns (address) { + return this; + } + + function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceID) constant returns (bool) { + return interfaceID == 0x3b3b57de || interfaceID == 0x01ffc9a7; + } + + function() { + throw; + } +} +``` + +Such a contract can be inserted directly into the ENS registry, eliminating the need for a separate resolver contract in simple use-cases. However, the requirement to 'throw' on unknown function calls may interfere with normal operation of some types of contract. + +### Standalone resolver + +A basic resolver that implements the contract address profile, and allows only its owner to update records: + +```solidity +contract Resolver { + event AddrChanged(bytes32 indexed node, address a); + + address owner; + mapping(bytes32=>address) addresses; + + modifier only_owner() { + if(msg.sender != owner) throw; + _ + } + + function Resolver() { + owner = msg.sender; + } + + function addr(bytes32 node) constant returns(address) { + return addresses[node]; + } + + function setAddr(bytes32 node, address addr) only_owner { + addresses[node] = addr; + AddrChanged(node, addr); + } + + function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceID) constant returns (bool) { + return interfaceID == 0x3b3b57de || interfaceID == 0x01ffc9a7; + } + + function() { + throw; + } +} +``` + +After deploying this contract, use it by updating the ENS registry to reference this contract for a name, then calling `setAddr()` with the same node to set the contract address it will resolve to. +### Public resolver + +Similar to the resolver above, this contract only supports the contract address profile, but uses the ENS registry to determine who should be allowed to update entries: + +```solidity +contract PublicResolver { + event AddrChanged(bytes32 indexed node, address a); + event ContentChanged(bytes32 indexed node, bytes32 hash); + + ENS ens; + mapping(bytes32=>address) addresses; + + modifier only_owner(bytes32 node) { + if(ens.owner(node) != msg.sender) throw; + _ + } + + function PublicResolver(address ensAddr) { + ens = ENS(ensAddr); + } + + function addr(bytes32 node) constant returns (address ret) { + ret = addresses[node]; + } + + function setAddr(bytes32 node, address addr) only_owner(node) { + addresses[node] = addr; + AddrChanged(node, addr); + } + + function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceID) constant returns (bool) { + return interfaceID == 0x3b3b57de || interfaceID == 0x01ffc9a7; + } + + function() { + throw; + } +} +``` +# Appendix C: Sample Registrar Implementation + +This registrar allows users to register names at no cost if they are the first to request them. + +```solidity +contract FIFSRegistrar { + ENS ens; + bytes32 rootNode; + + function FIFSRegistrar(address ensAddr, bytes32 node) { + ens = ENS(ensAddr); + rootNode = node; + } + + function register(bytes32 subnode, address owner) { + var node = sha3(rootNode, subnode); + var currentOwner = ens.owner(node); + if(currentOwner != 0 && currentOwner != msg.sender) + throw; + + ens.setSubnodeOwner(rootNode, subnode, owner); + } +} +``` diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-20.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-20.md index cdd8a14..a4b66c0 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-20.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-20.md @@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ There are already plenty of ERC20-compliant tokens deployed on the Ethereum netw Different implementations have been written by various teams that have different trade-offs: from gas saving to improved security. #### Example implementations are available at -- [OpenZeppelin implementation](../assets/eip-20/OpenZeppelin-ERC20.sol) -- [ConsenSys implementation](../assets/eip-20/Consensys-EIP20.sol) +- [OpenZeppelin implementation](https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/assets/erc-20/OpenZeppelin-ERC20.sol) +- [ConsenSys implementation](https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/assets/erc-20/Consensys-EIP20.sol) ## History @@ -190,4 +190,4 @@ Historical links related to this standard: ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4337.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4337.md index 14ff3ad..8ce72a2 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4337.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4337.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ A number of proposals have been thoroughly discussed, but so far none of them ha This proposal takes a different approach, avoiding any adjustments to the consensus layer. It seeks to achieve the following goals: * **Achieve the key goal of Account Abstraction**: allow users to use Smart Contract Accounts containing arbitrary verification logic instead of EOAs as their primary account. Completely remove any need at all for users to also have EOAs, - as required by both status quo Smart Contract Accounts and [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md). + as required by both status quo Smart Contract Accounts and [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702). * **Decentralization** * Allow any bundler (think: block builder) to participate in the process of including account-abstracted `UserOperations` * Work with all activity happening over a public mempool; users do not need to know the direct communication addresses (eg. IP, onion) of any specific actors @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ This proposal takes a different approach, avoiding any adjustments to the consen * **Do not require any Ethereum consensus changes**: Ethereum consensus layer development is focusing on scalability-oriented features, and there may not be any opportunity for further protocol changes for a long time. Hence, to increase the chance of faster adoption, this proposal avoids Ethereum consensus changes. * **Support other use cases** * Privacy-preserving applications - * Atomic multi-operations (similar goal to [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md)) - * Pay tx fees with [ERC-20](./eip-20.md) tokens, allow developers to pay fees for their users, and [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md)-like **sponsored transaction** use cases more generally + * Atomic multi-operations (similar goal to [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702)) + * Pay tx fees with [ERC-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20) tokens, allow developers to pay fees for their users, and [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702)-like **sponsored transaction** use cases more generally * abstracting the validation allows the contract to use different signature schemes, multisig configuration, custom recovery, and more. * abstracting gas payments allows easy onboarding by 3rd party payments, paying with tokens, cross-chain gas payments * abstracting execution allows bundled transactions @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ To avoid Ethereum consensus changes, we do not attempt to create new transaction | `callGasLimit` | `uint256` | The amount of gas to allocate the main execution call | | `verificationGasLimit` | `uint256` | The amount of gas to allocate for the verification step | | `preVerificationGas` | `uint256` | Extra gas to pay the bundler | -| `maxFeePerGas` | `uint256` | Maximum fee per gas (similar to [EIP-1559](./eip-1559.md) `max_fee_per_gas`) | +| `maxFeePerGas` | `uint256` | Maximum fee per gas (similar to [EIP-1559](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1559) `max_fee_per_gas`) | | `maxPriorityFeePerGas` | `uint256` | Maximum priority fee per gas (similar to EIP-1559 `max_priority_fee_per_gas`) | | `paymaster` | `address` | Address of paymaster contract, (or empty, if the `sender` pays for gas by itself) | | `paymasterVerificationGasLimit` | `uint256` | The amount of gas to allocate for the paymaster validation code (only if paymaster exists) | @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Users send `UserOperation` objects to a dedicated `UserOperation` mempool. To prevent replay attacks, either cross-chain or with multiple `EntryPoint` contract versions, the `signature` MUST depend on `chainid` and the `EntryPoint` address. -Note that one [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) "authorization tuple" value can be provided alongside the `UserOperation` struct, +Note that one [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) "authorization tuple" value can be provided alongside the `UserOperation` struct, but "authorization tuples" are not included in the `UserOperation` itself. ### `EntryPoint` interface @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ The `EntryPoint`'s `handleOps` function must perform the following steps (we fir In the verification loop, the `handleOps` call must perform the following steps for each `UserOperation`: * **Create the `sender` Smart Contract Account if it does not yet exist**, using the `initcode` provided in the `UserOperation`. - * If the `factory` address is "0x7702", then the sender MUST be an EOA with an [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) authorization designation. The `EntryPoint` validates the authorized address matches the one specified in the `UserOperation` signature (see [Support for [EIP-7702] authorizations](#support-for-eip-7702-authorizations)). + * If the `factory` address is "0x7702", then the sender MUST be an EOA with an [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) authorization designation. The `EntryPoint` validates the authorized address matches the one specified in the `UserOperation` signature (see [Support for [EIP-7702] authorizations](#support-for-eip-7702-authorizations)). * If the `sender` does not exist, _and_ the `initcode` is empty, or does not deploy a contract at the "sender" address, the call must fail. * **WARNING**: If the `sender` does exist, _and_ the `initcode` is _not_ empty, then the `initcode` is ignored. * calculate the maximum possible fee the `sender` needs to pay based on validation and call gas limits, and current gas values. @@ -251,21 +251,21 @@ In the execution loop, the `handleOps` call must perform the following steps for This penalty is necessary to prevent the `UserOperations` from reserving large parts of the gas space in the bundle but leaving it unused and preventing the bundler from including other `UserOperations`. * After the execution of all calls, pay the collected fees from all `UserOperations` to the `beneficiary` address provided by the bundler. -![](../assets/eip-4337/bundle-seq.svg) +![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/assets/erc-4337/bundle-seq.svg) Before accepting a `UserOperation`, bundlers SHOULD use an RPC method to locally call the `handleOps` function on the `EntryPoint`, to verify that the signature is correct and the `UserOperation` actually pays fees; see the [Simulation section below](#useroperation-simulation) for details. A node/bundler MUST reject a `UserOperation` that fails the validation, meaning not adding it to the local mempool and not propagating it to other peers. -### JSON-RPC API for [ERC-4337](./eip-4337.md) +### JSON-RPC API for [ERC-4337](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337) In order to support sending `UserOperation` objects to bundlers, which in turn propagate them through the P2P mempool, we introduce a set of JSON-RPC APIs including `eth_sendUserOperation` and `eth_getUserOperationReceipt`. The full definition of the new JSON-RPC API is outside the scope of this proposal. -### Support for [EIP-712](./eip-712.md) signatures +### Support for [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712) signatures The `userOpHash` is calculated as an [EIP-712] typed message hash with the following parameters: @@ -281,13 +281,13 @@ bytes32 constant PACKED_USEROP_TYPEHASH = ); ``` -### Support for [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) authorizations +### Support for [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) authorizations -On networks with [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) enabled, the `eth_sendUserOperation` method accepts an extra `eip7702Auth` parameter. -If this parameter is set, it MUST be a valid [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) authorization tuple, and signed by the `sender` address. +On networks with [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) enabled, the `eth_sendUserOperation` method accepts an extra `eip7702Auth` parameter. +If this parameter is set, it MUST be a valid [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) authorization tuple, and signed by the `sender` address. The bundler MUST add all required `eip7702Auth` of all `UserOperations` in a bundle to the `authorizationList` and execute the bundle using a transaction type `SET_CODE_TX_TYPE`. -Additionally, the `UserOperation` hash calculation is updated to include the desired [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) delegation address. +Additionally, the `UserOperation` hash calculation is updated to include the desired [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) delegation address. If the `initCode` field starts with `0x7702` right-padded with 18 zeros, and this account was deployed using an EIP-7702 transaction, then the hash is calculated as follows: @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ If the `initCode` field starts with `0x7702` right-padded with 18 zeros, and thi * If the `initCode` is longer than 20 bytes, then the rest of the initCode is used to call an initialization function in the account itself. Note that a `UserOperation` may still be executed without such `initCode`. -In this case the `EntryPoint` doesn't hash the current [EIP-7702 delegate](./eip-7702.md), and can be potentially executed against a modified account. +In this case the `EntryPoint` doesn't hash the current [EIP-7702 delegate](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702), and can be potentially executed against a modified account. Additionally, EIP-7702 defines the gas cost of executing an authorization equal to `PER_EMPTY_ACCOUNT_COST = 25000`. This gas consumption is not observable on-chain by the `EntryPoint` contract and MUST be included in the `preVerificationGas` value. @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ This gas consumption is not observable on-chain by the `EntryPoint` contract and We extend the `EntryPoint` logic to support **paymasters** that can sponsor transactions for other users. This feature can be used to allow application developers to subsidize fees for their users, allow users to pay fees with ERC-20 tokens and many other use cases. When the `paymasterAndData` field in the `UserOperation` is not empty, the `EntryPoint` implements a different flow for that UserOperation: -![](../assets/eip-4337/bundle-seq-pm.svg) +![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/assets/erc-4337/bundle-seq-pm.svg) During the verification loop, in addition to calling `validateUserOp`, the `handleOps` execution also must check that the paymaster has enough ETH deposited with the `EntryPoint` to pay for the `UserOperation`, and then call `validatePaymasterUserOp` on the paymaster to verify that the paymaster is willing to pay for the `UserOperation`. Note that in this case, the `validateUserOp` is called with a `missingAccountFunds` of 0 to reflect that the account's deposit is not used for payment for this `UserOperation`. @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ function getCurrentUserOpHash() public view returns (bytes32); ### Bundler behavior upon receiving a UserOperation -![](../assets/eip-4337/bundle-build-full-seq.svg) +![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/assets/erc-4337/bundle-build-full-seq.svg) Similar to an Ethereum transaction, the offchain flow of a `UserOperation` can be described as follows: 1. Client sends a `UserOperation` to the bundler through an RPC call `eth_sendUserOperation`. @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ Similar to an Ethereum transaction, the offchain flow of a `UserOperation` can b When a bundler receives a `UserOperation`, it must first run some basic sanity checks, namely that: * Either the `sender` is an existing contract, or the `initCode` is not empty (but not both) -* If `initCode` is not empty, parse its first 20 bytes as a factory address or an [EIP-7702](./eip-7702.md) flag.\ +* If `initCode` is not empty, parse its first 20 bytes as a factory address or an [EIP-7702](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702) flag.\ Record whether the factory is staked, in case the later simulation indicates that it needs to be. If the factory accesses the global state, it must be staked. * The `verificationGasLimit` and `paymasterVerificationGasLimits` are lower than `MAX_VERIFICATION_GAS` (`500000`) and the `preVerificationGas` is high enough to pay for the calldata gas cost of serializing the `UserOperation` plus `PRE_VERIFICATION_OVERHEAD_GAS` (`50000`). * The `paymasterAndData` is either empty, or starts with the **paymaster** address, which is a contract that (i) currently has nonempty code on chain, (ii) has a sufficient deposit to pay for the UserOperation, and (iii) is not currently banned. During simulation, the paymaster's stake is also checked, depending on its storage usage. @@ -455,14 +455,14 @@ as it depends on non-permanent network properties such as operation and data gas However, the requirement is for the estimated value to be sufficient to cover the following costs: * Base bundle transaction cost. On Ethereum, `21000` gas divided by the number of `UserOperations`. -* The calldata gas cost related to the `UserOperation` as defined in [EIP-2028](./eip-2028.md). +* The calldata gas cost related to the `UserOperation` as defined in [EIP-2028](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2028). * Static `EntryPoint` contract code execution. * Static memory cost when loading the fixed size fields of the `UserOperation` into EVM memory * Memory cost (including expansion cost) due to context returned by paymaster `validatePaymasterUserOp` function, if relevant. * External call to the `innerHandleOp()` function which is a major part of the `EntryPoint` implementation. Note that this value is not static and depends on the `UserOperation`'s position in the bundle. * [EIP-7702] authorization cost, if any. -* [EIP-7623](./eip-7623.md) calldata floor price increase is estimated as follows: +* [EIP-7623](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7623) calldata floor price increase is estimated as follows: * Apply the new formula for `tx.gasUsed`, replacing the `execution_gas_used` value with an estimate for value made for this UserOperation. * The estimate is calculated as a sum of all verification gas used during simulation (account creation, validation and paymaster validation) and 10% of the sum of execution and `postOp` gas limit. @@ -554,11 +554,11 @@ either via on-chain delegate proxy contracts or via EIP-7702. When changing the underlying implementation, all Accounts MUST ensure that there are no conflicts in the storage layout of the two contracts. -One common approach to this problem is often referred to as "diamond storage" and is fully described in [ERC-7201](./eip-7201.md). +One common approach to this problem is often referred to as "diamond storage" and is fully described in [ERC-7201](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7201). ### Transient Storage -Contracts using the [EIP-1153](./eip-1153.md) transient storage MUST take into account that ERC-4337 allows multiple +Contracts using the [EIP-1153](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1153) transient storage MUST take into account that ERC-4337 allows multiple `UserOperations` from different unrelated `sender` addresses to be included in the same underlying transaction. The transient storage MUST be cleaned up manually if contains any sensitive information or is used for access control. @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ it makes a static call to the `entryPoint.getSenderAddress()` ## Backwards Compatibility -This ERC does not change the consensus layer, so there are no backwards compatibility issues for Ethereum as a whole. Unfortunately it is not easily compatible with pre-[ERC-4337](./eip-4337.md) Smart Contract Accounts, because those Accounts do not have a `validateUserOp` function. If the Smart Contract Account has a function for authorizing a trusted `UserOperation` submitter, then this could be fixed by creating an [ERC-4337](./eip-4337.md) compatible Account that re-implements the verification logic as a wrapper and setting it to be the original Account's trusted `UserOperation` submitter. +This ERC does not change the consensus layer, so there are no backwards compatibility issues for Ethereum as a whole. Unfortunately it is not easily compatible with pre-[ERC-4337](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337) Smart Contract Accounts, because those Accounts do not have a `validateUserOp` function. If the Smart Contract Account has a function for authorizing a trusted `UserOperation` submitter, then this could be fixed by creating an [ERC-4337](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337) compatible Account that re-implements the verification logic as a wrapper and setting it to be the original Account's trusted `UserOperation` submitter. ## Security Considerations @@ -644,4 +644,4 @@ Verification would need to cover two primary claims (not including claims needed ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4626.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4626.md index 41de5ab..1054ba6 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4626.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4626.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ requires: 20, 2612 ## Abstract The following standard allows for the implementation of a standard API for tokenized Vaults -representing shares of a single underlying [EIP-20](./eip-20.md) token. +representing shares of a single underlying [EIP-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20) token. This standard is an extension on the EIP-20 token that provides basic functionality for depositing and withdrawing tokens and reading balances. @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ A standard for tokenized Vaults will lower the integration effort for yield-bear ## Specification -All [EIP-4626](./eip-4626.md) tokenized Vaults MUST implement EIP-20 to represent shares. +All [EIP-4626](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4626) tokenized Vaults MUST implement EIP-20 to represent shares. If a Vault is to be non-transferrable, it MAY revert on calls to `transfer` or `transferFrom`. The EIP-20 operations `balanceOf`, `transfer`, `totalSupply`, etc. operate on the Vault "shares" which represent a claim to ownership on a fraction of the Vault's underlying holdings. @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ which represent a claim to ownership on a fraction of the Vault's underlying hol All EIP-4626 tokenized Vaults MUST implement EIP-20's optional metadata extensions. The `name` and `symbol` functions SHOULD reflect the underlying token's `name` and `symbol` in some way. -EIP-4626 tokenized Vaults MAY implement [EIP-2612](./eip-2612.md) to improve the UX of approving shares on various integrations. +EIP-4626 tokenized Vaults MAY implement [EIP-2612](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2612) to improve the UX of approving shares on various integrations. ### Definitions: @@ -609,4 +609,4 @@ the underlying token's `decimals` if at all possible, to eliminate possible sour ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4804.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4804.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f081742 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-4804.md @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +--- +eip: 4804 +title: Web3 URL to EVM Call Message Translation +description: A translation of an HTTP-style Web3 URL to an EVM call message +author: Qi Zhou (@qizhou), Chao Pi (@pichaoqkc), Sam Wilson (@SamWilsn) +discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-4804-web3-url-to-evm-call-message-translation/8300 +status: Final +type: Standards Track +category: ERC +created: 2022-02-14 +requires: 137 +--- + +## Abstract + +This standard translates an RFC 2396 URI like `web3://uniswap.eth/` to an EVM message such as: + +``` +EVMMessage { + To: 0xaabbccddee.... // where uniswap.eth's address registered at ENS + Calldata: 0x + ... +} +``` + +## Motivation + +Currently, reading data from Web3 generally relies on a translation done by a Web2 proxy to Web3 blockchain. The translation is mostly done by the proxies such as dApp websites/node service provider/etherscan, which are out of the control of users. The standard here aims to provide a simple way for Web2 users to directly access the content of Web3, especially on-chain Web contents such as SVG/HTML. Moreover, this standard enables interoperability with other standards already compatible with URIs, like SVG/HTML. + +## Specification + +This specification only defines read-only (i.e. Solidity's `view` functions) semantics. State modifying functions may be defined as a future extension. + +A Web3 URL is in the following form + +``` +web3URL = web3Schema [userinfo "@"] contractName [":" chainid] path ["?" query] +web3Schema = [ "ethereum-web3://" | "eth-web3://" | "web3://" ] +contractName = address | [name "." [ subDomain0 "." ... ]] nsProviderSuffix +path = ["/" method ["/" argument_0 ["/" argument_1 ... ]]] +argument = [type "!"] value +query = "attribute_1=value_1 [ "&" attribute_2=value_2 ... ] +attribute = "returns" | "returnTypes" | other_attribute +``` + +where + +- **web3Schema** indicates the schema of the URL, which is `web3://` or `w3://` for short. +- **userinfo** indicates which user is calling the EVM, i.e., "From" field in EVM call message. If not specified, the protocol will use 0x0 as the sender address. +- **contractName** indicates the contract to be called, i.e., "To" field in the EVM call message. If the **contractName** is an **address**, i.e., 0x + 20-byte-data hex, then "To" will be the address. Otherwise, the name is from a name service. In the second case, **nsProviderSuffix** will be the suffix from name service providers such as "eth", etc. The way to translate the name from a name service to an address will be discussed in later EIPs. +- **chainid** indicates which chain to resolve **contractName** and call the message. If not specified, the protocol will use the same chain as the name service provider, e.g., 1 for eth. If no name service provider is available, the default chainid is 1. +- **query** is an optional component containing a sequence of attribute-value pairs separated by "&". + +### Resolve Mode + +Once the "To" address and chainid are determined, the protocol will check the resolver mode of contract by calling "resolveMode" method. The protocol currently supports two resolve modes: + +#### Manual Mode + +The manual mode will not do any interpretation of **path** and **query**, and put **path** [ "?" **query** ] as the calldata of the message directly. + +#### Auto Mode + +The auto mode is the default mode to resolve (also applies when the "resolveMode" method is unavailable in the target contract). In the auto mode, if **path** is empty, then the protocol will call the target contract with empty calldata. Otherwise, the calldata of the EVM message will use standard Solidity contract ABI, where + +- **method** is a string of function method be called +- **argument_i** is the ith argument of the method. If **type** is specified, the value will be translated to the corresponding type. The protocol currently supports the basic types such as uint256, bytes32, address, bytes, and string. If **type** is not specified, then the type will be automatically detected using the following rule in a sequential way: + +1. **type**="uint256", if **value** is numeric; or +2. **type**="bytes32", if **value** is in the form of 0x+32-byte-data hex; or +3. **type**="address", if **value** is in the form of 0x+20-byte-data hex; or +4. **type**="bytes", if **value** is in the form of 0x followed by any number of bytes besides 20 or 32; or +5. else **type**="address" and parse the argument as a domain name in the form of `[name "." [ subDomain0 "." ... ]] nsProviderSuffix`. In this case, the actual value of the argument will be obtained from **nsProviderSuffix**, e.g., eth. If **nsProviderSuffix** is not supported, an unsupported NS provider error will be returned. + +Note that if **method** does not exist, i.e., **path** is empty or "/", then the contract will be called with empty calldata. + +- **returns** attribute in **query** tells the format of the returned data. If not specified, the returned message data will be parsed in "(bytes32)" and MIME will be set based on the suffix of the last argument. If **returns** is "()", the returned data will be parsed in raw bytes in JSON. Otherwise, the returned message will be parsed in the specified **returns** attribute in JSON. If multiple **returns** attributes are present, the value of the last **returns** attribute will be applied. Note that **returnTypes** is the alias of **returns**, but it is not recommended to use and is mainly for backward-compatible purpose. + +### Examples + +#### Example 1 + +``` +web3://w3url.eth/ +``` + +The protocol will find the address of **w3url.eth** from ENS in chainid 1 (Mainnet), and then the protocol will call the address with "From" = "0x..." and "Calldata" = "0x2F". + +#### Example 2 + +``` +web3://cyberbrokers-meta.eth/renderBroker/9999 +``` + +The protocol will find the address of **cyberbrokers-meta.eth** from ENS on chainid 1 (Mainnet), and then call the address with "To" = "0x..." and "Calldata" = "0x" + `keccak("view(uint256)")[0:4] + abi.encode(uint256(9999))`. + +#### Example 3 + +``` +web3://vitalikblog.eth:5/ +``` + +The protocol will find the address of **vitalikblog.eth** from ENS on chainid 5 (Goerli), and then call the address with "From" = "0x..." and "Calldata" = "0x2F" with chainid = 5. + +#### Example 4 + +``` +web3://0xe4ba0e245436b737468c206ab5c8f4950597ab7f:42170/ +``` + +The protocol will call the address with "To" = "0x9e081Df45E0D167636DB9C61C7ce719A58d82E3b" and "Calldata" = "0x" with chainid = 42170 (Arbitrum Nova). + +#### Example 5 + +``` +web3://0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48/balanceOf/vitalik.eth?returns=(uint256) +``` + +The protocol will find the addresses of **vitalik.eth** from ENS on chainid 1 (Mainnet) and then call the method "balanceOf(address)" of the contract with the **charles.eth**'s address. The returned data will be parsed as uint256 like `[ "10000000000000" ]`. + +#### Example 6 + +``` +web3://0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48/balanceOf/vitalik.eth?returns=() +``` + +The protocol will find the address of **vitalik.eth** from ENS on chainid 1 (Mainnet) and then call the method "balanceOf(address)" of the address. The returned data will be parsed as raw bytes like `["0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009184e72a000"]`. + +## Rationale + +The purpose of the proposal is to add a decentralized presentation layer for Ethereum. With the layer, we are able to render any web content (including HTML/CSS/JPG/PNG/SVG, etc) on-chain using human-readable URLs, and thus EVM can be served as decentralized Backend. The design of the standard is based on the following principles: + +- **Human-readable**. The Web3 URL should be easily recognized by human similar to Web2 URL (`http://`). As a result, we support names from name services to replace address for better readability. In addition, instead of using calldata in hex, we use human-readable method + arguments and translate them to calldata for better readability. + +- **Maximum-Compatible with HTTP-URL standard**. The Web3 URL should be compatible with HTTP-URL standard including relative pathing, query, fragment, etc so that the support of existing HTTP-URL (e.g., by browser) can be easily extended to Web3 URL with minimal modification. This also means that existing Web2 users can easily migrate to Web3 with minimal extra knowledge of this standard. + +- **Simple**. Instead of providing explicit types in arguments, we use a "maximum likelihood" principle of auto-detecting the types of the arguments such as address, bytes32, and uint256. This could greatly minimize the length of URL, while avoiding confusion. In addition, explicit types are also supported to clear the confusion if necessary. + +- **Flexible**. The contract is able to override the encoding rule so that the contract has fine-control of understanding the actual Web resources that the users want to locate. + +## Security Considerations + +No security considerations were found. + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-721.md b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-721.md index 7f23182..9b2511f 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-721.md +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/erc-721.md @@ -391,9 +391,9 @@ XXXXERC721, by William Entriken -- a scalable example implementation **Standards** -1. [ERC-20](./eip-20.md) Token Standard. -1. [ERC-165](./eip-165.md) Standard Interface Detection. -1. [ERC-173](./eip-173.md) Owned Standard. +1. [ERC-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20) Token Standard. +1. [ERC-165](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165) Standard Interface Detection. +1. [ERC-173](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-173) Owned Standard. 1. [ERC-223](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/223) Token Standard. 1. [ERC-677](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/677) `transferAndCall` Token Standard. 1. [ERC-827](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/827) Token Standard. @@ -440,8 +440,8 @@ XXXXERC721, by William Entriken -- a scalable example implementation 1. Curio Cards. https://mycuriocards.com 1. Rare Pepe. https://rarepepewallet.com 1. Auctionhouse Asset Interface. https://github.com/dob/auctionhouse/blob/master/contracts/Asset.sol -1. [OpenZeppelin `SafeERC20.sol` Implementation](../assets/eip-721/SafeERC20.sol). +1. [OpenZeppelin `SafeERC20.sol` Implementation](https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/assets/erc-721/SafeERC20.sol). ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](../LICENSE.md). +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/ethereum-eips/manifest.json b/datasets/ethereum-eips/manifest.json index 627f69a..6b6da8d 100644 --- a/datasets/ethereum-eips/manifest.json +++ b/datasets/ethereum-eips/manifest.json @@ -3,18 +3,246 @@ "dataset": "ethereum-eips", "title": "Ethereum Standards", "anchorPath": "/standards", - "description": "Landmark Ethereum standards (EIPs/ERCs), public domain (CC0).", - "defaults": { "contentType": "text/markdown", "license": "CC0-1.0" }, + "description": "Landmark Ethereum standards (EIPs and ERCs), public domain under CC0.", + "defaults": { + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "license": "CC0-1.0" + }, "files": [ - { "path": "erc-20.md", "name": "erc-20.md", "tags": ["tokens","fungible","foundational"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/master/ERCS/erc-20.md"] }, - { "path": "erc-721.md", "name": "erc-721.md", "tags": ["tokens","nft","foundational"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/master/ERCS/erc-721.md"] }, - { "path": "erc-1155.md", "name": "erc-1155.md", "tags": ["tokens","nft","multi-token"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/master/ERCS/erc-1155.md"] }, - { "path": "erc-4626.md", "name": "erc-4626.md", "tags": ["defi","tokens","vaults"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/master/ERCS/erc-4626.md"] }, - { "path": "erc-4337.md", "name": "erc-4337.md", "tags": ["account-abstraction","infrastructure"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/master/ERCS/erc-4337.md"] }, - { "path": "eip-712.md", "name": "eip-712.md", "tags": ["signing","infrastructure"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/master/EIPS/eip-712.md"] }, - { "path": "erc-1271.md", "name": "erc-1271.md", "tags": ["signing","smart-wallets"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/master/ERCS/erc-1271.md"] }, - { "path": "eip-1559.md", "name": "eip-1559.md", "tags": ["core","economics","fees"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/master/EIPS/eip-1559.md"] }, - { "path": "eip-155.md", "name": "eip-155.md", "tags": ["core","security"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/master/EIPS/eip-155.md"] }, - { "path": "eip-4844.md", "name": "eip-4844.md", "tags": ["core","scaling","data"], "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs", "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/master/EIPS/eip-4844.md"] } + { + "path": "README.md", + "name": "README.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Ethereum Standards", + "description": "Overview of the collection: which standards are here and why they matter.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "overview"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://github.com/efs-project/content/tree/main/datasets/ethereum-eips" + }, + { + "path": "erc-20.md", + "name": "erc-20.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-20: Token Standard", + "description": "The interface behind fungible tokens: balances, transfers and allowances.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "tokens", "fungible", "foundational"], + "authors": ["Fabian Vogelsteller", "Vitalik Buterin"], + "year": 2015, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-20.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-20.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-721.md", + "name": "erc-721.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-721: Non-Fungible Token Standard", + "description": "The interface for non-fungible tokens (NFTs), each with a unique ID and owner.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "tokens", "nft", "foundational"], + "authors": ["William Entriken", "Dieter Shirley", "Jacob Evans", "Nastassia Sachs"], + "year": 2018, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-721.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-721.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-721", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-1155.md", + "name": "erc-1155.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-1155: Multi Token Standard", + "description": "One contract interface that manages many fungible and non-fungible token types at once.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "tokens", "nft", "multi-token"], + "authors": ["Witek Radomski", "Andrew Cooke", "Philippe Castonguay", "James Therien", "Eric Binet", "Ronan Sandford"], + "year": 2018, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-1155.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-1155.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1155", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-4626.md", + "name": "erc-4626.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-4626: Tokenized Vaults", + "description": "A standard API for yield-bearing vaults that hold a single underlying ERC-20 token.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "defi", "tokens", "vaults"], + "authors": ["Joey Santoro", "t11s", "Jet Jadeja", "Alberto Cuesta Cañada", "Señor Doggo"], + "year": 2021, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-4626.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-4626.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4626", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-4337.md", + "name": "erc-4337.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-4337: Account Abstraction Using Alt Mempool", + "description": "Account abstraction through UserOperations and an EntryPoint contract, with no consensus changes.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "account-abstraction", "infrastructure"], + "authors": ["Vitalik Buterin", "Yoav Weiss", "Dror Tirosh", "Shahaf Nacson", "Alex Forshtat", "Kristof Gazso", "Tjaden Hess"], + "year": 2021, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-4337.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-4337.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-712.md", + "name": "eip-712.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-712: Typed structured data hashing and signing", + "description": "Hashing and signing typed structured data, so wallets can show users what they are signing.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "signing", "infrastructure"], + "authors": ["Remco Bloemen", "Leonid Logvinov", "Jacob Evans"], + "year": 2017, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-712.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-712.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-1271.md", + "name": "erc-1271.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-1271: Standard Signature Validation Method for Contracts", + "description": "A standard isValidSignature method that lets smart contract accounts validate signatures.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "signing", "smart-wallets"], + "authors": ["Francisco Giordano", "Matt Condon", "Philippe Castonguay", "Amir Bandeali", "Jorge Izquierdo", "Bertrand Masius"], + "year": 2018, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-1271.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-1271.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-1559.md", + "name": "eip-1559.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-1559: Fee market change for ETH 1.0 chain", + "description": "The fee market change that introduced a burned base fee and priority tips (London, 2021).", + "tags": ["ethereum", "core", "economics", "fees"], + "authors": ["Vitalik Buterin", "Eric Conner", "Rick Dudley", "Matthew Slipper", "Ian Norden", "Abdelhamid Bakhta"], + "year": 2019, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-1559.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-1559.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1559", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-155.md", + "name": "eip-155.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-155: Simple replay attack protection", + "description": "Adds the chain ID to transaction signatures so they cannot be replayed on another chain.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "core", "security"], + "author": "Vitalik Buterin", + "year": 2016, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-155.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-155.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-155", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-4844.md", + "name": "eip-4844.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-4844: Shard Blob Transactions", + "description": "Blob-carrying transactions for cheap rollup data, activated in the Dencun upgrade (2024).", + "tags": ["ethereum", "core", "scaling", "data"], + "authors": ["Vitalik Buterin", "Dankrad Feist", "Diederik Loerakker", "George Kadianakis", "Matt Garnett", "Mofi Taiwo", "Ansgar Dietrichs"], + "year": 2022, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-4844.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-4844.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4844", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-7702.md", + "name": "eip-7702.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs", + "description": "Lets an externally owned account set code for itself, activated in the Pectra upgrade (2025).", + "tags": ["ethereum", "core", "account-abstraction", "smart-wallets"], + "authors": ["Vitalik Buterin", "Sam Wilson", "Ansgar Dietrichs", "lightclient"], + "year": 2024, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-7702.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-7702.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-7594.md", + "name": "eip-7594.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-7594: PeerDAS - Peer Data Availability Sampling", + "description": "Peer data availability sampling, so nodes check blob data without downloading all of it; activated in Fusaka (2025).", + "tags": ["ethereum", "core", "scaling", "data"], + "authors": ["Danny Ryan", "Dankrad Feist", "Francesco D'Amato", "Hsiao-Wei Wang", "Alex Stokes"], + "year": 2024, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-7594.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-7594.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7594", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-4804.md", + "name": "erc-4804.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-4804: Web3 URL to EVM Call Message Translation", + "description": "Defines web3:// URLs that resolve to EVM calls; EFS uses web3:// links to reference on-chain content.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "web3-url", "infrastructure", "storage"], + "authors": ["Qi Zhou", "Chao Pi", "Sam Wilson"], + "year": 2022, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-4804.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-4804.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4804", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "erc-137.md", + "name": "erc-137.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ERC-137: Ethereum Domain Name Service - Specification", + "description": "The original specification of the Ethereum Name Service (ENS): registry, resolvers and namehash.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ens", "naming", "infrastructure"], + "author": "Nick Johnson", + "year": 2016, + "status": "Final", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-137.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/ERCs/c664b2a401e950e0a32ee3b0e5a818831c8adfcf/ERCS/erc-137.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-137", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "eip-1.md", + "name": "eip-1.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-1: EIP Purpose and Guidelines", + "description": "How EIPs work: types, statuses, the editing process and the required format.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "process", "governance", "foundational"], + "author": "Martin Becze, Hudson Jameson, et al.", + "year": 2015, + "status": "Living", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-1.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-1.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + } ] } diff --git a/datasets/history/CURATION.md b/datasets/history/CURATION.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3b9139 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/CURATION.md @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +# Curation notes: Ethereum History + +Notes for maintainers. This file is not part of the published dataset (it is not listed in +`manifest.json`); the visitor-facing overview is `README.md`, which is published as the folder's Overview. + +## Sources (retrieved 2026-11-12) + +| File | Source | Notes | +|---|---|---| +| `ethereum-now-going-public.md` | https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/01/23/ethereum-now-going-public | Vitalik Buterin | +| `dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md` | https://gavwood.com/dappsweb3.html | Gavin Wood; first posted 17 April 2014 on his blog | +| `devcon-0-recap.md` | https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/12/05/devcon-0-recap | George Hallam | +| `ethereum-launches.md` | https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/07/30/ethereum-launches | Stephan Tual | +| `critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md` | https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability | Vitalik Buterin | +| `mainnet-merge-announcement.md` | https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/08/24/mainnet-merge-announcement | Protocol Support Team | +| `eip-779.md`, `eip-3675.md` | ethereum/EIPs at commit `253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1` | CC0; verbatim except that `./eip-N.md` and `../LICENSE.md` links were made absolute, as in the standards dataset | + +Authors and dates come from each post's own metadata on blog.ethereum.org. + +## Conversion + +blog.ethereum.org serves each post's source (markdown with embedded WordPress-era HTML) in the page's +`__NEXT_DATA__` JSON. The conversion took that source, not the rendered page, so no site chrome was +involved. HTML elements were mapped to markdown (paragraphs, bold, lists, headings, links, images); the +2014 team table became a bulleted list; the 2014 contract example became a code block; Devcon 0's bold +"Day N" lines became headings; embedded YouTube players became links to the same videos. A word-level +comparison against the source confirmed the text is unchanged. + +Links were made absolute (`/2015/...` to `https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/...`). Ten Devcon 0 photos are +referenced as `.jpg` in the post but are served by blog.ethereum.org only as `.jpeg`; the copy links to +the `.jpeg` files, which return 200. Other links, including dead `http://` links, are kept as published. + +Each converted file opens with a provenance header (source URL, original date, "converted to +markdown"). EFS-written notes in those headers are limited to what happened next (the DAO soft fork +was never activated; The Merge's terminal block). + +## Block cards + +`genesis-block.md` and `last-proof-of-work-block.md` were checked with read-only +`eth_getBlockByNumber` calls on 2026-11-12: + +- https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com served block 15,537,393, but returned "pruned history unavailable" + for block 0. +- https://eth.drpc.org, https://1rpc.io/eth and https://rpc.flashbots.net agreed on block 0; drpc.org + also served blocks 1, 46,146, 46,147, 15,537,394 and the fork blocks quoted in `timeline.md`. +- Total difficulty for block 15,537,393 came from https://1rpc.io/eth (other endpoints omit the field). +- The miner label "F2Pool Old" is Etherscan's label for `0x829bd824…a830`. Other blocks from that miner + (15,537,382, 15,537,390, 15,537,391) carry the same 七彩神仙鱼 prefix with different trailing bytes. +- The genesis extra-data explanation (hash of testnet block #1028201) is attributed to the "Final Steps" + post of 27 July 2015; the testnet block itself can no longer be queried. + +## Timeline dates + +Upgrade dates and block numbers match ethereum.org's history page +(https://ethereum.org/en/ethereum-forks/), and each fork block's timestamp was checked by RPC. "November +2013" for the whitepaper follows Vitalik's own account in "Ethereum: Now Going Public". "April 2014" for +the Yellow Paper and the ether sale dates (opened 22 July 2014, 42 days) follow ethereum.org. diff --git a/datasets/history/README.md b/datasets/history/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd42569 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# Ethereum History + +Ethereum's story told through its own documents: the posts that announced the project and its launch, +Gavin Wood's essay on Web 3.0, the record of the first Devcon, the emergency notice about The DAO, the +specifications of the DAO fork and The Merge, and two blocks read straight from the chain. + +**Start with the [timeline](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/timeline.md).** It lists each event +with its date and links to the documents here. + +## What is in this folder + +| Document | Date | What it is | +|---|---|---| +| [Ethereum: Now Going Public](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/ethereum-now-going-public.md) | 23 Jan 2014 | Vitalik Buterin introduces Ethereum to the world | +| [ĐApps: What Web 3.0 Looks Like](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md) | 17 Apr 2014 | Gavin Wood's essay on the post-Snowden web | +| [ÐΞVcon-0 Recap](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/devcon-0-recap.md) | 5 Dec 2014 | A day-by-day account of the first Devcon, Berlin | +| [Ethereum Launches](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/ethereum-launches.md) | 30 Jul 2015 | The Frontier launch announcement | +| [The Genesis Block](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/genesis-block.md) | 30 Jul 2015 | Block 0, read from mainnet and explained | +| [CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md) | 17 Jun 2016 | The first response to the DAO attack | +| [EIP-779: Hardfork Meta: DAO Fork](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/eip-779.md) | 20 Jul 2016 | The specification of the DAO hard fork | +| [Mainnet Merge Announcement](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/mainnet-merge-announcement.md) | 24 Aug 2022 | The schedule and client releases for The Merge | +| [EIP-3675: Upgrade consensus to Proof-of-Stake](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/eip-3675.md) | 15 Sep 2022 | The specification of The Merge | +| [The Last Proof-of-Work Block](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/last-proof-of-work-block.md) | 15 Sep 2022 | Block 15,537,393, read from mainnet and explained | + +## How to read it + +- **Converted posts** keep the author's words unchanged. Each opens with a short header giving the + original URL and date. Links are kept as published, so some in + older posts no longer work. +- **EIPs** are the full text from the [ethereum/EIPs](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs) repository, + public domain under [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), with relative links + made absolute. +- **Block cards** are written for EFS. The values in their tables were read from Ethereum mainnet + with a JSON-RPC call, and each card names the call so you can repeat the check. + +Related folders: [Crypto Whitepapers](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers), including the +Ethereum whitepaper and Yellow Paper, and [Ethereum Standards](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards). diff --git a/datasets/history/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md b/datasets/history/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44e3272 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability + +*Vitalik Buterin · 17 June 2016* + +> **Source:** +> +> Published on the Ethereum Foundation Blog on 17 June 2016. Converted to markdown for EFS: the author's text is unchanged, and site navigation, share buttons and footers are left out. Links are as originally published; some no longer work. +> +> The soft fork proposed here was never activated: a denial-of-service flaw was found in its implementation, and the community instead adopted the hard fork described in [EIP-779](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/eip-779.md), activated at block 1,920,000 on 20 July 2016. + +--- + +An attack has been found and exploited in [the DAO](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413), and the attacker is currently in the process of draining the ether contained in the DAO into a child DAO. The attack is a [recursive calling vulnerability](http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/16/scanning-live-ethereum-contracts-for-bugs/), where an attacker called the “split” function, and then calls the split function recursively inside of the split, thereby collecting ether many times over in a single transaction. + +The leaked ether is in a child DAO at [https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490](https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490); **even if no action is taken, the attacker will not be able to withdraw any ether at least for another ~27 days (the creation window for the child DAO)**. This is an issue that affects the DAO specifically; **Ethereum itself is perfectly safe**. + +A software fork has been proposed, **(with NO ROLLBACK; no transactions or blocks will be “reversed”)** which will make any transactions that make any calls/callcodes/delegatecalls that reduce the balance of an account with code hash 0x7278d050619a624f84f51987149ddb439cdaadfba5966f7cfaea7ad44340a4ba (ie. the DAO and children) lead to the transaction (not just the call, the transaction) being invalid, starting from block 1760000 (precise block number subject to change up until the point the code is released), **preventing the ether from being withdrawn by the attacker past the 27-day window**.This will provide plenty of time for discussion of potential further steps including to give token holders the ability to recover their ether. + +**Miners and mining pools should resume allowing transactions as normal, wait for the soft fork code and stand ready to download and run it if they agree with this path forward for the Ethereum ecosystem. DAO token holders and ethereum users should sit tight and remain calm. Exchanges should feel safe in resuming trading ETH.** + +Contract authors should take care to (1) be very careful about recursive call bugs, and listen to advice from the Ethereum contract programming community that will likely be forthcoming in the next week on mitigating such bugs, and (2) avoid creating contracts that contain more than ~$10m worth of value, with the exception of sub-token contracts and other systems whose value is itself defined by social consensus outside of the Ethereum platform, and which can be easily “hard forked” via community consensus if a bug emerges (eg. MKR), at least until the community gains more experience with bug mitigation and/or better tools are developed. + +Developers, cryptographers and computer scientists should note that any high-level tools (including IDEs, formal verification, debuggers, symbolic execution) that make it easy to write safe smart contracts on Ethereum are prime candidates for [DevGrants](https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/07/devgrants-help/), [Blockchain Labs grants](http://www.blockchainlabs.org/blockgrant-x-en/) and [String’s autonomous finance grants](https://medium.com/@StringLabs/string-grants-for-public-chain-projects-on-ethereum-94c3da1950ec#.57wv3si1j). + +**This post will continue to be updated.** diff --git a/datasets/history/dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md b/datasets/history/dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dcbf634 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +# ĐApps: What Web 3.0 Looks Like + +*Gavin Wood · 17 April 2014* + +> **Source:** +> +> Gavin Wood's essay, first posted on 17 April 2014 and now hosted on his website. Converted to markdown for EFS: the author's text is unchanged. + +--- + +*Note: originally posted Wednesday, 17 April 2014 on gavofyork's blog Insights into a Modern World.* + +As we move into the future, we find increasing need for a zero-trust interaction system. Even pre-Snowden, we had realised that entrusting our information to arbitrary entities on the internet was fraught with danger. However, post-Snowden the argument plainly falls in the hand of those who believe that large organisations and governments routinely attempt to stretch and overstep their authority. Thus we realise that entrusting our information to organisations in general is a fundamentally broken model. The chance of an organisation not meddling with our data is merely the effort required minus their expected gains. Given they tend to have an income model that requires they know as much about people as possible the realist will realise that the potential for convert misuse is difficult to overestimate. + +The protocols and technologies on the Web, and even at large the Internet, served as a great technology preview. The workhorses of SMTP, FTP, HTTP(S), PHP, HTML, Javascript each helped contribute to the sort of rich cloud-based applications we see today such as Google's Drive, Facebook and Twitter, not to mention the countless other applications ranging through games, shopping, banking and dating. However, going into the future, much of these protocols and technologies will have to be re-engineered according to our new understandings of the interaction between society and technology. + +Web 3.0, or as might be termed the "post-Snowden" web, is a reimagination of the sorts of things that we already use the Web for, but with a fundamentally different model for the interactions between parties. Information that we assume to be public, we publish. Information that we assume to be agreed, we place on a consensus-ledger. Information that we assume to be private, we keep secret and never reveal. Communication always takes place over encrypted channels and only with pseudonymous identities as endpoints; never with anything traceable (such as IP addresses). In short, we engineer the system to mathematically enforce our prior assumptions, since no government or organisation can reasonably be trusted. + +There are four components to the post-Snowden Web: static content publication, dynamic messages, trustless transactions and an integrated user-interface. + +The first, we already have much of: a decentralised, encrypted information publication system. All this does is take a short intrinsic address of some information (a hash, if we're being technical) and return, after some time, the information itself. New information can be submitted to it. Once downloaded, we can be guaranteed it's the right information since the address is intrinsic to it. This static publication system accounts for much of HTTP(S)'s job and all that of FTP. There are already many implementations of this technology, but the easiest to cite is that of Bit Torrent. Every time you click on a magnet link of Bit Torrent, all you're really doing is telling your client to download the data whose intrinsic address (hash) is equal to it. + +In Web 3.0, this portion of the technology is used to publish and download any (potentially large) static portion of information that we are happy to share. We are able, just as with Bit Torrent, to incentivise others to maintain and share this information, however combined with other portions of Web 3.0, we can make this more efficient and precise. Because an incentivisation framework is intrinsic to the protocol, we become (at this level, anyway) DDoS-proof by design. How's that for a bonus? + +The second portion of Web 3.0 is an identity-based pseudonymous low-level messaging system. This is used for communicating between people on the network. It uses strong-cryptography in order to make a number of guarantees about the messages; they can be encrypted with an identity's public key in order to guarantee only that identity can decode it. They can be signed by the sender's private key to guarantee that it does indeed come from the sender and provide the receiver with a secure receipt of communication. A shared secret can provide the opportunity to communicate securely, including between groups, without the necessity of proof of receipt. + +Since each of these provide ultimate message logistics, the use of transmission-protocol level addresses becomes needless; addresses, where once user or port together with IP address, now become merely a hash. + +Messages would have a time-to-live, allowing the disambiguation between publication messages that one may wish to be 'alive' for as long as possible to guarantee as many identities see it and instant signalling messages that wish to be transmitted as quickly as possible across the network. Thus the dichotomy of latency and longevity is traded. + +Actual physical routing would be carried out through an game-theoretic adaptive network system. Each peer attempts to maximise their value to other peers in the assertion that the other peers are valuable to them for the incoming information. A peer whose information is not valuable would be disconnected and their slot taken with a connection to some other, perhaps unknown (or perhaps second-degree), peer. In order that a peer be more useful, messages with some specific attributes would be requested (e.g. of a sender address or topic---both unencrypted---beginning with a particular bit string). + +In Web 3.0 this portion allows peers to communicate, update and self-organise in real-time, publishing information whose precedence does not need to be intrinsically trusted or later referred. In the traditional Web, this is much of the information that travels over HTTP in AJAX style implementations. + +The third portion of Web 3.0 is the consensus engine. Bitcoin introduced many of us to the idea of a consensus-based application. However, this was merely the first tentative step. A consensus engine is a means of agreeing some rules of interaction, in the knowledge that future interactions (or lack thereof) will automatically and irrevocably result in the enforcement exactly as specified. It is effectively an all-encompassing social-contract and draws its strength from the network effect of consensus. + +The fact that the effects of a renege of one agreement may be felt in all others is key to creating a strong social contract and thus making reducing the changes of renege or wilful ignorance. For example, the more a reputation system is isolated from a more personal social interaction system, the less effective the reputation system will be. A reputation system combined with Facebook or Twitter like functionality would work better than one without, since users place an intrinsic value on what their friends, partners or colleagues think of them. A particularly poignant example of this is the difficult question of whether, and when, to befriend on Facebook an employer or dating partner. + +Consensus engines will be used for all trustful publication and alteration of information. This will happen through a completely generalised global transaction processing system the first workable example of which is the Ethereum project. + +The traditional web does not fundamentally address consensus, instead falling back on centralised trust of authorities, such as ICANN, Verisign and Facebook, and reducing to private and government websites together with the software upon which they are built. + +The fourth and final component to the Web 3.0 experience is the technology that brings this all together; the 'browser' and user interface. Funnily enough, this will look fairly similar to the browser interface we already know and love. There will be the URI bar, the back button and of course, the lions share will be given over to the display of the ĐApp (né webpage/website). + +Using this consensus-based name resolution system (not unlike NameCoin in application), a URI can be reduced to the unique address of the front-end for that application (i.e. a hash). Through the information publication system, this can be expanded into a collection of files required for the front-end (e.g. an archive containing .html, .js, .css & .jpg files). This is the static portion of the ĐApp (-let). + +It contains no dynamic content; that is instead serviced through the other communication channels. For gathering and submitting dynamic but publicly available content whose provenance needs to be absolutely determined and which must be held immutably forever ("set in stone"), such as reputation, balances and so forth, there is a Javascript-based API for interacting with the consensus-engine. For gathering and submitting dynamic, potentially private, content that is necessarily volatile and subject to annihilation or lack of availability, the p2p-messaging-engine is used. + +There will be a few superficial differences; we'll see a move away from the traditional client-server URL model of addresses like "https://address/path", and instead start to see new-form addresses such as "goldcoin" and "uk.gov". Name resolution will be carried out by a consensus-engine-based contract and can trivially be redirected or augmented by the user. Periods would allow multiple levels of name resolution - "uk.gov", for example, might pass the "gov" subname into the name resolver given by "uk". + +Due to the ever-transient nature of the information made available to the browser automatically and accidentally through the update of the consensus back-end and the maintenance of the peer network, we'll see background-ĐApps or ĐApplets play a great role in our Web 3.0 experience. Either through always-visible Mac OS dock-like dynamic iconic infographics or dashboard style dynamic ĐApplets, we'll be kept accidentally up to date about that which we care. + +After the initial synchronisation process, page-loading times will reduce to zero as the static data is pre-downloaded and guaranteed up to date and the dynamic data (delivered through the consensus-engine or p2p-messaging-engine) are also maintained up to date. While being synchronised, the user-experience will be perfectly solid though actual information shown may be out of date (though may easily not, and can be annotated as such). + +As a user of Web 3.0, all interactions will be carried out pseudonymously, securely and for many services, trustlessly. Those that require third party(-ies), the tools will give the users and ĐApp-developers the ability to spread the trust among multiple different, possibly competing, entities, massively reducing the amount of trust one must place in the hands of any given single entity. + +With the separation of APIs from front-end and back-ends, we'll see additional ability to utilise differing front-end solutions able to deliver a superior user-experience. Qt's QtQuick and QML technologies could, e.g. be a stand-in replacement for the HTML/CSS combination of traditional web technologies and would provide native interfaces and rich accelerated graphics with minimal syntactical overhead and on a highly-effective reactive-programming paradigm. + +The changeover will be gradual, on Web 2.0, we'll increasingly see sites whose back-ends utilise Web 3.0-like components such as Bitcoin, BitTorrent, NameCoin. This trend will continue and the truly Web-3.0 platform Ethereum will likely be used by sites that wish to provide transactional evidence of their content e.g. voting sites and exchanges. Of course, a system is only as secure as the weakest link and so eventually such sites will transition themselves onto a Web 3.0 browser which can provide end-to-end security and trustless interaction. + +Say 'hello' to Web 3.0, a Secure Social Operating System. diff --git a/datasets/history/devcon-0-recap.md b/datasets/history/devcon-0-recap.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e1d5aa --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/devcon-0-recap.md @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +# ÐΞVcon-0 Recap + +*George Hallam · 5 December 2014* + +> **Source:** +> +> Published on the Ethereum Foundation Blog on 5 December 2014. Devcon 0 ran from 24 to 28 November 2014 in Berlin. Converted to markdown for EFS: the author's text is unchanged, and site navigation, share buttons and footers are left out. Links are as originally published; some no longer work. +> +> Devcon 0 in the Devcon Archive: . Photos in this copy load from blog.ethereum.org. + +--- + +### Day 1 - Monday 24th Nov - ÐΞV: Mission and Processes + +The first day of ÐΞVcon-0 kicked off early at 7am with the Ethereum UK communications team arriving at the venue (Ethereum Dev UG’s workspace in Kreuzberg, Berlin) to set up the 4K high quality recording equipment and arrange the space for the event. + +![Before set-up](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_6467-16.jpeg) + +After a quick coffee and croissant/pain au chocolat, everyone was ready for the first presentation - “Welcome! Our mission: ÐApps” which was delivered by Gavin Wood. Gavin made it very clear within this presentation the need for decentralised applications in today’s society with two very powerful opening quotes, “Progress has led to the concentration of power” and "Our mission therefore is decentralisation”. Following the presentation on ÐApps, Gavin invited everyone present to introduce themselves and explain their roles in Ethereum. It was humbling to see how Ethereum has attracted such a [magnificent team](https://ethdev.com/#team) of incredibly talented people from such a wide variety of backgrounds. + +[Video on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_BvvUlKDqp0) + +--- + +Next up, Stephan Tual gave a talk highlighting the important role of the UK based communications team in building a strong and populous Ethereum community. He also touched on the streamlining of internal communications procedures to maximise Ethereum's core team efficiency. With 81 Ethereum meetup/hackathons taking place from Tehran to New York and with over 6000 members worldwide, the Ethereum community has grown exponentially over the past 11 months. Still, there is always more to be done. With the inclusion of 4 new members to the team, new educational tools on the horizon and increased interaction with the community, Stephan hopes Ethereum can become a worldwide phenomenon as we move forward to the release of the genesis block. + +![IMG_6668](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_6668.jpeg) + +Straight after Stephan’s talk, Sven Ehlert gave an insightful presentation on how Scrum and Agile will be utilised to again maximise the efficiency of Ethereum’s software development.  This will be achieved by focusing on the key elements of the “product” that are needed for completion, and by applying incremental development goals with short deadlines for each of the individual developer teams (Mist, C++, Solidity etc). This will hopefully increase the overall output whilst breaking down what is a truly enormous project into manageable pieces. + +![Sven](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_6684-26.jpeg) + +Finally to cap off the first day, Alex Van de Sande gave an update on Mist, the Ethereum Go client’s ÐApp Navigator. As many of you will have seen in Alex’s recent [Mist presentation](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgNjs_WaFSc&list=UU6rYoXJ_3BbPyWx_GQDDRRQ), the ÐApp Navigator will be an incredibly useful and powerful tool for people looking to interact with Ethereum and will really help make it accessible and easy to use by everyone from the outset - which is of course important for swift adoption. + +![Alex](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_6775-30.jpeg) + +### Day 2 - Tuesday 25th Nov - Languages, Ðapps & Architecture + +After Monday’s introduction and team updates, day 2 would focus strongly on the direction of Ethereum’s languages, ÐApp creation and architecture updates. Gavin Wood and Christian Reitwießner started off with a talk on the vision of the Solidity language and the roadmap to its completion as it comes closer to a language that supports all features provided by the Ethereum Virtual Machine. You can try [solidity in your browser](https://forum.ethereum.org/discussion/1593/try-solidity-online) now. + +This was followed by a brief chat from Gavin this time focusing on the importance of secure documentation in ÐApp Development. The concept is to intertwine documentation and code in Solidity so that the documentation can be used by the client to alert the user of any significant actions that may take place as a consequence of running the code in certain smart contracts. + +![Gav blog-44](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/Gav-blog-44.jpg) + +Marek Kotewicz then gave an update on the Javascript API in a workshop setting allowing a lot of to-and-fro with the audience. He explained how it works, how to use it with smart contracts and what tools will be available to enable its use and uptake in the future. + +After lunch, Piotr Zieliński presented on Golem, a project that aims to use Ethereum to coordinate a P2P distributed computation network for research use. Participants of the network share their computing power and in return receive a token of worth, incentivising their continued participation. Users can also access the resources to implement their own tasks and distribute them across the network. + +![Golem](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_6830-34.jpeg) + +Following Piotr, Sven Elert took the stage again to speak further on optimising Ethereum’s workflow using continuous integration. CI is a concept intended to improve the quality of whichever project it is being used with. Though Ethereum already uses CI, we wish to further refine the process as we move forward. To this end, Sven introduced several new and different implementations to make the developers lives easier as the project moves forward. + +To finish off day 2, Lefteris Karapetsas gave an interesting presentation about using Emacs for C++ Ethereum development. He highlighted several plugins to use in order to improve workflow as well as the plugin he's working on for syntax highlighting on Solidity for Emacs. It is very cool to see personal projects increasing Ethereum's team overall efficiency! + +### Day 3 - Wednesday 26th Nov - Client Comparisons and What is Ethereum? + +Wednesday’s presentation and panel content offered a great opportunity to get the whole team on the same page from a client perspective. With Martin Becze arriving from San Francisco, we had representatives for each client ready for a panel talk later on in the day. The aim of panel was to increase the development team’s understanding of the different clients and highlight the minor differences between each client and how they implement the Ethereum Virtual Machine. + +The morning commenced with Vinay Gupta leading a workshop which had everyone present trying to come up with a definitive answer to “What is Ethereum?”. It turns out it’s not as easy as we thought! Each person had a chance to stand up and offer their own personal 30 second definition on what Ethereum is. The answers were diverse, and it was interesting to see how people changed their angle of approach depending on which audience the explanation was aimed at. + +![Blog Collage-55](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/Blog-Collage-55.jpg) + +Following Vinay’s workshop, Martin Becze brought everyone up to speed with node-ethereum - a Node.js project he has been working on with Joseph Chow in Palo Alto. The talk started by outlining the ethereumjs-lib and node-etheruem's architecture, then focused on areas where the client differs in structure from the other C++, Go and Python client implementations. Jeff Wilcke also gave a brief update on Ethereum Go client on the whiteboard before the panel discussion. + +![Martin](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_6921-57.jpeg) + +The presentation space was then rearranged for the panel with Gavin Wood (Ethereum C++), Jeff Wilcke (Ethereum Go), Heiko Hees (Pythereum) and Martin Becze (Node-Ethereum). Each took turns outlining how each client handles state transactions, moves account balances, runs the EVM and saves data to accounts whilst handling sucides and out-of-gas exceptions. Questions where then posed by the audience, discussions continued on late into the night as day 3 drew to a close. + +![Client panel-61](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/Client-panel-61.jpg) + +### Day 4 - Thursday 27th Nov - Robustness and security + +Though it is exceptionally useful to have a large suite of tools available for developers and users wanting to interact with Ethereum, it means nothing if the security and robustness of the network are in anyway compromised. To this end, the Ethereum team is working very hard to audit the software with several external partners and ensure network stability from the release of the genesis block onwards. + +To this end, Sven Ehlert, Jutta Steiner and Heiko Hees kicked off the morning with a workshop on the Stress Testing Project. The goal of the project is to again use continuous integration and take it one step further. With CI, the Dev team can test to make sure that each client will behave correctly when it executes a contract. In this respect it will simulate how clients would interact with the blockchain in the real world. This will allow us to understand how the network will behave if the clients have different properties. For instance - clients with low bandwidth and less cpu power interacting with those with more resources available. The project pays special attention to how this will affect potential forks of the blockchain. Later on, the team will simulate attacks on the Ethereum blockchain and network to test its durability and resilience. + +After the workshop, Christoph Jenzsch presented on the why and how of unit testing in the Ethereum project. In his talk, Christoph described several different types of test that need to be carried out - unit tests, integration tests and system tests. He also explained the different tools available to make it easy for every developer involved in Ethereum to get working on the huge amount of testing that needs to be carried out before it’s released. + +![Christoph](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_7000.jpeg) + +Next, Jutta Steiner took the stage to deliver a talk on “Achieving Security”. She explained how our approach to security is to initiate both an internal audit and a massive external audit with established software security firms, academics, blockchain research firms and companies interested in utilising Ethereum all taking part. Jutta is also working on a bounty program which will be open to the community rewarding those who test and explore the protocol and software. We’ll be releasing more information on this shortly if you wish to take part. + +![IMG_7007-65](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_7007-65.jpeg) + +After a quick lunch, Alex Leverington updated us on the vision and roadmap of the Libp2p Multi  Protocol Network Framework. The p2p networking protocol is geared towards security as it is entirely encrypted from end to end. He contrasted the Ethereum network with the internet as we know it today, emphasising the difference between using SSL certificates and p2p anonymous networks. He also commented on Ethereum’s 3 network protocols - Whisper, Swarm and Ethereum itself. All 3 protocols run on the same line, so framing/multiplexing is being used to stop them from interfering with each others bandwidth needs. A key point to take away from this is that other ÐApps can potentially build their own protocols and use the multiplexing to optimise the connection as well. + +Gavin followed up with a presentation on the what and why of Whisper: the Multi DHT Messaging System with Routing Privacy. Consensus is expensive, and for things like pure communications there are more elegant solutions available than using blockchain tech, hence the need for Whisper. To understand Whisper in general, think transactions, but without the eventual archival, any necessity of being bound to what is said or automated execution & state change. He also talked about some specific use cases for Whisper, such as ÐApps that need to provide dark (plausible denial over perfect network traffic analysis) comms to two correspondents that know nothing of each other but a hash. This could be a ÐApp for a whistleblower to communicate to a known journalist exchange some small amount of verifiable material and arrange between themselves for some other protocol (Swarm, perhaps) to handle the bulk transfer. + +To finish off the day, Daniel Nagy bought us up to speed on Swarm, Ethereum’s decentralised file storage and transmission protocol specifically targeted toward static web content hosting. Daniel also covered DHT (Distributed Hash Table - Kademlia). This will allow peers to connect to other peers distributed throughout the network instead of peer that are simply close to each other. By deterministically connecting to random peers, you know that each peer will have a better picture of the overall state of the network, increasing its viability. + +### Day 5 - Friday 28th Nov - Blockchain Theory and The Future + +The fifth and final day of DEVcon 0! After a week of talking about the near future of Ethereum’s development and completion, the last day would be focused on future iterations of Ethereum and blockchain technology as a whole. + +Vitalik Buterin and Vlad Zamfir started off day five with a whiteboard presentation on Ethereum 1.x. There are several problems that need to be solved as blockchain technology moves forward in the future - scalability and blockchain interoperability being at the forefront of those issues. The idea of Ethereum interacting with thousands of other blockchains is an attractive one, this in itself solves certain scalability problems in that work can distributed across many chains as opposed to bloating one central chain. + +![Vitalik and Vlad](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_7636-69.jpeg) + +Gavin then joined Vitalik and together they talked about the Ethereum Light-Client. A light client protocol is especially important for Ethereum as it will allow it to run on low capacity environments such as mobile phones, IoT (Internet of Things) devices and browser extensions. The two explained the development process and usage of Patricia Merkle Trees to implement it. Expect the light client to be ready for the release of Ethereum 1.0. + +After lunch, Juan Batiz-Benet of Filecoin/IPFS showed the audience the technology behind IPFS and Bitswap. He also presented some Ethereum/IPFS use cases such as content addressed files, IPNS naming and high performance distributed filesystem and tool integration. + +![Juan](https://blog.ethereum.org/images/posts/2014/12/IMG_7642-73.jpeg) + +Gavin once again took the stage to reveal Mix, the Ethereum IDE. Mix is being developed in conjunction with Alethzero and expected to be released in the next 12 to 18 months. It supports a rather amazing feature set, including documentation, compiler and debugger integration as you type, information on code health, valid invariant, code structure and code formatting, as well as variable values and assertion truth annotations. + +Finally, Vitalik wrapped up the event with a presentation showing some ideas for Ethereum 2.0 (Sharding, Hypercubes) and thanked all of those who attended. + +Overall, ÐΞVcon-0 was very enriching and worthwhile for everyone who attended. As expected, the Eth Dev team is now  very much on the same page and ready to push forward to the release of the genesis block. All of the presentations from DEVcon 0 were recorded and are currently being edited together by our resident graphic designer/video editor Ian Meikle. Starting on the 8th, a steady stream of content - “The ÐΞVcon-0 Series” will be added to the [Ethereum Youtube Channel](https://www.youtube.com/user/ethereumproject). diff --git a/datasets/history/eip-3675.md b/datasets/history/eip-3675.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5622ec --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/eip-3675.md @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +--- +eip: 3675 +title: Upgrade consensus to Proof-of-Stake +description: Specification of the consensus mechanism upgrade on Ethereum Mainnet that introduces Proof-of-Stake +author: Mikhail Kalinin (@mkalinin), Danny Ryan (@djrtwo), Vitalik Buterin (@vbuterin) +discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-3675-upgrade-consensus-to-proof-of-stake/6706 +status: Final +type: Standards Track +category: Core +created: 2021-07-22 +requires: 2124 +--- + + +## Abstract + +This EIP deprecates Proof-of-Work (PoW) and supersedes it with the new Proof-of-Stake consensus mechanism (PoS) driven by the beacon chain. Information on the bootstrapping of the new consensus mechanism is documented in [EIP-2982](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2982). Full specification of the beacon chain can be found in the `ethereum/consensus-specs` repository. + +This document specifies the set of changes to the block structure, block processing, fork choice rule and network interface introduced by the consensus upgrade. + + +## Motivation + +The beacon chain network has been up and running since December 2020. Neither safety nor liveness failures were detected during this period of time. This long period of running without failure demonstrates the sustainability of the beacon chain system and its readiness to become a security provider for the Ethereum Mainnet. + +To understand the motivation of introducing the Proof-of-Stake consensus see the Motivation section of [EIP-2982](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2982#motivation). + + +## Specification + +### Definitions + +* **PoW block**: Block that is built and verified by the existing proof-of-work mechanism. In other words, a block of the Ethereum network before the consensus upgrade. +* **PoS block**: Block that is built and verified by the new proof-of-stake mechanism. +* **Terminal PoW block**: A PoW block that satisfies the following conditions -- +`pow_block.total_difficulty >= TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY` *and* `pow_block.parent_block.total_difficulty < TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY`. +There can be more than one terminal PoW block in the network, e.g. multiple children of the same pre-terminal block. +* **`TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY`** The amount of total difficulty reached by the network that triggers the consensus upgrade. Ethereum Mainnet configuration **MUST** have this parameter set to the value `58750000000000000000000`. +* **`TRANSITION_BLOCK`** The earliest PoS block of the canonical chain, i.e. the PoS block with the lowest block height. +* **`POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED`** An event occurring when the state of the proof-of-stake fork choice is updated. +* **`FORK_NEXT_VALUE`** A block number set to the `FORK_NEXT` parameter for the upcoming consensus upgrade. +* **`TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH`** Designates the hash of the terminal PoW block if set, i.e. if not stubbed with `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000`. +* **`TERMINAL_BLOCK_NUMBER`** Designates the number of the terminal PoW block if `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` is set. + +#### PoS events + +Events having the `POS_` prefix in the name (PoS events) are emitted by the new proof-of-stake consensus mechanism. They signify the corresponding assertion that has been made regarding a block specified by the event. The underlying logic of PoS events can be found in the beacon chain specification. On the occurrence of each PoS event the corresponding action that is specified by this EIP **MUST** be taken. + +The details provided below must be taken into account when reading those parts of the specification that refer to the PoS events: +* Reference to a block that is contained by PoS events is provided in a form of a block hash unless another is explicitly specified. +* A `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event contains references to the head of the canonical chain and to the most recent finalized block. Before the first finalized block occurs in the system the finalized block hash provided by this event is stubbed with `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000`. +* **`FIRST_FINALIZED_BLOCK`** The first finalized block that is designated by `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event and has the hash that differs from the stub. + + +### Client software configuration + +The following set of parameters is a part of client software configuration and **MUST** be included into its binary distribution: +* `TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY` +* `FORK_NEXT_VALUE` +* `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` +* `TERMINAL_BLOCK_NUMBER` + +*Note*: If `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` is stubbed with `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` then `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` and `TERMINAL_BLOCK_NUMBER` parameters **MUST NOT** take an effect. + + +### PoW block processing + +PoW blocks that are descendants of any terminal PoW block **MUST NOT** be imported. This implies that a terminal PoW block will be the last PoW block in the canonical chain. + + +### Constants + +| Name | Value | +|-|-| +| **`MAX_EXTRA_DATA_BYTES`** | `32` | + +### Block structure + +Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, a number of previously dynamic block fields are deprecated by enforcing these values to instead be constants. Each block field listed in the table below **MUST** be replaced with the corresponding constant value. + +| Field | Constant value | Comment | +|-|-|-| +| **`ommersHash`** | `0x1dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d49347` | `= Keccak256(RLP([]))` | +| **`difficulty`** | `0` | | +| **`mixHash`** | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | | +| **`nonce`** | `0x0000000000000000` | | +| **`ommers`** | `[]` | `RLP([]) = 0xc0` | + +Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, the validation of the block's **`extraData`** field changes: The length of the block's **`extraData`** **MUST** be less than or equal to **`MAX_EXTRA_DATA_BYTES`** bytes. + +*Note*: Logic and validity conditions of block fields that are *not* specified here **MUST** remain unchanged. Additionally, the overall block format **MUST** remain unchanged. + +*Note*: Subsequent EIPs may override the constant values specified above to provide additional functionality. For an example, see [EIP-4399](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4399). + + +### Block validity + +Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, the block validity conditions **MUST** be altered by the following: +* Remove verification of the block's **`difficulty`** value with respect to the difficulty formula. +* Remove verification of the block's **`nonce`** and **`mixHash`** values with respect to the Ethash function. +* Remove all validation rules that are evaluated over the list of ommers and each member of this list. +* Add verification of the fields noted in the [block structure](#block-structure) section. + +*Note*: If one of the new rules fails then the block **MUST** be invalidated. + +*Note*: Validity rules that are not specified in the list above **MUST** remain unchanged. + +#### Transition block validity + +In addition to satisfying the above conditions, `TRANSITION_BLOCK` **MUST** be a child of a terminal PoW block. That is, a parent of `TRANSITION_BLOCK` **MUST** satisfy terminal PoW block conditions. + + +### Block and ommer rewards + +Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, block and ommer rewards are deprecated. Specifically, the following actions **MUST** be taken: +* Remove increasing the balance of the block's **`beneficiary`** account by the block reward. +* Remove increasing the balance of the block's **`beneficiary`** account by the ommer inclusion reward per each ommer. +* Remove increasing the balance of the ommer's **`beneficiary`** account by the ommer block reward per each ommer. + +*Note*: Transaction fee mechanics affecting the block's `beneficiary` account **MUST** remain unchanged. + + +### Fork choice rule + +If set, `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` parameter affects the PoW heaviest chain rule in the following way: +* Canonical blockchain **MUST** contain a block with the hash defined by `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` parameter at the height defined by `TERMINAL_BLOCK_NUMBER` parameter. + +*Note*: This rule is akin to block hash whitelisting functionality already present in client software implementations. + +As of the first `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event, the fork choice rule **MUST** be altered in the following way: +* Remove the existing PoW heaviest chain rule. +* Adhere to the new PoS LMD-GHOST rule. + +The new PoS LMD-GHOST fork choice rule is specified as follows. On each occurrence of a `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event including the first one, the following actions **MUST** be taken: +* Consider the chain starting at genesis and ending with the head block nominated by the event as the canonical blockchain. +* Set the head of the canonical blockchain to the corresponding block nominated by the event. +* Beginning with the `FIRST_FINALIZED_BLOCK`, set the most recent finalized block to the corresponding block nominated by the event. + +Changes to the block tree store that are related to the above actions **MUST** be applied atomically. + +*Note*: This rule **MUST** be strictly enforced. "Optimistic" updates to the head **MUST NOT** be made. That is -- if a new block is processed on top of the current head block, this new block becomes the new head if and only if an accompanying `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event occurs. + +### Network + +#### Fork identifier + +For the purposes of the [EIP-2124](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2124) fork identifier, nodes implementing this EIP **MUST** set the `FORK_NEXT` parameter to the `FORK_NEXT_VALUE`. + +#### devp2p + +The networking stack **SHOULD NOT** send the following messages if they advertise the descendant of any terminal PoW block: +* `NewBlockHashes (0x01)` +* `NewBlock (0x07)` + +Beginning with receiving the `FIRST_FINALIZED_BLOCK`, the networking stack **MUST** discard the following ingress messages: +* `NewBlockHashes (0x01)` +* `NewBlock (0x07)` + +Beginning with receiving the finalized block next to the `FIRST_FINALIZED_BLOCK`, the networking stack **MUST** remove the handlers corresponding to the following messages: +* `NewBlockHashes (0x01)` +* `NewBlock (0x07)` + +Peers that keep sending these messages after the handlers have been removed **SHOULD** be disconnected. + +*Note:* The logic of message handlers that are not affected by this section **MUST** remain unchanged. + + +## Rationale + +The changes specified in this EIP target a minimal requisite set of consensus and client software modifications to safely replace the existing proof-of-work consensus algorithm with the new proof-of-stake consensus represented by the already in-production beacon chain. + +This EIP was designed to minimize the complexity of hot-swapping the live consensus of the Ethereum network. Both the safety of the operation and time to production were taken into consideration. Additionally, a minimal changeset helps ensure that *most* smart contracts and services will continue to function as intended during and after the transition with little to no required intervention. + +### Total difficulty triggering the upgrade + +See [Security considerations](#terminal-total-difficulty-vs-block-number). + +### Parameterizing terminal block hash + +See [Security considerations](#terminal-pow-block-overriding). + +### Halting the import of PoW blocks + +See [Security considerations](#halt-the-importing-of-pow-blocks). + +### Replacing block fields with constants + +Deprecated block fields are replaced with constant values to ensure the block format remains backwards compatible. Preserving the block format aids existing smart contracts and services in providing uninterrupted service during and after this transition. + +Particularly, this is important for those smart contracts that verify Merkle proofs of transaction/receipt inclusion and state by validating the hash of externally provided block header against the corresponding value returned by the `BLOCKHASH` operation. + +This change introduces an additional validity rule that enforces the replacement of deprecated block fields. + +### Replacing `difficulty` with `0` + +After deprecating the proof-of-work the notion of difficulty no longer exists and replacing the block header **`difficulty`** field with `0` constant is semantically sound. + +### Changing block validity rules + +The rule set enforcing the PoW seal validity is replaced with the corresponding PoS rules along with the consensus upgrade as the rationale behind this change. + +An additional rule validating a set of deprecated block fields is required by the block format changes introduced by this specification. + +### Removing block rewards + +Existing rewards for producing and sealing blocks are deprecated along with the PoW mechanism. The new PoS consensus becomes both responsible for sealing blocks and for issuing block rewards once this specification enters into effect. + +### Supplanting fork choice rule + +The fork choice rule of the PoW mechanism becomes completely irrelevant after the upgrade and is replaced with the corresponding rule of the new PoS consensus mechanism. + +### Remove of `POS_CONSENSUS_VALIDATED` + +In prior draft versions of this EIP, an additional POS event -- `POS_CONSENSUS_VALIDATED` -- was required as a validation condition for blocks. This event gave the signal to either fully incorporate or prune the block from the block tree. + +This event was removed for two reasons: +1. This event was an unnecessary optimization to allow for pruning of "bad" blocks from the block tree. This optimization was unnecessary because the PoS consensus would never send `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` for any such bad blocks or their descendants, and eventually any such blocks would be able to be pruned after a PoS finality event of an alternative branch in the block tree. +2. This event was dangerous in some scenarios because a block could be referenced by two *different* and conflicting PoS branches. Thus for the same block in some scenarios, both a `POS_CONSENSUS_VALIDATED == TRUE` and `POS_CONSENSUS_VALIDATED == FALSE` event could sent, entirely negating the ability to safely perform the optimization in (1). + +### EIP-2124 fork identifier + +The value of `FORK_NEXT` in EIP-2124 refers to the block number of the next fork a given node knows about and `0` otherwise. + +The number of `TRANSITION_BLOCK` cannot be known ahead of time given the dynamic nature of the transition trigger condition. As the block will not be known a priori, nodes can't use its number for `FORK_NEXT` and in light of this fact an explicitly set `FORK_NEXT_VALUE` is used instead. + +### Removing block gossip + +After the upgrade of the consensus mechanism only the beacon chain network will have enough information to validate a block. Thus, block gossip provided by the `eth` network protocol will become unsafe and is deprecated in favour of the block gossip existing in the beacon chain network. + +It is recommended for the client software to not propagate descendants of any terminal PoW block to reduce the load on processing the P2P component and stop operating in the environment with unknown security properties. + +### Restricting the length of `extraData` + +The `extraData` field is defined as a maximum of `32` bytes in the yellow paper. Thus mainnet and most PoW testnets cap the value at `32` bytes. `extraData` fields of greater length are used by clique testnets and other networks to carry special signature/consensus schemes. This EIP restricts the length of `extraData` to `32` bytes because any network that is transitioning from another consensus mechanism to a beacon chain PoS consensus mechanism no longer needs extended or unbounded `extraData`. + +## Backwards Compatibility + +This EIP introduces backward incompatibilities in block validity, block rewards and fork choice rule. + +The design of the consensus upgrade specified by this document does not introduce backward incompatibilities for existing applications and services built on top of Ethereum except for those that are described in the [EVM](#evm) section below or heavily depends on the PoW consensus in any other way. + + +### EVM + +Although this EIP does not introduce any explicit changes to the EVM there are a couple of places where it may affect the logic of existing smart contracts. + +#### DIFFICULTY + +`DIFFICULTY` operation will always return `0` after this EIP takes effect and deprecates the **`difficulty`** field by replacing it with `0` constant. + +*Note:* Altering the `DIFFICULTY` semantics to return randomness accumulated by the beacon chain is under consideration but will be introduced in a separate EIP. + +#### BLOCKHASH + +Pseudo-random numbers obtained as the output of `BLOCKHASH` operation become more insecure after this EIP takes effect and the PoW mechanism (which decreases the malleability of block hashes) gets supplanted by PoS. + + +## Test Cases + +* Block validity + * Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, block is invalidated if any of the following is true: + * `ommersHash != Keccak256(RLP([]))` + * `difficulty != 0` + * `nonce != 0x0000000000000000` + * `len(extraData) > MAX_EXTRA_DATA_BYTES` + * Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, block rewards aren't added to `beneficiary` account +* Client software adheres to PoS LMD-GHOST rule + * Head and finalized blocks are set according to the recent `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event + * No fork choice state is updated unless `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED` event is received +* Transition process + * Client software doesn't process any PoW block beyond a terminal PoW block + * Beginning with `TRANSITION_BLOCK`, client software applies new block validity rules + * Beginning with the first `POS_FORKCHOICE_UPDATED`, client software switches its fork choice rule to PoS LMD-GHOST + * `TRANSITION_BLOCK` must be a child of a terminal PoW block + * `NewBlockHashes (0x01)` and `NewBlock (0x07)` network messages are discarded after receiving the `FIRST_FINALIZED_BLOCK` + + +## Security Considerations + +### Beacon chain + +See Security Considerations section of [EIP-2982](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2982#security-considerations). + +### Transition process + +The transition process used to take this specification into effect is a more sophisticated version of a hardfork -- the regular procedure of applying backwards incompatible changes in the Ethereum network. This process has multiple successive steps instead of the normal block-height point condition of simpler hardforks. + +The complexity of this upgrade process stems from this fork targeting the underlying consensus mechanism rather than the execution layer within the consensus mechanism. Although the design seeks simplicity where possible, safety and liveness considerations during this transition have been prioritized. + +#### Terminal total difficulty vs block number + +Using a pre-defined block number for the hardfork is unsafe in this context due to the PoS fork choice taking priority during the transition. + +An attacker may use a minority of hash power to build a malicious chain fork that would satisfy the block height requirement. Then the first PoS block may be maliciously proposed on top of the PoW block from this adversarial fork, becoming the head and subverting the security of the transition. + +To protect the network from this attack scenario, difficulty accumulated by the chain (total difficulty) is used to trigger the upgrade. + +#### Ability to jump between terminal PoW blocks + +There could be the case when a terminal PoW block is not observed by the majority of network participants due to (temporal) network partitioning. In such a case, this minority would switch their fork choice to the new rule provided by the PoS rooted on the minority terminal PoW block that they observed. + +The transition process allows the network to re-org between forks with different terminal PoW blocks as long as (a) these blocks satisfy the terminal PoW block conditions and (b) the `FIRST_FINALIZED_BLOCK` has not yet been received. This provides resilience against adverse network conditions during the transition process and prevents irreparable forks/partitions. + +#### Halt the importing of PoW blocks + +Suppose the part of the client software that is connected to the beacon chain network goes offline before the Ethereum network reaches the `TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY` and stays offline while the network meets this threshold. Such an event makes the client software unable to switch to PoS and allows it to keep following the PoW chain if this chain is being built beyond the terminal PoW block. Depending on how long the beacon chain part was offline, it could result in different adverse effects such as: +* The client has no post-state for the terminal PoW block (the state has been pruned) which prevents it from doing the re-org to the PoS chain and leaving syncing from scratch as the only option to recover. +* An application, a user or a service uses the data from the wrong fork (PoW chain that is kept being built) which can cause security issues on their side. + +Not importing PoW blocks that are beyond the terminal PoW block prevents these adverse effects on safety/re-orgs in the event of software or configuration failures *in favor* of a liveness failure. + +#### Terminal PoW block overriding + +There is a mechanism allowing for accelerating the consensus upgrade in emergency cases. +This EIP considers the following emergency case scenarios for the acceleration to come into effect: +* A drop of the network hashing rate which delays the upgrade significantly. +* Attacks on the PoW network before the upgrade. + +The first case can be safely accelerated by updating the following parameters: +* `TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY` -- reset to a value that is closer in time than the original one. +* `FORK_NEXT_VALUE` -- adjust accordingly. + +The second, more dire attack scenario requires a more invasive override: +* `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH` -- set to the hash of a certain block to become the terminal PoW block. +* `TERMINAL_BLOCK_NUMBER` -- set to the number of a block designated by `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH`. +* `TERMINAL_TOTAL_DIFFICULTY` -- set to the total difficulty value of a block designated by `TERMINAL_BLOCK_HASH`. +* `FORK_NEXT_VALUE` -- adjust accordingly. + +*Note*: Acceleration in the second case is considered for the most extreme of scenarios because it will result in a non-trivial liveness failure on Ethereum Mainnet. + +### Ancient blocks are no longer a requisite for a network security + +Keeping historical blocks starting from genesis is essential in the PoW network. A header of every block that belongs to a particular chain is required to justify the validity of this chain with respect to the PoW seal. + +Validating the entire history of the chain is not required by the new PoS mechanism. Instead, the sync process in the PoS network relies on weak subjectivity checkpoints, which are historical snapshots shared by peers on the network. This means historical blocks beyond weak subjectivity checkpoint are no longer a requisite for determining the canonical blockchain. + +Specification of weak subjectivity checkpoints can be found in the `ethereum/consensus-specs` repository. + + +## Copyright +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/history/eip-779.md b/datasets/history/eip-779.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e25f74 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/eip-779.md @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +--- +eip: 779 +title: "Hardfork Meta: DAO Fork" +author: Casey Detrio (@cdetrio) +type: Meta +status: Final +created: 2017-11-26 +requires: 606 +--- + +## Abstract + +This documents the changes included in the hard fork named "DAO Fork". Unlike other hard forks, the DAO Fork did not change the protocol; all EVM opcodes, transaction format, block structure, and so on remained the same. Rather, the DAO Fork was an "irregular state change" that transferred ether balances from a list of accounts ("child DAO" contracts) into a specified account (the "WithdrawDAO" contract). + +## Specification + +- Codename: DAO Fork +- Activation: + - Block == 1,920,000 on Mainnet + +See references [1] and [2] for the original, full specification. It is summarized here for convenience. + +At block 1880000, the following accounts are encoded into a list `L`: +* The DAO (`0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413`) +* its extraBalance (`0x807640a13483f8ac783c557fcdf27be11ea4ac7a`) +* all children of the DAO creator (`0x4a574510c7014e4ae985403536074abe582adfc8`) +* and the extraBalance of each child + +
+Reference list L + +``` +0xd4fe7bc31cedb7bfb8a345f31e668033056b2728, +0xb3fb0e5aba0e20e5c49d252dfd30e102b171a425, +0x2c19c7f9ae8b751e37aeb2d93a699722395ae18f, +0xecd135fa4f61a655311e86238c92adcd779555d2, +0x1975bd06d486162d5dc297798dfc41edd5d160a7, +0xa3acf3a1e16b1d7c315e23510fdd7847b48234f6, +0x319f70bab6845585f412ec7724b744fec6095c85, +0x06706dd3f2c9abf0a21ddcc6941d9b86f0596936, +0x5c8536898fbb74fc7445814902fd08422eac56d0, +0x6966ab0d485353095148a2155858910e0965b6f9, +0x779543a0491a837ca36ce8c635d6154e3c4911a6, +0x2a5ed960395e2a49b1c758cef4aa15213cfd874c, +0x5c6e67ccd5849c0d29219c4f95f1a7a93b3f5dc5, +0x9c50426be05db97f5d64fc54bf89eff947f0a321, +0x200450f06520bdd6c527622a273333384d870efb, +0xbe8539bfe837b67d1282b2b1d61c3f723966f049, +0x6b0c4d41ba9ab8d8cfb5d379c69a612f2ced8ecb, +0xf1385fb24aad0cd7432824085e42aff90886fef5, +0xd1ac8b1ef1b69ff51d1d401a476e7e612414f091, +0x8163e7fb499e90f8544ea62bbf80d21cd26d9efd, +0x51e0ddd9998364a2eb38588679f0d2c42653e4a6, +0x627a0a960c079c21c34f7612d5d230e01b4ad4c7, +0xf0b1aa0eb660754448a7937c022e30aa692fe0c5, +0x24c4d950dfd4dd1902bbed3508144a54542bba94, +0x9f27daea7aca0aa0446220b98d028715e3bc803d, +0xa5dc5acd6a7968a4554d89d65e59b7fd3bff0f90, +0xd9aef3a1e38a39c16b31d1ace71bca8ef58d315b, +0x63ed5a272de2f6d968408b4acb9024f4cc208ebf, +0x6f6704e5a10332af6672e50b3d9754dc460dfa4d, +0x77ca7b50b6cd7e2f3fa008e24ab793fd56cb15f6, +0x492ea3bb0f3315521c31f273e565b868fc090f17, +0x0ff30d6de14a8224aa97b78aea5388d1c51c1f00, +0x9ea779f907f0b315b364b0cfc39a0fde5b02a416, +0xceaeb481747ca6c540a000c1f3641f8cef161fa7, +0xcc34673c6c40e791051898567a1222daf90be287, +0x579a80d909f346fbfb1189493f521d7f48d52238, +0xe308bd1ac5fda103967359b2712dd89deffb7973, +0x4cb31628079fb14e4bc3cd5e30c2f7489b00960c, +0xac1ecab32727358dba8962a0f3b261731aad9723, +0x4fd6ace747f06ece9c49699c7cabc62d02211f75, +0x440c59b325d2997a134c2c7c60a8c61611212bad, +0x4486a3d68fac6967006d7a517b889fd3f98c102b, +0x9c15b54878ba618f494b38f0ae7443db6af648ba, +0x27b137a85656544b1ccb5a0f2e561a5703c6a68f, +0x21c7fdb9ed8d291d79ffd82eb2c4356ec0d81241, +0x23b75c2f6791eef49c69684db4c6c1f93bf49a50, +0x1ca6abd14d30affe533b24d7a21bff4c2d5e1f3b, +0xb9637156d330c0d605a791f1c31ba5890582fe1c, +0x6131c42fa982e56929107413a9d526fd99405560, +0x1591fc0f688c81fbeb17f5426a162a7024d430c2, +0x542a9515200d14b68e934e9830d91645a980dd7a, +0xc4bbd073882dd2add2424cf47d35213405b01324, +0x782495b7b3355efb2833d56ecb34dc22ad7dfcc4, +0x58b95c9a9d5d26825e70a82b6adb139d3fd829eb, +0x3ba4d81db016dc2890c81f3acec2454bff5aada5, +0xb52042c8ca3f8aa246fa79c3feaa3d959347c0ab, +0xe4ae1efdfc53b73893af49113d8694a057b9c0d1, +0x3c02a7bc0391e86d91b7d144e61c2c01a25a79c5, +0x0737a6b837f97f46ebade41b9bc3e1c509c85c53, +0x97f43a37f595ab5dd318fb46e7a155eae057317a, +0x52c5317c848ba20c7504cb2c8052abd1fde29d03, +0x4863226780fe7c0356454236d3b1c8792785748d, +0x5d2b2e6fcbe3b11d26b525e085ff818dae332479, +0x5f9f3392e9f62f63b8eac0beb55541fc8627f42c, +0x057b56736d32b86616a10f619859c6cd6f59092a, +0x9aa008f65de0b923a2a4f02012ad034a5e2e2192, +0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490, +0x914d1b8b43e92723e64fd0a06f5bdb8dd9b10c79, +0x4deb0033bb26bc534b197e61d19e0733e5679784, +0x07f5c1e1bc2c93e0402f23341973a0e043f7bf8a, +0x35a051a0010aba705c9008d7a7eff6fb88f6ea7b, +0x4fa802324e929786dbda3b8820dc7834e9134a2a, +0x9da397b9e80755301a3b32173283a91c0ef6c87e, +0x8d9edb3054ce5c5774a420ac37ebae0ac02343c6, +0x0101f3be8ebb4bbd39a2e3b9a3639d4259832fd9, +0x5dc28b15dffed94048d73806ce4b7a4612a1d48f, +0xbcf899e6c7d9d5a215ab1e3444c86806fa854c76, +0x12e626b0eebfe86a56d633b9864e389b45dcb260, +0xa2f1ccba9395d7fcb155bba8bc92db9bafaeade7, +0xec8e57756626fdc07c63ad2eafbd28d08e7b0ca5, +0xd164b088bd9108b60d0ca3751da4bceb207b0782, +0x6231b6d0d5e77fe001c2a460bd9584fee60d409b, +0x1cba23d343a983e9b5cfd19496b9a9701ada385f, +0xa82f360a8d3455c5c41366975bde739c37bfeb8a, +0x9fcd2deaff372a39cc679d5c5e4de7bafb0b1339, +0x005f5cee7a43331d5a3d3eec71305925a62f34b6, +0x0e0da70933f4c7849fc0d203f5d1d43b9ae4532d, +0xd131637d5275fd1a68a3200f4ad25c71a2a9522e, +0xbc07118b9ac290e4622f5e77a0853539789effbe, +0x47e7aa56d6bdf3f36be34619660de61275420af8, +0xacd87e28b0c9d1254e868b81cba4cc20d9a32225, +0xadf80daec7ba8dcf15392f1ac611fff65d94f880, +0x5524c55fb03cf21f549444ccbecb664d0acad706, +0x40b803a9abce16f50f36a77ba41180eb90023925, +0xfe24cdd8648121a43a7c86d289be4dd2951ed49f, +0x17802f43a0137c506ba92291391a8a8f207f487d, +0x253488078a4edf4d6f42f113d1e62836a942cf1a, +0x86af3e9626fce1957c82e88cbf04ddf3a2ed7915, +0xb136707642a4ea12fb4bae820f03d2562ebff487, +0xdbe9b615a3ae8709af8b93336ce9b477e4ac0940, +0xf14c14075d6c4ed84b86798af0956deef67365b5, +0xca544e5c4687d109611d0f8f928b53a25af72448, +0xaeeb8ff27288bdabc0fa5ebb731b6f409507516c, +0xcbb9d3703e651b0d496cdefb8b92c25aeb2171f7, +0x6d87578288b6cb5549d5076a207456a1f6a63dc0, +0xb2c6f0dfbb716ac562e2d85d6cb2f8d5ee87603e, +0xaccc230e8a6e5be9160b8cdf2864dd2a001c28b6, +0x2b3455ec7fedf16e646268bf88846bd7a2319bb2, +0x4613f3bca5c44ea06337a9e439fbc6d42e501d0a, +0xd343b217de44030afaa275f54d31a9317c7f441e, +0x84ef4b2357079cd7a7c69fd7a37cd0609a679106, +0xda2fef9e4a3230988ff17df2165440f37e8b1708, +0xf4c64518ea10f995918a454158c6b61407ea345c, +0x7602b46df5390e432ef1c307d4f2c9ff6d65cc97, +0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413, +0x807640a13483f8ac783c557fcdf27be11ea4ac7a +``` +
+ +At the beginning of block 1920000, all ether throughout all accounts in `L` will be transferred to a contract deployed at `0xbf4ed7b27f1d666546e30d74d50d173d20bca754`. The contract was created from the following Solidity code (compiler version `v0.3.5-2016-07-01-48238c9`): + +```solidity +// Deployed on mainnet at 0xbf4ed7b27f1d666546e30d74d50d173d20bca754 + +contract DAO { + function balanceOf(address addr) returns (uint); + function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint balance) returns (bool); + uint public totalSupply; +} + +contract WithdrawDAO { + DAO constant public mainDAO = DAO(0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413); + address public trustee = 0xda4a4626d3e16e094de3225a751aab7128e96526; + + function withdraw(){ + uint balance = mainDAO.balanceOf(msg.sender); + + if (!mainDAO.transferFrom(msg.sender, this, balance) || !msg.sender.send(balance)) + throw; + } + + function trusteeWithdraw() { + trustee.send((this.balance + mainDAO.balanceOf(this)) - mainDAO.totalSupply()); + } +} +``` + +This contract is deployed on Mainnet in block 1883496 in transaction hash `0xfeae1ff3cf9b6927d607744e3883ea105fb16042d4639857d9cfce3eba644286`. The deployment code of the contract is: + +``` 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 +``` + +This deployment results in the runtime bytecode: + +``` 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 +``` + +Blocks with block numbers in the range [1_920_000, 1_920_009] **MUST** have `0x64616f2d686172642d666f726b` (hex encoded ASCII string `dao-hard-fork`) in the `extraData` field of the block. + +## References + +1. https://blog.slock.it/hard-fork-specification-24b889e70703 +2. https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/15/to-fork-or-not-to-fork/ + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/datasets/history/ethereum-launches.md b/datasets/history/ethereum-launches.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df2aee0 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/ethereum-launches.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +# Ethereum Launches + +*Stephan Tual · 30 July 2015* + +> **Source:** +> +> Published on the Ethereum Foundation Blog on 30 July 2015. The embedded video is shown here as a link. Converted to markdown for EFS: the author's text is unchanged, and site navigation, share buttons and footers are left out. Links are as originally published; some no longer work. + +--- + +A few minutes ago, many of you generated and loaded the Ethereum Genesis block, marking the inception of Frontier, the first Live release of the Ethereum project. + +The [Dev team](https://ethdev.com/) joins me in thanking each and everyone of you for your support during the past year and half. It’s incredible to see the progress that has taken place since that humble [first commit](https://github.com/ethereum/cpp-ethereum/commit/85aaddc694adc23ee56fce3d83a92a943a54b100) on Christmas Eve 2013. The vision of a censorship-proof ‘world computer’ that anyone can program, paying exclusively for what they use and nothing more, is now a reality. + +Many of you will want to get started immediately. Please check out our [brand new website](https://www.ethereum.org/) for instructions on how to install and run the clients. If you face issues, the first port of call should be [our forums](http://forum.ethereum.org/). For more detailed information as to what this release includes, please see my previous [blog post](https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/07/27/final-steps/). + +To celebrate the release, we’ll leave you with this new intro video to our project. We hope you enjoy it, and we cannot wait to see what you will build on Ethereum! + +[Video on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j23HnORQXvs) diff --git a/datasets/history/ethereum-now-going-public.md b/datasets/history/ethereum-now-going-public.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95241f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/ethereum-now-going-public.md @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +# Ethereum: Now Going Public + +*Vitalik Buterin · 23 January 2014* + +> **Source:** +> +> Published on the Ethereum Foundation Blog on 23 January 2014. Converted to markdown for EFS: the author's text is unchanged, and site navigation, share buttons and footers are left out. Links are as originally published; some no longer work. + +--- + +I first wrote the initial draft of the Ethereum whitepaper on a cold day in San Francisco in November, as a culmination of months of thought and often frustrating work into an area that we have come to call “cryptocurrency 2.0″ – in short, using the Bitcoin blockchain for more than just money. In the months leading up to the development of Ethereum, I had the privilege to work closely with several projects attempting to implement colored coins, smart property, and various types of decentralized exchange. At the time, I was excited by the sheer potential that these technologies could bring, as I was acutely aware that many of the major problems still plaguing the Bitcoin ecosystem, including fraudulent services, unreliable exchanges, and an often surprising lack of security, were not caused by Bitcoin’s unique property of decentralization; rather, these issues are a result of the fact that there was still great centralization left, in places where it could potentially quite easily be removed. + +What I soon realized, however, was the sheer difficulty that many of these projects were facing, and the often ugly technological hacks that were required to make them work. And, once one looks at the problem carefully, the culprit becomes obvious: fragmentation. Each individual project was attempting to implement its own blockchain or meta-layer on top of Bitcoin, and considerable effort was being duplicated and interoperability lost as a result. Eventually, I realized that the key to solving the problem once and for all was a simple insight that the field of computer science first conceived in 1935: there is no need to construct a separate infrastructure for each individual feature and implementation; rather, it is possible to create a Turing-complete programming language, and allow everyone to use that language to implement any feature that can be mathematically defined. This is how our computers work, and this is how our web browsers work; and, with Ethereum, this is how our cryptocurrencies can work. + +Since that moment, Ethereum has come very far over the past two months. The Ethereum team has expanded to include dozens of developers including Gavin Wood and Jeffrey Wilcke, lead developers of the C++ and Go implementations, respectively, as well as others including Charles Hoskinson, Anthony Di Iorio and Mihai Alisie, and dozens of other incredibly talented individuals who are unfortunately too many to mention. Many of them have even come to understand the project so deeply as to be better at explaining Ethereum than myself. There are now over fifteen people in our developer chat rooms actively working on the C++ and Go implementations, which are already surprisingly close to having all the functionality needed to run in a testnet. Aside from development effort, there are dozens of people operating around the world in our marketing and community outreach team, developing the non-technical infrastructure needed to make the Ethereum ecosystem the solid and robust community that it deserves to be. And now, at this stage, we have made a collective decision that we are ready to take our organization much more public than we have been before. + +### What Is Ethereum + +In short, Ethereum is a next-generation cryptographic ledger that intends to support numerous advanced features, including user-issued currencies, smart contracts, decentralized exchange and even what we think is the first proper implementation of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) or companies (DACs). However, this is not what makes Ethereum special. Rather, what makes Ethereum special is the way that it does this. Instead of attempting to specifically support each individual type of functionality as a feature, Ethereum includes a built-in Turing-complete scripting language, which allows you to code the features yourself through a mechanism known as “contracts”. A contract is like an autonomous agent that runs a certain piece of code every time a transaction is sent to it, and this code can modify the contract’s internal data storage or send transactions. Advanced contracts can even modify their own code. + +A simple example of a contract would be a basic name registration system, allowing users to register their name with their address. This contract would not send transactions; its sole purpose is to build up a database which other nodes can then query. The contract, written in our high-level [C-Like Language (CLL)](http://wiki.ethereum.org/index.php/CLL) (or perhaps more accurately Python-like language), looks as follows: + +``` +if tx.value < block.basefee * 200: +stop +if contract.storage[tx.data[0]] or tx.data[0] < 100: +stop +contract.storage[tx.data[0]] = tx.data[1] +``` + +And there you have it. Five lines of code, executed simultaneously by thousands of nodes around the world, and you have the beginnings of a solution to a major problem in cryptography: human-friendly authentication. It is important to point out that when the original version of Ethereum’s scripting code was designed we did not have name registration in mind; rather, the fact that this is possible came about as an emergent property of its Turing-completeness. Hopefully this will give you an insight into exactly what Ethereum makes possible; for more applications, with code, see [the whitepaper](https://ethereum.org/ethereum.html). Just a few examples include: + +- User-issued currencies / “colored coins” +- Decentralized exchange +- Financial contracts, including leverage trading and hedging +- Crop insurance +- Savings wallets with withdrawal limits +- Peer to peer gambling +- Decentralized Dropbox-style data storage +- Decentralized autonomous organizations + +Perhaps now you see why we are excited. + +### Who is Ethereum + +The core Ethereum team includes four members: + +- **Vitalik Buterin**: Vitalik Buterin first joined the Bitcoin community in March 2011, and co-founded Bitcoin Magazine with Mihai Alisie in September 2011. He was admitted to the University of Waterloo to study computer science in 2012, and in 2013 made the decision to leave Waterloo to travel through Bitcoin communities around the world and work on Bitcoin projects full time. Vitalik is responsible for a number of Bitcoin projects, including [pybitcointools](https://github.com/vbuterin/pybitcointools/), [a fork of BitcoinJS](https://github.com/vbuterin/bitcoinjs-lib/)and [multisig.info](http://multisig.info/); now, he has returned to Canada and is fully dedicated to working on Ethereum. +- **Mihai Alisie**: Mihai Alisie’s first foray into the Bitcoin community is Bitcoin Magazine, in September 2011. From Issue #1, which was shipped from his living room in Romania, to today Bitcoin Magazine bears Mihai’s imprint, and has grown as he has grown with the magazine. What started out as a team of people that didn’t have any experience in the publishing industry, is now distributing a physical magazine internationally and in Barnes & Noble bookstores across the US. Mihai is also involved in an innovative online e-commerce startup known as Egora. +- **Anthony Di Iorio**: Anthony Di Iorio is a Founding Member, Board Member & Executive Director of the [Bitcoin Alliance of Canada](http://www.bitcoinalliance.ca/), Founder of the [Toronto Bitcoin Meetup Group](http://www.meetup.com/Bitcoin-Toronto/), and partner / founder in various Bitcoin start-ups and initiatives including the in-browser Bitcoin wallet [KryptoKit](http://kryptokit.com/), [Cointalk](http://cointalk.ca/), the Toronto-based Bitcoin hub and coworking space[Bitcoin Decentral](http://bitcoindecentral.ca/), [Bitcoin Across America](http://bitcoinacrossamerica.com/), and the Global Bitcoin Alliance. +- **Charles Hoskinson**: Charles Hoskinson is an entrepreneur and cryptographer actively working on ventures in the Bitcoin ecosystem. He founded both the Bitcoin Education Project and Invictus Innovations prior to accepting his current role as a core developer of the Ethereum Project. He studied at Metropolitan State University of Denver and University of Colorado at Boulder with an emphasis in Analytic Number Theory. Charles is known for his love of economics, horology and MOOCs alongside a passion for chess and games of strategy. + +We also have an excellent team of developers, entrepreneurs, marketers and evangelists: + +- **Dr. Gavin Wood**: Core C++ Developer +- **Geff Obscura**: Core Go Developer +- **Dr. Emanuele Costa**: Quantitative Analyst; SCRUM Master +- **Joseph Lubin**: Software Engineering, Quantitative Analyst +- **Eric Lombrozo**: Software Architect +- **Max Kaye**: Developer +- **Jonathan Mohan**: Media, Marketing and Evangelism (BitcoinNYC) +- **Wendell Davis**: Strategic Partner and Branding (Hive Wallet) +- **Anthony Donofrio**: Logos, branding, Web Development (Hive Wallet) +- **Taylor Gerring**: Web Development +- **Paul Snow**: Language Development, Software Development +- **Chris Odom**: Strategic Partner, Developer (Open Transactions) +- **Jerry Liu and Bin Lu**: Chinese strategy and translations ([http://www.8btc.com/ethereum](http://www.8btc.com/ethereum)) +- **Hai Nguyen**: Accounting +- **Amir Shetrit**: Business Development (Colored Coins) +- **Steve Dakh**: Developer (KryptoKit) +- **kyle Kurbegovich**: Media (Cointalk) + +### Looking Forward + +I personally will be presenting at the Bitcoin conference in Miami on Jan 25-26. Soon after that, on February 1, the ether pre-sale will begin, at which point anyone will be able to obtain some of the initial pre-allocated ether (Ethereum’s internal currency) at a rate of 1000-2000 ether for 1 BTC by going to [http://fund.ethereum.org](http://fund.ethereum.org/). The pre-sale will run throughout February and March, and early funders will get higher rewards; anyone who sends money in the first seven days will receive the full 2000 ether, then 1980 ether on the 8th day, 1960 on the 9th day, and so forth until the baseline rate of 1000 ether per BTC is retained for the last three days of the pre-sale. + +We will be able to develop fully functional and robust Ethereum clients with as little as 500 BTC funding with current rates; basic implementations in Go, C++ and Python are coming close to testnet quality already. However, we are seeking to go much further than that. Ethereum is not “just another altcoin”; it is a new way forward for cryptocurrency, and ultimately for peer-to-peer protocols as a whole. To that end, we would like to be able to invest a large quantity of funds into securing top-notch talent for improving the security and scalability of the Ethereum network itself, but also supporting a robust Ethereum ecosystem hopefully bringing other cryptocurrency and peer-to-peer projects into our fold. We are already well underway in talks with KryptoKit, Humint and OpenTransactions, and are interested in working with other groups such as Tahoe-LAFS, Bitmessage and Bitcloud as well. + +All of these projects can potentially benefit from integrating with the Ethereum blockchain in some fashion, simply because the layer is so universal; because of its Turing-completeness, an Ethereum contract can be constructed to incentivize nearly everything, and even entirely non-financial uses such as public key registration have extremely wide-reaching benefits for any decentralized cryptographic product that intends to include, for example, a social network. All of these projects will add great value to the Ethereum ecosystem, and the Ethereum ecosystem will hopefully add great value to them. We do not wish to compete with any organization; we intend to work together. + +Throughout the fundraiser, we will be working hard on development; we will release a centralized testnet, a server to which anyone can push contracts and transactions, very soon, and will then follow up with a decentralized testnet to test networking features and mining algorithms. We also intend to host a contest, similar to those used to decide the algorithms for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2005 and SHA3 in 2013, in which we invite researchers from universities around the world to compete to develop the best possible specialized hardware-resistant, centralization-resistant and fair mining algorithms, and will also explore alternatives such as proof of stake, proof of burn and proof of excellence. Details on this will be further released in February. + +Finally, to promote local community development, we also intend to create public community hubs and incubators, which we are tentatively calling “holons”, in several cities around the world. The first holon will be based inside of Bitcoin Decentral in Toronto, and a substantial portion of Ethereum development will take place there; anyone who is seriously interested in participating heavily in Ethereum should consider giving us a visit over the next month. Other cities we are looking into include San Francisco, Amsterdam, Tel Aviv and some city in Asia; this part of the project is still in a very early phase of development, and more details will come over the next month. + +For now feel free to check out our resources: + +- **Forum:** [http://forum.ethereum.org](http://forum.ethereum.org/) +- **Blog:** [http://blog.ethereum.org](https://blog.ethereum.org/) +- **Wiki:** [http://wiki.ethereum.org](http://wiki.ethereum.org/) +- **Whitepaper:** [https://ethereum.org/ethereum.html](https://ethereum.org/ethereum.html) + +**Reddit:** [http://reddit.com/r/ethereum](http://reddit.com/r/ethereum) diff --git a/datasets/history/genesis-block.md b/datasets/history/genesis-block.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a901de6 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/genesis-block.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# The Genesis Block + +Block 0 of Ethereum mainnet: the starting state of the chain that launched as Frontier on 30 July 2015. + +The values below were read from Ethereum mainnet with the JSON-RPC call +`eth_getBlockByNumber("0x0", false)` on 12 November 2026. Anyone can repeat the call against any +full-history mainnet node and should get the same answers. + +| Field | Value | +|---|---| +| Block number | 0 | +| Hash | `0xd4e56740f876aef8c010b86a40d5f56745a118d0906a34e69aec8c0db1cb8fa3` | +| Parent hash | `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` | +| Timestamp | `0x0` (0, i.e. 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC) | +| Extra data | `0x11bbe8db4e347b4e8c937c1c8370e4b5ed33adb3db69cbdb7a38e1e50b1b82fa` | +| Gas limit | `0x1388` (5,000) | +| Difficulty | `0x400000000` (17,179,869,184, i.e. 2^34) | +| Nonce | `0x0000000000000042` | +| State root | `0xd7f8974fb5ac78d9ac099b9ad5018bedc2ce0a72dad1827a1709da30580f0544` | +| Transactions | 0 | + +## What the fields mean + +**Hash.** Every Ethereum client has this hash built in. A node that computes a different genesis hash is +on a different network. + +**Timestamp.** The genesis block was assembled in advance, not mined, so its timestamp is simply 0, the +start of Unix time. The chain's real first moment is block 1, mined at 2015-07-30 15:26:28 UTC +(timestamp `0x55ba4224`; its extra data reads `Geth/v1.0.0/linux/go1.4.2`). + +**Extra data.** These 32 bytes are not text and do not decode to anything readable. Ethereum's launch +plan, set out in the blog post +["Final Steps"](https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/07/27/final-steps), was to generate the genesis block with +a script whose `--extradata` argument was the hash of block 1,028,201 of the Ethereum testnet, a number +chosen for being both prime and palindromic. Nobody could know that hash in advance, so nobody could have +prepared the genesis block early, and anyone could regenerate it and check the result. + +**Gas limit.** Every transaction costs at least 21,000 gas, so with a 5,000 gas limit no transaction +could fit in a block. This was Frontier's deliberate "thawing" period: miners could start mining and +nodes could sync before any ether moved. Miners then raised the limit a little at a time. It first +passed 21,000 at block 46,147 (gas limit 21,003, mined 2015-08-07 03:30:33 UTC), which carries the +chain's first transaction. + +**State root.** The genesis block carries no transactions, but its state is not empty: it allocates the +ether bought in the 2014 ether sale and the other launch allocations. The state root commits to that +whole starting state. + +## Read more + +- [Ethereum Launches](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/ethereum-launches.md), the announcement + posted that day +- [Timeline](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/timeline.md) +- [Block 0 on Etherscan](https://etherscan.io/block/0) diff --git a/datasets/history/last-proof-of-work-block.md b/datasets/history/last-proof-of-work-block.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4edeac4 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/last-proof-of-work-block.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# The Last Proof-of-Work Block + +Block 15,537,393 was the last block of Ethereum mainnet produced by proof-of-work mining. Its total +difficulty crossed the Terminal Total Difficulty set for The Merge, so the next block, 15,537,394, was +the first one proposed by a proof-of-stake validator on the Beacon Chain. + +The values below were read from Ethereum mainnet with the JSON-RPC call +`eth_getBlockByNumber("0xed14f1", false)` on 12 November 2026. + +| Field | Value | +|---|---| +| Block number | 15,537,393 (`0xed14f1`) | +| Hash | `0x55b11b918355b1ef9c5db810302ebad0bf2544255b530cdce90674d5887bb286` | +| Parent hash | `0x2b3ea3cd4befcab070812443affb08bf17a91ce382c714a536ca3cacab82278b` | +| Timestamp | `0x6322c962` (1663224162, i.e. 2022-09-15 06:42:42 UTC) | +| Miner | `0x829bd824b016326a401d083b33d092293333a830` | +| Extra data | `0xe4b883e5bda9e7a59ee4bb99e9b1bc460021` | +| Difficulty | 11,055,787,484,078,698 | +| Total difficulty | 58,750,003,716,598,352,816,469 | +| Nonce | `0x62a3ee77461d4fc9` | +| Gas used / limit | 29,991,429 / 30,000,000 | +| Transactions | 1 | + +## What the fields mean + +**Total difficulty.** The Merge was triggered not by a block number but by the chain's accumulated +proof-of-work difficulty. The Terminal Total Difficulty was set at 58,750,000,000,000,000,000,000. This +block's total difficulty, 58,750,003,716,598,352,816,469, was the first to reach it, which made it the +terminal proof-of-work block. + +**Miner.** The block reward went to `0x829bd824b016326a401d083b33d092293333a830`, an address Etherscan +labels "F2Pool Old", belonging to the F2Pool mining pool. + +**Extra data.** The 18 bytes decode as UTF-8 to **七彩神仙鱼** ("discus fish", literally "seven-coloured +immortal fish"), followed by three bytes that are not text (`0x46 0x00 0x21`). The same five characters +appear in other blocks from this miner, each followed by three different bytes, so they work as the +pool's signature. + +**Gas.** The block holds a single transaction that used almost the whole 30 million gas limit. + +## The next block + +Block 15,537,394 (`0x56a9bb0302da44b8c0b3df540781424684c3af04d0b7a38d72842b762076a664`), timestamped +2022-09-15 06:42:59 UTC, has a difficulty of 0, a nonce of 0 and empty extra data: from this block on, +Ethereum blocks are proposed by validators rather than mined. Its parent hash is the hash of block +15,537,393 above. + +## Read more + +- [Mainnet Merge Announcement](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/mainnet-merge-announcement.md) +- [EIP-3675: Upgrade consensus to Proof-of-Stake](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/eip-3675.md) +- [Timeline](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/timeline.md) +- [Block 15,537,393 on Etherscan](https://etherscan.io/block/15537393) diff --git a/datasets/history/mainnet-merge-announcement.md b/datasets/history/mainnet-merge-announcement.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a9a4e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/mainnet-merge-announcement.md @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +# Mainnet Merge Announcement + +*Protocol Support Team · 24 August 2022* + +> **Source:** +> +> Published on the Ethereum Foundation Blog on 24 August 2022. Converted to markdown for EFS: the author's text is unchanged, and site navigation, share buttons and footers are left out. Links are as originally published; some no longer work. +> +> The Merge completed on 15 September 2022: [block 15,537,393](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/last-proof-of-work-block.md) was the last proof-of-work block. + +--- + +![](https://storage.googleapis.com/ethereum-hackmd/upload_fc82062a814fd40a66c7d03a522da205.jpeg) + +- Ethereum is moving to proof-of-stake! The transition, known as The Merge, must first be activated on the Beacon Chain with the Bellatrix upgrade. After this, the proof-of-work chain will migrate to proof-of-stake upon hitting a specific `Total Difficulty` value. +- The Bellatrix upgrade is scheduled for epoch **`144896`** on the Beacon Chain -- **11:34:47am UTC on Sept 6, 2022**. +- The `Terminal Total Difficulty` value triggering The Merge is **`58750000000000000000000`**, expected between **Sept 10-20, 2022**. +- Note: as [announced earlier](https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/06/21/testnet-deprecation/), the Kiln testnet is being sunset. Operators will shut down on September 6, 2022. + +## Background + +Following years of hard work, Ethereum's proof-of-stake upgrade is finally here! The successful upgrade of all public testnets is now complete, and The Merge has been scheduled for the Ethereum mainnet. + +The Merge is different from previous network upgrades in two ways. First, node operators need to update both their consensus layer (CL) and execution layer (EL) clients in tandem, rather than just one of the two. Second, the upgrade activates in two phases: the first, named Bellatrix, at an epoch height on the Beacon Chain, and the second, named Paris, upon hitting a [`Total Difficulty`](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3675#terminal-total-difficulty-vs-block-number) value on the execution layer. + +## Upgrade Information + +![](https://storage.googleapis.com/ethereum-hackmd/upload_aa804448c0b15c877035c523d6ae948a.png) + +### Timing + +_The Merge_ is a two-step process. The first step is a network upgrade, Bellatrix, on the consensus layer triggered by an epoch height. This is followed by the execution layer's transition from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake, Paris, triggered by a specific `Total Difficulty` threshold called the `Terminal Total Difficulty` (`TTD`). + +The Bellatrix upgrade is scheduled for epoch **`144896`** on the Beacon Chain -- **11:34:47am UTC on Sept 6, 2022**. + +Paris, the execution layer's portion of the transition, will be triggered by the `Terminal Total Difficulty (TTD)` of **`58750000000000000000000`**, expected between **`Sept 10-20, 2022`**. The exact date at which `TTD` is reached depends proof-of-work hash rate. Estimates for the transition can be found at [bordel.wtf](https://bordel.wtf/) and [797.io/themerge](https://797.io/themerge/). + +Once the execution layer reaches or exceeds the `TTD`, the subsequent block will be produced by a Beacon Chain validator. The Merge transition is considered complete once the Beacon Chain finalizes this block. Under normal network conditions, this will happen 2 epochs (or ~13 minutes) after the first post-TTD block is produced! + +A new JSON-RPC block tag, `finalized`, returns the latest finalized block or an error if no such post-merge block exists. This tag can be used by applications to check if The Merge has been completed. Similarly, smart contracts can [query the `DIFFICULTY` opcode (`0x44`)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4399#using-264-threshold-to-determine-pos-blocks) (renamed to `PREVRANDAO` post-merge) to determine if The Merge has happened. We recommend infrastructure providers monitor overall network stability in addition to finalization status. + +### Client Releases + +The following client releases support The Merge on the Ethereum mainnet. Node operators must run **both** an execution and consensus layer client to remain on the network during and after The Merge. + +When choosing which client to run, validators should be especially mindful of the risks of running a majority client on both the EL and CL. An explainer of these risks and their consequences can be found [here](https://dankradfeist.de/ethereum/2022/03/24/run-the-majority-client-at-your-own-peril.html). An estimate of current EL and CL client distribution and guides for switching from one client to another can be found [here](https://clientdiversity.org/). + +#### Consensus Layer + +| Name | Version | Link | +| ---------- | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Lighthouse | v3.1.0 | [Download](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/releases/tag/v3.1.0) | +| Lodestar | v1.0.0 | [Download](https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/releases/tag/v1.0.0) | +| Nimbus | v22.9.0 | [Download](https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/releases/tag/v22.9.0) | +| Prysm | v3.1.1 | [Download](https://github.com/prysmaticlabs/prysm/releases/tag/v3.1.1) | +| Teku | 22.9.0 | [Download](https://github.com/ConsenSys/teku/releases/tag/22.9.0) | + +**_Warning_**: Nimbus version v22.9.0 is a high-urgency upgrade that fixes a critical pre-TTD block production issue affecting users that restarted their node after Bellatrix. It also improves compatibility with Besu, Prysm and slow block builders and provides a speed boost in block processing important for those running on Raspberry Pi and similar hardware. + +**_Warning_**: Lighthouse version v3.1.0 is a high-priority release contains an important fix to ensure that Lighthouse does not attempt to produce invalid blocks. The --strict-fee-recipient flag for the Lighthouse Validator Client has also been found to prevent block proposals in the period between the Bellatrix upgrade (Sept 6th) and the TTD date (estimated Sept 15th). We are presently inside that period of time and therefore all stakers using that flag are affected. We advise that anyone using the --strict-fee-recipient flag should remove it and restart the Validator Client as soon as possible. **This does not affect the --suggested-fee-recipient flag.** + +**_Warning_**: Prysm v3.1.1 is a highly recommended update as it contains several important fixes and features for the merge. + +**_Warning_**: Teku version 22.9.0 is a required update. + +#### Execution Layer + +| Name | Version | Link | +| ------------------ | ----------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| Besu | 22.7.2 | [Download](https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/releases/tag/22.7.2) | +| Erigon | v2022.09.01-alpha | [Download](https://github.com/ledgerwatch/erigon/releases/tag/v2022.09.01) | +| go-ethereum (geth) | v1.10.23 | [Download](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/releases/tag/v1.10.23) | +| Nethermind | v1.14.1 | [Download](https://github.com/NethermindEth/nethermind/releases/tag/1.14.1) | + +**_Warning_**: Besu 22.7.2 is a recommended release for the Merge and Mainnet users. 22.7.1 remains Merge-ready. This release provides additional robustness before the Merge with some fixes and improvements in sync, peering, and logging. + +**_Warning_**: Erigon version v2022.09.01-alpha fixes invalid block production due to insufficient verification of digital signature components, block snapshot production that sometimes occurs during POS reverse header download and a lot of smaller bugs and safety issues. All Erigon users are recommended to upgrade to this or a later version prior to the Merge. + +**_Warning_**: geth version v1.10.22 contains a critical database issue, do not use this version, and if you have already upgraded, please upgrade to v1.10.23 as soon as possible. + +### Upgrade Specifications + +Consensus-critical changes for The Merge are specified in two places: + +- The consensus layer changes under the [`Bellatrix` directory](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/tree/dev/specs/bellatrix) of the consensus-specs repository +- The execution layer changes under the [`Paris` spec](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-specs/blob/master/network-upgrades/mainnet-upgrades/paris.md) in the execution-specs repository + +In addition to these, two other specifications cover how the consensus and execution layer clients interact: + +- The Engine API, specified in the [execution-apis repository](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/tree/main/src/engine), is used for communication between the consensus and execution layers +- Optimistic Sync, specified in the [`sync`](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/dev/sync/optimistic.md) folder of the consensus-specs repository, is used by the consensus layer to import blocks as the execution layer client is syncing and to provide a partial view of the head of the chain from the former to the latter + +## Merge Bug Bounty Bonus + +All Merge-related bounties for vulnerabilities have received a 4x multiplier between now and the 8th of September. Critical bugs are now worth up to **$1 million USD**. + +See the [bug bounty program](https://bounty.ethereum.org) for more details. + +## FAQ + +### As a node operator, what should I do? + +Post-merge, an Ethereum full node is the combination of a consensus layer (CL) client which runs the proof-of-stake Beacon Chain and an execution layer (EL) client which manages the user-state and runs the computations associated with transactions. The EL and CL client communicate over an authenticated port using a new set of JSON RPC methods called the [Engine API](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/tree/main/src/engine). The EL and CL client authenticate each other using a JWT secret. **Node operators should refer to their clients' documentation for instructions about how to generate and configure this value.** + +In other words, if you were already running a node on the Beacon Chain, you now also need to run an execution layer client. Similarly, if you were running a node on the current proof-of-work network, you will need to run a consensus layer client. For them to communicate securely, a JWT token must be passed to each client. An update to the ['Run a Node' section](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/nodes-and-clients/run-a-node/) of the ethereum.org website goes over these steps in more detail. + +It is worth emphasizing that while they are both part of consensus layer client releases, running a Beacon Node is distinct from running a Validator Client. Stakers must run both, but node operators only need the former. [This post](https://docs.ethhub.io/ethereum-roadmap/ethereum-2.0/eth-2.0-client-architecture/) explains the difference between both components in more detail. + +Also, note that each layer will maintain an independent set of peers and expose its own APIs. The [Beacon](https://github.com/ethereum/beacon-apis) and [JSON RPC](https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis) APIs will both continue working as expected. + +### As a staker, what do I need to do? + +As explained above, **validators on the Beacon Chain will need to run an execution layer client after The Merge in addition to their consensus layer clients.** Pre-merge, this was strongly recommended, but some validators have outsourced these functions to third-party providers. This was possible because the only data required on the execution layer were updates to the deposit contract. + +Post-merge, validators must ensure that user transactions and state transitions blocks that they create and attest to are valid. To do this, each beacon node must be paired with an execution layer client. Note that multiple validators can still be paired to a single beacon node & execution layer client combo. This expands validators' responsibilities but also gives a validator who proposes a block the right to its associated transaction priority fees (which currently go to miners). + +While validator rewards still accrue on the Beacon Chain and will require a subsequent network upgrade to be withdrawn, transaction fees will be paid, burned, and distributed on the execution layer. Validators can specify any Ethereum address as a recipient for transaction fees. + +**After updating your consensus client, be sure to set the `fee recipient` as part of your validator client configurations to ensure transaction fees are sent to an address you control.** If you have staked using a third-party provider, it is up to your selected provider to specify how these fees are allocated. + +The Staking Launchpad has a [Merge Readiness Checklist](https://launchpad.ethereum.org/en/merge-readiness) that stakers can use to ensure they have gone through each step of the process. EthStaker have also hosted [Validator Prep Workshops](https://ethstaker.cc/ethstaker-validator-workshop/), with more being planned. + +Stakers who wish to run a validator on a testnet in preparation for the mainnet proof-of-stake transition can do so on Goerli (now merged with Prater), which also has a [Staking Launchpad instance](https://prater.launchpad.ethereum.org/). + +### Why is the estimated date for the `Terminal Total Difficulty` so broad? + +The incremental difficulty added per block is dependent on the network hash rate which is volatile. If more hash rate joins the network, `TTD` will be reached sooner. Similarly, if hash rate leaves the network, `TTD` will be reached later. In the event of a significant drop in hash rate levels, a `TTD Override` could be coordinated as was done on [Ropsten](https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/06/03/ropsten-merge-ttd/). + +### As an application or tooling developer, what should I do? + +As explained in a [previous post](https://blog.ethereum.org/2021/11/29/how-the-merge-impacts-app-layer/), The Merge will have only minimal impact on a subset of contracts deployed on Ethereum, none of which should be breaking. Additionally, the lion's share of user API endpoints remain stable (unless you use proof-of-work specific methods such as `eth_getWork`). + +That said, most applications on Ethereum involve much more than on-chain contracts. **Now is the time** to ensure that your front-end code, tooling, deployment pipeline and other off-chain components work as intended. We strongly recommend that developers run through a complete testing & deployment cycle on Sepolia or Goerli and report any issues with tools or dependencies to those projects' maintainers. If you are unsure where to open an issue, please use [this repository](https://github.com/eth-clients/merge-testnets/). + +Additionally, please note that all testnets aside from Sepolia and Goerli will be deprecated post-merge. If you are a user of Ropsten, Rinkeby or Kiln, you should plan to migrate to Goerli or Sepolia. More information about this can be found [here](https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/06/21/testnet-deprecation/). + +### As an Ethereum user or Ether holder, is there anything I need to do? + +Whether you are using Ethereum applications on-chain, holding Ether on an exchange or in a self-custodied wallet, you do not have to do anything. If an application, exchange or wallet you use offers additonal instructions or recommendations, you should verify these are actually coming from them. Be on the lookout for scams! + +### As a miner, is there anything I need to do? + +No. If you are mining on the Ethereum mainnet, you should be aware that the network will operate entirely under proof-of-stake after The Merge. At that point, mining will no longer be possible on the network. + +### What happens if I am a miner or node operator and I do not participate in the upgrade? + +If you are using an Ethereum client that is not updated to the latest version (listed above), your client will sync to the pre-fork blockchain once the upgrade occurs. + +You will be stuck on an incompatible chain following the old rules and will be unable to send Ether or operate on the post-merge Ethereum network. + +### As a validator, can I withdraw my stake? + +No. The Merge is the most complicated upgrade to Ethereum to date. To minimize risks of network disruptions, a minimal approach was taken which excluded any non-transition changes from this upgrade. + +Withdrawals from the Beacon Chain will likely be introduced in the first upgrade after The Merge. Specifications for both the [consensus](https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/issues/2758) and [execution](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4895) layers are in progress. + +### I have more questions, where can I ask them? + +Join client team developers, members of ETHStaker, researchers, and more on the next [Merge Community Call](https://github.com/ethereum/pm/issues/599) on Friday, Sept 9 at 14:00 UTC! + +## Thank You + +Ethereum's transition to proof-of-stake has been a _loooong_ time coming. Thank you to everyone who contributed to researching, specifying, developing, analyzing, testing, breaking, fixing, or explaining everything that got us to The Merge. + +There have been far too many contributors over the years to list here, but you know who you are. Without all of you in the bazaar, we wouldn't have built this cathedral. + +wen merge? Very 🔜. + +--- + +Thank you to Joseph Schweitzer and Tomo Saito for the cover image for this post! diff --git a/datasets/history/manifest.json b/datasets/history/manifest.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b1bf7f --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/manifest.json @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +{ + "schemaVersion": "efs-content-manifest/v1", + "dataset": "history", + "title": "Ethereum History", + "anchorPath": "/history", + "description": "Ethereum's story in its own documents: launch posts, the DAO and Merge specifications, and blocks read from the chain.", + "defaults": { + "contentType": "text/markdown" + }, + "files": [ + { + "path": "README.md", + "name": "README.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Ethereum History", + "description": "Overview of the folder: what each document is and how to read it, starting from the timeline.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "overview"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "year": 2026, + "source": "https://github.com/efs-project/content/tree/main/datasets/history" + }, + { + "path": "timeline.md", + "name": "timeline.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Ethereum Timeline", + "description": "Dated index of Ethereum's history from the 2013 whitepaper to the Fusaka upgrade, linking each event to its documents.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "timeline"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "year": 2026, + "source": "https://ethereum.org/en/ethereum-forks/" + }, + { + "path": "ethereum-now-going-public.md", + "name": "ethereum-now-going-public.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Ethereum: Now Going Public", + "description": "Vitalik Buterin's January 2014 post introducing Ethereum, its team and the planned ether sale.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "announcement"], + "author": "Vitalik Buterin", + "year": 2014, + "date": "2014-01-23", + "source": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/01/23/ethereum-now-going-public", + "modificationStatus": "converted-to-markdown" + }, + { + "path": "dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md", + "name": "dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ĐApps: What Web 3.0 Looks Like", + "description": "Gavin Wood's 2014 essay describing the four components of a decentralised, post-Snowden web.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "web3", "essay"], + "author": "Gavin Wood", + "year": 2014, + "date": "2014-04-17", + "source": "https://gavwood.com/dappsweb3.html", + "modificationStatus": "converted-to-markdown" + }, + { + "path": "devcon-0-recap.md", + "name": "devcon-0-recap.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "ÐΞVcon-0 Recap", + "description": "A day-by-day recap of Devcon 0, the first Ethereum developer conference, held in Berlin in November 2014.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "devcon"], + "author": "George Hallam", + "year": 2014, + "date": "2014-12-05", + "source": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/12/05/devcon-0-recap", + "relatedUrl": "https://archive.devcon.org/devcon-0", + "modificationStatus": "converted-to-markdown" + }, + { + "path": "ethereum-launches.md", + "name": "ethereum-launches.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Ethereum Launches", + "description": "The 30 July 2015 announcement that Frontier, the first live release of Ethereum, had launched.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "launch", "frontier"], + "author": "Stephan Tual", + "year": 2015, + "date": "2015-07-30", + "source": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/07/30/ethereum-launches", + "modificationStatus": "converted-to-markdown" + }, + { + "path": "genesis-block.md", + "name": "genesis-block.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "The Genesis Block", + "description": "Mainnet block 0 read by RPC: its hash, zero timestamp, extra data and 5,000 gas limit, explained.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "launch", "frontier", "block"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "year": 2026, + "source": "https://etherscan.io/block/0", + "verifiedWith": "eth_getBlockByNumber(0x0) on Ethereum mainnet, 2026-11-12" + }, + { + "path": "critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md", + "name": "critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability", + "description": "Vitalik Buterin's 17 June 2016 notice on the attack draining The DAO and the first proposed response.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "the-dao", "security"], + "author": "Vitalik Buterin", + "year": 2016, + "date": "2016-06-17", + "source": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability", + "modificationStatus": "converted-to-markdown" + }, + { + "path": "eip-779.md", + "name": "eip-779.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-779: Hardfork Meta: DAO Fork", + "description": "The specification of the DAO hard fork, activated at block 1,920,000 on 20 July 2016.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "the-dao", "hard-fork"], + "author": "Casey Detrio", + "year": 2017, + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-779.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-779.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-779", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "mainnet-merge-announcement.md", + "name": "mainnet-merge-announcement.md", + "license": "NOASSERTION", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Mainnet Merge Announcement", + "description": "The Ethereum Foundation's 24 August 2022 announcement of the Bellatrix epoch and Terminal Total Difficulty for The Merge.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "the-merge", "proof-of-stake", "announcement"], + "author": "Protocol Support Team", + "year": 2022, + "date": "2022-08-24", + "source": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2022/08/24/mainnet-merge-announcement", + "modificationStatus": "converted-to-markdown" + }, + { + "path": "eip-3675.md", + "name": "eip-3675.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "EIP-3675: Upgrade consensus to Proof-of-Stake", + "description": "The specification of The Merge, Ethereum's switch from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "the-merge", "proof-of-stake"], + "authors": ["Mikhail Kalinin", "Danny Ryan", "Vitalik Buterin"], + "year": 2021, + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "source": "https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-3675.md", + "mirrors": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ethereum/EIPs/253f6bd20d1b1b600228c0d696775a90720ba5f1/EIPS/eip-3675.md"], + "canonicalUrl": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3675", + "modificationStatus": "verbatim-with-absolute-links" + }, + { + "path": "last-proof-of-work-block.md", + "name": "last-proof-of-work-block.md", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "The Last Proof-of-Work Block", + "description": "Block 15,537,393 read by RPC: the terminal proof-of-work block of The Merge, with its miner and decoded extra data.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "ethereum-history", "the-merge", "block"], + "author": "EFS contributors", + "year": 2026, + "source": "https://etherscan.io/block/15537393", + "verifiedWith": "eth_getBlockByNumber(0xed14f1) on Ethereum mainnet, 2026-11-12" + } + ] +} diff --git a/datasets/history/timeline.md b/datasets/history/timeline.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac64b01 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/history/timeline.md @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +# Ethereum Timeline + +Key moments in Ethereum's history, from the whitepaper to today's upgrades. Each entry links to the +original document stored on EFS where there is one. Dates are UTC; block numbers and times come from +mainnet itself. + +## 2013–2014: The idea + +- **November 2013.** Vitalik Buterin writes the first draft of the Ethereum whitepaper in San Francisco. + [Whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/ethereum-whitepaper-2014.pdf) · + [About the whitepaper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/ethereum.md) +- **23 January 2014.** "Ethereum: Now Going Public": Vitalik introduces the project, its team and the + plan for an ether sale. + [Read the post](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/ethereum-now-going-public.md) +- **April 2014.** Gavin Wood publishes the Yellow Paper, a formal specification of the Ethereum protocol. + [Yellow Paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/yellowpaper.pdf) · + [About the Yellow Paper](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/whitepapers/yellowpaper.md) +- **17 April 2014.** Gavin Wood's essay "ĐApps: What Web 3.0 Looks Like" sets out the vision of a + decentralised web built on Ethereum. + [Read the essay](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/dapps-what-web3-looks-like.md) +- **22 July 2014.** The ether sale opens. It runs for 42 days, with ether bought in bitcoin. +- **24–28 November 2014.** Devcon 0, the first Ethereum developer conference, is held in Berlin. + [Read the recap](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/devcon-0-recap.md) + +## 2015–2016: Launch and the DAO + +- **30 July 2015.** Frontier, the first live release of Ethereum, launches. Block 1 is mined at + 15:26:28 UTC. + [Ethereum Launches](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/ethereum-launches.md) · + [The genesis block](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/genesis-block.md) +- **7 August 2015.** Block 46,147 carries the first transaction, once miners have raised the gas limit + above 21,000. + [The genesis block](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/genesis-block.md) +- **14 March 2016.** The Homestead upgrade activates at block 1,150,000. +- **17 June 2016.** An attacker begins draining ether from The DAO through a recursive-call bug. + [CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability.md) +- **20 July 2016.** The DAO hard fork activates at block 1,920,000. It moves the ether held by The + DAO and its child DAOs, including the drained funds, into a contract from which DAO token holders can + withdraw. The fork block's extra data reads `dao-hard-fork`. + [EIP-779: Hardfork Meta: DAO Fork](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/eip-779.md) + +## 2020–2022: Proof-of-stake + +- **1 December 2020.** The Beacon Chain, Ethereum's proof-of-stake consensus layer, launches alongside + the proof-of-work chain. +- **5 August 2021.** The London upgrade activates at block 12,965,000, introducing EIP-1559's burned base + fee. + [EIP-1559](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-1559.md) +- **24 August 2022.** The Ethereum Foundation announces the mainnet schedule for The Merge. + [Mainnet Merge Announcement](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/mainnet-merge-announcement.md) +- **6 September 2022.** The Bellatrix upgrade on the Beacon Chain prepares it for The Merge. +- **15 September 2022.** The Merge: block 15,537,393, mined at 06:42:42 UTC, is the last proof-of-work + block, and Ethereum continues under proof-of-stake. + [The last proof-of-work block](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/last-proof-of-work-block.md) · + [EIP-3675: Upgrade consensus to Proof-of-Stake](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history/eip-3675.md) + +## 2023–2025: Scaling and accounts + +- **12 April 2023.** The Shanghai-Capella ("Shapella") upgrade activates at block 17,034,870, enabling + withdrawals of staked ether. +- **13 March 2024.** The Cancun-Deneb ("Dencun") upgrade activates at block 19,426,587, adding blob + transactions that make rollup data much cheaper. + [EIP-4844: Shard Blob Transactions](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-4844.md) +- **7 May 2025.** The Prague-Electra ("Pectra") upgrade activates at block 22,431,084. Among other + changes, it lets ordinary accounts set code for themselves. + [EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-7702.md) +- **3 December 2025.** The Fulu-Osaka ("Fusaka") upgrade activates at block 23,935,694, introducing + PeerDAS so nodes can check blob data by sampling it. + [EIP-7594: PeerDAS](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/standards/eip-7594.md) + +For an overview of this folder, see +[Ethereum History](https://app.efs.eth.limo/explorer/history). Upgrade dates and block numbers match +ethereum.org's [history of Ethereum forks](https://ethereum.org/en/ethereum-forks/). diff --git a/datasets/media/README.md b/datasets/media/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c06fc6b --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/media/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# Media + +A small set of images stored on EFS, chosen around one idea: records made to +outlast the medium that carries them. + +- **Voyager Golden Record cover** (1977). The engraved cover of the record + that Voyager 1 and 2 carry into interstellar space, with instructions for + playing it drawn for a reader who shares no language with us. +- **Pale Blue Dot** (1990). Earth as Voyager 1 saw it from more than 4 billion + miles away: a crescent smaller than one pixel. +- **Ethereum diamond icon**. The logo of the network these files are stored on, + as a tiny plain-text SVG. + +Each image has a short card beside it with its date, creator, source and +licence. All three are public domain, as recorded on Wikimedia Commons: + +- https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg +- https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pale_Blue_Dot.png +- https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethereum-icon-purple.svg + +The Ethereum logo may be a trademark even though the file itself is free of +copyright. diff --git a/datasets/media/ethereum-icon-purple.md b/datasets/media/ethereum-icon-purple.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c9bf441 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/media/ethereum-icon-purple.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# Ethereum Diamond Icon + +- **What:** The Ethereum diamond logo as a six-polygon SVG in purple-grey tones +- **Date:** 26 February 2020 (file created) +- **Creator:** Wikimedia Commons user GitR0n1n (SVG file) +- **File:** `ethereum-icon-purple.svg`, SVG, 820 bytes, identical to the Wikimedia Commons original; plain shapes, no scripts or external references +- **Source:** https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethereum-icon-purple.svg +- **Licence:** Public domain. Commons tags it {{PD-textlogo}}: it consists only of simple geometric shapes, which are not eligible for copyright. +- **Trademark:** Commons also tags it {{trademark}}. The file is free of copyright, but the Ethereum logo may be protected as a trademark, which limits some uses independently of copyright. + +## About + +Six flat polygons on a 1920 × 1920 view box: an upper diamond split into four +facets and a lower chevron of two, in three shades. Because SVG is plain +text, the whole 820-byte file can be read as source as well as drawn as an +image. diff --git a/datasets/media/ethereum-icon-purple.svg b/datasets/media/ethereum-icon-purple.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..668f2cc --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/media/ethereum-icon-purple.svg @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/datasets/media/manifest.json b/datasets/media/manifest.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5f2701 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/media/manifest.json @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +{ + "schemaVersion": "efs-content-manifest/v1", + "dataset": "media", + "title": "Media", + "anchorPath": "/media", + "description": "A small set of verified public-domain images on the theme of records that outlast their medium.", + "defaults": { + "contentType": "text/markdown" + }, + "files": [ + { + "path": "README.md", + "name": "README.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "Media", + "description": "Overview of the images in this folder and where each comes from.", + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://github.com/efs-project/content/tree/main/datasets/media", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + }, + { + "path": "voyager-golden-record-cover.jpg", + "name": "voyager-golden-record-cover.jpg", + "contentType": "image/jpeg", + "title": "Voyager Golden Record Cover", + "description": "The engraved cover of the record carried by Voyager 1 and 2, with diagrams showing how to play it.", + "tags": ["space", "archive", "image"], + "author": "NASA/JPL", + "year": 1977, + "aboutCard": "voyager-golden-record-cover.md", + "license": "LicenseRef-PublicDomain", + "licenseUrl": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg", + "licenseNote": "Wikimedia Commons: {{PD-USGov-NASA}}", + "rendition": "Wikimedia Commons 1920 px rendition of the 2215 x 2215 px, 4,073,030-byte original (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/56/The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg)", + "modificationStatus": "resized-by-source", + "nasaId": "GPN-2000-001978", + "source": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg", + "retrievedFrom": "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg/1920px-The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg", + "retrievedAt": "2026-11-12", + "bytes": 767819, + "redistributionStatus": "deployable" + }, + { + "path": "voyager-golden-record-cover.md", + "name": "voyager-golden-record-cover.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Voyager Golden Record Cover", + "description": "Date, creator, source, licence and the meaning of the engraved diagrams.", + "tags": ["space", "archive"], + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + }, + { + "path": "pale-blue-dot.png", + "name": "pale-blue-dot.png", + "contentType": "image/png", + "title": "Pale Blue Dot", + "description": "Earth photographed by Voyager 1 on 14 February 1990 from more than 4 billion miles away.", + "tags": ["space", "archive", "image"], + "author": "NASA/JPL (Voyager 1)", + "year": 1990, + "aboutCard": "pale-blue-dot.md", + "license": "LicenseRef-PublicDomain", + "licenseUrl": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pale_Blue_Dot.png", + "licenseNote": "Wikimedia Commons: {{PD-USGov-NASA}}", + "modificationStatus": "unmodified", + "nasaId": "PIA00452", + "source": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pale_Blue_Dot.png", + "retrievedFrom": "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Pale_Blue_Dot.png", + "retrievedAt": "2026-11-12", + "bytes": 538822, + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "commonsSha1": "611260a6510a79cb496748f10dac90bf5d04cd65" + }, + { + "path": "pale-blue-dot.md", + "name": "pale-blue-dot.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Pale Blue Dot", + "description": "Date, creator, source and licence of Voyager 1's 1990 image of Earth.", + "tags": ["space", "archive"], + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pale_Blue_Dot.png", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + }, + { + "path": "ethereum-icon-purple.svg", + "name": "ethereum-icon-purple.svg", + "contentType": "image/svg+xml", + "title": "Ethereum Diamond Icon", + "description": "The Ethereum diamond logo as a plain six-polygon SVG. The file is public domain; the logo may be a trademark.", + "tags": ["ethereum", "image"], + "author": "GitR0n1n (Wikimedia Commons)", + "year": 2020, + "aboutCard": "ethereum-icon-purple.md", + "license": "LicenseRef-PublicDomain", + "licenseUrl": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethereum-icon-purple.svg", + "licenseNote": "Wikimedia Commons: {{PD-textlogo}} (simple geometric shapes, not eligible for copyright); also tagged {{trademark}}", + "modificationStatus": "unmodified", + "source": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethereum-icon-purple.svg", + "retrievedFrom": "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Ethereum-icon-purple.svg", + "retrievedAt": "2026-11-12", + "bytes": 820, + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "commonsSha1": "4d100cd08256cb41dd56b2b6faa2acd56e838ab3" + }, + { + "path": "ethereum-icon-purple.md", + "name": "ethereum-icon-purple.md", + "contentType": "text/markdown", + "title": "About: Ethereum Diamond Icon", + "description": "Date, creator, source, licence and trademark note for the Ethereum diamond SVG.", + "tags": ["ethereum"], + "license": "CC0-1.0", + "author": "EFS contributors", + "source": "https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethereum-icon-purple.svg", + "redistributionStatus": "deployable", + "modificationStatus": "original-metadata" + } + ] +} diff --git a/datasets/media/pale-blue-dot.md b/datasets/media/pale-blue-dot.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a6fd95 --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/media/pale-blue-dot.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# Pale Blue Dot + +- **What:** Earth photographed by Voyager 1 from more than 4 billion miles away +- **Taken:** 14 February 1990 +- **Creator:** NASA/JPL, Voyager 1 narrow-angle camera +- **File:** `pale-blue-dot.png`, PNG, 453 × 614 px, 538,822 bytes, identical to the Wikimedia Commons original +- **Source:** https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pale_Blue_Dot.png +- **NASA catalog entry:** https://photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/catalog/PIA00452 (PIA00452) +- **Licence:** Public domain. Commons tags it {{PD-USGov-NASA}}: a NASA work, not subject to copyright in the United States. + +## About + +Near the end of its planetary mission, Voyager 1 turned its cameras back and +took 60 frames for the first "portrait" of the solar system. In this +narrow-angle frame Earth is a crescent only 0.12 pixel across, sitting by +chance inside a ray of sunlight scattered in the camera. The image was taken +through violet, blue and green filters and recombined in colour; the +background features are artifacts of the magnification. + +It gave Carl Sagan the title of his 1994 book *Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the +Human Future in Space*. diff --git a/datasets/media/pale-blue-dot.png b/datasets/media/pale-blue-dot.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b51d4d7 Binary files /dev/null and b/datasets/media/pale-blue-dot.png differ diff --git a/datasets/media/voyager-golden-record-cover.jpg b/datasets/media/voyager-golden-record-cover.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0fb49d Binary files /dev/null and b/datasets/media/voyager-golden-record-cover.jpg differ diff --git a/datasets/media/voyager-golden-record-cover.md b/datasets/media/voyager-golden-record-cover.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c01dff --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/media/voyager-golden-record-cover.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# Voyager Golden Record Cover + +- **What:** The cover of the "Sounds of Earth" record carried by Voyager 1 and Voyager 2 +- **Date:** 1977, the year both probes launched +- **Creator:** NASA/JPL (NASA image GPN-2000-001978) +- **File:** `voyager-golden-record-cover.jpg`, JPEG, 1920 × 1920 px, 767,819 bytes +- **Source:** https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg +- **Licence:** Public domain. Commons tags it {{PD-USGov-NASA}}: a NASA work, not subject to copyright in the United States. + +This is the 1920-pixel rendition that Wikimedia Commons generates from the +original upload (2215 × 2215 px, about 4 MB). It is the same public-domain +image at a smaller size: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg/1920px-The_Sounds_of_Earth_Record_Cover_-_GPN-2000-001978.jpg + +## About + +Each Voyager probe carries a 12-inch gold-plated copper record of greetings, +music, natural and human-made sounds, and encoded images from Earth. This gold +aluminium cover protects the record from micrometeorites and also tells a +finder how to play it. + +The engraved diagrams show the stylus and playing speed, how to turn the +signal into pictures, a map of 14 pulsars that locates the Sun, and, at the +bottom right, the hydrogen atom's two lowest states, whose transition sets the +unit of time used in the other diagrams. The diagrams are engraved on both +the inner and outer surfaces of the cover, because the outer ones will erode +over time. diff --git a/datasets/web-games/CURATION.md b/datasets/web-games/CURATION.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e72da6f --- /dev/null +++ b/datasets/web-games/CURATION.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# Web Games — curation notes + +How this set was chosen, its licences and sources. The visitor-facing intro is [`README.md`](./README.md), which is published as the folder's Overview. + +A flat collection of **real, existing single-file HTML5 games**: each one is a webpage you drop into an `