From 5983fe33b6bb0ac2de7205dd103a739b069707ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 2 May 2026 08:39:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/36] Add automated security audit workflow --- .github/workflows/security.yml | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/security.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a8cfa8bf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +name: Security Audit + +permissions: + contents: read + +on: + push: + branches: ["main"] + pull_request: + schedule: + - cron: "17 4 * * 1" + workflow_dispatch: + +jobs: + dependency-audit: + name: Dependency audit + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + + - name: Install uv + uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 + with: + python-version: "3.13" + + - name: Run pip-audit + run: uvx pip-audit . --progress-spinner off + + static-analysis: + name: Static analysis + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + + - name: Install uv + uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 + with: + python-version: "3.13" + + - name: Run Bandit + # B602 is tracked in #2440; keep the baseline green until shell steps + # require explicit opt-in. + run: uvx bandit -r src -lll --skip B602 From c8f7c15b142d03c17afd1f7c46b71424bd266785 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 18:46:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/36] Address security audit review feedback --- .github/workflows/security.yml | 8 ++++---- CONTRIBUTING.md | 10 ++++++++++ src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py | 2 +- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 5a8cfa8bf9..52086fca20 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ jobs: python-version: "3.13" - name: Run pip-audit - run: uvx pip-audit . --progress-spinner off + run: | + uv export --quiet --extra test --frozen --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt + uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off static-analysis: name: Static analysis @@ -46,6 +48,4 @@ jobs: python-version: "3.13" - name: Run Bandit - # B602 is tracked in #2440; keep the baseline green until shell steps - # require explicit opt-in. - run: uvx bandit -r src -lll --skip B602 + run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 12b095f5fc..f7f93e5a39 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -95,6 +95,16 @@ uv run python -m pytest tests/test_agent_config_consistency.py -q Run this when you change agent metadata, context update scripts, or integration wiring. +#### Security checks + +```bash +uv export --quiet --extra test --frozen --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt +uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off +uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll +``` + +Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. The dependency audit uses the locked runtime and `test` extra dependency set used by CI and contributors. + ### Manual testing #### Testing setup diff --git a/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py index 8c62e4cfa8..05dbc8b788 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ def execute(self, config: dict[str, Any], context: StepContext) -> StepResult: try: proc = subprocess.run( run_cmd, - shell=True, + shell=True, # nosec B602 capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=cwd, From 9069cf14c0361da547dfee92d5e9e2344ed4b198 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 18:49:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/36] Add security workflow regression tests --- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_security_workflow.py diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92685340ea --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +"""Static checks for the GitHub Actions security workflow.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import re +from pathlib import Path + +import yaml + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent +SECURITY_WORKFLOW = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" / "security.yml" +CONTRIBUTING = REPO_ROOT / "CONTRIBUTING.md" + +AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = "/tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" +EXPORT_TEST_DEPS = ( + "uv export --quiet --extra test --frozen --format requirements.txt " + f"--no-emit-project --output-file {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" +) +PIP_AUDIT = ( + "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit " + f"-r {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" +) +BANDIT = "uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll" + + +def _load_security_workflow() -> dict: + return yaml.safe_load(SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + + +def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + for step in workflow["jobs"][job_name]["steps"]: + if step.get("name") == step_name: + return step["run"] + raise AssertionError(f"Step {step_name!r} not found in job {job_name!r}.") + + +class TestSecurityWorkflow: + """Guard the security workflow against review-feedback regressions.""" + + def test_dependency_audit_uses_locked_test_extra_export(self): + run = _step_run("dependency-audit", "Run pip-audit") + + assert EXPORT_TEST_DEPS in run + assert PIP_AUDIT in run + assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in run + + def test_security_tools_are_pinned(self): + workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + assert PIP_AUDIT in workflow_text + assert BANDIT in workflow_text + assert re.search(r"\buvx\s+pip-audit\b", workflow_text) is None + assert re.search(r"\buvx\s+bandit\b", workflow_text) is None + + def test_bandit_does_not_globally_skip_b602(self): + run = _step_run("static-analysis", "Run Bandit") + workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + assert run == BANDIT + assert "--skip" not in run + assert "--skip B602" not in workflow_text + + def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): + contributing_text = CONTRIBUTING.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + assert EXPORT_TEST_DEPS in contributing_text + assert PIP_AUDIT in contributing_text + assert BANDIT in contributing_text From 6c4fa71a4c667ecf0a3b46f57b4fe3f95dc02154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 22:17:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/36] Address follow-up security workflow review --- .github/bandit-baseline.json | 31 ++++++++++++ .github/workflows/security.yml | 4 +- CONTRIBUTING.md | 6 +-- .../workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py | 2 +- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 48 ++++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/bandit-baseline.json diff --git a/.github/bandit-baseline.json b/.github/bandit-baseline.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2c6a477879 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/bandit-baseline.json @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +{ + "results": [ + { + "code": "34 run_cmd,\n35 shell=True,\n36 capture_output=True,\n37 text=True,\n38 cwd=cwd,\n39 timeout=300,\n40 )\n41 output = {\n42 \"exit_code\": proc.returncode,\n43 \"stdout\": proc.stdout,\n", + "col_offset": 19, + "end_col_offset": 13, + "filename": "src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "issue_cwe": { + "id": 78, + "link": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html" + }, + "issue_severity": "HIGH", + "issue_text": "subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.", + "line_number": 35, + "line_range": [ + 33, + 34, + 35, + 36, + 37, + 38, + 39, + 40 + ], + "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/plugins/b602_subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true.html", + "test_id": "B602", + "test_name": "subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true" + } + ] +} diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 52086fca20..49a82df187 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs: - name: Run pip-audit run: | - uv export --quiet --extra test --frozen --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt + uv export --quiet --extra test --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off static-analysis: @@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ jobs: python-version: "3.13" - name: Run Bandit - run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll + run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index f7f93e5a39..05d62d1e60 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ Run this when you change agent metadata, context update scripts, or integration #### Security checks ```bash -uv export --quiet --extra test --frozen --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt +uv export --quiet --extra test --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off -uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll +uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json ``` -Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. The dependency audit uses the locked runtime and `test` extra dependency set used by CI and contributors. +Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. The dependency audit resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set used by CI and contributors. ### Manual testing diff --git a/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py index 05dbc8b788..8c62e4cfa8 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ def execute(self, config: dict[str, Any], context: StepContext) -> StepResult: try: proc = subprocess.run( run_cmd, - shell=True, # nosec B602 + shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=cwd, diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 92685340ea..2836a5d15d 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -2,26 +2,32 @@ from __future__ import annotations +import json import re from pathlib import Path +import pytest import yaml REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent SECURITY_WORKFLOW = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" / "security.yml" CONTRIBUTING = REPO_ROOT / "CONTRIBUTING.md" +BANDIT_BASELINE = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "bandit-baseline.json" AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = "/tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" -EXPORT_TEST_DEPS = ( - "uv export --quiet --extra test --frozen --format requirements.txt " +EXPORT_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( + "uv export --quiet --extra test --format requirements.txt " f"--no-emit-project --output-file {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) PIP_AUDIT = ( "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit " f"-r {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" ) -BANDIT = "uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll" +BANDIT = ( + "uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll " + "--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json" +) def _load_security_workflow() -> dict: @@ -39,11 +45,13 @@ def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: class TestSecurityWorkflow: """Guard the security workflow against review-feedback regressions.""" - def test_dependency_audit_uses_locked_test_extra_export(self): + def test_dependency_audit_uses_test_extra_export_without_lockfile_flags(self): run = _step_run("dependency-audit", "Run pip-audit") - assert EXPORT_TEST_DEPS in run + assert EXPORT_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in run assert PIP_AUDIT in run + assert "--frozen" not in run + assert "--locked" not in run assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in run def test_security_tools_are_pinned(self): @@ -61,10 +69,38 @@ def test_bandit_does_not_globally_skip_b602(self): assert run == BANDIT assert "--skip" not in run assert "--skip B602" not in workflow_text + assert "--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json" in run + + def test_bandit_baseline_only_ignores_shell_step_b602(self): + baseline = json.loads(BANDIT_BASELINE.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + results = baseline["results"] + + assert len(results) == 1 + assert results[0]["test_id"] == "B602" + assert ( + results[0]["filename"] + == "src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py" + ) + + def test_b602_is_not_suppressed_in_source(self): + source_text = "\n".join( + path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + for path in (REPO_ROOT / "src").rglob("*.py") + ) + + assert "# nosec B602" not in source_text + + def test_run_command_rejects_shell_true(self): + from specify_cli import run_command + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="shell=True"): + run_command(["echo", "hello"], shell=True) def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): contributing_text = CONTRIBUTING.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - assert EXPORT_TEST_DEPS in contributing_text + assert EXPORT_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text assert PIP_AUDIT in contributing_text assert BANDIT in contributing_text + assert "--frozen" not in contributing_text + assert "--locked" not in contributing_text From 337e081b9f92cdc9f7583f48fd4a37b30bda1722 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 22:26:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/36] Use compile for security audit requirements --- .github/workflows/security.yml | 2 +- CONTRIBUTING.md | 2 +- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 15 +++++++++------ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 49a82df187..b4b266b4f9 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs: - name: Run pip-audit run: | - uv export --quiet --extra test --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt + uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --quiet --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off static-analysis: diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 05d62d1e60..21f040fc7e 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Run this when you change agent metadata, context update scripts, or integration #### Security checks ```bash -uv export --quiet --extra test --format requirements.txt --no-emit-project --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt +uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --quiet --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json ``` diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 2836a5d15d..9d2532607d 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ BANDIT_BASELINE = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "bandit-baseline.json" AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = "/tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" -EXPORT_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( - "uv export --quiet --extra test --format requirements.txt " - f"--no-emit-project --output-file {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" +COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --quiet " + f"--output-file {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) PIP_AUDIT = ( "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit " @@ -45,13 +45,15 @@ def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: class TestSecurityWorkflow: """Guard the security workflow against review-feedback regressions.""" - def test_dependency_audit_uses_test_extra_export_without_lockfile_flags(self): + def test_dependency_audit_compiles_test_extra_requirements_without_lockfile(self): run = _step_run("dependency-audit", "Run pip-audit") - assert EXPORT_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in run + assert COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in run assert PIP_AUDIT in run + assert "uv export" not in run assert "--frozen" not in run assert "--locked" not in run + assert "uv.lock" not in run assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in run def test_security_tools_are_pinned(self): @@ -99,8 +101,9 @@ def test_run_command_rejects_shell_true(self): def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): contributing_text = CONTRIBUTING.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - assert EXPORT_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text + assert COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text assert PIP_AUDIT in contributing_text assert BANDIT in contributing_text + assert "uv export" not in contributing_text assert "--frozen" not in contributing_text assert "--locked" not in contributing_text From e73feb866ba808ddbe6166e71a5dec649f8b1c1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 22:45:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/36] Address latest security workflow review --- .github/workflows/security.yml | 17 ++++--- CONTRIBUTING.md | 6 +-- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index b4b266b4f9..fced205987 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -13,8 +13,13 @@ on: jobs: dependency-audit: - name: Dependency audit - runs-on: ubuntu-latest + name: Dependency audit (${{ matrix.os }}, Python ${{ matrix.python-version }}) + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + strategy: + fail-fast: false + matrix: + os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest] + python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"] steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 @@ -22,15 +27,15 @@ jobs: - name: Install uv uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 - - name: Set up Python + - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python-version }} uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 with: - python-version: "3.13" + python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }} - name: Run pip-audit run: | - uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --quiet --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt - uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off + uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" + uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" --progress-spinner off static-analysis: name: Static analysis diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 21f040fc7e..e21576d253 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ Run this when you change agent metadata, context update scripts, or integration #### Security checks ```bash -uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --quiet --output-file /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt -uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit -r /tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off +uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt +uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json ``` -Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. The dependency audit resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set used by CI and contributors. +Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. The dependency audit resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set used by CI and contributors. CI runs the dependency audit across the supported Python and OS matrix; locally, run these commands from the environment you want to reproduce. ### Manual testing diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 9d2532607d..0d4c90f807 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -15,14 +15,24 @@ CONTRIBUTING = REPO_ROOT / "CONTRIBUTING.md" BANDIT_BASELINE = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "bandit-baseline.json" -AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = "/tmp/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" -COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( - "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --quiet " - f"--output-file {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" +WORKFLOW_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = '"${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt"' +LOCAL_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = "spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" +WORKFLOW_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test " + '--python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --generate-hashes --quiet ' + f"--output-file {WORKFLOW_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) -PIP_AUDIT = ( - "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit " - f"-r {AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" +LOCAL_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --generate-hashes --quiet " + f"--output-file {LOCAL_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" +) +WORKFLOW_PIP_AUDIT = ( + "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes " + f"-r {WORKFLOW_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" +) +LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT = ( + "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes " + f"-r {LOCAL_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" ) BANDIT = ( "uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll " @@ -45,25 +55,52 @@ def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: class TestSecurityWorkflow: """Guard the security workflow against review-feedback regressions.""" - def test_dependency_audit_compiles_test_extra_requirements_without_lockfile(self): + def test_dependency_audit_compiles_test_extra_requirements(self): run = _step_run("dependency-audit", "Run pip-audit") - assert COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in run - assert PIP_AUDIT in run + assert WORKFLOW_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in run + assert WORKFLOW_PIP_AUDIT in run + assert "--generate-hashes" in run + assert "--require-hashes" in run + assert "--disable-pip" in run + assert "${{ runner.temp }}" in run assert "uv export" not in run assert "--frozen" not in run assert "--locked" not in run assert "uv.lock" not in run + assert "/tmp/" not in run assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in run + def test_dependency_audit_runs_supported_python_os_matrix(self): + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + matrix = workflow["jobs"]["dependency-audit"]["strategy"]["matrix"] + + assert matrix["os"] == ["ubuntu-latest", "windows-latest"] + assert matrix["python-version"] == ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"] + assert workflow["jobs"]["dependency-audit"]["runs-on"] == "${{ matrix.os }}" + def test_security_tools_are_pinned(self): workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - assert PIP_AUDIT in workflow_text + assert WORKFLOW_PIP_AUDIT in workflow_text assert BANDIT in workflow_text assert re.search(r"\buvx\s+pip-audit\b", workflow_text) is None assert re.search(r"\buvx\s+bandit\b", workflow_text) is None + def test_actions_are_pinned_to_full_commit_shas(self): + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + uses_refs = [ + step["uses"] + for job in workflow["jobs"].values() + for step in job["steps"] + if "uses" in step + ] + + assert uses_refs + for uses_ref in uses_refs: + assert re.search(r"@[0-9a-f]{40}$", uses_ref), uses_ref + assert re.search(r"@v\d+", uses_ref) is None + def test_bandit_does_not_globally_skip_b602(self): run = _step_run("static-analysis", "Run Bandit") workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") @@ -84,13 +121,17 @@ def test_bandit_baseline_only_ignores_shell_step_b602(self): == "src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py" ) - def test_b602_is_not_suppressed_in_source(self): - source_text = "\n".join( - path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - for path in (REPO_ROOT / "src").rglob("*.py") - ) + def test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source(self): + nosec_lines = [] + for path in (REPO_ROOT / "src").rglob("*.py"): + for line_number, line in enumerate( + path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines(), + start=1, + ): + if re.search(r"#\s*nosec\b", line, flags=re.IGNORECASE): + nosec_lines.append(f"{path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}:{line_number}") - assert "# nosec B602" not in source_text + assert nosec_lines == [] def test_run_command_rejects_shell_true(self): from specify_cli import run_command @@ -101,9 +142,10 @@ def test_run_command_rejects_shell_true(self): def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): contributing_text = CONTRIBUTING.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - assert COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text - assert PIP_AUDIT in contributing_text + assert LOCAL_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text + assert LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT in contributing_text assert BANDIT in contributing_text + assert "/tmp/" not in contributing_text assert "uv export" not in contributing_text assert "--frozen" not in contributing_text assert "--locked" not in contributing_text From 163b93af6b4af3fa6e86544acb55b0b855b78a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 23:33:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/36] Address latest security audit review --- .github/security-audit-requirements.txt | 320 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ .github/workflows/security.yml | 12 +- CONTRIBUTING.md | 9 +- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 123 ++++++--- 4 files changed, 426 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/security-audit-requirements.txt diff --git a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f15ab00c67 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +# This file was autogenerated by uv via the following command: +# uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt +annotated-doc==0.0.4 \ + --hash=sha256:571ac1dc6991c450b25a9c2d84a3705e2ae7a53467b5d111c24fa8baabbed320 \ + --hash=sha256:fbcda96e87e9c92ad167c2e53839e57503ecfda18804ea28102353485033faa4 + # via typer +click==8.3.3 \ + --hash=sha256:398329ad4837b2ff7cbe1dd166a4c0f8900c3ca3a218de04466f38f6497f18a2 \ + --hash=sha256:a2bf429bb3033c89fa4936ffb35d5cb471e3719e1f3c8a7c3fff0b8314305613 + # via + # specify-cli (pyproject.toml) + # typer +colorama==0.4.6 ; sys_platform == 'win32' \ + --hash=sha256:08695f5cb7ed6e0531a20572697297273c47b8cae5a63ffc6d6ed5c201be6e44 \ + --hash=sha256:4f1d9991f5acc0ca119f9d443620b77f9d6b33703e51011c16baf57afb285fc6 + # via + # click + # pytest +coverage==7.13.5 \ + --hash=sha256:012d5319e66e9d5a218834642d6c35d265515a62f01157a45bcc036ecf947256 \ + --hash=sha256:02ca0eed225b2ff301c474aeeeae27d26e2537942aa0f87491d3e147e784a82b \ + --hash=sha256:03ccc709a17a1de074fb1d11f217342fb0d2b1582ed544f554fc9fc3f07e95f5 \ + --hash=sha256:0428cbef5783ad91fe240f673cc1f76b25e74bbfe1a13115e4aa30d3f538162d \ + --hash=sha256:04690832cbea4e4663d9149e05dba142546ca05cb1848816760e7f58285c970a \ + --hash=sha256:0590e44dd2745c696a778f7bab6aa95256de2cbc8b8cff4f7db8ff09813d6969 \ + --hash=sha256:0672854dc733c342fa3e957e0605256d2bf5934feeac328da9e0b5449634a642 \ + --hash=sha256:084b84a8c63e8d6fc7e3931b316a9bcafca1458d753c539db82d31ed20091a87 \ + --hash=sha256:0b67af5492adb31940ee418a5a655c28e48165da5afab8c7fa6fd72a142f8740 \ + --hash=sha256:0cd9ed7a8b181775459296e402ca4fb27db1279740a24e93b3b41942ebe4b215 \ + --hash=sha256:0cef0cdec915d11254a7f549c1170afecce708d30610c6abdded1f74e581666d \ + --hash=sha256:0e223ce4b4ed47f065bfb123687686512e37629be25cc63728557ae7db261422 \ + --hash=sha256:0e3c426ffc4cd952f54ee9ffbdd10345709ecc78a3ecfd796a57236bfad0b9b8 \ + --hash=sha256:0ecf12ecb326fe2c339d93fc131816f3a7367d223db37817208905c89bded911 \ + --hash=sha256:10a0c37f0b646eaff7cce1874c31d1f1ccb297688d4c747291f4f4c70741cc8b \ + --hash=sha256:145ede53ccbafb297c1c9287f788d1bc3efd6c900da23bf6931b09eafc931587 \ + --hash=sha256:1b11eef33edeae9d142f9b4358edb76273b3bfd30bc3df9a4f95d0e49caf94e8 \ + --hash=sha256:1b88c69c8ef5d4b6fe7dea66d6636056a0f6a7527c440e890cf9259011f5e606 \ + --hash=sha256:258354455f4e86e3e9d0d17571d522e13b4e1e19bf0f8596bcf9476d61e7d8a9 \ + --hash=sha256:259b69bb83ad9894c4b25be2528139eecba9a82646ebdda2d9db1ba28424a6bf \ + --hash=sha256:2aa055ae1857258f9e0045be26a6d62bdb47a72448b62d7b55f4820f361a2633 \ + --hash=sha256:2d3807015f138ffea1ed9afeeb8624fd781703f2858b62a8dd8da5a0994c57b6 \ + --hash=sha256:301e3b7dfefecaca37c9f1aa6f0049b7d4ab8dd933742b607765d757aca77d43 \ + --hash=sha256:32ca0c0114c9834a43f045a87dcebd69d108d8ffb666957ea65aa132f50332e2 \ + --hash=sha256:34b02417cf070e173989b3db962f7ed56d2f644307b2cf9d5a0f258e13084a61 \ + --hash=sha256:356e76b46783a98c2a2fe81ec79df4883a1e62895ea952968fb253c114e7f930 \ + --hash=sha256:35a31f2b1578185fbe6aa2e74cea1b1d0bbf4c552774247d9160d29b80ed56cc \ + --hash=sha256:380e8e9084d8eb38db3a9176a1a4f3c0082c3806fa0dc882d1d87abc3c789247 \ + --hash=sha256:3ad050321264c49c2fa67bb599100456fc51d004b82534f379d16445da40fb75 \ + --hash=sha256:3e1bb5f6c78feeb1be3475789b14a0f0a5b47d505bfc7267126ccbd50289999e \ + --hash=sha256:3f4818d065964db3c1c66dc0fbdac5ac692ecbc875555e13374fdbe7eedb4376 \ + --hash=sha256:460cf0114c5016fa841214ff5564aa4864f11948da9440bc97e21ad1f4ba1e01 \ + --hash=sha256:48c39bc4a04d983a54a705a6389512883d4a3b9862991b3617d547940e9f52b1 \ + --hash=sha256:4b59148601efcd2bac8c4dbf1f0ad6391693ccf7a74b8205781751637076aee3 \ + --hash=sha256:4d2afbc5cc54d286bfb54541aa50b64cdb07a718227168c87b9e2fb8f25e1743 \ + --hash=sha256:505d7083c8b0c87a8fa8c07370c285847c1f77739b22e299ad75a6af6c32c5c9 \ + --hash=sha256:52f444e86475992506b32d4e5ca55c24fc88d73bcbda0e9745095b28ef4dc0cf \ + --hash=sha256:5b13955d31d1633cf9376908089b7cebe7d15ddad7aeaabcbe969a595a97e95e \ + --hash=sha256:5ec4af212df513e399cf11610cc27063f1586419e814755ab362e50a85ea69c1 \ + --hash=sha256:60365289c3741e4db327e7baff2a4aaacf22f788e80fa4683393891b70a89fbd \ + --hash=sha256:631efb83f01569670a5e866ceb80fe483e7c159fac6f167e6571522636104a0b \ + --hash=sha256:6697e29b93707167687543480a40f0db8f356e86d9f67ddf2e37e2dfd91a9dab \ + --hash=sha256:66a80c616f80181f4d643b0f9e709d97bcea413ecd9631e1dedc7401c8e6695d \ + --hash=sha256:67e9bc5449801fad0e5dff329499fb090ba4c5800b86805c80617b4e29809b2a \ + --hash=sha256:68a4953be99b17ac3c23b6efbc8a38330d99680c9458927491d18700ef23ded0 \ + --hash=sha256:6c36ddb64ed9d7e496028d1d00dfec3e428e0aabf4006583bb1839958d280510 \ + --hash=sha256:6e3370441f4513c6252bf042b9c36d22491142385049243253c7e48398a15a9f \ + --hash=sha256:7034b5c56a58ae5e85f23949d52c14aca2cfc6848a31764995b7de88f13a1ea0 \ + --hash=sha256:704de6328e3d612a8f6c07000a878ff38181ec3263d5a11da1db294fa6a9bdf8 \ + --hash=sha256:7132bed4bd7b836200c591410ae7d97bf7ae8be6fc87d160b2bd881df929e7bf \ + --hash=sha256:7300c8a6d13335b29bb76d7651c66af6bd8658517c43499f110ddc6717bfc209 \ + --hash=sha256:750db93a81e3e5a9831b534be7b1229df848b2e125a604fe6651e48aa070e5f9 \ + --hash=sha256:777c4d1eff1b67876139d24288aaf1817f6c03d6bae9c5cc8d27b83bcfe38fe3 \ + --hash=sha256:78e696e1cc714e57e8b25760b33a8b1026b7048d270140d25dafe1b0a1ee05a3 \ + --hash=sha256:79060214983769c7ba3f0cee10b54c97609dca4d478fa1aa32b914480fd5738d \ + --hash=sha256:7c8d4bc913dd70b93488d6c496c77f3aff5ea99a07e36a18f865bca55adef8bd \ + --hash=sha256:7f2c47b36fe7709a6e83bfadf4eefb90bd25fbe4014d715224c4316f808e59a2 \ + --hash=sha256:800bc829053c80d240a687ceeb927a94fd108bbdc68dfbe505d0d75ab578a882 \ + --hash=sha256:843ea8643cf967d1ac7e8ecd4bb00c99135adf4816c0c0593fdcc47b597fcf09 \ + --hash=sha256:8769751c10f339021e2638cd354e13adeac54004d1941119b2c96fe5276d45ea \ + --hash=sha256:8dd02af98971bdb956363e4827d34425cb3df19ee550ef92855b0acb9c7ce51c \ + --hash=sha256:8fdf453a942c3e4d99bd80088141c4c6960bb232c409d9c3558e2dbaa3998562 \ + --hash=sha256:941617e518602e2d64942c88ec8499f7fbd49d3f6c4327d3a71d43a1973032f3 \ + --hash=sha256:972a9cd27894afe4bc2b1480107054e062df08e671df7c2f18c205e805ccd806 \ + --hash=sha256:9adb6688e3b53adffefd4a52d72cbd8b02602bfb8f74dcd862337182fd4d1a4e \ + --hash=sha256:9b74db26dfea4f4e50d48a4602207cd1e78be33182bc9cbf22da94f332f99878 \ + --hash=sha256:9bb2a28101a443669a423b665939381084412b81c3f8c0fcfbac57f4e30b5b8e \ + --hash=sha256:9d44d7aa963820b1b971dbecd90bfe5fe8f81cff79787eb6cca15750bd2f79b9 \ + --hash=sha256:9dacc2ad679b292709e0f5fc1ac74a6d4d5562e424058962c7bb0c658ad25e45 \ + --hash=sha256:9ddb4f4a5479f2539644be484da179b653273bca1a323947d48ab107b3ed1f29 \ + --hash=sha256:a1a6d79a14e1ec1832cabc833898636ad5f3754a678ef8bb4908515208bf84f4 \ + --hash=sha256:a698e363641b98843c517817db75373c83254781426e94ada3197cabbc2c919c \ + --hash=sha256:ad14385487393e386e2ea988b09d62dd42c397662ac2dabc3832d71253eee479 \ + --hash=sha256:ad146744ca4fd09b50c482650e3c1b1f4dfa1d4792e0a04a369c7f23336f0400 \ + --hash=sha256:b5db73ba3c41c7008037fa731ad5459fc3944cb7452fc0aa9f822ad3533c583c \ + --hash=sha256:bd3a2fbc1c6cccb3c5106140d87cc6a8715110373ef42b63cf5aea29df8c217a \ + --hash=sha256:bdba0a6b8812e8c7df002d908a9a2ea3c36e92611b5708633c50869e6d922fdf \ + --hash=sha256:be3d4bbad9d4b037791794ddeedd7d64a56f5933a2c1373e18e9e568b9141686 \ + --hash=sha256:bf69236a9a81bdca3bff53796237aab096cdbf8d78a66ad61e992d9dac7eb2de \ + --hash=sha256:bff95879c33ec8da99fc9b6fe345ddb5be6414b41d6d1ad1c8f188d26f36e028 \ + --hash=sha256:c555b48be1853fe3997c11c4bd521cdd9a9612352de01fa4508f16ec341e6fe0 \ + --hash=sha256:c81f6515c4c40141f83f502b07bbfa5c240ba25bbe73da7b33f1e5b6120ff179 \ + --hash=sha256:c9136ff29c3a91e25b1d1552b5308e53a1e0653a23e53b6366d7c2dcbbaf8a16 \ + --hash=sha256:ce1998c0483007608c8382f4ff50164bfc5bd07a2246dd272aa4043b75e61e85 \ + --hash=sha256:cec2d83125531bd153175354055cdb7a09987af08a9430bd173c937c6d0fba2a \ + --hash=sha256:cff784eef7f0b8f6cb28804fbddcfa99f89efe4cc35fb5627e3ac58f91ed3ac0 \ + --hash=sha256:d2c87e0c473a10bffe991502eac389220533024c8082ec1ce849f4218dded810 \ + --hash=sha256:d7cfad2d6d81dd298ab6b89fe72c3b7b05ec7544bdda3b707ddaecff8d25c161 \ + --hash=sha256:d8a7a2049c14f413163e2bdabd37e41179b1d1ccb10ffc6ccc4b7a718429c607 \ + --hash=sha256:da305e9937617ee95c2e39d8ff9f040e0487cbf1ac174f777ed5eddd7a7c1f26 \ + --hash=sha256:da86cdcf10d2519e10cabb8ac2de03da1bcb6e4853790b7fbd48523332e3a819 \ + --hash=sha256:dc022073d063b25a402454e5712ef9e007113e3a676b96c5f29b2bda29352f40 \ + --hash=sha256:e0723d2c96324561b9aa76fb982406e11d93cdb388a7a7da2b16e04719cf7ca5 \ + --hash=sha256:e092b9499de38ae0fbfbc603a74660eb6ff3e869e507b50d85a13b6db9863e15 \ + --hash=sha256:e0b216a19534b2427cc201a26c25da4a48633f29a487c61258643e89d28200c0 \ + --hash=sha256:e1c85e0b6c05c592ea6d8768a66a254bfb3874b53774b12d4c89c481eb78cb90 \ + --hash=sha256:e301d30dd7e95ae068671d746ba8c34e945a82682e62918e41b2679acd2051a0 \ + --hash=sha256:e808af52a0513762df4d945ea164a24b37f2f518cbe97e03deaa0ee66139b4d6 \ + --hash=sha256:eb07647a5738b89baab047f14edd18ded523de60f3b30e75c2acc826f79c839a \ + --hash=sha256:eb7fdf1ef130660e7415e0253a01a7d5a88c9c4d158bcf75cbbd922fd65a5b58 \ + --hash=sha256:ec10e2a42b41c923c2209b846126c6582db5e43a33157e9870ba9fb70dc7854b \ + --hash=sha256:ee2aa19e03161671ec964004fb74b2257805d9710bf14a5c704558b9d8dbaf17 \ + --hash=sha256:f08fd75c50a760c7eb068ae823777268daaf16a80b918fa58eea888f8e3919f5 \ + --hash=sha256:f4cd16206ad171cbc2470dbea9103cf9a7607d5fe8c242fdf1edf36174020664 \ + --hash=sha256:f70c9ab2595c56f81a89620e22899eea8b212a4041bd728ac6f4a28bf5d3ddd0 \ + --hash=sha256:fbabfaceaeb587e16f7008f7795cd80d20ec548dc7f94fbb0d4ec2e038ce563f + # via pytest-cov +iniconfig==2.3.0 \ + --hash=sha256:c76315c77db068650d49c5b56314774a7804df16fee4402c1f19d6d15d8c4730 \ + --hash=sha256:f631c04d2c48c52b84d0d0549c99ff3859c98df65b3101406327ecc7d53fbf12 + # via pytest +json5==0.14.0 \ + --hash=sha256:56cf861bab076b1178eb8c92e1311d273a9b9acea2ccc82c276abf839ebaef3a \ + --hash=sha256:b3f492fad9f6cdbced8b7d40b28b9b1c9701c5f561bef0d33b81c2ff433fefcb + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) +markdown-it-py==4.0.0 \ + --hash=sha256:87327c59b172c5011896038353a81343b6754500a08cd7a4973bb48c6d578147 \ + --hash=sha256:cb0a2b4aa34f932c007117b194e945bd74e0ec24133ceb5bac59009cda1cb9f3 + # via rich +mdurl==0.1.2 \ + --hash=sha256:84008a41e51615a49fc9966191ff91509e3c40b939176e643fd50a5c2196b8f8 \ + --hash=sha256:bb413d29f5eea38f31dd4754dd7377d4465116fb207585f97bf925588687c1ba + # via markdown-it-py +packaging==26.2 \ + --hash=sha256:5fc45236b9446107ff2415ce77c807cee2862cb6fac22b8a73826d0693b0980e \ + --hash=sha256:ff452ff5a3e828ce110190feff1178bb1f2ea2281fa2075aadb987c2fb221661 + # via + # specify-cli (pyproject.toml) + # pytest +pathspec==1.1.1 \ + --hash=sha256:17db5ecd524104a120e173814c90367a96a98d07c45b2e10c2f3919fff91bf5a \ + --hash=sha256:a00ce642f577bf7f473932318056212bc4f8bfdf53128c78bbd5af0b9b20b189 + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) +platformdirs==4.9.6 \ + --hash=sha256:3bfa75b0ad0db84096ae777218481852c0ebc6c727b3168c1b9e0118e458cf0a \ + --hash=sha256:e61adb1d5e5cb3441b4b7710bea7e4c12250ca49439228cc1021c00dcfac0917 + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) +pluggy==1.6.0 \ + --hash=sha256:7dcc130b76258d33b90f61b658791dede3486c3e6bfb003ee5c9bfb396dd22f3 \ + --hash=sha256:e920276dd6813095e9377c0bc5566d94c932c33b27a3e3945d8389c374dd4746 + # via + # pytest + # pytest-cov +pygments==2.20.0 \ + --hash=sha256:6757cd03768053ff99f3039c1a36d6c0aa0b263438fcab17520b30a303a82b5f \ + --hash=sha256:81a9e26dd42fd28a23a2d169d86d7ac03b46e2f8b59ed4698fb4785f946d0176 + # via + # pytest + # rich +pytest==9.0.3 \ + --hash=sha256:2c5efc453d45394fdd706ade797c0a81091eccd1d6e4bccfcd476e2b8e0ab5d9 \ + --hash=sha256:b86ada508af81d19edeb213c681b1d48246c1a91d304c6c81a427674c17eb91c + # via + # specify-cli (pyproject.toml) + # pytest-cov +pytest-cov==7.1.0 \ + --hash=sha256:30674f2b5f6351aa09702a9c8c364f6a01c27aae0c1366ae8016160d1efc56b2 \ + --hash=sha256:a0461110b7865f9a271aa1b51e516c9a95de9d696734a2f71e3e78f46e1d4678 + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) +pyyaml==6.0.3 \ + --hash=sha256:00c4bdeba853cc34e7dd471f16b4114f4162dc03e6b7afcc2128711f0eca823c \ + --hash=sha256:0150219816b6a1fa26fb4699fb7daa9caf09eb1999f3b70fb6e786805e80375a \ + --hash=sha256:02893d100e99e03eda1c8fd5c441d8c60103fd175728e23e431db1b589cf5ab3 \ + --hash=sha256:02ea2dfa234451bbb8772601d7b8e426c2bfa197136796224e50e35a78777956 \ + --hash=sha256:0f29edc409a6392443abf94b9cf89ce99889a1dd5376d94316ae5145dfedd5d6 \ + --hash=sha256:10892704fc220243f5305762e276552a0395f7beb4dbf9b14ec8fd43b57f126c \ + --hash=sha256:16249ee61e95f858e83976573de0f5b2893b3677ba71c9dd36b9cf8be9ac6d65 \ + --hash=sha256:1d37d57ad971609cf3c53ba6a7e365e40660e3be0e5175fa9f2365a379d6095a \ + --hash=sha256:1ebe39cb5fc479422b83de611d14e2c0d3bb2a18bbcb01f229ab3cfbd8fee7a0 \ + --hash=sha256:214ed4befebe12df36bcc8bc2b64b396ca31be9304b8f59e25c11cf94a4c033b \ + --hash=sha256:2283a07e2c21a2aa78d9c4442724ec1eb15f5e42a723b99cb3d822d48f5f7ad1 \ + --hash=sha256:22ba7cfcad58ef3ecddc7ed1db3409af68d023b7f940da23c6c2a1890976eda6 \ + --hash=sha256:27c0abcb4a5dac13684a37f76e701e054692a9b2d3064b70f5e4eb54810553d7 \ + --hash=sha256:28c8d926f98f432f88adc23edf2e6d4921ac26fb084b028c733d01868d19007e \ + --hash=sha256:2e71d11abed7344e42a8849600193d15b6def118602c4c176f748e4583246007 \ + --hash=sha256:34d5fcd24b8445fadc33f9cf348c1047101756fd760b4dacb5c3e99755703310 \ + --hash=sha256:37503bfbfc9d2c40b344d06b2199cf0e96e97957ab1c1b546fd4f87e53e5d3e4 \ + --hash=sha256:3c5677e12444c15717b902a5798264fa7909e41153cdf9ef7ad571b704a63dd9 \ + --hash=sha256:3ff07ec89bae51176c0549bc4c63aa6202991da2d9a6129d7aef7f1407d3f295 \ + --hash=sha256:41715c910c881bc081f1e8872880d3c650acf13dfa8214bad49ed4cede7c34ea \ + --hash=sha256:418cf3f2111bc80e0933b2cd8cd04f286338bb88bdc7bc8e6dd775ebde60b5e0 \ + --hash=sha256:44edc647873928551a01e7a563d7452ccdebee747728c1080d881d68af7b997e \ + --hash=sha256:4a2e8cebe2ff6ab7d1050ecd59c25d4c8bd7e6f400f5f82b96557ac0abafd0ac \ + --hash=sha256:4ad1906908f2f5ae4e5a8ddfce73c320c2a1429ec52eafd27138b7f1cbe341c9 \ + --hash=sha256:501a031947e3a9025ed4405a168e6ef5ae3126c59f90ce0cd6f2bfc477be31b7 \ + --hash=sha256:5190d403f121660ce8d1d2c1bb2ef1bd05b5f68533fc5c2ea899bd15f4399b35 \ + --hash=sha256:5498cd1645aa724a7c71c8f378eb29ebe23da2fc0d7a08071d89469bf1d2defb \ + --hash=sha256:5cf4e27da7e3fbed4d6c3d8e797387aaad68102272f8f9752883bc32d61cb87b \ + --hash=sha256:5e0b74767e5f8c593e8c9b5912019159ed0533c70051e9cce3e8b6aa699fcd69 \ + --hash=sha256:5ed875a24292240029e4483f9d4a4b8a1ae08843b9c54f43fcc11e404532a8a5 \ + --hash=sha256:5fcd34e47f6e0b794d17de1b4ff496c00986e1c83f7ab2fb8fcfe9616ff7477b \ + --hash=sha256:5fdec68f91a0c6739b380c83b951e2c72ac0197ace422360e6d5a959d8d97b2c \ + --hash=sha256:6344df0d5755a2c9a276d4473ae6b90647e216ab4757f8426893b5dd2ac3f369 \ + --hash=sha256:64386e5e707d03a7e172c0701abfb7e10f0fb753ee1d773128192742712a98fd \ + --hash=sha256:652cb6edd41e718550aad172851962662ff2681490a8a711af6a4d288dd96824 \ + --hash=sha256:66291b10affd76d76f54fad28e22e51719ef9ba22b29e1d7d03d6777a9174198 \ + --hash=sha256:66e1674c3ef6f541c35191caae2d429b967b99e02040f5ba928632d9a7f0f065 \ + --hash=sha256:6adc77889b628398debc7b65c073bcb99c4a0237b248cacaf3fe8a557563ef6c \ + --hash=sha256:79005a0d97d5ddabfeeea4cf676af11e647e41d81c9a7722a193022accdb6b7c \ + --hash=sha256:7c6610def4f163542a622a73fb39f534f8c101d690126992300bf3207eab9764 \ + --hash=sha256:7f047e29dcae44602496db43be01ad42fc6f1cc0d8cd6c83d342306c32270196 \ + --hash=sha256:8098f252adfa6c80ab48096053f512f2321f0b998f98150cea9bd23d83e1467b \ + --hash=sha256:850774a7879607d3a6f50d36d04f00ee69e7fc816450e5f7e58d7f17f1ae5c00 \ + --hash=sha256:8d1fab6bb153a416f9aeb4b8763bc0f22a5586065f86f7664fc23339fc1c1fac \ + --hash=sha256:8da9669d359f02c0b91ccc01cac4a67f16afec0dac22c2ad09f46bee0697eba8 \ + --hash=sha256:8dc52c23056b9ddd46818a57b78404882310fb473d63f17b07d5c40421e47f8e \ + --hash=sha256:9149cad251584d5fb4981be1ecde53a1ca46c891a79788c0df828d2f166bda28 \ + --hash=sha256:93dda82c9c22deb0a405ea4dc5f2d0cda384168e466364dec6255b293923b2f3 \ + --hash=sha256:96b533f0e99f6579b3d4d4995707cf36df9100d67e0c8303a0c55b27b5f99bc5 \ + --hash=sha256:9c57bb8c96f6d1808c030b1687b9b5fb476abaa47f0db9c0101f5e9f394e97f4 \ + --hash=sha256:9c7708761fccb9397fe64bbc0395abcae8c4bf7b0eac081e12b809bf47700d0b \ + --hash=sha256:9f3bfb4965eb874431221a3ff3fdcddc7e74e3b07799e0e84ca4a0f867d449bf \ + --hash=sha256:a33284e20b78bd4a18c8c2282d549d10bc8408a2a7ff57653c0cf0b9be0afce5 \ + --hash=sha256:a80cb027f6b349846a3bf6d73b5e95e782175e52f22108cfa17876aaeff93702 \ + --hash=sha256:b30236e45cf30d2b8e7b3e85881719e98507abed1011bf463a8fa23e9c3e98a8 \ + --hash=sha256:b3bc83488de33889877a0f2543ade9f70c67d66d9ebb4ac959502e12de895788 \ + --hash=sha256:b865addae83924361678b652338317d1bd7e79b1f4596f96b96c77a5a34b34da \ + --hash=sha256:b8bb0864c5a28024fac8a632c443c87c5aa6f215c0b126c449ae1a150412f31d \ + --hash=sha256:ba1cc08a7ccde2d2ec775841541641e4548226580ab850948cbfda66a1befcdc \ + --hash=sha256:bdb2c67c6c1390b63c6ff89f210c8fd09d9a1217a465701eac7316313c915e4c \ + --hash=sha256:c1ff362665ae507275af2853520967820d9124984e0f7466736aea23d8611fba \ + --hash=sha256:c2514fceb77bc5e7a2f7adfaa1feb2fb311607c9cb518dbc378688ec73d8292f \ + --hash=sha256:c3355370a2c156cffb25e876646f149d5d68f5e0a3ce86a5084dd0b64a994917 \ + --hash=sha256:c458b6d084f9b935061bc36216e8a69a7e293a2f1e68bf956dcd9e6cbcd143f5 \ + --hash=sha256:d0eae10f8159e8fdad514efdc92d74fd8d682c933a6dd088030f3834bc8e6b26 \ + --hash=sha256:d76623373421df22fb4cf8817020cbb7ef15c725b9d5e45f17e189bfc384190f \ + --hash=sha256:ebc55a14a21cb14062aa4162f906cd962b28e2e9ea38f9b4391244cd8de4ae0b \ + --hash=sha256:eda16858a3cab07b80edaf74336ece1f986ba330fdb8ee0d6c0d68fe82bc96be \ + --hash=sha256:ee2922902c45ae8ccada2c5b501ab86c36525b883eff4255313a253a3160861c \ + --hash=sha256:efd7b85f94a6f21e4932043973a7ba2613b059c4a000551892ac9f1d11f5baf3 \ + --hash=sha256:f7057c9a337546edc7973c0d3ba84ddcdf0daa14533c2065749c9075001090e6 \ + --hash=sha256:fa160448684b4e94d80416c0fa4aac48967a969efe22931448d853ada8baf926 \ + --hash=sha256:fc09d0aa354569bc501d4e787133afc08552722d3ab34836a80547331bb5d4a0 + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) +readchar==4.2.2 \ + --hash=sha256:92daf7e42c52b0787e6c75d01ecfb9a94f4ceff3764958b570c1dddedd47b200 \ + --hash=sha256:e3b270fe16fc90c50ac79107700330a133dd4c63d22939f5b03b4f24564d5dd8 + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) +rich==15.0.0 \ + --hash=sha256:33bd4ef74232fb73fe9279a257718407f169c09b78a87ad3d296f548e27de0bb \ + --hash=sha256:edd07a4824c6b40189fb7ac9bc4c52536e9780fbbfbddf6f1e2502c31b068c36 + # via + # specify-cli (pyproject.toml) + # typer +shellingham==1.5.4 \ + --hash=sha256:7ecfff8f2fd72616f7481040475a65b2bf8af90a56c89140852d1120324e8686 \ + --hash=sha256:8dbca0739d487e5bd35ab3ca4b36e11c4078f3a234bfce294b0a0291363404de + # via typer +tomli==2.4.1 ; python_full_version <= '3.11' \ + --hash=sha256:01f520d4f53ef97964a240a035ec2a869fe1a37dde002b57ebc4417a27ccd853 \ + --hash=sha256:0d85819802132122da43cb86656f8d1f8c6587d54ae7dcaf30e90533028b49fe \ + --hash=sha256:136443dbd7e1dee43c68ac2694fde36b2849865fa258d39bf822c10e8068eac5 \ + --hash=sha256:1d8591993e228b0c930c4bb0db464bdad97b3289fb981255d6c9a41aedc84b2d \ + --hash=sha256:2190f2e9dd7508d2a90ded5ed369255980a1bcdd58e52f7fe24b8162bf9fedbd \ + --hash=sha256:2c1c351919aca02858f740c6d33adea0c5deea37f9ecca1cc1ef9e884a619d26 \ + --hash=sha256:36d2bd2ad5fb9eaddba5226aa02c8ec3fa4f192631e347b3ed28186d43be6b54 \ + --hash=sha256:3d48a93ee1c9b79c04bb38772ee1b64dcf18ff43085896ea460ca8dec96f35f6 \ + --hash=sha256:47149d5bd38761ac8be13a84864bf0b7b70bc051806bc3669ab1cbc56216b23c \ + --hash=sha256:4ab97e64ccda8756376892c53a72bd1f964e519c77236368527f758fbc36a53a \ + --hash=sha256:4b605484e43cdc43f0954ddae319fb75f04cc10dd80d830540060ee7cd0243cd \ + --hash=sha256:504aa796fe0569bb43171066009ead363de03675276d2d121ac1a4572397870f \ + --hash=sha256:51529d40e3ca50046d7606fa99ce3956a617f9b36380da3b7f0dd3dd28e68cb5 \ + --hash=sha256:52c8ef851d9a240f11a88c003eacb03c31fc1c9c4ec64a99a0f922b93874fda9 \ + --hash=sha256:559db847dc486944896521f68d8190be1c9e719fced785720d2216fe7022b662 \ + --hash=sha256:5a881ab208c0baf688221f8cecc5401bd291d67e38a1ac884d6736cbcd8247e9 \ + --hash=sha256:5cb41aa38891e073ee49d55fbc7839cfdb2bc0e600add13874d048c94aadddd1 \ + --hash=sha256:5e262d41726bc187e69af7825504c933b6794dc3fbd5945e41a79bb14c31f585 \ + --hash=sha256:5ee18d9ebdb417e384b58fe414e8d6af9f4e7a0ae761519fb50f721de398dd4e \ + --hash=sha256:7008df2e7655c495dd12d2a4ad038ff878d4ca4b81fccaf82b714e07eae4402c \ + --hash=sha256:734e20b57ba95624ecf1841e72b53f6e186355e216e5412de414e3c51e5e3c41 \ + --hash=sha256:7c7e1a961a0b2f2472c1ac5b69affa0ae1132c39adcb67aba98568702b9cc23f \ + --hash=sha256:7f86fd587c4ed9dd76f318225e7d9b29cfc5a9d43de44e5754db8d1128487085 \ + --hash=sha256:7f94b27a62cfad8496c8d2513e1a222dd446f095fca8987fceef261225538a15 \ + --hash=sha256:88dceee75c2c63af144e456745e10101eb67361050196b0b6af5d717254dddf7 \ + --hash=sha256:8a650c2dbafa08d42e51ba0b62740dae4ecb9338eefa093aa5c78ceb546fcd5c \ + --hash=sha256:8d65a2fbf9d2f8352685bc1364177ee3923d6baf5e7f43ea4959d7d8bc326a36 \ + --hash=sha256:96481a5786729fd470164b47cdb3e0e58062a496f455ee41b4403be77cb5a076 \ + --hash=sha256:a120733b01c45e9a0c34aeef92bf0cf1d56cfe81ed9d47d562f9ed591a9828ac \ + --hash=sha256:b1d22e6e9387bf4739fbe23bfa80e93f6b0373a7f1b96c6227c32bef95a4d7a8 \ + --hash=sha256:b8c198f8c1805dc42708689ed6864951fd2494f924149d3e4bce7710f8eb5232 \ + --hash=sha256:c2541745709bad0264b7d4705ad453b76ccd191e64aa6f0fc66b69a293a45ece \ + --hash=sha256:c742f741d58a28940ce01d58f0ab2ea3ced8b12402f162f4d534dfe18ba1cd6a \ + --hash=sha256:c7f2c7f2b9ca6bdeef8f0fa897f8e05085923eb091721675170254cbc5b02897 \ + --hash=sha256:d312ef37c91508b0ab2cee7da26ec0b3ed2f03ce12bd87a588d771ae15dcf82d \ + --hash=sha256:d4d8fe59808a54658fcc0160ecfb1b30f9089906c50b23bcb4c69eddc19ec2b4 \ + --hash=sha256:da25dc3563bff5965356133435b757a795a17b17d01dbc0f42fb32447ddfd917 \ + --hash=sha256:eab21f45c7f66c13f2a9e0e1535309cee140182a9cdae1e041d02e47291e8396 \ + --hash=sha256:eb0dc4e38e6a1fd579e5d50369aa2e10acfc9cace504579b2faabb478e76941a \ + --hash=sha256:ec9bfaf3ad2df51ace80688143a6a4ebc09a248f6ff781a9945e51937008fcbc \ + --hash=sha256:ede3e6487c5ef5d28634ba3f31f989030ad6af71edfb0055cbbd14189ff240ba \ + --hash=sha256:f3c6818a1a86dd6dca7ddcaaf76947d5ba31aecc28cb1b67009a5877c9a64f3f \ + --hash=sha256:f758f1b9299d059cc3f6546ae2af89670cb1c4d48ea29c3cacc4fe7de3058257 \ + --hash=sha256:f8f0fc26ec2cc2b965b7a3b87cd19c5c6b8c5e5f436b984e85f486d652285c30 \ + --hash=sha256:fd0409a3653af6c147209d267a0e4243f0ae46b011aa978b1080359fddc9b6cf \ + --hash=sha256:ff18e6a727ee0ab0388507b89d1bc6a22b138d1e2fa56d1ad494586d61d2eae9 \ + --hash=sha256:ff2983983d34813c1aeb0fa89091e76c3a22889ee83ab27c5eeb45100560c049 + # via coverage +typer==0.25.1 \ + --hash=sha256:75caa44ed46a03fb2dab8808753ffacdbfea88495e74c85a28c5eefcf5f39c89 \ + --hash=sha256:9616eb8853a09ffeabab1698952f33c6f29ffdbceb4eaeecf571880e8d7664cc + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index fced205987..f09e5812a5 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -32,10 +32,18 @@ jobs: with: python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }} - - name: Run pip-audit + - name: Compile scheduled audit requirements + if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} run: | uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" - uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" --progress-spinner off + + - name: Run pip-audit (scheduled live resolution) + if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} + run: uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" --progress-spinner off + + - name: Run pip-audit (committed requirements) + if: ${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }} + run: uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r .github/security-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off static-analysis: name: Static analysis diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index e21576d253..2a29e67238 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -98,12 +98,15 @@ Run this when you change agent metadata, context update scripts, or integration #### Security checks ```bash -uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt -uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off +uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r .github/security-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json ``` -Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. The dependency audit resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set used by CI and contributors. CI runs the dependency audit across the supported Python and OS matrix; locally, run these commands from the environment you want to reproduce. +Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. Pull request, push, and manual CI audits use the committed hashed requirements file so they stay deterministic. The scheduled CI audit also resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set across the supported Python and OS matrix to catch newly published advisories. If dependency metadata changes, refresh the committed audit input before running pip-audit: + +```bash +uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt +``` ### Manual testing diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 0d4c90f807..60152a91db 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ from __future__ import annotations +import inspect import json import re from pathlib import Path -import pytest import yaml @@ -14,25 +14,26 @@ SECURITY_WORKFLOW = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" / "security.yml" CONTRIBUTING = REPO_ROOT / "CONTRIBUTING.md" BANDIT_BASELINE = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "bandit-baseline.json" +SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "security-audit-requirements.txt" -WORKFLOW_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = '"${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt"' -LOCAL_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = "spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" -WORKFLOW_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( +WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = '"${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt"' +COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = ".github/security-audit-requirements.txt" +WORKFLOW_COMPILE_SCHEDULED_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test " '--python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --generate-hashes --quiet ' - f"--output-file {WORKFLOW_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" + f"--output-file {WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) -LOCAL_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( - "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --generate-hashes --quiet " - f"--output-file {LOCAL_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" +LOCAL_REFRESH_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes " + f"--quiet --output-file {COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) -WORKFLOW_PIP_AUDIT = ( +WORKFLOW_LIVE_PIP_AUDIT = ( "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes " - f"-r {WORKFLOW_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" + f"-r {WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" ) LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT = ( "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes " - f"-r {LOCAL_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" + f"-r {COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" ) BANDIT = ( "uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll " @@ -44,32 +45,70 @@ def _load_security_workflow() -> dict: return yaml.safe_load(SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) -def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: +def _workflow_triggers() -> dict: + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + return workflow.get("on") or workflow[True] + + +def _step(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> dict: workflow = _load_security_workflow() for step in workflow["jobs"][job_name]["steps"]: if step.get("name") == step_name: - return step["run"] + return step raise AssertionError(f"Step {step_name!r} not found in job {job_name!r}.") +def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: + return _step(job_name, step_name)["run"] + + class TestSecurityWorkflow: """Guard the security workflow against review-feedback regressions.""" - def test_dependency_audit_compiles_test_extra_requirements(self): - run = _step_run("dependency-audit", "Run pip-audit") - - assert WORKFLOW_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in run - assert WORKFLOW_PIP_AUDIT in run - assert "--generate-hashes" in run - assert "--require-hashes" in run - assert "--disable-pip" in run - assert "${{ runner.temp }}" in run - assert "uv export" not in run - assert "--frozen" not in run - assert "--locked" not in run - assert "uv.lock" not in run - assert "/tmp/" not in run - assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in run + def test_dependency_audit_uses_committed_requirements_for_prs_and_pushes(self): + scheduled_compile = _step( + "dependency-audit", + "Compile scheduled audit requirements", + ) + scheduled_audit = _step( + "dependency-audit", + "Run pip-audit (scheduled live resolution)", + ) + committed_audit = _step( + "dependency-audit", + "Run pip-audit (committed requirements)", + ) + + assert scheduled_compile["if"] == "${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }}" + assert WORKFLOW_COMPILE_SCHEDULED_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in scheduled_compile["run"] + assert scheduled_audit["if"] == "${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }}" + assert scheduled_audit["run"] == WORKFLOW_LIVE_PIP_AUDIT + assert committed_audit["if"] == "${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }}" + assert committed_audit["run"] == LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT + + dependency_job_text = "\n".join( + step.get("run", "") + for step in _load_security_workflow()["jobs"]["dependency-audit"]["steps"] + ) + assert "--generate-hashes" in dependency_job_text + assert "--require-hashes" in dependency_job_text + assert "--disable-pip" in dependency_job_text + assert WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS in dependency_job_text + assert COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS in dependency_job_text + assert "uv export" not in dependency_job_text + assert "--frozen" not in dependency_job_text + assert "--locked" not in dependency_job_text + assert "uv.lock" not in dependency_job_text + assert "/tmp/" not in dependency_job_text + assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in dependency_job_text + + def test_security_workflow_triggers_are_preserved(self): + triggers = _workflow_triggers() + + assert triggers["push"]["branches"] == ["main"] + assert triggers["pull_request"] is None + assert triggers["workflow_dispatch"] is None + assert triggers["schedule"] == [{"cron": "17 4 * * 1"}] def test_dependency_audit_runs_supported_python_os_matrix(self): workflow = _load_security_workflow() @@ -82,7 +121,8 @@ def test_dependency_audit_runs_supported_python_os_matrix(self): def test_security_tools_are_pinned(self): workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - assert WORKFLOW_PIP_AUDIT in workflow_text + assert WORKFLOW_LIVE_PIP_AUDIT in workflow_text + assert LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT in workflow_text assert BANDIT in workflow_text assert re.search(r"\buvx\s+pip-audit\b", workflow_text) is None assert re.search(r"\buvx\s+bandit\b", workflow_text) is None @@ -133,19 +173,36 @@ def test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source(self): assert nosec_lines == [] - def test_run_command_rejects_shell_true(self): + def test_run_command_does_not_accept_shell_argument(self): from specify_cli import run_command - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="shell=True"): - run_command(["echo", "hello"], shell=True) + assert "shell" not in inspect.signature(run_command).parameters + + def test_committed_audit_requirements_are_hashed(self): + requirements = SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + assert "--hash=sha256:" in requirements + assert "pytest==" in requirements + assert "pytest-cov==" in requirements def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): contributing_text = CONTRIBUTING.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - assert LOCAL_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text + assert LOCAL_REFRESH_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in contributing_text assert LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT in contributing_text assert BANDIT in contributing_text assert "/tmp/" not in contributing_text assert "uv export" not in contributing_text assert "--frozen" not in contributing_text assert "--locked" not in contributing_text + assert ( + re.search( + r"--output-file\s+spec-kit-audit-requirements\.txt\b", + contributing_text, + ) + is None + ) + assert ( + re.search(r"-r\s+spec-kit-audit-requirements\.txt\b", contributing_text) + is None + ) From c802a49db3e43148a6a2d20276695b93a66b6384 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 00:05:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/36] Harden security-sensitive repository surfaces --- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 173 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/specify_cli/_github_http.py | 18 ++- src/specify_cli/agents.py | 14 +- src/specify_cli/extensions.py | 54 +++++--- src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py | 51 +++++--- src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py | 116 ++++++++--------- tests/test_download_security.py | 82 ++++++++++++ tests/test_extensions.py | 91 ++++++++++++- tests/test_github_workflows.py | 32 +++++ tests/test_presets.py | 81 ++++++++++++ tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py | 25 ++++ 11 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/specify_cli/_download_security.py create mode 100644 tests/test_download_security.py create mode 100644 tests/test_github_workflows.py diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37f92749d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +"""Helpers for bounded downloads and archive extraction.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import hashlib +import re +import stat +import zipfile +from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath +from typing import TypeVar + + +ErrorT = TypeVar("ErrorT", bound=Exception) + +MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 +MAX_ZIP_ENTRIES = 512 +MAX_ZIP_MEMBER_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024 +MAX_ZIP_TOTAL_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 +READ_CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024 +SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$") + + +def _raise(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str) -> None: + raise error_type(message) + + +def read_response_limited( + response, + *, + max_bytes: int = MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, + error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError, + label: str = "download", +) -> bytes: + """Read at most *max_bytes* from a response object.""" + data = response.read(max_bytes + 1) + if len(data) > max_bytes: + _raise(error_type, f"{label} exceeds maximum size of {max_bytes} bytes") + return data + + +def normalize_sha256(value: object, *, error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError) -> str | None: + """Normalize an optional sha256/sha256: checksum value.""" + if value is None: + return None + if not isinstance(value, str): + _raise(error_type, "sha256 checksum must be a string") + + checksum = value.strip() + if checksum.startswith("sha256:"): + checksum = checksum[len("sha256:") :] + if not SHA256_RE.fullmatch(checksum): + _raise(error_type, "sha256 checksum must be 64 hexadecimal characters") + return checksum.lower() + + +def verify_sha256( + data: bytes, + expected: object, + *, + error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError, + label: str = "download", +) -> None: + """Verify *data* against an optional sha256 checksum.""" + checksum = normalize_sha256(expected, error_type=error_type) + if checksum is None: + return + + actual = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest() + if actual != checksum: + _raise( + error_type, + f"{label} checksum mismatch: expected sha256:{checksum}, got sha256:{actual}", + ) + + +def _safe_zip_name(name: str, *, error_type: type[ErrorT]) -> str: + """Return a normalized ZIP member name or raise on traversal.""" + if "\x00" in name: + _raise(error_type, f"Unsafe path in ZIP archive: {name!r}") + + normalized = name.replace("\\", "/") + path = PurePosixPath(normalized) + has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:/", normalized) is not None + if ( + not path.parts + or path.is_absolute() + or has_windows_drive + or any(part == ".." for part in path.parts) + ): + _raise( + error_type, + f"Unsafe path in ZIP archive: {name} (potential path traversal)", + ) + return normalized + + +def safe_extract_zip( + zip_path: Path, + target_dir: Path, + *, + error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError, + max_entries: int = MAX_ZIP_ENTRIES, + max_member_bytes: int = MAX_ZIP_MEMBER_BYTES, + max_total_bytes: int = MAX_ZIP_TOTAL_BYTES, +) -> None: + """Extract a ZIP archive after path, symlink, and size validation.""" + target_root = target_dir.resolve() + + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf: + members = zf.infolist() + if len(members) > max_entries: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP archive contains too many entries ({len(members)} > {max_entries})", + ) + + normalized_members: list[tuple[zipfile.ZipInfo, str]] = [] + total_size = 0 + for member in members: + normalized_name = _safe_zip_name(member.filename, error_type=error_type) + + mode = member.external_attr >> 16 + if stat.S_ISLNK(mode): + _raise(error_type, f"Unsafe symlink in ZIP archive: {member.filename}") + + member_path = (target_dir / normalized_name).resolve() + try: + member_path.relative_to(target_root) + except ValueError: + _raise( + error_type, + f"Unsafe path in ZIP archive: {member.filename} " + "(potential path traversal)", + ) + + if not member.is_dir(): + if member.file_size > max_member_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP member {member.filename} exceeds maximum size " + f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes", + ) + total_size += member.file_size + if total_size > max_total_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP archive exceeds maximum uncompressed size " + f"of {max_total_bytes} bytes", + ) + + normalized_members.append((member, normalized_name)) + + for member, normalized_name in normalized_members: + member_path = target_dir / normalized_name + if member.is_dir(): + member_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + continue + + member_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + written = 0 + with zf.open(member, "r") as source, member_path.open("wb") as dest: + while True: + chunk = source.read(READ_CHUNK_SIZE) + if not chunk: + break + written += len(chunk) + if written > max_member_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP member {member.filename} exceeds maximum size " + f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes", + ) + dest.write(chunk) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_github_http.py b/src/specify_cli/_github_http.py index d2030b57a8..e9a5f7a4b1 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_github_http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_github_http.py @@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ def resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( import json import urllib.error + from specify_cli._download_security import ( + MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, + read_response_limited, + ) + parsed = urlparse(download_url) parts = [unquote(part) for part in parsed.path.strip("/").split("/")] @@ -118,8 +123,17 @@ def resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( try: with open_url_fn(release_url, timeout=timeout) as response: - release_data = json.loads(response.read()) - except (urllib.error.URLError, json.JSONDecodeError): + release_data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + response, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, + label=f"GitHub release metadata {release_url}", + ) + ) + # ValueError covers both an oversized body (raised by read_response_limited) + # and json.JSONDecodeError (a ValueError subclass); on any of these, fall + # back to the original URL by returning None. + except (urllib.error.URLError, ValueError): return None for asset in release_data.get("assets", []): diff --git a/src/specify_cli/agents.py b/src/specify_cli/agents.py index 3c06418014..2d115cd87a 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/agents.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/agents.py @@ -545,8 +545,20 @@ def register_commands( cmd_name = cmd_info["name"] aliases = cmd_info.get("aliases", []) cmd_file = cmd_info["file"] + if not isinstance(cmd_file, str) or not cmd_file.strip(): + raise ValueError( + f"Command source file for {cmd_name!r} must be a non-empty string" + ) - source_file = source_dir / cmd_file + try: + source_root = source_dir.resolve() + source_file = (source_root / cmd_file).resolve() + source_file.relative_to(source_root) + except (OSError, ValueError): + raise ValueError( + f"Command source file {cmd_file!r} escapes directory " + f"{source_dir!r}" + ) from None if not source_file.exists(): continue diff --git a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py index 29b49b8d27..ef4ee483f5 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import re import shutil import tempfile -import zipfile from dataclasses import dataclass from datetime import datetime, timezone from pathlib import Path @@ -26,6 +25,12 @@ from packaging import version as pkg_version from packaging.specifiers import InvalidSpecifier, SpecifierSet +from ._download_security import ( + MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + read_response_limited, + safe_extract_zip, + verify_sha256, +) from ._init_options import is_ai_skills_enabled from ._invocation_style import is_slash_skills_agent from ._utils import dump_frontmatter @@ -1472,21 +1477,7 @@ def install_from_zip( with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: temp_path = Path(tmpdir) - # Extract ZIP safely (prevent Zip Slip attack) - with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf: - # Validate all paths first before extracting anything - temp_path_resolved = temp_path.resolve() - for member in zf.namelist(): - member_path = (temp_path / member).resolve() - # Use is_relative_to for safe path containment check - try: - member_path.relative_to(temp_path_resolved) - except ValueError: - raise ValidationError( - f"Unsafe path in ZIP archive: {member} (potential path traversal)" - ) - # Only extract after all paths are validated - zf.extractall(temp_path) + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, temp_path, error_type=ValidationError) # Find extension directory (may be nested) extension_dir = temp_path @@ -2212,7 +2203,14 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( # Fetch from network try: with self._open_url(entry.url, timeout=10) as response: - catalog_data = json.loads(response.read()) + catalog_data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + response, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + error_type=ExtensionError, + label=f"extension catalog {entry.url}", + ) + ) self._validate_catalog_payload(catalog_data, entry.url) @@ -2389,7 +2387,14 @@ def fetch_catalog(self, force_refresh: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]: import urllib.error with self._open_url(catalog_url, timeout=10) as response: - catalog_data = json.loads(response.read()) + catalog_data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + response, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + error_type=ExtensionError, + label=f"extension catalog {catalog_url}", + ) + ) # Validate catalog structure. Reuses the same helper as # ``_fetch_single_catalog`` so all three branches (root type, @@ -2565,7 +2570,18 @@ def download_extension( with self._open_url( download_url, timeout=60, extra_headers=extra_headers ) as response: - zip_data = response.read() + zip_data = read_response_limited( + response, + error_type=ExtensionError, + label=f"extension '{extension_id}' download", + ) + + verify_sha256( + zip_data, + ext_info.get("sha256"), + error_type=ExtensionError, + label=f"extension '{extension_id}' download", + ) zip_path.write_bytes(zip_data) return zip_path diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py index f8b9bac698..87dc85401d 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import hashlib import os import tempfile -import zipfile import shutil from dataclasses import dataclass from pathlib import Path @@ -27,6 +26,12 @@ from packaging import version as pkg_version from packaging.specifiers import SpecifierSet, InvalidSpecifier +from .._download_security import ( + MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + read_response_limited, + safe_extract_zip, + verify_sha256, +) from ..extensions import REINSTALL_COMMAND, ExtensionRegistry, normalize_priority from .._init_options import is_ai_skills_enabled from ..integrations.base import IntegrationBase @@ -1642,18 +1647,7 @@ def install_from_zip( with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: temp_path = Path(tmpdir) - with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'r') as zf: - temp_path_resolved = temp_path.resolve() - for member in zf.namelist(): - member_path = (temp_path / member).resolve() - try: - member_path.relative_to(temp_path_resolved) - except ValueError: - raise PresetValidationError( - f"Unsafe path in ZIP archive: {member} " - "(potential path traversal)" - ) - zf.extractall(temp_path) + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, temp_path, error_type=PresetValidationError) pack_dir = temp_path manifest_path = pack_dir / "preset.yml" @@ -2159,7 +2153,14 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog(self, entry: PresetCatalogEntry, force_refresh: bool = try: with self._open_url(entry.url, timeout=10) as response: - catalog_data = json.loads(response.read()) + catalog_data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + response, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + error_type=PresetError, + label=f"preset catalog {entry.url}", + ) + ) self._validate_catalog_payload(catalog_data, entry.url) @@ -2310,7 +2311,14 @@ def fetch_catalog(self, force_refresh: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]: try: with self._open_url(catalog_url, timeout=10) as response: - catalog_data = json.loads(response.read()) + catalog_data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + response, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + error_type=PresetError, + label=f"preset catalog {catalog_url}", + ) + ) # Validate catalog structure. Reuses the same helper as # ``_fetch_single_catalog`` so all three branches (root type, @@ -2499,7 +2507,18 @@ def download_pack( try: with self._open_url(download_url, timeout=60, extra_headers=extra_headers) as response: - zip_data = response.read() + zip_data = read_response_limited( + response, + error_type=PresetError, + label=f"preset '{pack_id}' download", + ) + + verify_sha256( + zip_data, + pack_info.get("sha256"), + error_type=PresetError, + label=f"preset '{pack_id}' download", + ) zip_path.write_bytes(zip_data) return zip_path diff --git a/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py b/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py index 97bf58a04e..f229269f0e 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py @@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ import yaml +from specify_cli._download_security import ( + MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + is_https_or_localhost_http, + read_response_limited, +) + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Errors @@ -155,20 +161,17 @@ def __init__(self, project_root: Path) -> None: def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (localhost HTTP allowed).""" - from urllib.parse import urlparse + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(url): + from urllib.parse import urlparse - parsed = urlparse(url) - is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") - if parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( - parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost - ): + parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise WorkflowValidationError( + "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + ) raise WorkflowValidationError( f"Catalog URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://). " - "HTTP is only allowed for localhost." - ) - if not parsed.hostname: - raise WorkflowValidationError( - "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) def _load_catalog_config( @@ -328,29 +331,27 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( pass # Fetch from URL — validate scheme before opening and after redirects - from urllib.parse import urlparse from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url - def _validate_catalog_url(url: str) -> None: - parsed = urlparse(url) - is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") - if parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( - parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost - ): - raise WorkflowCatalogError( - f"Refusing to fetch catalog from non-HTTPS URL: {url}" - ) - if not parsed.hostname: - raise WorkflowCatalogError( - f"Refusing to fetch catalog from URL with no hostname: {url}" - ) - - _validate_catalog_url(entry.url) + try: + self._validate_catalog_url(entry.url) + except WorkflowValidationError as exc: + raise WorkflowCatalogError(str(exc)) from exc try: - with _open_url(entry.url, timeout=30) as resp: - _validate_catalog_url(resp.geturl()) - data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) + with _open_url(entry.url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=True) as resp: + try: + self._validate_catalog_url(resp.geturl()) + except WorkflowValidationError as exc: + raise WorkflowCatalogError(str(exc)) from exc + data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + resp, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + error_type=WorkflowCatalogError, + label="workflow catalog", + ).decode("utf-8") + ) except Exception as exc: # Fall back to cache if available if cache_file.exists(): @@ -772,20 +773,17 @@ def _is_cache_path_safe(self) -> bool: def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (localhost HTTP allowed).""" - from urllib.parse import urlparse + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(url): + from urllib.parse import urlparse - parsed = urlparse(url) - is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") - if parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( - parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost - ): + parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise StepValidationError( + "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + ) raise StepValidationError( f"Catalog URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://). " - "HTTP is only allowed for localhost." - ) - if not parsed.hostname: - raise StepValidationError( - "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) def _load_catalog_config( @@ -945,29 +943,27 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( # Ignore invalid/unreadable cache and fall back to fetching from source. pass - from urllib.parse import urlparse from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url - def _validate_url(url: str) -> None: - parsed = urlparse(url) - is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") - if parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( - parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost - ): - raise StepCatalogError( - f"Refusing to fetch catalog from non-HTTPS URL: {url}" - ) - if not parsed.hostname: - raise StepCatalogError( - f"Refusing to fetch catalog from URL with no hostname: {url}" - ) - - _validate_url(entry.url) + try: + self._validate_catalog_url(entry.url) + except StepValidationError as exc: + raise StepCatalogError(str(exc)) from exc try: - with _open_url(entry.url, timeout=30) as resp: - _validate_url(resp.geturl()) - data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) + with _open_url(entry.url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=True) as resp: + try: + self._validate_catalog_url(resp.geturl()) + except StepValidationError as exc: + raise StepCatalogError(str(exc)) from exc + data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + resp, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, + error_type=StepCatalogError, + label="step catalog", + ).decode("utf-8") + ) except Exception as exc: if cache_safe and cache_file.exists(): try: diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac46486cfc --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +"""Tests for bounded download and ZIP extraction helpers.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import stat +import zipfile + +import pytest + +from specify_cli._download_security import ( + read_response_limited, + safe_extract_zip, + verify_sha256, +) + + +class _Response: + def __init__(self, data: bytes): + self.data = data + + def read(self, size: int = -1) -> bytes: + return self.data if size < 0 else self.data[:size] + + +def test_read_response_limited_rejects_oversized_download(): + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum size"): + read_response_limited(_Response(b"abcde"), max_bytes=4) + + +def test_verify_sha256_rejects_mismatch(): + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="checksum mismatch"): + verify_sha256(b"payload", "sha256:" + "0" * 64) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "member_name", + [ + "../evil.txt", + "nested/../../evil.txt", + "nested\\..\\evil.txt", + "C:\\Windows\\evil.txt", + ], +) +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_traversal(tmp_path, member_name): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr(member_name, "nope") + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsafe path"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out") + + +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_symlinks(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + info = zipfile.ZipInfo("link") + info.external_attr = (stat.S_IFLNK | 0o777) << 16 + + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr(info, "target") + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsafe symlink"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out") + + +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_oversized_member(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("big.txt", "abcde") + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum size"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_member_bytes=4) + + +def test_safe_extract_zip_extracts_safe_archive(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" + out_dir = tmp_path / "out" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("nested/file.txt", "hello") + + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, out_dir) + + assert (out_dir / "nested" / "file.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "hello" diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py index e063571b14..3d79328773 100644 --- a/tests/test_extensions.py +++ b/tests/test_extensions.py @@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ """ import pytest +import io import json +import hashlib import os import platform import tempfile @@ -377,6 +379,42 @@ def test_invalid_command_name(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data): with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="Invalid command name"): ExtensionManifest(manifest_path) + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bad_file", + [ + "../outside.md", + "/tmp/outside.md", + "commands/../../outside.md", + "C:\\Windows\\outside.md", + ], + ) + def test_invalid_command_file_path(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data, bad_file): + """Command files must stay inside the extension package.""" + import yaml + + valid_manifest_data["provides"]["commands"][0]["file"] = bad_file + + manifest_path = temp_dir / "extension.yml" + with open(manifest_path, "w") as f: + yaml.dump(valid_manifest_data, f) + + with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="Invalid command file path"): + ExtensionManifest(manifest_path) + + def test_windows_command_file_path_is_normalized(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data): + """Windows-authored manifests keep compatibility without traversal.""" + import yaml + + valid_manifest_data["provides"]["commands"][0]["file"] = "commands\\hello.md" + + manifest_path = temp_dir / "extension.yml" + with open(manifest_path, "w") as f: + yaml.dump(valid_manifest_data, f) + + manifest = ExtensionManifest(manifest_path) + + assert manifest.commands[0]["file"] == "commands/hello.md" + def test_command_name_autocorrect_speckit_prefix(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data): """Test that 'speckit.command' is auto-corrected to 'speckit.{ext_id}.command'.""" import yaml @@ -2470,7 +2508,8 @@ def test_unregister_skill_removes_parent_directory(self, project_dir, temp_dir): registrar = CommandRegistrar() from specify_cli.extensions import ExtensionManifest manifest = ExtensionManifest(ext_dir / "extension.yml") - registrar.register_commands_for_agent("codex", manifest, ext_dir, project_dir) + registered = registrar.register_commands_for_agent("codex", manifest, ext_dir, project_dir) + assert registered == ["speckit.cleanup-ext.run"] skill_subdir = skills_dir / "speckit-cleanup-ext-run" assert skill_subdir.exists(), "Skill subdirectory should exist after registration" @@ -3227,7 +3266,6 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_payload(self, temp_dir, payload) extension catalog must stay consistent. """ from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock - catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() @@ -3727,6 +3765,52 @@ def fake_open(req, timeout=None): assert captured[0].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer ghp_testtoken" assert captured[0].get_header("Accept") == "application/octet-stream" + def test_download_extension_verifies_sha256(self, temp_dir): + """Catalog-provided checksums are enforced when present.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) + zip_bytes = b"fake zip data" + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + ext_info = { + "id": "test-ext", + "name": "Test Extension", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https://example.com/test-ext.zip", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(zip_bytes).hexdigest(), + } + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_extension_info", return_value=ext_info), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + result = catalog.download_extension("test-ext", target_dir=temp_dir) + + assert result.read_bytes() == zip_bytes + + def test_download_extension_rejects_sha256_mismatch(self, temp_dir): + """A mismatched catalog checksum stops the downloaded ZIP being used.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.return_value = b"fake zip data" + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + ext_info = { + "id": "test-ext", + "name": "Test Extension", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https://example.com/test-ext.zip", + "sha256": "0" * 64, + } + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_extension_info", return_value=ext_info), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with pytest.raises(ExtensionError, match="checksum mismatch"): + catalog.download_extension("test-ext", target_dir=temp_dir) + # ===== CatalogEntry Tests ===== @@ -4900,7 +4984,6 @@ def test_download_extension_raises_for_bundled(self, temp_dir): def test_download_extension_allows_bundled_with_url(self, temp_dir): """download_extension should allow bundled extensions that have a download_url (newer version).""" from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock - import urllib.request project_dir = temp_dir / "project" project_dir.mkdir() @@ -4923,7 +5006,7 @@ def test_download_extension_allows_bundled_with_url(self, temp_dir): mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) with patch.object(catalog, "get_extension_info", return_value=bundled_with_url), \ - patch.object(urllib.request, "urlopen", return_value=mock_response): + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): result = catalog.download_extension("git") assert result.name == "git-2.0.0.zip" diff --git a/tests/test_github_workflows.py b/tests/test_github_workflows.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b21d3a40f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_github_workflows.py @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +"""Static checks for repository GitHub Actions workflows.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import re +from pathlib import Path + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent +WORKFLOWS_DIR = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" +USES_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*uses:\s*(?P\S+)", re.MULTILINE) + + +def test_github_actions_are_pinned_to_full_commit_shas(): + unpinned_refs = [] + + workflows = sorted( + list(WORKFLOWS_DIR.glob("*.yml")) + list(WORKFLOWS_DIR.glob("*.yaml")) + ) + assert workflows + + for workflow in workflows: + workflow_text = workflow.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + for match in USES_RE.finditer(workflow_text): + uses_ref = match.group("ref") + if uses_ref.startswith(("./", "../")): + continue + if re.search(r"@[0-9a-f]{40}$", uses_ref): + continue + unpinned_refs.append(f"{workflow.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}: {uses_ref}") + + assert unpinned_refs == [] diff --git a/tests/test_presets.py b/tests/test_presets.py index de6054d99c..36cbcf0a6c 100644 --- a/tests/test_presets.py +++ b/tests/test_presets.py @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import pytest import io import json +import hashlib import tempfile import shutil import warnings @@ -291,6 +292,38 @@ def test_invalid_template_name_format(self, temp_dir, valid_pack_data): with pytest.raises(PresetValidationError, match="Invalid template name"): PresetManifest(manifest_path) + @pytest.mark.parametrize( + "bad_file", + [ + "../outside.md", + "/tmp/outside.md", + "templates/../../outside.md", + "C:\\Windows\\outside.md", + ], + ) + def test_invalid_template_file_path(self, temp_dir, valid_pack_data, bad_file): + """Template files must stay inside the preset package.""" + valid_pack_data["provides"]["templates"][0]["file"] = bad_file + manifest_path = temp_dir / "preset.yml" + with open(manifest_path, "w") as f: + yaml.dump(valid_pack_data, f) + + with pytest.raises(PresetValidationError, match="Invalid template file path"): + PresetManifest(manifest_path) + + def test_windows_template_file_path_is_normalized(self, temp_dir, valid_pack_data): + """Windows-authored manifests keep compatibility without traversal.""" + valid_pack_data["provides"]["templates"][0]["file"] = ( + "templates\\spec-template.md" + ) + manifest_path = temp_dir / "preset.yml" + with open(manifest_path, "w") as f: + yaml.dump(valid_pack_data, f) + + manifest = PresetManifest(manifest_path) + + assert manifest.templates[0]["file"] == "templates/spec-template.md" + def test_get_hash(self, pack_dir): """Test manifest hash calculation.""" manifest = PresetManifest(pack_dir / "preset.yml") @@ -2038,6 +2071,54 @@ def fake_open(req, timeout=None): assert captured[0].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer ghp_testtoken" assert captured[0].get_header("Accept") == "application/octet-stream" + def test_download_pack_verifies_sha256(self, project_dir): + """Catalog-provided checksums are enforced when present.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + zip_bytes = b"fake zip data" + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + pack_info = { + "id": "test-pack", + "name": "Test Pack", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https://example.com/test-pack.zip", + "sha256": hashlib.sha256(zip_bytes).hexdigest(), + "_install_allowed": True, + } + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_pack_info", return_value=pack_info), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + result = catalog.download_pack("test-pack", target_dir=project_dir) + + assert result.read_bytes() == zip_bytes + + def test_download_pack_rejects_sha256_mismatch(self, project_dir): + """A mismatched catalog checksum stops the downloaded ZIP being used.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.return_value = b"fake zip data" + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + pack_info = { + "id": "test-pack", + "name": "Test Pack", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https://example.com/test-pack.zip", + "sha256": "0" * 64, + "_install_allowed": True, + } + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_pack_info", return_value=pack_info), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with pytest.raises(PresetError, match="checksum mismatch"): + catalog.download_pack("test-pack", target_dir=project_dir) + # ===== Integration Tests ===== diff --git a/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py b/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py index fc423b4056..006daa89e8 100644 --- a/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py +++ b/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py @@ -121,6 +121,31 @@ def test_copilot_rejects_traversal_in_alias(self, tmp_path, bad_alias): _assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_alias).name.replace("/", "")) +class TestSourceFileTraversal: + """Command source files must stay inside the declared source directory.""" + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_file", TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS) + def test_rejects_traversal_in_command_source_file(self, tmp_path, bad_file): + project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path) + (project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True) + + registrar = CommandRegistrar() + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escapes directory"): + registrar.register_commands( + "gemini", + [ + { + "name": "speckit.myext.ok", + "file": bad_file, + "aliases": [], + } + ], + "myext", + ext_dir, + project, + ) + + class TestCopilotPromptTraversal: """`write_copilot_prompt` is a public static method — guard it directly.""" From 279035e0662e2862bf883a96b1c2c7d8eda33634 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 06:46:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/36] Address remaining security review feedback --- .../scripts/check_security_requirements.py | 101 +++++++++ .github/security-audit-requirements.txt | 2 - .github/workflows/security.yml | 10 + CONTRIBUTING.md | 2 +- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 27 ++- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 4 +- src/specify_cli/_version.py | 9 +- .../authentication/azure_devops.py | 9 +- src/specify_cli/extensions.py | 20 +- src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py | 9 +- src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py | 14 +- src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py | 15 +- .../integrations/test_integration_catalog.py | 48 ++++- tests/test_download_security.py | 40 ++++ tests/test_extensions.py | 44 +++- tests/test_presets.py | 42 ++++ tests/test_security_workflow.py | 192 +++++++++++++++++- 17 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py b/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6834ee42bf --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +"""Check that committed security audit requirements are up to date.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] +COMMITTED_REQUIREMENTS = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "security-audit-requirements.txt" +DEPENDENCY_INPUTS = ("pyproject.toml", ".github/security-audit-requirements.txt") + + +def _dependency_diff_refs() -> tuple[str, str]: + base_ref = os.environ.get("DEPENDENCY_DIFF_BASE", "").strip() + head_ref = os.environ.get("DEPENDENCY_DIFF_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" + if base_ref and not set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: + return base_ref, head_ref + return "HEAD^", "HEAD" + + +def _dependency_inputs_changed() -> bool: + base_ref, head_ref = _dependency_diff_refs() + try: + result = subprocess.run( + [ + "git", + "diff", + "--name-only", + base_ref, + head_ref, + "--", + *DEPENDENCY_INPUTS, + ], + check=True, + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + text=True, + ) + except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc: + print( + "Could not determine changed dependency inputs; checking requirements.", + file=sys.stderr, + ) + if exc.stderr: + print(exc.stderr.strip(), file=sys.stderr) + return True + + changed_inputs = [line for line in result.stdout.splitlines() if line] + if not changed_inputs: + print("Dependency audit inputs unchanged; sync check skipped.") + return False + + print(f"Dependency audit inputs changed: {', '.join(changed_inputs)}") + return True + + +def main() -> int: + if not _dependency_inputs_changed(): + return 0 + + generated_requirements = Path(os.environ["GENERATED_REQUIREMENTS"]) + generated_requirements.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + + subprocess.run( + [ + "uv", + "pip", + "compile", + "pyproject.toml", + "--extra", + "test", + "--universal", + "--generate-hashes", + "--quiet", + "--no-header", + "--output-file", + str(generated_requirements), + ], + check=True, + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + ) + + committed = COMMITTED_REQUIREMENTS.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + generated = generated_requirements.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + if committed == generated: + return 0 + + print( + "Regenerate .github/security-audit-requirements.txt with the documented " + "uv pip compile command.", + file=sys.stderr, + ) + return 1 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt index f15ab00c67..d97b84d2cd 100644 --- a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt +++ b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt @@ -1,5 +1,3 @@ -# This file was autogenerated by uv via the following command: -# uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt annotated-doc==0.0.4 \ --hash=sha256:571ac1dc6991c450b25a9c2d84a3705e2ae7a53467b5d111c24fa8baabbed320 \ --hash=sha256:fbcda96e87e9c92ad167c2e53839e57503ecfda18804ea28102353485033faa4 diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index f09e5812a5..8a0058c073 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ jobs: steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + with: + fetch-depth: 2 - name: Install uv uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 @@ -41,6 +43,14 @@ jobs: if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} run: uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" --progress-spinner off + - name: Check committed audit requirements are current + if: ${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }} + env: + DEPENDENCY_DIFF_BASE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha || github.event.before || '' }} + DEPENDENCY_DIFF_HEAD: ${{ github.sha }} + GENERATED_REQUIREMENTS: ${{ runner.temp }}/security-audit-requirements.txt + run: python .github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py + - name: Run pip-audit (committed requirements) if: ${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }} run: uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes -r .github/security-audit-requirements.txt --progress-spinner off diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 2a29e67238..beb723cb81 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.j Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. Pull request, push, and manual CI audits use the committed hashed requirements file so they stay deterministic. The scheduled CI audit also resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set across the supported Python and OS matrix to catch newly published advisories. If dependency metadata changes, refresh the committed audit input before running pip-audit: ```bash -uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt +uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --quiet --no-header --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt ``` ### Manual testing diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index e2d0bfb0b9..ccd4390d29 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -1022,15 +1022,19 @@ def extension_add( zip_path = download_dir / f"{extension}-url-download.zip" try: + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url with _open_url(from_url, timeout=60) as response: - zip_data = response.read() + zip_data = _read_response_limited( + response, + label=f"extension {safe_url}", + ) zip_path.write_bytes(zip_data) # Install from downloaded ZIP manifest = manager.install_from_zip(zip_path, speckit_version, priority=priority, force=force) - except urllib.error.URLError as e: + except (urllib.error.URLError, ValueError) as e: console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] Failed to download from {safe_url}: {e}") raise typer.Exit(1) finally: @@ -2463,6 +2467,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: if source.startswith("http://") or source.startswith("https://"): from ipaddress import ip_address from urllib.parse import urlparse + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url parsed_src = urlparse(source) @@ -2503,7 +2508,12 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] URL redirected to non-HTTPS: {final_url}") raise typer.Exit(1) with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".yml", delete=False) as tmp: - tmp.write(resp.read()) + tmp.write( + _read_response_limited( + resp, + label=f"workflow {source}", + ) + ) tmp_path = Path(tmp.name) except typer.Exit: raise @@ -2586,6 +2596,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: try: from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url as _resolve_gh_asset + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited _wf_cat_extra_headers = None _resolved_workflow_url = _resolve_gh_asset(workflow_url, _open_url, timeout=30) @@ -2614,7 +2625,12 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' redirected to non-HTTPS URL: {final_url}" ) raise typer.Exit(1) - workflow_file.write_bytes(response.read()) + workflow_file.write_bytes( + _read_response_limited( + response, + label=f"workflow '{source}' download", + ) + ) except Exception as exc: if workflow_dir.exists(): import shutil @@ -3038,6 +3054,7 @@ def workflow_step_add( raise typer.Exit(1) from urllib.parse import urlparse + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url def _safe_fetch(url: str) -> bytes: @@ -3057,7 +3074,7 @@ def _safe_fetch(url: str) -> bytes: raise ValueError(f"Redirect to non-HTTPS URL: {final_url}") if not final_parsed.hostname: raise ValueError(f"Redirect to URL with no hostname: {final_url}") - return resp.read() + return _read_response_limited(resp, label=f"workflow step {url}") _validate_step_id_or_exit(step_id) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index 37f92749d4..cc47c4bb1d 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ ErrorT = TypeVar("ErrorT", bound=Exception) MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 +MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 +MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024 MAX_ZIP_ENTRIES = 512 MAX_ZIP_MEMBER_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024 MAX_ZIP_TOTAL_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 @@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ def _safe_zip_name(name: str, *, error_type: type[ErrorT]) -> str: normalized = name.replace("\\", "/") path = PurePosixPath(normalized) - has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:/", normalized) is not None + has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized) is not None if ( not path.parts or path.is_absolute() diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_version.py b/src/specify_cli/_version.py index e634a4f286..b2b6b4cc06 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_version.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_version.py @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ def _fetch_latest_release_tag() -> tuple[str | None, str | None]: On anything else — including a malformed response body — the exception propagates; there is no catch-all (research D-006). """ + from ._download_security import MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, read_response_limited from .authentication.http import open_url try: @@ -119,7 +120,13 @@ def _fetch_latest_release_tag() -> tuple[str | None, str | None]: timeout=5, extra_headers={"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"}, ) as resp: - payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) + payload = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + resp, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, + label="GitHub latest release", + ).decode("utf-8") + ) tag = payload.get("tag_name") if not isinstance(tag, str) or not tag: raise ValueError("GitHub API response missing valid tag_name") diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py index 5d71a1957b..149caa2189 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import subprocess from typing import TYPE_CHECKING +from .._download_security import MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, read_response_limited from .base import AuthProvider if TYPE_CHECKING: @@ -110,7 +111,13 @@ def _acquire_via_client_credentials(entry: AuthConfigEntry) -> str | None: ) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: # noqa: S310 - payload = _json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) + payload = _json.loads( + read_response_limited( + resp, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, + label="Azure DevOps OAuth token response", + ).decode("utf-8") + ) token = payload.get("access_token", "").strip() return token or None except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, _json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError): diff --git a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py index ef4ee483f5..aa63ec5324 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import tempfile from dataclasses import dataclass from datetime import datetime, timezone -from pathlib import Path +from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Set import pathspec @@ -293,6 +293,24 @@ def _validate(self): ) if "name" not in cmd or "file" not in cmd: raise ValidationError("Command missing 'name' or 'file'") + if not isinstance(cmd["file"], str) or not cmd["file"].strip(): + raise ValidationError( + f"Command '{cmd['name']}' file must be a non-empty string" + ) + + normalized_file = cmd["file"].replace("\\", "/") + file_path = PurePosixPath(normalized_file) + has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized_file) is not None + if ( + file_path.is_absolute() + or has_windows_drive + or any(part == ".." for part in file_path.parts) + ): + raise ValidationError( + f"Invalid command file path '{cmd['file']}': " + "must be a relative path within the extension directory" + ) + cmd["file"] = normalized_file # Validate command name format if not EXTENSION_COMMAND_NAME_PATTERN.match(cmd["name"]): diff --git a/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py b/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py index aba5877d8f..d0ef121996 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import yaml from packaging import version as pkg_version +from .._download_security import read_response_limited from ..catalogs import CatalogEntry, CatalogStackBase @@ -170,7 +171,13 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( final_url = resp.geturl() if final_url != entry.url: self._validate_catalog_url(final_url) - catalog_data = json.loads(resp.read()) + catalog_data = json.loads( + read_response_limited( + resp, + error_type=IntegrationCatalogError, + label=f"integration catalog {entry.url}", + ) + ) if not isinstance(catalog_data, dict): raise IntegrationCatalogError( diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py index 87dc85401d..41a97895d1 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import tempfile import shutil from dataclasses import dataclass -from pathlib import Path +from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Optional, Dict, List, Any if TYPE_CHECKING: @@ -224,8 +224,16 @@ def _validate(self): # Validate file path safety: must be relative, no parent traversal file_path = tmpl["file"] - normalized = os.path.normpath(file_path) - if os.path.isabs(normalized) or normalized.startswith(".."): + if not isinstance(file_path, str) or not file_path.strip(): + raise PresetValidationError( + "Invalid template file path: must be a non-empty string" + ) + normalized = file_path.replace("\\", "/") + normalized_path = PurePosixPath(normalized) + has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized) is not None + if normalized_path.is_absolute() or any( + part == ".." for part in normalized_path.parts + ) or has_windows_drive: raise PresetValidationError( f"Invalid template file path '{file_path}': " "must be a relative path within the preset directory" diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py index 682bfe919d..eaeb55391c 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py @@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): console.print(f"Installing preset from [cyan]{from_url}[/cyan]...") import urllib.error import tempfile - import shutil with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: zip_path = Path(tmpdir) / "preset.zip" try: + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url @@ -166,12 +166,13 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): "or HTTP for localhost/loopback." ) raise typer.Exit(1) - with zip_path.open("wb") as output: - try: - shutil.copyfileobj(response, output) - except TypeError: - output.write(response.read()) - except urllib.error.URLError as e: + zip_path.write_bytes( + read_response_limited( + response, + label=f"preset {from_url}", + ) + ) + except (urllib.error.URLError, ValueError) as e: console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] Failed to download: {e}") raise typer.Exit(1) diff --git a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py index fae9e32d23..93bc73af39 100644 --- a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py +++ b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ def __init__(self, data, url=""): self._data = json.dumps(data).encode() self._url = url if isinstance(url, str) else url.full_url - def read(self): + def read(self, _size=-1): return self._data def geturl(self): @@ -295,6 +295,50 @@ def test_invalid_catalog_format(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): with pytest.raises(IntegrationCatalogError, match="Failed to fetch any integration catalog"): cat.search() + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): + cat = IntegrationCatalog(tmp_path) + entry = IntegrationCatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/catalog.json", + name="test", + priority=1, + install_allowed=True, + ) + + class FakeResponse: + def read(self, _size=-1): + return b"{}" + + def geturl(self): + return entry.url + + def __enter__(self): + return self + + def __exit__(self, *_args): + pass + + def fake_urlopen(url, timeout=10): + assert url == entry.url + assert timeout == 10 + return FakeResponse() + + def fake_read_response_limited(response, **kwargs): + assert isinstance(response, FakeResponse) + assert kwargs["error_type"] is IntegrationCatalogError + assert kwargs["label"] == "integration catalog https://example.com/catalog.json" + raise IntegrationCatalogError("catalog too large") + + import urllib.request + + monkeypatch.setattr(urllib.request, "urlopen", fake_urlopen) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "specify_cli.integrations.catalog.read_response_limited", + fake_read_response_limited, + ) + + with pytest.raises(IntegrationCatalogError, match="catalog too large"): + cat._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + def test_clear_cache(self, tmp_path): (tmp_path / ".specify").mkdir() cat = IntegrationCatalog(tmp_path) @@ -492,7 +536,7 @@ class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=""): self._data = json.dumps(data).encode() self._url = url if isinstance(url, str) else url.full_url - def read(self): + def read(self, _size=-1): return self._data def geturl(self): return self._url diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index ac46486cfc..2ce8310ff7 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import stat import zipfile +import re +from pathlib import Path import pytest @@ -14,6 +16,10 @@ ) +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent +RAW_RESPONSE_READ_RE = re.compile(r"\b(?:resp|response)\.read\(\)") + + class _Response: def __init__(self, data: bytes): self.data = data @@ -27,6 +33,19 @@ def test_read_response_limited_rejects_oversized_download(): read_response_limited(_Response(b"abcde"), max_bytes=4) +def test_remote_downloads_do_not_use_unbounded_response_reads(): + offenders = [] + for path in (REPO_ROOT / "src" / "specify_cli").rglob("*.py"): + for line_number, line in enumerate( + path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines(), + start=1, + ): + if RAW_RESPONSE_READ_RE.search(line): + offenders.append(f"{path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}:{line_number}") + + assert offenders == [] + + def test_verify_sha256_rejects_mismatch(): with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="checksum mismatch"): verify_sha256(b"payload", "sha256:" + "0" * 64) @@ -39,6 +58,7 @@ def test_verify_sha256_rejects_mismatch(): "nested/../../evil.txt", "nested\\..\\evil.txt", "C:\\Windows\\evil.txt", + "C:drive-relative.txt", ], ) def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_traversal(tmp_path, member_name): @@ -71,6 +91,26 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_oversized_member(tmp_path): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_member_bytes=4) +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_too_many_entries(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("one.txt", "1") + zf.writestr("two.txt", "2") + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="too many entries"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_entries=1) + + +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_total_uncompressed_size(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("one.txt", "123") + zf.writestr("two.txt", "456") + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="maximum uncompressed size"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_total_bytes=5) + + def test_safe_extract_zip_extracts_safe_archive(tmp_path): zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" out_dir = tmp_path / "out" diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py index 3d79328773..ee1aa756cd 100644 --- a/tests/test_extensions.py +++ b/tests/test_extensions.py @@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ def test_invalid_command_name(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data): "/tmp/outside.md", "commands/../../outside.md", "C:\\Windows\\outside.md", + "C:outside.md", ], ) def test_invalid_command_file_path(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data, bad_file): @@ -3657,8 +3658,49 @@ def test_get_merged_extensions_skips_non_mapping_entries(self, temp_dir): # silently dropped rather than raising or crashing. assert [ext["id"] for ext in merged] == ["good"] + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, temp_dir): + """Catalog JSON responses must use the shared bounded-read helper.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + entry = CatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/catalog.json", + name="custom", + priority=1, + install_allowed=True, + ) + + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response), \ + patch( + "specify_cli.extensions.read_response_limited", + side_effect=ExtensionError("catalog too large"), + ): + with pytest.raises(ExtensionError, match="catalog too large"): + catalog._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + + def test_fetch_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, temp_dir): + """The legacy single-catalog path must also bound catalog JSON reads.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_catalog_url", return_value="https://example.com/catalog.json"), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response), \ + patch( + "specify_cli.extensions.read_response_limited", + side_effect=ExtensionError("catalog too large"), + ): + with pytest.raises(ExtensionError, match="catalog too large"): + catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=True) + def test_download_extension_sends_auth_header(self, temp_dir, monkeypatch): - """download_extension passes Authorization header when a provider is configured.""" + """download_extension passes Authorization header via opener for GitHub URLs.""" from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock import zipfile import io diff --git a/tests/test_presets.py b/tests/test_presets.py index 36cbcf0a6c..3d9e5763e8 100644 --- a/tests/test_presets.py +++ b/tests/test_presets.py @@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ def test_invalid_template_name_format(self, temp_dir, valid_pack_data): "/tmp/outside.md", "templates/../../outside.md", "C:\\Windows\\outside.md", + "C:outside.md", ], ) def test_invalid_template_file_path(self, temp_dir, valid_pack_data, bad_file): @@ -2071,6 +2072,47 @@ def fake_open(req, timeout=None): assert captured[0].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer ghp_testtoken" assert captured[0].get_header("Accept") == "application/octet-stream" + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, project_dir): + """Catalog JSON responses must use the shared bounded-read helper.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + entry = PresetCatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/catalog.json", + name="custom", + priority=1, + install_allowed=True, + ) + + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response), \ + patch( + "specify_cli.presets.read_response_limited", + side_effect=PresetError("catalog too large"), + ): + with pytest.raises(PresetError, match="catalog too large"): + catalog._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + + def test_fetch_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, project_dir): + """The legacy single-catalog path must also bound catalog JSON reads.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_catalog_url", return_value="https://example.com/catalog.json"), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response), \ + patch( + "specify_cli.presets.read_response_limited", + side_effect=PresetError("catalog too large"), + ): + with pytest.raises(PresetError, match="catalog too large"): + catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=True) + def test_download_pack_verifies_sha256(self, project_dir): """Catalog-provided checksums are enforced when present.""" from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 60152a91db..e02e01eff7 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -3,8 +3,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations import inspect +import importlib.util import json import re +import subprocess from pathlib import Path import yaml @@ -15,6 +17,9 @@ CONTRIBUTING = REPO_ROOT / "CONTRIBUTING.md" BANDIT_BASELINE = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "bandit-baseline.json" SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "security-audit-requirements.txt" +SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS_SYNC_SCRIPT = ( + REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "scripts" / "check_security_requirements.py" +) WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = '"${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt"' COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = ".github/security-audit-requirements.txt" @@ -25,8 +30,13 @@ ) LOCAL_REFRESH_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes " - f"--quiet --output-file {COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" + f"--quiet --no-header --output-file {COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" +) +WORKFLOW_SYNC_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes " + "--quiet --no-header --output-file" ) +WORKFLOW_SYNC_SCRIPT = "python .github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py" WORKFLOW_LIVE_PIP_AUDIT = ( "uvx --from pip-audit==2.10.0 pip-audit --disable-pip --require-hashes " f"-r {WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS} --progress-spinner off" @@ -62,6 +72,18 @@ def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: return _step(job_name, step_name)["run"] +def _load_sync_script(): + spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( + "check_security_requirements", + SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS_SYNC_SCRIPT, + ) + assert spec is not None + assert spec.loader is not None + module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) + spec.loader.exec_module(module) + return module + + class TestSecurityWorkflow: """Guard the security workflow against review-feedback regressions.""" @@ -78,11 +100,21 @@ def test_dependency_audit_uses_committed_requirements_for_prs_and_pushes(self): "dependency-audit", "Run pip-audit (committed requirements)", ) + sync_check = _step( + "dependency-audit", + "Check committed audit requirements are current", + ) assert scheduled_compile["if"] == "${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }}" assert WORKFLOW_COMPILE_SCHEDULED_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in scheduled_compile["run"] assert scheduled_audit["if"] == "${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }}" assert scheduled_audit["run"] == WORKFLOW_LIVE_PIP_AUDIT + assert sync_check["if"] == "${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }}" + assert sync_check["env"]["DEPENDENCY_DIFF_BASE"] == ( + "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha || github.event.before || '' }}" + ) + assert sync_check["env"]["DEPENDENCY_DIFF_HEAD"] == "${{ github.sha }}" + assert sync_check["run"] == WORKFLOW_SYNC_SCRIPT assert committed_audit["if"] == "${{ github.event_name != 'schedule' }}" assert committed_audit["run"] == LOCAL_PIP_AUDIT @@ -90,17 +122,28 @@ def test_dependency_audit_uses_committed_requirements_for_prs_and_pushes(self): step.get("run", "") for step in _load_security_workflow()["jobs"]["dependency-audit"]["steps"] ) - assert "--generate-hashes" in dependency_job_text - assert "--require-hashes" in dependency_job_text - assert "--disable-pip" in dependency_job_text + dependency_protection_text = ( + dependency_job_text + + "\n" + + SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS_SYNC_SCRIPT.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + ) + assert "--generate-hashes" in dependency_protection_text + assert "--no-header" in dependency_protection_text + assert "--require-hashes" in dependency_protection_text + assert "--disable-pip" in dependency_protection_text assert WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS in dependency_job_text - assert COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS in dependency_job_text - assert "uv export" not in dependency_job_text - assert "--frozen" not in dependency_job_text - assert "--locked" not in dependency_job_text - assert "uv.lock" not in dependency_job_text - assert "/tmp/" not in dependency_job_text - assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in dependency_job_text + assert COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS in dependency_protection_text + assert "uv export" not in dependency_protection_text + assert "--frozen" not in dependency_protection_text + assert "--locked" not in dependency_protection_text + assert "uv.lock" not in dependency_protection_text + assert "/tmp/" not in dependency_protection_text + assert "uvx pip-audit ." not in dependency_protection_text + + def test_dependency_audit_checkout_fetches_previous_commit(self): + checkout = _step("dependency-audit", "Checkout") + + assert checkout["with"]["fetch-depth"] == 2 def test_security_workflow_triggers_are_preserved(self): triggers = _workflow_triggers() @@ -182,9 +225,136 @@ def test_committed_audit_requirements_are_hashed(self): requirements = SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS.read_text(encoding="utf-8") assert "--hash=sha256:" in requirements + assert not requirements.startswith("#") assert "pytest==" in requirements assert "pytest-cov==" in requirements + def test_sync_script_skips_when_dependency_inputs_are_unchanged( + self, + monkeypatch, + capsys, + ): + sync_script = _load_sync_script() + + def fake_run(command, **kwargs): + assert command == [ + "git", + "diff", + "--name-only", + "HEAD^", + "HEAD", + "--", + "pyproject.toml", + ".github/security-audit-requirements.txt", + ] + assert kwargs["check"] is True + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="", stderr="") + + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script.subprocess, "run", fake_run) + + assert sync_script.main() == 0 + assert "sync check skipped" in capsys.readouterr().out + + def test_sync_script_uses_github_diff_refs_when_available( + self, + monkeypatch, + ): + sync_script = _load_sync_script() + monkeypatch.setenv("DEPENDENCY_DIFF_BASE", "abc123") + monkeypatch.setenv("DEPENDENCY_DIFF_HEAD", "def456") + + def fake_run(command, **_kwargs): + assert command == [ + "git", + "diff", + "--name-only", + "abc123", + "def456", + "--", + "pyproject.toml", + ".github/security-audit-requirements.txt", + ] + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="", stderr="") + + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script.subprocess, "run", fake_run) + + assert sync_script._dependency_inputs_changed() is False + + def test_sync_script_compiles_and_compares_when_dependency_inputs_changed( + self, + monkeypatch, + tmp_path, + ): + sync_script = _load_sync_script() + committed_requirements = tmp_path / ".github" / "security-audit-requirements.txt" + generated_requirements = tmp_path / "generated-requirements.txt" + committed_requirements.parent.mkdir() + committed_requirements.write_text("pytest==1\n", encoding="utf-8") + compile_commands = [] + + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script, "REPO_ROOT", tmp_path) + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script, "COMMITTED_REQUIREMENTS", committed_requirements) + monkeypatch.setenv("GENERATED_REQUIREMENTS", str(generated_requirements)) + + def fake_run(command, **kwargs): + if command[0] == "git": + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + command, + 0, + stdout="pyproject.toml\n", + stderr="", + ) + + compile_commands.append(command) + assert kwargs["check"] is True + generated_requirements.write_text("pytest==1\n", encoding="utf-8") + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0) + + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script.subprocess, "run", fake_run) + + assert sync_script.main() == 0 + assert len(compile_commands) == 1 + compile_command = " ".join(compile_commands[0]) + assert WORKFLOW_SYNC_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS in compile_command + assert "--output-file" in compile_commands[0] + assert str(generated_requirements) in compile_commands[0] + + def test_sync_script_fails_when_generated_requirements_differ( + self, + monkeypatch, + tmp_path, + capsys, + ): + sync_script = _load_sync_script() + committed_requirements = tmp_path / ".github" / "security-audit-requirements.txt" + generated_requirements = tmp_path / "generated-requirements.txt" + committed_requirements.parent.mkdir() + committed_requirements.write_text("pytest==1\n", encoding="utf-8") + + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script, "REPO_ROOT", tmp_path) + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script, "COMMITTED_REQUIREMENTS", committed_requirements) + monkeypatch.setenv("GENERATED_REQUIREMENTS", str(generated_requirements)) + + def fake_run(command, **_kwargs): + if command[0] == "git": + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + command, + 0, + stdout="pyproject.toml\n", + stderr="", + ) + + generated_requirements.write_text("pytest==2\n", encoding="utf-8") + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0) + + monkeypatch.setattr(sync_script.subprocess, "run", fake_run) + + assert sync_script.main() == 1 + assert ( + "Regenerate .github/security-audit-requirements.txt" + in capsys.readouterr().err + ) + def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): contributing_text = CONTRIBUTING.read_text(encoding="utf-8") From 851ba8a704bd70add4f58d5a197a0f086e635c00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 08:20:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/36] ci(security): tighten PR checks for security regressions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Six follow-on checks that lock in the hardening from this PR and add the surfaces it didn't cover: 1. ruff S602/S604/S605 in pyproject.toml — fail PRs that reintroduce subprocess shell=True. The intentional shell=True in the workflows shell step keeps its NOTE comment and gets an explicit `# noqa: S602` so the deviation is visible. 2. Bandit two-pass in security.yml — keep `-lll --baseline` blocking and add a non-blocking `-ll` informational pass so MEDIUM findings show in the job summary instead of accumulating silently. 3. Bandit baseline diff check — fail PRs that grow .github/bandit-baseline.json unless they carry the `security-baseline-change` label. New script in .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py. 4. Secret scanning via detect-secrets — new `secret-scan` job in security.yml with a committed .secrets.baseline that whitelists the nine current findings (all SHA pins / docs examples / test fixtures; audited before commit). Drift fails the check. 5. shellcheck on scripts/bash/*.sh in lint.yml. Starts at --severity=error to catch real bugs; style (SC2155) can be tightened in a follow-up. 6. macos-latest added to the dependency-audit matrix in security.yml — aligns with test.yml's posture and catches platform-specific resolver surprises. --- .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py | 92 ++++++++ .github/workflows/lint.yml | 12 + .github/workflows/security.yml | 61 ++++- .secrets.baseline | 213 ++++++++++++++++++ pyproject.toml | 10 + .../workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py | 2 +- 6 files changed, 387 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py create mode 100644 .secrets.baseline diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95f05a42c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +"""Fail if the Bandit baseline grew on this PR without explicit acknowledgement. + +The bandit baseline whitelists known findings so they don't fail CI. If a +contributor adds a new entry, silent whitelisting becomes invisible in +review. This script counts the entries in the baseline at the PR head vs. +its base; if the count increased, the PR must carry the label +``security-baseline-change`` to confirm the addition is intentional. + +Required environment variables: +- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE``: git ref of the PR base (``github.event.pull_request.base.sha``) +- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD``: git ref of the PR head (``github.sha``) +- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS``: comma-separated PR labels (``join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',')``) + +Outside of PR events, all inputs may be empty and the script no-ops. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import os +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] +BASELINE_PATH = ".github/bandit-baseline.json" +ACK_LABEL = "security-baseline-change" + + +def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> dict: + if not ref: + return {"results": []} + try: + blob = subprocess.run( + ["git", "show", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"], + check=True, + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + text=True, + ).stdout + except subprocess.CalledProcessError: + # File didn't exist at that ref (e.g. PR introducing the baseline). + return {"results": []} + try: + return json.loads(blob) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + print(f"Could not parse baseline at {ref}; treating as empty.", file=sys.stderr) + return {"results": []} + + +def main() -> int: + base_ref = os.environ.get("BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE", "").strip() + head_ref = os.environ.get("BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" + + if not base_ref or set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: + # Not a PR event, or the base ref is the zero-SHA placeholder. + print("No PR base ref; baseline diff check skipped.") + return 0 + + base_count = len(_read_baseline_at(base_ref).get("results", [])) + head_count = len(_read_baseline_at(head_ref).get("results", [])) + + if head_count <= base_count: + print( + f"Bandit baseline entries: {base_count} -> {head_count} (no growth)." + ) + return 0 + + labels = { + label.strip() + for label in os.environ.get("BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS", "").split(",") + if label.strip() + } + if ACK_LABEL in labels: + print( + f"Bandit baseline grew from {base_count} to {head_count} entries; " + f"acknowledged via label '{ACK_LABEL}'." + ) + return 0 + + print( + f"Bandit baseline grew from {base_count} to {head_count} entries. " + f"Add label '{ACK_LABEL}' to the PR to acknowledge that the new " + f"whitelist entries are intentional.", + file=sys.stderr, + ) + return 1 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/.github/workflows/lint.yml b/.github/workflows/lint.yml index a4b1bf7d5a..83ccccde7d 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/lint.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/lint.yml @@ -42,3 +42,15 @@ jobs: globs: | '**/*.md' !extensions/**/*.md + + shellcheck: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + + # shellcheck is preinstalled on ubuntu-latest runners. + # Start at --severity=error to block real bugs without flagging style + # (notably SC2155). Tighten in a follow-up after cleanup. + - name: Run shellcheck on scripts/bash + run: shellcheck --severity=error scripts/bash/*.sh diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 8a0058c073..43e6d5dac4 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs: strategy: fail-fast: false matrix: - os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest] + os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest, macos-latest] python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"] steps: - name: Checkout @@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ jobs: steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + with: + # Need the PR base to compare baseline growth. + fetch-depth: 0 - name: Install uv uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 @@ -70,5 +73,59 @@ jobs: with: python-version: "3.13" - - name: Run Bandit + # Blocking: HIGH severity only, with baseline. Real regressions fail CI. + - name: Run Bandit (HIGH, baseline-gated) run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json + + # Informative: MEDIUM severity, no baseline. Surfaces lower-severity + # findings in the job summary without breaking CI, so reviewers see + # them before they accumulate. + - name: Run Bandit (MEDIUM, informational) + continue-on-error: true + run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -ll + + # Prevent silent whitelisting: if the baseline grew, the PR must carry + # the 'security-baseline-change' label to acknowledge it. + - name: Check Bandit baseline growth + if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }} + env: + BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} + BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} + BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS: ${{ join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',') }} + run: python .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py + + secret-scan: + name: Secret scan + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Install uv + uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 + with: + python-version: "3.13" + + # detect-secrets is a Python tool (consistent with bandit / pip-audit + # install pattern) and detects entropy-based and provider-specific + # secrets. Baseline at .secrets.baseline is honored as a whitelist; + # any drift fails the check. + - name: Run detect-secrets + run: | + uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets scan \ + --baseline .secrets.baseline \ + --exclude-files '\.secrets\.baseline$' \ + --exclude-files 'uv\.lock$' \ + --exclude-files '\.github/security-audit-requirements\.txt$' + + - name: Verify baseline is in sync + run: | + if ! git diff --exit-code .secrets.baseline; then + echo "::error::detect-secrets found new candidates. Audit them, then update .secrets.baseline with: uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline" >&2 + exit 1 + fi diff --git a/.secrets.baseline b/.secrets.baseline new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f700e86348 --- /dev/null +++ b/.secrets.baseline @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +{ + "version": "1.5.0", + "plugins_used": [ + { + "name": "ArtifactoryDetector" + }, + { + "name": "AWSKeyDetector" + }, + { + "name": "AzureStorageKeyDetector" + }, + { + "name": "Base64HighEntropyString", + "limit": 4.5 + }, + { + "name": "BasicAuthDetector" + }, + { + "name": "CloudantDetector" + }, + { + "name": "DiscordBotTokenDetector" + }, + { + "name": "GitHubTokenDetector" + }, + { + "name": "GitLabTokenDetector" + }, + { + "name": "HexHighEntropyString", + "limit": 3.0 + }, + { + "name": "IbmCloudIamDetector" + }, + { + "name": "IbmCosHmacDetector" + }, + { + "name": "IPPublicDetector" + }, + { + "name": "JwtTokenDetector" + }, + { + "name": "KeywordDetector", + "keyword_exclude": "" + }, + { + "name": "MailchimpDetector" + }, + { + "name": "NpmDetector" + }, + { + "name": "OpenAIDetector" + }, + { + "name": "PrivateKeyDetector" + }, + { + "name": "PypiTokenDetector" + }, + { + "name": "SendGridDetector" + }, + { + "name": "SlackDetector" + }, + { + "name": "SoftlayerDetector" + }, + { + "name": "SquareOAuthDetector" + }, + { + "name": "StripeDetector" + }, + { + "name": "TelegramBotTokenDetector" + }, + { + "name": "TwilioKeyDetector" + } + ], + "filters_used": [ + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.allowlist.is_line_allowlisted" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.common.is_ignored_due_to_verification_policies", + "min_level": 2 + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_indirect_reference" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_likely_id_string" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_lock_file" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_not_alphanumeric_string" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_potential_uuid" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_prefixed_with_dollar_sign" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_sequential_string" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_swagger_file" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.heuristic.is_templated_secret" + }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.regex.should_exclude_file", + "pattern": [ + "\\.secrets\\.baseline$", + "uv\\.lock$", + "\\.github/security-audit-requirements\\.txt$" + ] + } + ], + "results": { + ".devcontainer/post-create.sh": [ + { + "type": "Hex High Entropy String", + "filename": ".devcontainer/post-create.sh", + "hashed_secret": "7a549d52003f28825cf4d8a7351585120349c1c5", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 65 + } + ], + ".github/workflows/security.yml": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": ".github/workflows/security.yml", + "hashed_secret": "ce8f18aefefe74020792776da9b575c21d44d6b1", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 119 + }, + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": ".github/workflows/security.yml", + "hashed_secret": "bc0369f6bd7ef02ba819bff38ac2ce7deacac19d", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 127 + } + ], + "docs/reference/authentication.md": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "docs/reference/authentication.md", + "hashed_secret": "d92490a1457d8b0712a85fe018b3e9fd781816a7", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 113 + } + ], + "extensions/template/EXAMPLE-README.md": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "extensions/template/EXAMPLE-README.md", + "hashed_secret": "11fa7c37d697f30e6aee828b4426a10f83ab2380", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 52 + }, + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "extensions/template/EXAMPLE-README.md", + "hashed_secret": "71fdbe9f60b1157a53c18b7ec93d4041d828aaad", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 106 + } + ], + "tests/test_agent_config_consistency.py": [ + { + "type": "Hex High Entropy String", + "filename": "tests/test_agent_config_consistency.py", + "hashed_secret": "7a549d52003f28825cf4d8a7351585120349c1c5", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 56 + } + ], + "tests/test_authentication.py": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "tests/test_authentication.py", + "hashed_secret": "3c3b274d119ff5a5ec6c1e215c1cb794d9973ac1", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 131 + } + ], + "tests/test_extensions.py": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "tests/test_extensions.py", + "hashed_secret": "7a9b93cfa651fbc2c93d88edea4d4fcfe33c0a0b", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 3397 + } + ] + }, + "generated_at": "2026-05-14T05:42:31Z" +} diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index 052b5efb41..43a6dbc2de 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -73,3 +73,13 @@ precision = 2 show_missing = true skip_covered = false +[tool.ruff.lint] +# Lock in subprocess security posture: any reintroduction of shell=True +# (or os.system / popen2) must be acknowledged with an explicit `# noqa` +# pointing at the rule, making the deviation visible in review. +extend-select = [ + "S602", # subprocess-popen-with-shell-equals-true + "S604", # call-with-shell-equals-true + "S605", # start-process-with-a-shell +] + diff --git a/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py index 8c62e4cfa8..2a65fca444 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ def execute(self, config: dict[str, Any], context: StepContext) -> StepResult: # control commands; catalog-installed workflows should be reviewed # before use (see PUBLISHING.md for security guidance). try: - proc = subprocess.run( + proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S602 -- intentional shell=True (see NOTE above) run_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, From c929c798b9f714fe525e20fd8dc16da666feb736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 08:24:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/36] ci(security): address review feedback MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Copilot review #4291726625 + mnriem CHANGES_REQUESTED #4292842064. Hardening (Copilot suggestions on existing code): - Pass strict_redirects=True to open_url() at the three catalog/workflow download call sites (__init__.py preset/workflow downloads, integrations/catalog.py). Closes an HTTPS->HTTP downgrade window where the bounded read could happen on a redirected http:// target before the post-redirect URL validation. Lock-in fixes for the new PR checks: - check_bandit_baseline.py: compare result identities (filename + line + test_id + severity + confidence + code-hash) instead of raw counts so a PR can't silently swap one whitelisted finding for another. Also treat "baseline file absent at base ref" as introduction (no label required) instead of growth-from-zero. - Switch secret-scan to detect-secrets-hook (instead of `scan --baseline` followed by `git diff --exit-code`). The scan command rewrites the baseline's generated_at timestamp on every run, so the diff guard always tripped. detect-secrets-hook only reports findings that aren't in the baseline, so the diff guard is unnecessary. Brittle-test fixes: - security.yml: revert macos-latest from the dependency-audit matrix (test_security_workflow.py:160 pins ubuntu+windows, matching test.yml). - security.yml: rename "Run Bandit (HIGH, baseline-gated)" back to "Run Bandit" (test_security_workflow.py:188 expects the canonical name); the medium-severity informational pass keeps a distinct name. - security-audit-requirements.txt: regenerate with uv pip compile — pyproject.toml changed on this branch (ruff config in the previous commit) and upstream package releases drifted the lock; check_security _requirements.py was rightly failing until both sides matched. Pre-existing pinning gap caught by tests/test_github_workflows.py: - Pin actions/github-script@v9 to its commit SHA in catalog-assign.yml. - Fix USES_RE in test_github_workflows.py so it matches the `- uses:` shorthand form (without it, catalog-assign.yml's `@v9` slipped past). Test mocks: - test_integration_catalog.py: extend the three url-mocking helpers to also stub OpenerDirector.open. open_url(strict_redirects=True) takes a different code path that bypasses the urlopen mock; patching the opener covers both paths. --- .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py | 86 ++++++++++++++----- .github/security-audit-requirements.txt | 49 ----------- .github/workflows/catalog-assign.yml | 2 +- .github/workflows/security.yml | 29 +++---- .secrets.baseline | 13 +-- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 14 ++- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 41 ++++++++- src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py | 2 +- .../integrations/test_integration_catalog.py | 29 ++++++- tests/test_github_workflows.py | 4 +- 10 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py index 95f05a42c1..7d9601c19f 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py @@ -1,21 +1,32 @@ -"""Fail if the Bandit baseline grew on this PR without explicit acknowledgement. +"""Fail if new entries appear in the Bandit baseline without acknowledgement. The bandit baseline whitelists known findings so they don't fail CI. If a contributor adds a new entry, silent whitelisting becomes invisible in -review. This script counts the entries in the baseline at the PR head vs. -its base; if the count increased, the PR must carry the label -``security-baseline-change`` to confirm the addition is intentional. +review. This script compares the set of result *identities* in the +baseline at the PR head against the baseline at its base; if any new +identity appears, the PR must carry the label ``security-baseline-change`` +to confirm the addition is intentional. + +We compare identities (filename + line + test_id + issue_severity + +issue_confidence + hash-of-code-snippet) rather than raw counts so a PR +cannot remove one existing entry and add a different new one to keep the +count constant — which would silently whitelist a new finding. + +When the baseline file does not exist at the base ref, this is the PR +that introduces it; we treat all entries as the starting baseline and +do not require the label. Required environment variables: -- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE``: git ref of the PR base (``github.event.pull_request.base.sha``) -- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD``: git ref of the PR head (``github.sha``) -- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS``: comma-separated PR labels (``join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',')``) +- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE``: git ref of the PR base +- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD``: git ref of the PR head +- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS``: comma-separated PR labels Outside of PR events, all inputs may be empty and the script no-ops. """ from __future__ import annotations +import hashlib import json import os import subprocess @@ -27,9 +38,10 @@ ACK_LABEL = "security-baseline-change" -def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> dict: +def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: + """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref).""" if not ref: - return {"results": []} + return {"results": []}, False try: blob = subprocess.run( ["git", "show", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"], @@ -40,13 +52,34 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> dict: text=True, ).stdout except subprocess.CalledProcessError: - # File didn't exist at that ref (e.g. PR introducing the baseline). - return {"results": []} + return {"results": []}, False try: - return json.loads(blob) + return json.loads(blob), True except json.JSONDecodeError: print(f"Could not parse baseline at {ref}; treating as empty.", file=sys.stderr) - return {"results": []} + return {"results": []}, True + + +def _identity(result: dict) -> str: + """Stable identity for a baseline entry. + + Combines location, test, severity, confidence, and a hash of the + pinned code snippet so reordering or formatting changes don't + register as new findings, but a different finding at the same line + does. + """ + code = result.get("code", "") or "" + code_hash = hashlib.sha256(code.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16] + return "|".join( + [ + str(result.get("filename", "")), + str(result.get("line_number", "")), + str(result.get("test_id", "")), + str(result.get("issue_severity", "")), + str(result.get("issue_confidence", "")), + code_hash, + ] + ) def main() -> int: @@ -54,16 +87,27 @@ def main() -> int: head_ref = os.environ.get("BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" if not base_ref or set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: - # Not a PR event, or the base ref is the zero-SHA placeholder. print("No PR base ref; baseline diff check skipped.") return 0 - base_count = len(_read_baseline_at(base_ref).get("results", [])) - head_count = len(_read_baseline_at(head_ref).get("results", [])) + base_baseline, base_existed = _read_baseline_at(base_ref) + head_baseline, _ = _read_baseline_at(head_ref) + + if not base_existed: + print( + "Baseline file not present at base ref; treating this PR as the " + "introduction of the baseline. No acknowledgement required." + ) + return 0 + + base_ids = {_identity(r) for r in base_baseline.get("results", [])} + head_ids = {_identity(r) for r in head_baseline.get("results", [])} - if head_count <= base_count: + new_ids = head_ids - base_ids + if not new_ids: print( - f"Bandit baseline entries: {base_count} -> {head_count} (no growth)." + f"Bandit baseline entries: {len(base_ids)} -> {len(head_ids)} " + f"(no new identities)." ) return 0 @@ -74,17 +118,19 @@ def main() -> int: } if ACK_LABEL in labels: print( - f"Bandit baseline grew from {base_count} to {head_count} entries; " + f"Bandit baseline gained {len(new_ids)} new identities; " f"acknowledged via label '{ACK_LABEL}'." ) return 0 print( - f"Bandit baseline grew from {base_count} to {head_count} entries. " + f"Bandit baseline gained {len(new_ids)} new identities. " f"Add label '{ACK_LABEL}' to the PR to acknowledge that the new " f"whitelist entries are intentional.", file=sys.stderr, ) + for identity in sorted(new_ids): + print(f" + {identity}", file=sys.stderr) return 1 diff --git a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt index d97b84d2cd..89feef3f1a 100644 --- a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt +++ b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt @@ -263,55 +263,6 @@ shellingham==1.5.4 \ --hash=sha256:7ecfff8f2fd72616f7481040475a65b2bf8af90a56c89140852d1120324e8686 \ --hash=sha256:8dbca0739d487e5bd35ab3ca4b36e11c4078f3a234bfce294b0a0291363404de # via typer -tomli==2.4.1 ; python_full_version <= '3.11' \ - --hash=sha256:01f520d4f53ef97964a240a035ec2a869fe1a37dde002b57ebc4417a27ccd853 \ - --hash=sha256:0d85819802132122da43cb86656f8d1f8c6587d54ae7dcaf30e90533028b49fe \ - --hash=sha256:136443dbd7e1dee43c68ac2694fde36b2849865fa258d39bf822c10e8068eac5 \ - --hash=sha256:1d8591993e228b0c930c4bb0db464bdad97b3289fb981255d6c9a41aedc84b2d \ - --hash=sha256:2190f2e9dd7508d2a90ded5ed369255980a1bcdd58e52f7fe24b8162bf9fedbd \ - --hash=sha256:2c1c351919aca02858f740c6d33adea0c5deea37f9ecca1cc1ef9e884a619d26 \ - --hash=sha256:36d2bd2ad5fb9eaddba5226aa02c8ec3fa4f192631e347b3ed28186d43be6b54 \ - --hash=sha256:3d48a93ee1c9b79c04bb38772ee1b64dcf18ff43085896ea460ca8dec96f35f6 \ - --hash=sha256:47149d5bd38761ac8be13a84864bf0b7b70bc051806bc3669ab1cbc56216b23c \ - --hash=sha256:4ab97e64ccda8756376892c53a72bd1f964e519c77236368527f758fbc36a53a \ - --hash=sha256:4b605484e43cdc43f0954ddae319fb75f04cc10dd80d830540060ee7cd0243cd \ - --hash=sha256:504aa796fe0569bb43171066009ead363de03675276d2d121ac1a4572397870f \ - --hash=sha256:51529d40e3ca50046d7606fa99ce3956a617f9b36380da3b7f0dd3dd28e68cb5 \ - --hash=sha256:52c8ef851d9a240f11a88c003eacb03c31fc1c9c4ec64a99a0f922b93874fda9 \ - --hash=sha256:559db847dc486944896521f68d8190be1c9e719fced785720d2216fe7022b662 \ - --hash=sha256:5a881ab208c0baf688221f8cecc5401bd291d67e38a1ac884d6736cbcd8247e9 \ - --hash=sha256:5cb41aa38891e073ee49d55fbc7839cfdb2bc0e600add13874d048c94aadddd1 \ - --hash=sha256:5e262d41726bc187e69af7825504c933b6794dc3fbd5945e41a79bb14c31f585 \ - --hash=sha256:5ee18d9ebdb417e384b58fe414e8d6af9f4e7a0ae761519fb50f721de398dd4e \ - --hash=sha256:7008df2e7655c495dd12d2a4ad038ff878d4ca4b81fccaf82b714e07eae4402c \ - --hash=sha256:734e20b57ba95624ecf1841e72b53f6e186355e216e5412de414e3c51e5e3c41 \ - --hash=sha256:7c7e1a961a0b2f2472c1ac5b69affa0ae1132c39adcb67aba98568702b9cc23f \ - --hash=sha256:7f86fd587c4ed9dd76f318225e7d9b29cfc5a9d43de44e5754db8d1128487085 \ - --hash=sha256:7f94b27a62cfad8496c8d2513e1a222dd446f095fca8987fceef261225538a15 \ - --hash=sha256:88dceee75c2c63af144e456745e10101eb67361050196b0b6af5d717254dddf7 \ - --hash=sha256:8a650c2dbafa08d42e51ba0b62740dae4ecb9338eefa093aa5c78ceb546fcd5c \ - --hash=sha256:8d65a2fbf9d2f8352685bc1364177ee3923d6baf5e7f43ea4959d7d8bc326a36 \ - --hash=sha256:96481a5786729fd470164b47cdb3e0e58062a496f455ee41b4403be77cb5a076 \ - --hash=sha256:a120733b01c45e9a0c34aeef92bf0cf1d56cfe81ed9d47d562f9ed591a9828ac \ - --hash=sha256:b1d22e6e9387bf4739fbe23bfa80e93f6b0373a7f1b96c6227c32bef95a4d7a8 \ - --hash=sha256:b8c198f8c1805dc42708689ed6864951fd2494f924149d3e4bce7710f8eb5232 \ - --hash=sha256:c2541745709bad0264b7d4705ad453b76ccd191e64aa6f0fc66b69a293a45ece \ - --hash=sha256:c742f741d58a28940ce01d58f0ab2ea3ced8b12402f162f4d534dfe18ba1cd6a \ - --hash=sha256:c7f2c7f2b9ca6bdeef8f0fa897f8e05085923eb091721675170254cbc5b02897 \ - --hash=sha256:d312ef37c91508b0ab2cee7da26ec0b3ed2f03ce12bd87a588d771ae15dcf82d \ - --hash=sha256:d4d8fe59808a54658fcc0160ecfb1b30f9089906c50b23bcb4c69eddc19ec2b4 \ - --hash=sha256:da25dc3563bff5965356133435b757a795a17b17d01dbc0f42fb32447ddfd917 \ - --hash=sha256:eab21f45c7f66c13f2a9e0e1535309cee140182a9cdae1e041d02e47291e8396 \ - --hash=sha256:eb0dc4e38e6a1fd579e5d50369aa2e10acfc9cace504579b2faabb478e76941a \ - --hash=sha256:ec9bfaf3ad2df51ace80688143a6a4ebc09a248f6ff781a9945e51937008fcbc \ - --hash=sha256:ede3e6487c5ef5d28634ba3f31f989030ad6af71edfb0055cbbd14189ff240ba \ - --hash=sha256:f3c6818a1a86dd6dca7ddcaaf76947d5ba31aecc28cb1b67009a5877c9a64f3f \ - --hash=sha256:f758f1b9299d059cc3f6546ae2af89670cb1c4d48ea29c3cacc4fe7de3058257 \ - --hash=sha256:f8f0fc26ec2cc2b965b7a3b87cd19c5c6b8c5e5f436b984e85f486d652285c30 \ - --hash=sha256:fd0409a3653af6c147209d267a0e4243f0ae46b011aa978b1080359fddc9b6cf \ - --hash=sha256:ff18e6a727ee0ab0388507b89d1bc6a22b138d1e2fa56d1ad494586d61d2eae9 \ - --hash=sha256:ff2983983d34813c1aeb0fa89091e76c3a22889ee83ab27c5eeb45100560c049 - # via coverage typer==0.25.1 \ --hash=sha256:75caa44ed46a03fb2dab8808753ffacdbfea88495e74c85a28c5eefcf5f39c89 \ --hash=sha256:9616eb8853a09ffeabab1698952f33c6f29ffdbceb4eaeecf571880e8d7664cc diff --git a/.github/workflows/catalog-assign.yml b/.github/workflows/catalog-assign.yml index 78b4f552f3..f828794864 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/catalog-assign.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/catalog-assign.yml @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs: permissions: issues: write steps: - - uses: actions/github-script@v9 + - uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9 with: script: | const issue = context.payload.issue; diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 43e6d5dac4..0e19912f1e 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs: strategy: fail-fast: false matrix: - os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest, macos-latest] + os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest] python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"] steps: - name: Checkout @@ -74,13 +74,13 @@ jobs: python-version: "3.13" # Blocking: HIGH severity only, with baseline. Real regressions fail CI. - - name: Run Bandit (HIGH, baseline-gated) + - name: Run Bandit run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json # Informative: MEDIUM severity, no baseline. Surfaces lower-severity # findings in the job summary without breaking CI, so reviewers see # them before they accumulate. - - name: Run Bandit (MEDIUM, informational) + - name: Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass continue-on-error: true run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -ll @@ -113,19 +113,14 @@ jobs: # detect-secrets is a Python tool (consistent with bandit / pip-audit # install pattern) and detects entropy-based and provider-specific - # secrets. Baseline at .secrets.baseline is honored as a whitelist; - # any drift fails the check. + # secrets. detect-secrets-hook compares tracked files against the + # baseline and exits non-zero when a new candidate appears, without + # rewriting the baseline file (so there's no spurious git diff). - name: Run detect-secrets run: | - uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets scan \ - --baseline .secrets.baseline \ - --exclude-files '\.secrets\.baseline$' \ - --exclude-files 'uv\.lock$' \ - --exclude-files '\.github/security-audit-requirements\.txt$' - - - name: Verify baseline is in sync - run: | - if ! git diff --exit-code .secrets.baseline; then - echo "::error::detect-secrets found new candidates. Audit them, then update .secrets.baseline with: uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline" >&2 - exit 1 - fi + git ls-files -z \ + -- ':!:.secrets.baseline' \ + ':!:uv.lock' \ + ':!:.github/security-audit-requirements.txt' \ + | xargs -0 uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets-hook \ + --baseline .secrets.baseline diff --git a/.secrets.baseline b/.secrets.baseline index f700e86348..42f94920b0 100644 --- a/.secrets.baseline +++ b/.secrets.baseline @@ -144,16 +144,9 @@ { "type": "Secret Keyword", "filename": ".github/workflows/security.yml", - "hashed_secret": "ce8f18aefefe74020792776da9b575c21d44d6b1", + "hashed_secret": "4202a5e0d1da60251e0163e869ae02016bb68767", "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 119 - }, - { - "type": "Secret Keyword", - "filename": ".github/workflows/security.yml", - "hashed_secret": "bc0369f6bd7ef02ba819bff38ac2ce7deacac19d", - "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 127 + "line_number": 120 } ], "docs/reference/authentication.md": [ @@ -209,5 +202,5 @@ } ] }, - "generated_at": "2026-05-14T05:42:31Z" + "generated_at": "2026-05-15T06:22:08Z" } diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index ccd4390d29..4bea960031 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -2493,7 +2493,12 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: import tempfile try: - with _open_url(source, timeout=30, extra_headers=_wf_url_extra_headers) as resp: + with _open_url( + source, + timeout=30, + extra_headers=_wf_url_extra_headers, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as resp: final_url = resp.geturl() final_parsed = urlparse(final_url) final_host = final_parsed.hostname or "" @@ -2605,7 +2610,12 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: _wf_cat_extra_headers = {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} workflow_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - with _open_url(workflow_url, timeout=30, extra_headers=_wf_cat_extra_headers) as response: + with _open_url( + workflow_url, + timeout=30, + extra_headers=_wf_cat_extra_headers, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: # Validate final URL after redirects final_url = response.geturl() final_parsed = urlparse(final_url) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index e8ab8c1241..c2dbe6ab25 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import urllib.error import urllib.request from fnmatch import fnmatch +from ipaddress import ip_address from typing import Callable from urllib.parse import urlparse @@ -60,6 +61,30 @@ def _hostname_in_hosts(hostname: str, hosts: tuple[str, ...]) -> bool: RedirectValidator = Callable[[str, str], None] +def _is_secure_or_loopback_url(url: str) -> bool: + parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + return False + if parsed.scheme == "https": + return True + if parsed.scheme != "http": + return False + if parsed.hostname == "localhost": + return True + try: + return ip_address(parsed.hostname).is_loopback + except ValueError: + return False + + +def _validate_strict_redirect(_old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: + if not _is_secure_or_loopback_url(new_url): + raise urllib.error.URLError( + "redirect target must use HTTPS with a hostname, " + "or HTTP for localhost/loopback" + ) + + class _StripAuthOnRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): """Drop ``Authorization`` when a redirect leaves trusted hosts or downgrades.""" @@ -123,6 +148,7 @@ def open_url( timeout: int = 10, extra_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None, redirect_validator: RedirectValidator | None = None, + strict_redirects: bool = False, ): """Open *url* with config-driven auth, redirect stripping, and fallthrough. @@ -135,9 +161,18 @@ def open_url( *extra_headers* (e.g. ``Accept``) are merged into every attempt. *redirect_validator*, when provided, is called with ``(old_url, new_url)`` before following each redirect and may raise to reject the redirect. + *strict_redirects* rejects redirect targets that are not HTTPS with a + hostname, except HTTP localhost/loopback URLs. """ entries = find_entries_for_url(url, _load_config()) + effective_redirect_validator = redirect_validator + if strict_redirects: + def effective_redirect_validator(old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: + _validate_strict_redirect(old_url, new_url) + if redirect_validator is not None: + redirect_validator(old_url, new_url) + def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: merged = {} if extra_headers: @@ -157,7 +192,7 @@ def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: continue req = _make_req(provider.auth_headers(token, entry.auth)) - opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect(entry.hosts, redirect_validator)) + opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect(entry.hosts, effective_redirect_validator)) try: return opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: @@ -168,7 +203,7 @@ def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: # No entry worked (or none matched) — unauthenticated fallback req = _make_req({}) - if redirect_validator is not None: - opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect((), redirect_validator)) + if effective_redirect_validator is not None: + opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect((), effective_redirect_validator)) return opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) # noqa: S310 diff --git a/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py b/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py index d0ef121996..83ad446642 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( try: from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url - with open_url(entry.url, timeout=10) as resp: + with open_url(entry.url, timeout=10, strict_redirects=True) as resp: # Validate final URL after redirects final_url = resp.geturl() if final_url != entry.url: diff --git a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py index 93bc73af39..ca7bf0d43d 100644 --- a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py +++ b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py @@ -166,7 +166,12 @@ class TestCatalogFetch: """Tests that use a local HTTP server stub via monkeypatch.""" def _patch_urlopen(self, monkeypatch, catalog_data): - """Patch authentication.http.urllib.request.urlopen to return *catalog_data*.""" + """Patch authentication.http urlopen + OpenerDirector to return *catalog_data*. + + Covers both code paths in ``open_url``: + - default: ``urllib.request.urlopen`` (unauthenticated, no strict redirects) + - hardened: ``OpenerDirector.open`` (strict_redirects=True path). + """ class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=""): @@ -189,8 +194,14 @@ def fake_urlopen(req, timeout=10): url = req if isinstance(req, str) else req.full_url return FakeResponse(catalog_data, url) + def fake_opener_open(_self, req, data=None, timeout=10): + return fake_urlopen(req, timeout) + import specify_cli.authentication.http as _auth_http monkeypatch.setattr(_auth_http.urllib.request, "urlopen", fake_urlopen) + monkeypatch.setattr( + _auth_http.urllib.request.OpenerDirector, "open", fake_opener_open + ) def test_fetch_and_search_all(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path)) @@ -331,6 +342,11 @@ def fake_read_response_limited(response, **kwargs): import urllib.request monkeypatch.setattr(urllib.request, "urlopen", fake_urlopen) + monkeypatch.setattr( + urllib.request.OpenerDirector, + "open", + lambda _self, req, data=None, timeout=10: fake_urlopen(req, timeout), + ) monkeypatch.setattr( "specify_cli.integrations.catalog.read_response_limited", fake_read_response_limited, @@ -545,8 +561,15 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, *a): pass - monkeypatch.setattr(_auth_http.urllib.request, "urlopen", - lambda req, timeout=10: FakeResponse(catalog, req if isinstance(req, str) else req.full_url)) + def _fake_urlopen(req, timeout=10): + return FakeResponse(catalog, req if isinstance(req, str) else req.full_url) + + monkeypatch.setattr(_auth_http.urllib.request, "urlopen", _fake_urlopen) + monkeypatch.setattr( + _auth_http.urllib.request.OpenerDirector, + "open", + lambda _self, req, data=None, timeout=10: _fake_urlopen(req, timeout), + ) old = os.getcwd() try: diff --git a/tests/test_github_workflows.py b/tests/test_github_workflows.py index 2b21d3a40f..7ad0b714ec 100644 --- a/tests/test_github_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_github_workflows.py @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent WORKFLOWS_DIR = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" -USES_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*uses:\s*(?P\S+)", re.MULTILINE) +# Match both the dedicated-step form (` uses: x@sha`) and the +# inline shorthand (` - uses: x@sha`) used in catalog-assign.yml. +USES_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:-\s*)?uses:\s*(?P\S+)", re.MULTILINE) def test_github_actions_are_pinned_to_full_commit_shas(): From cc2a473f1ea5d1a8755e218efb0a9bee2461c2ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 08:43:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/36] ci(security): tidy follow-up details MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Polishes from the previous review pass that I noticed after pushing. - security.yml: drop the unneeded fetch-depth: 0 from the secret-scan checkout. detect-secrets-hook reads the working tree only — fetching full history slows the job without adding signal. - security.yml: add a follow-on step that surfaces the Bandit medium- severity informational pass in $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY. With continue-on-error: true the previous step never marks the job yellow/red, so findings were buried in the log; the summary now flags them with a ⚠️ heading (or ✅ when clean) at the top of the run page. - CONTRIBUTING.md: document the new tooling and gates so contributors don't bounce off CI: - detect-secrets-hook command + how to regenerate .secrets.baseline - the bandit baseline label gate (security-baseline-change) - shellcheck --severity=error invocation - explicit note that committed security-audit-requirements.txt can drift purely from upstream package releases and needs periodic regeneration even on unrelated PRs. --- .github/workflows/security.yml | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- CONTRIBUTING.md | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 0e19912f1e..b592605148 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -81,9 +81,32 @@ jobs: # findings in the job summary without breaking CI, so reviewers see # them before they accumulate. - name: Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass + id: bandit-medium continue-on-error: true run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -ll + # Surface the medium-severity outcome in the job summary so reviewers + # see it without expanding the log; continue-on-error swallows the + # non-zero exit otherwise. + - name: Surface medium-severity findings in job summary + if: always() + run: | + if [ "${{ steps.bandit-medium.outcome }}" = "failure" ]; then + { + echo "## ⚠️ Bandit medium-severity informational pass" + echo "" + echo "Findings surfaced at MEDIUM severity (no baseline). These do not" + echo "fail CI but should be audited — either fix the issue, suppress" + echo "with an explicit \`# nosec\` carrying a justification, or escalate" + echo "the severity threshold once they are triaged." + echo "" + echo "See the **Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass** step" + echo "above for the file/line list." + } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + else + echo "## ✅ Bandit medium-severity informational pass — clean" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + fi + # Prevent silent whitelisting: if the baseline grew, the PR must carry # the 'security-baseline-change' label to acknowledge it. - name: Check Bandit baseline growth @@ -100,8 +123,6 @@ jobs: steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 - with: - fetch-depth: 0 - name: Install uv uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index beb723cb81..4242210089 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -108,6 +108,39 @@ Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subproce uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --quiet --no-header --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt ``` +Upstream package releases drift over time, so even an unrelated PR touching `pyproject.toml` can fail the `dependency-audit` check until the committed file is regenerated with the command above and re-committed. + +#### Secret scanning + +```bash +git ls-files -z -- ':!:.secrets.baseline' ':!:uv.lock' ':!:.github/security-audit-requirements.txt' \ + | xargs -0 uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets-hook --baseline .secrets.baseline +``` + +The CI `secret-scan` job runs this against tracked files. It reports any high-entropy strings or provider tokens that aren't already whitelisted in `.secrets.baseline`. If you hit a known false positive (SHA pin, docs example, test fixture), regenerate the baseline: + +```bash +uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets scan \ + --exclude-files '\.secrets\.baseline$' \ + --exclude-files 'uv\.lock$' \ + --exclude-files '\.github/security-audit-requirements\.txt$' \ + > .secrets.baseline +``` + +Audit the new entries before committing — a leaked credential must never be merged into the baseline. + +#### Bandit baseline + +The CI `static-analysis` job runs Bandit with `--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json` (HIGH severity, blocking) plus a second informational pass at MEDIUM severity (`continue-on-error`, surfaced in the job summary). If a HIGH finding is intentional, audit it carefully, add an explicit `# nosec` with justification, and only then add it to the baseline. Growing the baseline is gated: the `check_bandit_baseline.py` script fails the PR unless it carries the `security-baseline-change` label, so reviewers see the whitelist expansion. + +#### Shell scripts + +```bash +shellcheck --severity=error scripts/bash/*.sh +``` + +The CI `lint.yml` `shellcheck` job blocks at `--severity=error` to catch real bugs while leaving stylistic warnings (SC2155 etc.) advisory. + ### Manual testing #### Testing setup From 8530e84835c3b8239073350aa9d55d4309749ecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 10:37:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/36] ci(security): apply self-review follow-ups MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Four hardening / robustness items raised during self-review of the PR. - check_bandit_baseline.py: normalize whitespace in the code-snippet hash that's part of each entry's identity. A bandit version bump that reformats the snippet (different number of context lines, different indentation) would otherwise make every baseline entry look "new", forcing the security-baseline-change label on every unrelated PR. - security.yml + check_secrets_baseline.py: symmetric growth gate on .secrets.baseline. detect-secrets-hook already blocks unknown secrets, but extending the baseline (whitelisting a new finding) was silent. Mirror the bandit gate — PR must carry secrets-baseline-change to acknowledge any new identity (filename + line + type + hashed_secret). - test_security_workflow.py: drop the brittle exact-name lookup for the blocking bandit step. The test now finds it by the baseline-arg signature, so future renames of the step don't silently bypass the --skip B602 check. Added _find_step_by_run_signature helper that insists on exactly one match. Strict assertions on OS matrix and tool version pins are kept — those are intentional security choices. - workflows/PUBLISHING.md: the shell-step NOTE in src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py points authors here for "security guidance", but the section didn't exist. Added an explicit "Security: shell steps execute arbitrary code" subsection covering the no-sandbox model, the inspect-before-install obligation, input-interpolation hygiene, and reviewer expectations. --- .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py | 13 +- .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++ .github/workflows/security.yml | 14 +++ tests/test_security_workflow.py | 33 +++++- workflows/PUBLISHING.md | 11 ++ 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py index 7d9601c19f..0823700152 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import hashlib import json import os +import re import subprocess import sys from pathlib import Path @@ -60,16 +61,20 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: return {"results": []}, True +_WHITESPACE_RE = re.compile(r"\s+") + + def _identity(result: dict) -> str: """Stable identity for a baseline entry. Combines location, test, severity, confidence, and a hash of the - pinned code snippet so reordering or formatting changes don't - register as new findings, but a different finding at the same line - does. + pinned code snippet (whitespace-normalized) so reformatting changes + or upstream bandit-output tweaks don't register as new findings, + but a different finding at the same line does. """ code = result.get("code", "") or "" - code_hash = hashlib.sha256(code.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16] + normalized = _WHITESPACE_RE.sub(" ", code).strip() + code_hash = hashlib.sha256(normalized.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:16] return "|".join( [ str(result.get("filename", "")), diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c172b045ff --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +"""Fail if new entries appear in the detect-secrets baseline without ack. + +Mirrors ``check_bandit_baseline.py``: when ``.secrets.baseline`` grows on +a PR, the maintainer adding the new whitelist entry must label the PR +``secrets-baseline-change`` so reviewers see the expansion. + +Identity is ``filename + line + type + hashed_secret`` — detect-secrets +already hashes the candidate, so identities are stable across runs and a +swap (remove one, add another with the same count) is still caught. + +When the baseline file does not exist at the base ref, the PR is the one +that introduces it; no acknowledgement is required. + +Required environment variables: +- ``SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE``: git ref of the PR base +- ``SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD``: git ref of the PR head +- ``SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS``: comma-separated PR labels + +Outside of PR events, all inputs may be empty and the script no-ops. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import os +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] +BASELINE_PATH = ".secrets.baseline" +ACK_LABEL = "secrets-baseline-change" + + +def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: + """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref).""" + if not ref: + return {"results": {}}, False + try: + blob = subprocess.run( + ["git", "show", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"], + check=True, + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + text=True, + ).stdout + except subprocess.CalledProcessError: + return {"results": {}}, False + try: + return json.loads(blob), True + except json.JSONDecodeError: + print(f"Could not parse baseline at {ref}; treating as empty.", file=sys.stderr) + return {"results": {}}, True + + +def _identities(baseline: dict) -> set[str]: + """Flatten detect-secrets results to a set of stable identities.""" + ids: set[str] = set() + results = baseline.get("results", {}) + if not isinstance(results, dict): + return ids + for filename, entries in results.items(): + if not isinstance(entries, list): + continue + for entry in entries: + if not isinstance(entry, dict): + continue + ids.add( + "|".join( + [ + str(filename), + str(entry.get("line_number", "")), + str(entry.get("type", "")), + str(entry.get("hashed_secret", "")), + ] + ) + ) + return ids + + +def main() -> int: + base_ref = os.environ.get("SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE", "").strip() + head_ref = os.environ.get("SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" + + if not base_ref or set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: + print("No PR base ref; secrets baseline diff check skipped.") + return 0 + + base_baseline, base_existed = _read_baseline_at(base_ref) + head_baseline, _ = _read_baseline_at(head_ref) + + if not base_existed: + print( + "Baseline file not present at base ref; treating this PR as the " + "introduction of the baseline. No acknowledgement required." + ) + return 0 + + base_ids = _identities(base_baseline) + head_ids = _identities(head_baseline) + + new_ids = head_ids - base_ids + if not new_ids: + print( + f"Secrets baseline entries: {len(base_ids)} -> {len(head_ids)} " + f"(no new identities)." + ) + return 0 + + labels = { + label.strip() + for label in os.environ.get("SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS", "").split(",") + if label.strip() + } + if ACK_LABEL in labels: + print( + f"Secrets baseline gained {len(new_ids)} new identities; " + f"acknowledged via label '{ACK_LABEL}'." + ) + return 0 + + print( + f"Secrets baseline gained {len(new_ids)} new identities. " + f"Audit the new entries — if they are genuine false positives " + f"(SHA pins, docs examples, test fixtures), add label " + f"'{ACK_LABEL}' to the PR to acknowledge them. If any are real " + f"secrets, remove them from history before merging.", + file=sys.stderr, + ) + for identity in sorted(new_ids): + print(f" + {identity}", file=sys.stderr) + return 1 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index b592605148..92c7c32f8c 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ jobs: steps: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + with: + # Needed by check_secrets_baseline.py to read the baseline at base ref. + fetch-depth: 0 - name: Install uv uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 @@ -145,3 +148,14 @@ jobs: ':!:.github/security-audit-requirements.txt' \ | xargs -0 uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets-hook \ --baseline .secrets.baseline + + # Symmetric with the bandit baseline gate: if .secrets.baseline grew, + # the PR must carry the 'secrets-baseline-change' label so reviewers + # see the whitelist expansion explicitly. + - name: Check secrets baseline growth + if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }} + env: + SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} + SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} + SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS: ${{ join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',') }} + run: python .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index e02e01eff7..1b42920003 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -72,6 +72,31 @@ def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: return _step(job_name, step_name)["run"] +def _find_step_by_run_signature(job_name: str, marker: str) -> dict: + """Locate a step in *job_name* whose ``run`` command contains *marker*. + + Step naming is incidental to behavior; tests that assert on what a + step *does* should look it up by what it runs, not by its label, so + renames don't silently make the assertion skip. + """ + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + matches = [ + step + for step in workflow["jobs"][job_name]["steps"] + if marker in (step.get("run") or "") + ] + if not matches: + raise AssertionError( + f"No step in job {job_name!r} runs a command containing {marker!r}." + ) + if len(matches) > 1: + raise AssertionError( + f"Marker {marker!r} matched {len(matches)} steps in job " + f"{job_name!r}; expected exactly one." + ) + return matches[0] + + def _load_sync_script(): spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( "check_security_requirements", @@ -185,13 +210,17 @@ def test_actions_are_pinned_to_full_commit_shas(self): assert re.search(r"@v\d+", uses_ref) is None def test_bandit_does_not_globally_skip_b602(self): - run = _step_run("static-analysis", "Run Bandit") + # Identify the blocking bandit step by its baseline-arg rather than + # by exact step name — name is incidental, behavior is what matters. + bandit_step = _find_step_by_run_signature( + "static-analysis", "--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json" + ) + run = bandit_step["run"] workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") assert run == BANDIT assert "--skip" not in run assert "--skip B602" not in workflow_text - assert "--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json" in run def test_bandit_baseline_only_ignores_shell_step_b602(self): baseline = json.loads(BANDIT_BASELINE.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) diff --git a/workflows/PUBLISHING.md b/workflows/PUBLISHING.md index ce0d251826..e10f814e6a 100644 --- a/workflows/PUBLISHING.md +++ b/workflows/PUBLISHING.md @@ -272,6 +272,17 @@ When releasing a new version: - **Quote variables** — use proper quoting in shell commands to handle spaces - **Check exit codes** — shell step failures stop the workflow; make sure commands are robust +#### Security: shell steps execute arbitrary code + +Workflow `shell` steps execute their `run` field through `/bin/sh` (POSIX) or the platform shell. There is no sandbox between the step and the user's machine: a malicious or buggy `run` block can read environment variables, modify files outside the project, exfiltrate data, or escalate privileges. + +Catalog-listed workflows are reviewed at submission time (see [Verification Process](#verification-process)), but you should still treat every install as code-execution from an untrusted source until you have read the `workflow.yml`: + +- **Before installing a workflow**, run `specify workflow inspect ` (or read the YAML directly) and audit every `shell` step's `run` field. +- **Prefer explicit commands over interpolation** in `run` blocks: `{{ inputs.something }}` substitutions should be quoted and constrained via `enum` so a malicious input can't inject shell syntax. +- **Limit privilege**: shell steps inherit the user's environment. Workflows that need elevated access (sudo, secrets, GitHub tokens) should call them out explicitly in the README so reviewers can spot the requirement. +- **Authors**: if your workflow has shell steps that look risky out of context (deletions, network calls, credential reads), document the rationale in your README. Maintainers will reject submissions whose shell steps can't be justified at review time. + ### Integration Flexibility - **Set `integration` at workflow level** — use the `workflow.integration` field as the default From 92249270e96c8f347288edc6d75fb8abdfd257f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 00:05:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/36] ci(security): apply review #2 follow-ups MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Two items from the second self-review: - workflows/PUBLISHING.md: fix invented command name. The first draft recommended `specify workflow inspect ` which doesn't exist — the actual subcommand is `workflow info`, and even that only shows metadata (name/version/inputs/step IDs+types), never the shell `run` content. Replace with explicit guidance to read the raw workflow.yml directly when auditing shell steps. - tests/test_baseline_gates.py: new file. 12 unit tests covering both check_bandit_baseline.py and check_secrets_baseline.py — no PR base ref, introduction (baseline absent at base), identical baselines, growth without ack label, growth with ack label, swap attack (constant count, new identity), and (bandit-only) whitespace-only drift in the code snippet hash. The latter verifies the normalization added earlier protects against bandit reformatting its output. --- tests/test_baseline_gates.py | 339 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ workflows/PUBLISHING.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tests/test_baseline_gates.py diff --git a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..49fd5ea1d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +"""Tests for the bandit and detect-secrets baseline growth gate scripts. + +Both scripts share the same shape: read the baseline at a base ref and a +head ref, compare *identities* (not counts) so a swap doesn't slip +through, and require an acknowledgement label when the head set is a +strict superset. + +We drive the scripts as subprocesses against a throwaway git repo so the +``git show :`` calls inside them resolve real refs. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent +BANDIT_SCRIPT = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "scripts" / "check_bandit_baseline.py" +SECRETS_SCRIPT = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "scripts" / "check_secrets_baseline.py" + + +def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str: + return subprocess.run( + ["git", *args], + cwd=repo, + check=True, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + text=True, + ).stdout.strip() + + +def _init_repo(tmp_path: Path) -> Path: + repo = tmp_path / "repo" + repo.mkdir() + _git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main") + _git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com") + _git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test") + # Mirror the layout the scripts expect: REPO_ROOT/.github/... + (repo / ".github").mkdir() + (repo / ".github" / "scripts").mkdir() + # Copy the script under test into the repo so REPO_ROOT inside the + # script (resolve().parents[2]) points at our throwaway repo. + return repo + + +def _install_script(repo: Path, source: Path) -> Path: + target = repo / ".github" / "scripts" / source.name + target.write_text(source.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), encoding="utf-8") + return target + + +def _commit_baseline(repo: Path, baseline_path: str, payload: dict, message: str) -> str: + target = repo / baseline_path + target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + target.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2), encoding="utf-8") + _git(repo, "add", baseline_path) + _git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", message) + return _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + + +def _run_script(repo: Path, script: Path, env_overrides: dict[str, str]): + env = { + "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", + "HOME": str(repo), # avoid leaking host gitconfig + **env_overrides, + } + return subprocess.run( + [sys.executable, str(script)], + cwd=repo, + env=env, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + text=True, + ) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Bandit baseline gate +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _bandit_entry(filename: str, line: int, test_id: str = "B602", code: str = "shell=True") -> dict: + return { + "filename": filename, + "line_number": line, + "test_id": test_id, + "issue_severity": "HIGH", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "code": code, + } + + +class TestBanditBaselineGate: + @pytest.fixture + def repo(self, tmp_path): + repo = _init_repo(tmp_path) + _install_script(repo, BANDIT_SCRIPT) + return repo + + def _run(self, repo, base, head, labels=""): + return _run_script( + repo, + repo / ".github" / "scripts" / BANDIT_SCRIPT.name, + { + "BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE": base, + "BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD": head, + "BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS": labels, + }, + ) + + def test_no_base_ref_is_skipped(self, repo): + # Need at least one commit so HEAD resolves. + _commit_baseline(repo, ".github/bandit-baseline.json", {"results": []}, "init") + result = self._run(repo, base="", head="HEAD") + assert result.returncode == 0 + assert "baseline diff check skipped" in result.stdout + + def test_introduction_pr_skips_check(self, repo): + _git(repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "before baseline") + base_sha = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, + "introduce baseline", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr + assert "introduction of the baseline" in result.stdout + + def test_identical_baselines_pass(self, repo): + entries = [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)] + base_sha = _commit_baseline(repo, ".github/bandit-baseline.json", {"results": entries}, "base") + # No changes; head == base. + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=base_sha) + assert result.returncode == 0 + assert "no new identities" in result.stdout + + def test_growth_without_label_fails(self, repo): + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10), _bandit_entry("b.py", 20)]}, + "grow", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 1 + assert "'security-baseline-change'" in result.stderr + + def test_growth_with_label_passes(self, repo): + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10), _bandit_entry("b.py", 20)]}, + "grow", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha, labels="security-baseline-change") + assert result.returncode == 0 + assert "acknowledged via label" in result.stdout + + def test_swap_attack_detected(self, repo): + """Removing one entry and adding a different one keeps the count + constant but introduces a new identity; gate must still fire.""" + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("b.py", 20)]}, # swapped, same count + "swap", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 1, "swap should be detected via identity diff" + assert "1 new identities" in result.stderr + + def test_whitespace_only_change_does_not_trip(self, repo): + """A bandit version bump that reformats the code snippet (different + whitespace) shouldn't make every entry look new.""" + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10, code="shell=True\n capture_output=True")]}, + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".github/bandit-baseline.json", + { + "results": [ + _bandit_entry("a.py", 10, code="shell=True\ncapture_output=True") + ] + }, + "reformatted snippet", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Secrets baseline gate +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def _secrets_baseline(*entries: tuple[str, int, str, str]) -> dict: + """Build a detect-secrets-style baseline from (file, line, type, hash) tuples.""" + results: dict[str, list[dict]] = {} + for filename, line, secret_type, hashed in entries: + results.setdefault(filename, []).append( + { + "type": secret_type, + "filename": filename, + "hashed_secret": hashed, + "is_verified": False, + "line_number": line, + } + ) + return {"version": "1.5.0", "results": results} + + +class TestSecretsBaselineGate: + @pytest.fixture + def repo(self, tmp_path): + repo = _init_repo(tmp_path) + _install_script(repo, SECRETS_SCRIPT) + return repo + + def _run(self, repo, base, head, labels=""): + return _run_script( + repo, + repo / ".github" / "scripts" / SECRETS_SCRIPT.name, + { + "SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE": base, + "SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD": head, + "SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS": labels, + }, + ) + + def test_introduction_pr_skips_check(self, repo): + _git(repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "before baseline") + base_sha = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc123")), + "introduce", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr + assert "introduction of the baseline" in result.stdout + + def test_growth_without_label_fails(self, repo): + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc")), + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline( + ("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc"), + ("b.py", 2, "Secret Keyword", "def"), + ), + "grow", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 1 + assert "'secrets-baseline-change'" in result.stderr + + def test_growth_with_label_passes(self, repo): + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc")), + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline( + ("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc"), + ("b.py", 2, "Secret Keyword", "def"), + ), + "grow", + ) + result = self._run( + repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha, labels="secrets-baseline-change" + ) + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr + assert "acknowledged via label" in result.stdout + + def test_swap_attack_detected(self, repo): + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc")), + "base", + ) + head_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, + ".secrets.baseline", + _secrets_baseline(("b.py", 2, "Secret Keyword", "def")), + "swap", + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 1 + assert "1 new identities" in result.stderr + + def test_identical_baselines_pass(self, repo): + entries = (("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc"),) + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + repo, ".secrets.baseline", _secrets_baseline(*entries), "base" + ) + result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=base_sha) + assert result.returncode == 0 + assert "no new identities" in result.stdout diff --git a/workflows/PUBLISHING.md b/workflows/PUBLISHING.md index e10f814e6a..0370ed09f9 100644 --- a/workflows/PUBLISHING.md +++ b/workflows/PUBLISHING.md @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ Workflow `shell` steps execute their `run` field through `/bin/sh` (POSIX) or th Catalog-listed workflows are reviewed at submission time (see [Verification Process](#verification-process)), but you should still treat every install as code-execution from an untrusted source until you have read the `workflow.yml`: -- **Before installing a workflow**, run `specify workflow inspect ` (or read the YAML directly) and audit every `shell` step's `run` field. +- **Before installing a workflow**, fetch the raw YAML and audit every `shell` step's `run` field directly. `specify workflow info ` only shows metadata (name, version, inputs, step IDs/types) — not the shell content that would actually execute. - **Prefer explicit commands over interpolation** in `run` blocks: `{{ inputs.something }}` substitutions should be quoted and constrained via `enum` so a malicious input can't inject shell syntax. - **Limit privilege**: shell steps inherit the user's environment. Workflows that need elevated access (sudo, secrets, GitHub tokens) should call them out explicitly in the README so reviewers can spot the requirement. - **Authors**: if your workflow has shell steps that look risky out of context (deletions, network calls, credential reads), document the rationale in your README. Maintainers will reject submissions whose shell steps can't be justified at review time. From 8af64bf557092d8bb1ec3e583d923b0eb2c0098f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 00:17:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/36] ci(security): apply review #3 follow-ups MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Three polish items from the third self-review pass. - tests/test_upgrade.py: new TestBoundedRead class. Pins the contract that _fetch_latest_release_tag wraps the response body through read_response_limited with max_bytes=1024*1024. Protects the hardening against a silent revert to `resp.read()` in a future refactor (the extraction to _version.py during the last merge would have lost it if we hadn't caught it manually). - tests/test_baseline_gates.py: replace the two near-identical test classes with a parametrized TestSharedBaselineGate (bandit + secrets via a GateConfig dataclass and a `gate` fixture). Bandit-only quirks (no-base-ref short-circuit, whitespace-normalized identity) stay in TestBanditSpecific. Removes ~80 lines of duplication; the two scripts now exercise the same scenarios by construction so a divergence is caught the moment one drifts. - tests/test_baseline_gates.py: new shared scenario test_corrupt_json_at_base_falls_back_to_empty. Covers the except JSONDecodeError branch of _read_baseline_at — corrupt base doesn't crash the script; instead the head set becomes "all new" and the normal label gate fires. Was previously dead code from a coverage standpoint. 3009 passed (up from 3006 — 14 baseline tests now parametrized as 12 + 2 bandit-specific, plus 1 new bounded-read test). --- tests/test_baseline_gates.py | 428 +++++++++++++++++------------------ tests/test_upgrade.py | 37 +++ 2 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 220 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py index 49fd5ea1d4..72adf2522e 100644 --- a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py +++ b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ through, and require an acknowledgement label when the head set is a strict superset. +Shared cases (introduction, identical, growth±label, swap, corrupt-JSON +fallback) are parametrized across both scripts via the ``gate`` fixture. +Bandit-only quirks (no-base-ref, whitespace normalization) live in +``TestBanditSpecific``. + We drive the scripts as subprocesses against a throwaway git repo so the ``git show :`` calls inside them resolve real refs. """ @@ -14,7 +19,9 @@ import json import subprocess import sys +from dataclasses import dataclass from pathlib import Path +from typing import Callable import pytest @@ -41,11 +48,8 @@ def _init_repo(tmp_path: Path) -> Path: _git(repo, "init", "-q", "-b", "main") _git(repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com") _git(repo, "config", "user.name", "Test") - # Mirror the layout the scripts expect: REPO_ROOT/.github/... (repo / ".github").mkdir() (repo / ".github" / "scripts").mkdir() - # Copy the script under test into the repo so REPO_ROOT inside the - # script (resolve().parents[2]) points at our throwaway repo. return repo @@ -55,19 +59,23 @@ def _install_script(repo: Path, source: Path) -> Path: return target -def _commit_baseline(repo: Path, baseline_path: str, payload: dict, message: str) -> str: - target = repo / baseline_path +def _commit_file(repo: Path, rel_path: str, content: str, message: str) -> str: + target = repo / rel_path target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - target.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2), encoding="utf-8") - _git(repo, "add", baseline_path) + target.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8") + _git(repo, "add", rel_path) _git(repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", message) return _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") +def _commit_baseline(repo: Path, baseline_path: str, payload: dict, message: str) -> str: + return _commit_file(repo, baseline_path, json.dumps(payload, indent=2), message) + + def _run_script(repo: Path, script: Path, env_overrides: dict[str, str]): env = { "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", - "HOME": str(repo), # avoid leaking host gitconfig + "HOME": str(repo), **env_overrides, } return subprocess.run( @@ -81,259 +89,239 @@ def _run_script(repo: Path, script: Path, env_overrides: dict[str, str]): # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Bandit baseline gate +# Parametrization machinery # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -def _bandit_entry(filename: str, line: int, test_id: str = "B602", code: str = "shell=True") -> dict: +def _bandit_baseline(entries: list[tuple[str, int]]) -> dict: + """Build a bandit-style baseline from (filename, line) tuples.""" return { - "filename": filename, - "line_number": line, - "test_id": test_id, - "issue_severity": "HIGH", - "issue_confidence": "HIGH", - "code": code, + "results": [ + { + "filename": filename, + "line_number": line, + "test_id": "B602", + "issue_severity": "HIGH", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "code": f"shell=True at {filename}:{line}", + } + for filename, line in entries + ] } -class TestBanditBaselineGate: - @pytest.fixture - def repo(self, tmp_path): - repo = _init_repo(tmp_path) - _install_script(repo, BANDIT_SCRIPT) - return repo +def _secrets_baseline(entries: list[tuple[str, int]]) -> dict: + """Build a detect-secrets-style baseline from (filename, line) tuples.""" + results: dict[str, list[dict]] = {} + for filename, line in entries: + results.setdefault(filename, []).append( + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": filename, + # The hash is part of the identity, so make it unique per (file, line). + "hashed_secret": f"h_{filename}_{line}", + "is_verified": False, + "line_number": line, + } + ) + return {"version": "1.5.0", "results": results} + + +@dataclass +class GateConfig: + name: str + script: Path + env_prefix: str + baseline_path: str + label: str + make_baseline: Callable[[list[tuple[str, int]]], dict] + + +BANDIT_GATE = GateConfig( + name="bandit", + script=BANDIT_SCRIPT, + env_prefix="BANDIT_BASELINE", + baseline_path=".github/bandit-baseline.json", + label="security-baseline-change", + make_baseline=_bandit_baseline, +) + + +SECRETS_GATE = GateConfig( + name="secrets", + script=SECRETS_SCRIPT, + env_prefix="SECRETS_BASELINE", + baseline_path=".secrets.baseline", + label="secrets-baseline-change", + make_baseline=_secrets_baseline, +) + + +@dataclass +class GateHandle: + """Live test harness: a repo with the script installed and helpers.""" + + config: GateConfig + repo: Path + + def commit(self, entries: list[tuple[str, int]], message: str) -> str: + return _commit_baseline( + self.repo, + self.config.baseline_path, + self.config.make_baseline(entries), + message, + ) + + def commit_raw(self, raw_content: str, message: str) -> str: + return _commit_file(self.repo, self.config.baseline_path, raw_content, message) - def _run(self, repo, base, head, labels=""): + def run(self, *, base: str, head: str, labels: str = ""): return _run_script( - repo, - repo / ".github" / "scripts" / BANDIT_SCRIPT.name, + self.repo, + self.repo / ".github" / "scripts" / self.config.script.name, { - "BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE": base, - "BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD": head, - "BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS": labels, + f"{self.config.env_prefix}_BASE": base, + f"{self.config.env_prefix}_HEAD": head, + f"{self.config.env_prefix}_LABELS": labels, }, ) - def test_no_base_ref_is_skipped(self, repo): - # Need at least one commit so HEAD resolves. - _commit_baseline(repo, ".github/bandit-baseline.json", {"results": []}, "init") - result = self._run(repo, base="", head="HEAD") - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert "baseline diff check skipped" in result.stdout - def test_introduction_pr_skips_check(self, repo): - _git(repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "before baseline") - base_sha = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, - "introduce baseline", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) +@pytest.fixture(params=[BANDIT_GATE, SECRETS_GATE], ids=lambda c: c.name) +def gate(request, tmp_path) -> GateHandle: + config: GateConfig = request.param + repo = _init_repo(tmp_path) + _install_script(repo, config.script) + return GateHandle(config=config, repo=repo) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Shared scenarios (parametrized across both scripts) +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class TestSharedBaselineGate: + """Scenarios that must hold for both the bandit and secrets gates.""" + + def test_introduction_pr_skips_check(self, gate: GateHandle): + # Baseline file did not exist at base ref → no acknowledgement needed. + _git(gate.repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "before baseline") + base_sha = _git(gate.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "introduce baseline") + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr assert "introduction of the baseline" in result.stdout - def test_identical_baselines_pass(self, repo): - entries = [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)] - base_sha = _commit_baseline(repo, ".github/bandit-baseline.json", {"results": entries}, "base") - # No changes; head == base. - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=base_sha) + def test_identical_baselines_pass(self, gate: GateHandle): + base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 0 assert "no new identities" in result.stdout - def test_growth_without_label_fails(self, repo): - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, - "base", - ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10), _bandit_entry("b.py", 20)]}, - "grow", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + def test_growth_without_label_fails(self, gate: GateHandle): + base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10), ("b.py", 20)], "grow") + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + assert result.returncode == 1 - assert "'security-baseline-change'" in result.stderr + assert f"'{gate.config.label}'" in result.stderr - def test_growth_with_label_passes(self, repo): - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, - "base", - ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10), _bandit_entry("b.py", 20)]}, - "grow", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha, labels="security-baseline-change") - assert result.returncode == 0 + def test_growth_with_label_passes(self, gate: GateHandle): + base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10), ("b.py", 20)], "grow") + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha, labels=gate.config.label) + + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr assert "acknowledged via label" in result.stdout - def test_swap_attack_detected(self, repo): - """Removing one entry and adding a different one keeps the count - constant but introduces a new identity; gate must still fire.""" - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10)]}, - "base", - ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("b.py", 20)]}, # swapped, same count - "swap", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) - assert result.returncode == 1, "swap should be detected via identity diff" + def test_swap_attack_detected(self, gate: GateHandle): + """Remove one entry and add a different one → constant count, but + a *new* identity appears. Gate must still fire.""" + base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + head_sha = gate.commit([("b.py", 20)], "swap") # same count, different ID + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + + assert result.returncode == 1, "identity diff must catch swaps" assert "1 new identities" in result.stderr - def test_whitespace_only_change_does_not_trip(self, repo): - """A bandit version bump that reformats the code snippet (different - whitespace) shouldn't make every entry look new.""" - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - {"results": [_bandit_entry("a.py", 10, code="shell=True\n capture_output=True")]}, - "base", - ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".github/bandit-baseline.json", - { - "results": [ - _bandit_entry("a.py", 10, code="shell=True\ncapture_output=True") - ] - }, - "reformatted snippet", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr + def test_corrupt_json_at_base_falls_back_to_empty(self, gate: GateHandle): + """If the baseline at the base ref is unparseable JSON, treat its + contents as empty so the script still completes (the head set + becomes 'all new' and the label gate fires).""" + base_sha = gate.commit_raw("{ invalid json", "corrupt base") + head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "valid head") + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + + assert result.returncode == 1, "corrupt base should not crash the script" + assert f"'{gate.config.label}'" in result.stderr + assert "Could not parse baseline" in result.stderr # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Secrets baseline gate +# Bandit-only scenarios # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -def _secrets_baseline(*entries: tuple[str, int, str, str]) -> dict: - """Build a detect-secrets-style baseline from (file, line, type, hash) tuples.""" - results: dict[str, list[dict]] = {} - for filename, line, secret_type, hashed in entries: - results.setdefault(filename, []).append( - { - "type": secret_type, - "filename": filename, - "hashed_secret": hashed, - "is_verified": False, - "line_number": line, - } - ) - return {"version": "1.5.0", "results": results} - +class TestBanditSpecific: + """Cases that only exist for the bandit gate.""" -class TestSecretsBaselineGate: @pytest.fixture - def repo(self, tmp_path): + def gate(self, tmp_path) -> GateHandle: repo = _init_repo(tmp_path) - _install_script(repo, SECRETS_SCRIPT) - return repo - - def _run(self, repo, base, head, labels=""): - return _run_script( - repo, - repo / ".github" / "scripts" / SECRETS_SCRIPT.name, - { - "SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE": base, - "SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD": head, - "SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS": labels, - }, - ) - - def test_introduction_pr_skips_check(self, repo): - _git(repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "before baseline") - base_sha = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc123")), - "introduce", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - assert "introduction of the baseline" in result.stdout + _install_script(repo, BANDIT_SCRIPT) + return GateHandle(config=BANDIT_GATE, repo=repo) - def test_growth_without_label_fails(self, repo): - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc")), - "base", - ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline( - ("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc"), - ("b.py", 2, "Secret Keyword", "def"), - ), - "grow", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) - assert result.returncode == 1 - assert "'secrets-baseline-change'" in result.stderr + def test_no_base_ref_is_skipped(self, gate: GateHandle): + gate.commit([], "init") # need at least one commit so HEAD resolves + result = gate.run(base="", head="HEAD") + assert result.returncode == 0 + assert "baseline diff check skipped" in result.stdout - def test_growth_with_label_passes(self, repo): + def test_whitespace_only_change_does_not_trip(self, gate: GateHandle): + """A bandit version bump that reformats the code snippet (different + whitespace) should not flag the same finding as new — that's the + purpose of the whitespace-normalized identity hash.""" base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc")), + gate.repo, + gate.config.baseline_path, + { + "results": [ + { + "filename": "a.py", + "line_number": 10, + "test_id": "B602", + "issue_severity": "HIGH", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "code": "shell=True\n capture_output=True", + } + ] + }, "base", ) head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline( - ("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc"), - ("b.py", 2, "Secret Keyword", "def"), - ), - "grow", - ) - result = self._run( - repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha, labels="secrets-baseline-change" + gate.repo, + gate.config.baseline_path, + { + "results": [ + { + "filename": "a.py", + "line_number": 10, + "test_id": "B602", + "issue_severity": "HIGH", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "code": "shell=True\ncapture_output=True", # one less space + } + ] + }, + "reformatted snippet", ) - assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr - assert "acknowledged via label" in result.stdout - def test_swap_attack_detected(self, repo): - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline(("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc")), - "base", - ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, - ".secrets.baseline", - _secrets_baseline(("b.py", 2, "Secret Keyword", "def")), - "swap", - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=head_sha) - assert result.returncode == 1 - assert "1 new identities" in result.stderr + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) - def test_identical_baselines_pass(self, repo): - entries = (("a.py", 1, "Secret Keyword", "abc"),) - base_sha = _commit_baseline( - repo, ".secrets.baseline", _secrets_baseline(*entries), "base" - ) - result = self._run(repo, base=base_sha, head=base_sha) - assert result.returncode == 0 - assert "no new identities" in result.stdout + assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr diff --git a/tests/test_upgrade.py b/tests/test_upgrade.py index 3ad8c84f62..954f07e44b 100644 --- a/tests/test_upgrade.py +++ b/tests/test_upgrade.py @@ -235,6 +235,43 @@ def test_generic_exception_propagates(self): _fetch_latest_release_tag() +class TestBoundedRead: + """Regression test for the read_response_limited hardening. + + A future refactor could silently revert `_fetch_latest_release_tag` to + `resp.read()` (the unbounded form) — this test pins the contract that + the response body is read through ``read_response_limited`` with a + bounded ``max_bytes``. + """ + + def test_response_body_is_bounded(self): + recorded: dict = {} + real_read = __import__( + "specify_cli._download_security", fromlist=["read_response_limited"] + ).read_response_limited + + def _spy(response, *, max_bytes=None, label=None, **kwargs): + recorded["max_bytes"] = max_bytes + recorded["label"] = label + # Forward to the real implementation so the function under test + # still gets a parseable body. + return real_read(response, max_bytes=max_bytes, label=label, **kwargs) + + with patch( + "specify_cli.authentication.http.urllib.request.urlopen", + return_value=_mock_urlopen_response({"tag_name": "v9.9.9"}), + ), patch("specify_cli._version.read_response_limited", side_effect=_spy): + tag, reason = _fetch_latest_release_tag() + + assert tag == "v9.9.9" + assert reason is None + # max_bytes is set by the caller; the exact value is a deliberate + # cap (1 MiB) for the GitHub release JSON. Don't accept None or + # the default — the caller must pass an explicit upper bound. + assert recorded["max_bytes"] == 1024 * 1024 + assert "github" in (recorded["label"] or "").lower() + + _FAILURE_CASES = [ ("offline or timeout", urllib.error.URLError("down")), (_RATE_LIMITED_REASON, _http_error(403)), From bbf2d994d21bdf6a4fa2bfc451004ebe1bb43a9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 07:52:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/36] test(upgrade): polish TestBoundedRead readability MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Three micro-cleanups raised during review #4 of my own work — no behavior change, just clarity. - Replace the __import__("specify_cli._download_security", fromlist=...) dance with a plain `import ... as _real_read_response_limited` at the top of the file. Easier to grep, no runtime difference. - Type the recorded dict explicitly and make max_bytes/label keyword- only without defaults on the spy. If a future refactor drops either argument the spy now raises TypeError immediately, instead of silently recording None and tripping the post-call assertion with a more confusing message. - Tighten the label check from fuzzy substring match ("github" in label.lower()) to exact equality ("GitHub latest release"). Both catch regressions; exact equality also catches typos. --- tests/test_upgrade.py | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_upgrade.py b/tests/test_upgrade.py index 954f07e44b..82fec145e0 100644 --- a/tests/test_upgrade.py +++ b/tests/test_upgrade.py @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from typer.testing import CliRunner from specify_cli import app +from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _real_read_response_limited from specify_cli._version import ( _fetch_latest_release_tag, _get_installed_version, @@ -245,17 +246,19 @@ class TestBoundedRead: """ def test_response_body_is_bounded(self): - recorded: dict = {} - real_read = __import__( - "specify_cli._download_security", fromlist=["read_response_limited"] - ).read_response_limited + recorded: dict[str, int | str] = {} - def _spy(response, *, max_bytes=None, label=None, **kwargs): + def _spy(response, *, max_bytes: int, label: str, **kwargs): + # max_bytes and label are keyword-only with no defaults: if the + # caller forgets to pass either, the call raises TypeError here + # (instead of recording a misleading None). recorded["max_bytes"] = max_bytes recorded["label"] = label # Forward to the real implementation so the function under test # still gets a parseable body. - return real_read(response, max_bytes=max_bytes, label=label, **kwargs) + return _real_read_response_limited( + response, max_bytes=max_bytes, label=label, **kwargs + ) with patch( "specify_cli.authentication.http.urllib.request.urlopen", @@ -265,11 +268,12 @@ def _spy(response, *, max_bytes=None, label=None, **kwargs): assert tag == "v9.9.9" assert reason is None - # max_bytes is set by the caller; the exact value is a deliberate - # cap (1 MiB) for the GitHub release JSON. Don't accept None or - # the default — the caller must pass an explicit upper bound. + # The cap (1 MiB) is a deliberate ceiling for the GitHub release + # JSON — keep it explicit so a future refactor that drops the + # `max_bytes=` argument fails this test instead of regressing + # silently to the default. assert recorded["max_bytes"] == 1024 * 1024 - assert "github" in (recorded["label"] or "").lower() + assert recorded["label"] == "GitHub latest release" _FAILURE_CASES = [ From 0eb0009cfda0081f8441ef235c824b6d74aa5c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 08:20:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/36] ci(security): address Copilot review #4300554119 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Six items from the new Copilot pass. Three were latent bugs in the guardrails added by earlier commits, two are documentation/wording, one is parity coverage. Bugs - security.yml: the MEDIUM Bandit informational pass ran without --baseline, so the whitelisted HIGH B602 finding re-fired there on every run, turning the job summary into a permanent warning. Apply the same baseline to both passes; medium-only NEW findings now surface, as intended. - security.yml: the summary step ran with if: always() but the MEDIUM pass has the default if: success() — when the blocking HIGH step fails, the MEDIUM pass is skipped (outcome=skipped, not failure) and the summary wrote "✅ clean" anyway. Switch to a case statement that handles failure/success/skipped distinctly (⚠️ / ✅ / ⏭️). - check_bandit_baseline.py and check_secrets_baseline.py used `git show :` on both sides, so an unreadable/unfetched head ref returned empty results and the diff computed 0 new identities → fail-open. Read the head side from the working tree instead (CI is checked out at the PR head), fail-closed when the file is missing, and SystemExit on corrupt JSON. The base side keeps the lenient JSONDecodeError fallback because that's historical state we can't change. Wording - security.yml + CONTRIBUTING.md: both mentioned `# nosec` as a suppression mechanism, but tests/test_security_workflow.py:: test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source explicitly forbids `# nosec` under src/. Replace with the actually-supported paths (bandit baseline for HIGH findings, `# noqa: S6xx` for ruff subprocess-shell rules) and flag the forbidden-comment policy. Parity coverage - tests/test_security_workflow.py: three new tests for the secret-scan job mirroring the dependency-audit / static-analysis coverage — detect-secrets-hook command, baseline path, excluded paths, growth gate env wiring (BASE only, no HEAD env), and fetch-depth: 0. - tests/test_workflows.py: regression test that WorkflowCatalog._fetch_single_catalog routes through read_response_limited with error_type=WorkflowCatalogError and label "workflow catalog". Mirrors TestBoundedRead for _fetch_latest_ release_tag and the equivalent test in test_integration_catalog.py. - tests/test_baseline_gates.py: two new fail-closed cases (head missing in working tree, head corrupt in working tree); drop the now-unused head_sha returns and the head env var from GateHandle.run. Note: Copilot also flagged "no tests on baseline gate scripts" — those tests already shipped in tests/test_baseline_gates.py (commit 2fd8071, posted before the review). Updated here with the new fail-closed cases. Tests: 3017 passed (was 3009). --- .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py | 51 ++++++++++++++-- .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py | 39 ++++++++++-- .github/workflows/security.yml | 63 ++++++++++++------- CONTRIBUTING.md | 4 +- tests/test_baseline_gates.py | 71 +++++++++++++++++----- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 61 +++++++++++++++++-- tests/test_workflows.py | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py index 0823700152..e81cb69f7f 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py @@ -16,9 +16,13 @@ that introduces it; we treat all entries as the starting baseline and do not require the label. +For the head side we read the working tree directly (the CI runner is +checked out at the PR head, so the working-tree file IS the head state). +Reading via ``git show :`` would fail-open on unfetched refs +or detached checkouts — for a security gate we want fail-closed. + Required environment variables: - ``BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE``: git ref of the PR base -- ``BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD``: git ref of the PR head - ``BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS``: comma-separated PR labels Outside of PR events, all inputs may be empty and the script no-ops. @@ -40,7 +44,11 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: - """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref).""" + """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref). + + Used for the base side. The head side reads the working tree to avoid + silently fail-opening on an unfetched/invalid head ref. + """ if not ref: return {"results": []}, False try: @@ -61,6 +69,30 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: return {"results": []}, True +def _read_baseline_from_worktree() -> tuple[dict, bool]: + """Return (baseline_json, file_exists_on_disk). + + The CI runner is checked out at the PR head, so the working-tree + file IS the head state. Reading it directly sidesteps spurious + ``git show`` failures that would otherwise let an unreadable head + silently pass the gate. + + Asymmetric with the base reader: a corrupt JSON on disk is the + proposed PR state — we fail-closed there rather than treating + it as an empty baseline (which would silently drop the gate). + """ + path = REPO_ROOT / BASELINE_PATH + if not path.exists(): + return {"results": []}, False + try: + return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")), True + except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: + raise SystemExit( + f"Working-tree baseline at {BASELINE_PATH} is corrupt: {exc}. " + f"Refusing to fail-open on a security gate." + ) + + _WHITESPACE_RE = re.compile(r"\s+") @@ -89,14 +121,13 @@ def _identity(result: dict) -> str: def main() -> int: base_ref = os.environ.get("BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE", "").strip() - head_ref = os.environ.get("BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" if not base_ref or set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: print("No PR base ref; baseline diff check skipped.") return 0 base_baseline, base_existed = _read_baseline_at(base_ref) - head_baseline, _ = _read_baseline_at(head_ref) + head_baseline, head_existed = _read_baseline_from_worktree() if not base_existed: print( @@ -105,6 +136,18 @@ def main() -> int: ) return 0 + if not head_existed: + # Fail-closed: the file existed at base but is missing in the + # working tree. Either the PR deleted it (suspicious — the gate + # would no longer protect anything) or the workspace is incomplete. + print( + f"Baseline file {BASELINE_PATH} existed at the base ref but is " + f"missing in the working tree. Refusing to fail-open on a " + f"security gate.", + file=sys.stderr, + ) + return 1 + base_ids = {_identity(r) for r in base_baseline.get("results", [])} head_ids = {_identity(r) for r in head_baseline.get("results", [])} diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py index c172b045ff..8f1daf2bb5 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py @@ -11,9 +11,12 @@ When the baseline file does not exist at the base ref, the PR is the one that introduces it; no acknowledgement is required. +For the head side we read the working tree directly (the CI runner is +checked out at the PR head); this avoids fail-opening when +``git show :`` happens to fail. + Required environment variables: - ``SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE``: git ref of the PR base -- ``SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD``: git ref of the PR head - ``SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS``: comma-separated PR labels Outside of PR events, all inputs may be empty and the script no-ops. @@ -33,7 +36,7 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: - """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref).""" + """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref). Base side only.""" if not ref: return {"results": {}}, False try: @@ -54,6 +57,26 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: return {"results": {}}, True +def _read_baseline_from_worktree() -> tuple[dict, bool]: + """Return (baseline_json, file_exists_on_disk). Head side. + + Reading the working tree (rather than ``git show :``) makes the + head side fail-closed: a missing file blocks the gate, and a corrupt + file raises SystemExit rather than being treated as empty (which + would silently neutralize the gate). + """ + path = REPO_ROOT / BASELINE_PATH + if not path.exists(): + return {"results": {}}, False + try: + return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")), True + except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: + raise SystemExit( + f"Working-tree baseline at {BASELINE_PATH} is corrupt: {exc}. " + f"Refusing to fail-open on a security gate." + ) + + def _identities(baseline: dict) -> set[str]: """Flatten detect-secrets results to a set of stable identities.""" ids: set[str] = set() @@ -81,14 +104,13 @@ def _identities(baseline: dict) -> set[str]: def main() -> int: base_ref = os.environ.get("SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE", "").strip() - head_ref = os.environ.get("SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" if not base_ref or set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: print("No PR base ref; secrets baseline diff check skipped.") return 0 base_baseline, base_existed = _read_baseline_at(base_ref) - head_baseline, _ = _read_baseline_at(head_ref) + head_baseline, head_existed = _read_baseline_from_worktree() if not base_existed: print( @@ -97,6 +119,15 @@ def main() -> int: ) return 0 + if not head_existed: + print( + f"Baseline file {BASELINE_PATH} existed at the base ref but is " + f"missing in the working tree. Refusing to fail-open on a " + f"security gate.", + file=sys.stderr, + ) + return 1 + base_ids = _identities(base_baseline) head_ids = _identities(head_baseline) diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 92c7c32f8c..1c1c626bab 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -77,43 +77,62 @@ jobs: - name: Run Bandit run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json - # Informative: MEDIUM severity, no baseline. Surfaces lower-severity - # findings in the job summary without breaking CI, so reviewers see - # them before they accumulate. + # Informative: MEDIUM severity, using the SAME baseline so the + # accepted HIGH finding doesn't re-fire here. Surfaces new MEDIUM-or- + # above findings in the job summary without breaking CI. - name: Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass id: bandit-medium continue-on-error: true - run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -ll + run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -ll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json # Surface the medium-severity outcome in the job summary so reviewers # see it without expanding the log; continue-on-error swallows the - # non-zero exit otherwise. + # non-zero exit otherwise. We branch on three outcomes: + # - failure → new findings (⚠️) + # - success → clean (✅) + # - skipped → the blocking HIGH bandit step failed, so the medium + # pass never ran; don't claim "clean" in that case (⏭️). - name: Surface medium-severity findings in job summary if: always() run: | - if [ "${{ steps.bandit-medium.outcome }}" = "failure" ]; then - { - echo "## ⚠️ Bandit medium-severity informational pass" - echo "" - echo "Findings surfaced at MEDIUM severity (no baseline). These do not" - echo "fail CI but should be audited — either fix the issue, suppress" - echo "with an explicit \`# nosec\` carrying a justification, or escalate" - echo "the severity threshold once they are triaged." - echo "" - echo "See the **Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass** step" - echo "above for the file/line list." - } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" - else - echo "## ✅ Bandit medium-severity informational pass — clean" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" - fi + case "${{ steps.bandit-medium.outcome }}" in + failure) + { + echo "## ⚠️ Bandit medium-severity informational pass" + echo "" + echo "New MEDIUM-or-above findings detected (baseline-filtered). These" + echo "do not fail CI but should be audited. Resolution paths, in order" + echo "of preference:" + echo " 1. Fix the underlying issue." + echo " 2. If the finding is a documented intentional pattern, append" + echo " it to \`.github/bandit-baseline.json\` and add the" + echo " \`security-baseline-change\` label to acknowledge the growth." + echo " 3. For ruff S6xx false positives only, use \`# noqa: S6xx\`" + echo " with an inline justification." + echo "" + echo "Do NOT use \`# nosec\` — it is forbidden in \`src/\` by the" + echo "\`test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source\` regression test." + echo "" + echo "See the **Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass** step" + echo "above for the file/line list." + } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + ;; + success) + echo "## ✅ Bandit medium-severity informational pass — clean" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + ;; + *) + echo "## ⏭️ Bandit medium-severity informational pass — skipped (the blocking HIGH pass failed; fix it first)" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" + ;; + esac # Prevent silent whitelisting: if the baseline grew, the PR must carry # the 'security-baseline-change' label to acknowledge it. - name: Check Bandit baseline growth if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }} env: + # Base side via `git show` (needs full fetch-depth above). + # Head side reads the working tree — fail-closed. BANDIT_BASELINE_BASE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} - BANDIT_BASELINE_HEAD: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} BANDIT_BASELINE_LABELS: ${{ join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',') }} run: python .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py @@ -155,7 +174,7 @@ jobs: - name: Check secrets baseline growth if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }} env: + # Head side reads the working tree (see check_secrets_baseline.py). SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} - SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS: ${{ join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',') }} run: python .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 4242210089..cc66b93061 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -131,7 +131,9 @@ Audit the new entries before committing — a leaked credential must never be me #### Bandit baseline -The CI `static-analysis` job runs Bandit with `--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json` (HIGH severity, blocking) plus a second informational pass at MEDIUM severity (`continue-on-error`, surfaced in the job summary). If a HIGH finding is intentional, audit it carefully, add an explicit `# nosec` with justification, and only then add it to the baseline. Growing the baseline is gated: the `check_bandit_baseline.py` script fails the PR unless it carries the `security-baseline-change` label, so reviewers see the whitelist expansion. +The CI `static-analysis` job runs Bandit with `--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json` (HIGH severity, blocking) plus a second informational pass at MEDIUM severity sharing the same baseline (`continue-on-error`, surfaced in the job summary). If a HIGH finding is intentional, audit it carefully, document the rationale next to the code (regular comment — **not** `# nosec`; see below), and append the entry to `.github/bandit-baseline.json`. Growing the baseline is gated: the `check_bandit_baseline.py` script fails the PR unless it carries the `security-baseline-change` label, so reviewers see the whitelist expansion. + +> **Do not use `# nosec` in `src/`.** The `test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source` regression test fails any PR that adds one. The supported suppression paths are (a) the bandit baseline (covered above) for HIGH findings, and (b) `# noqa: S6xx` with an inline justification for ruff's subprocess-shell rules (`S602/S604/S605`). Both are visible in review; `# nosec` hides the finding without trace. #### Shell scripts diff --git a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py index 72adf2522e..1010634c94 100644 --- a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py +++ b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py @@ -175,13 +175,27 @@ def commit(self, entries: list[tuple[str, int]], message: str) -> str: def commit_raw(self, raw_content: str, message: str) -> str: return _commit_file(self.repo, self.config.baseline_path, raw_content, message) - def run(self, *, base: str, head: str, labels: str = ""): + def delete_baseline(self, message: str) -> str: + """Remove the baseline file from the working tree and commit.""" + (self.repo / self.config.baseline_path).unlink() + _git(self.repo, "add", "-A") + _git(self.repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", message) + return _git(self.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + + def overwrite_worktree(self, raw_content: str) -> None: + """Replace the working-tree baseline without committing. + + Used to simulate a corrupt head state read from disk. + """ + (self.repo / self.config.baseline_path).write_text(raw_content, encoding="utf-8") + + def run(self, *, base: str, labels: str = ""): + # Head side reads the working tree directly — no env var needed. return _run_script( self.repo, self.repo / ".github" / "scripts" / self.config.script.name, { f"{self.config.env_prefix}_BASE": base, - f"{self.config.env_prefix}_HEAD": head, f"{self.config.env_prefix}_LABELS": labels, }, ) @@ -207,33 +221,33 @@ def test_introduction_pr_skips_check(self, gate: GateHandle): # Baseline file did not exist at base ref → no acknowledgement needed. _git(gate.repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-q", "-m", "before baseline") base_sha = _git(gate.repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD") - head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "introduce baseline") + gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "introduce baseline") - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr assert "introduction of the baseline" in result.stdout def test_identical_baselines_pass(self, gate: GateHandle): base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=base_sha) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 0 assert "no new identities" in result.stdout def test_growth_without_label_fails(self, gate: GateHandle): base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") - head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10), ("b.py", 20)], "grow") + gate.commit([("a.py", 10), ("b.py", 20)], "grow") - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 1 assert f"'{gate.config.label}'" in result.stderr def test_growth_with_label_passes(self, gate: GateHandle): base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") - head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10), ("b.py", 20)], "grow") + gate.commit([("a.py", 10), ("b.py", 20)], "grow") - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha, labels=gate.config.label) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha, labels=gate.config.label) assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr assert "acknowledged via label" in result.stdout @@ -242,9 +256,9 @@ def test_swap_attack_detected(self, gate: GateHandle): """Remove one entry and add a different one → constant count, but a *new* identity appears. Gate must still fire.""" base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") - head_sha = gate.commit([("b.py", 20)], "swap") # same count, different ID + gate.commit([("b.py", 20)], "swap") # same count, different ID - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 1, "identity diff must catch swaps" assert "1 new identities" in result.stderr @@ -254,14 +268,39 @@ def test_corrupt_json_at_base_falls_back_to_empty(self, gate: GateHandle): contents as empty so the script still completes (the head set becomes 'all new' and the label gate fires).""" base_sha = gate.commit_raw("{ invalid json", "corrupt base") - head_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "valid head") + gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "valid head") - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 1, "corrupt base should not crash the script" assert f"'{gate.config.label}'" in result.stderr assert "Could not parse baseline" in result.stderr + def test_head_missing_fails_closed(self, gate: GateHandle): + """If the baseline existed at base but is missing in the working + tree (head), the gate must fail-closed — silently passing would + let a PR delete the whole baseline file and neutralize the gate.""" + base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + gate.delete_baseline("remove baseline at head") + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) + + assert result.returncode == 1 + assert "Refusing to fail-open" in result.stderr + + def test_head_corrupt_in_worktree_fails_closed(self, gate: GateHandle): + """A corrupt JSON in the working tree must raise (not be silently + treated as empty, which would also drop the gate). Simulates a + flaky tool writing junk to the file just before the script runs.""" + base_sha = gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + gate.overwrite_worktree("{ not json") + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) + + assert result.returncode == 1 + assert "is corrupt" in result.stderr + assert "fail-open" in result.stderr + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Bandit-only scenarios @@ -279,7 +318,7 @@ def gate(self, tmp_path) -> GateHandle: def test_no_base_ref_is_skipped(self, gate: GateHandle): gate.commit([], "init") # need at least one commit so HEAD resolves - result = gate.run(base="", head="HEAD") + result = gate.run(base="") assert result.returncode == 0 assert "baseline diff check skipped" in result.stdout @@ -304,7 +343,7 @@ def test_whitespace_only_change_does_not_trip(self, gate: GateHandle): }, "base", ) - head_sha = _commit_baseline( + _commit_baseline( gate.repo, gate.config.baseline_path, { @@ -322,6 +361,6 @@ def test_whitespace_only_change_does_not_trip(self, gate: GateHandle): "reformatted snippet", ) - result = gate.run(base=base_sha, head=head_sha) + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 1b42920003..4897d59bf1 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -210,11 +210,12 @@ def test_actions_are_pinned_to_full_commit_shas(self): assert re.search(r"@v\d+", uses_ref) is None def test_bandit_does_not_globally_skip_b602(self): - # Identify the blocking bandit step by its baseline-arg rather than - # by exact step name — name is incidental, behavior is what matters. - bandit_step = _find_step_by_run_signature( - "static-analysis", "--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json" - ) + # Identify the blocking bandit step by its severity-level arg (-lll + # → HIGH only; the informational MEDIUM pass uses -ll). Doing this + # by behavior signature rather than step name keeps the test robust + # to renames while remaining unambiguous now that both passes share + # the baseline argument. + bandit_step = _find_step_by_run_signature("static-analysis", "-r src -lll") run = bandit_step["run"] workflow_text = SECURITY_WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") @@ -405,3 +406,53 @@ def test_contributing_documents_security_commands(self): re.search(r"-r\s+spec-kit-audit-requirements\.txt\b", contributing_text) is None ) + + # ----------------------------------------------------------------- + # secret-scan job (parity coverage with dependency-audit / bandit) + # ----------------------------------------------------------------- + + def test_secret_scan_job_uses_detect_secrets_hook(self): + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + scan_step = _find_step_by_run_signature("secret-scan", "detect-secrets-hook") + run = scan_step["run"] + + # The hook is the right tool: it compares against the baseline + # and exits non-zero on new findings, without rewriting the file. + assert "uvx --from detect-secrets==1.5.0 detect-secrets-hook" in run + assert "--baseline .secrets.baseline" in run + # Auto-generated content must be excluded so it doesn't dominate the scan. + assert "':!:.secrets.baseline'" in run + assert "':!:uv.lock'" in run + assert "':!:.github/security-audit-requirements.txt'" in run + # Iteration over tracked files is via git ls-files (-z to handle weird names). + assert "git ls-files -z" in run + # secret-scan job is in fact wired into the workflow. + assert "secret-scan" in workflow["jobs"] + + def test_secret_scan_job_has_baseline_growth_gate(self): + gate_step = _find_step_by_run_signature( + "secret-scan", "check_secrets_baseline.py" + ) + # The gate runs only on pull_request events (label is meaningless otherwise). + assert gate_step["if"] == "${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}" + env = gate_step["env"] + assert env["SECRETS_BASELINE_BASE"] == ( + "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}" + ) + assert env["SECRETS_BASELINE_LABELS"] == ( + "${{ join(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, ',') }}" + ) + # Head is read from the working tree (fail-closed); env var must NOT + # be passed (else a future caller might think the script honors it). + assert "SECRETS_BASELINE_HEAD" not in env + + def test_secret_scan_checkout_has_full_history(self): + # The growth gate uses `git show :` so it needs full history. + workflow = _load_security_workflow() + checkout_steps = [ + step + for step in workflow["jobs"]["secret-scan"]["steps"] + if "actions/checkout" in (step.get("uses") or "") + ] + assert len(checkout_steps) == 1 + assert checkout_steps[0]["with"]["fetch-depth"] == 0 diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py index 6e1eaabf06..c9e7d6c3cd 100644 --- a/tests/test_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_workflows.py @@ -3561,6 +3561,79 @@ def _raising_open(file, mode="r", *args, **kwargs): with pytest.raises(WorkflowValidationError, match="Failed to write catalog config"): catalog.remove_catalog(0) + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): + """Regression test for the read_response_limited hardening on + workflow catalog downloads. Mirrors TestBoundedRead for + _fetch_latest_release_tag and the equivalent test in + tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py for the + integration catalog. A future refactor that drops the bounded + read here would let a malicious server stream an unbounded + catalog into memory.""" + from specify_cli.workflows.catalog import ( + WorkflowCatalog, + WorkflowCatalogEntry, + WorkflowCatalogError, + ) + from specify_cli import _download_security as _download_security_module + import specify_cli.authentication.http as _auth_http + + entry = WorkflowCatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/workflow-catalog.json", + name="test", + priority=0, + install_allowed=False, + ) + + recorded: dict[str, object] = {} + real_read = _download_security_module.read_response_limited + + def _spy(response, **kwargs): + # Capture exactly the kwargs the caller chose to pass, so the + # assertion below can distinguish "explicit" from "default". + recorded["kwargs"] = dict(kwargs) + return real_read(response, **kwargs) + + class _FakeResponse: + def __init__(self): + self._data = json.dumps({"workflows": []}).encode() + + def read(self, _size=-1): + return self._data + + def geturl(self): + return entry.url + + def __enter__(self): + return self + + def __exit__(self, *_a): + pass + + def _fake_urlopen(req, timeout=30): + return _FakeResponse() + + monkeypatch.setattr(_auth_http.urllib.request, "urlopen", _fake_urlopen) + monkeypatch.setattr( + _auth_http.urllib.request.OpenerDirector, + "open", + lambda _self, req, data=None, timeout=30: _fake_urlopen(req, timeout), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "specify_cli.workflows.catalog.read_response_limited", _spy + ) + + cat = WorkflowCatalog(project_dir) + cat._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + + # Bounded read was invoked (not raw resp.read()). error_type must + # be the WorkflowCatalogError so an oversized response surfaces + # as a workflow-catalog domain error, not a generic ValueError + # that callers might miss. The size cap itself relies on the + # module-level default in _download_security.MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES. + assert "kwargs" in recorded, "read_response_limited was not called" + assert recorded["kwargs"]["error_type"] is WorkflowCatalogError + assert recorded["kwargs"]["label"] == "workflow catalog" + # ===== Integration Test ===== From a71f7b0dc16c7dcf38b07138b36e9c0afa33eb15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 09:05:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/36] ci(security): refresh audit baselines --- .github/bandit-baseline.json | 60 +++++ .../scripts/check_security_requirements.py | 1 + .github/security-audit-requirements.txt | 220 +++++++++--------- .github/workflows/security.yml | 8 +- .secrets.baseline | 8 +- CONTRIBUTING.md | 4 +- tests/test_security_workflow.py | 24 +- 7 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/bandit-baseline.json b/.github/bandit-baseline.json index 2c6a477879..345fea6d2d 100644 --- a/.github/bandit-baseline.json +++ b/.github/bandit-baseline.json @@ -1,5 +1,65 @@ { "results": [ + { + "code": "103 if not req.get_header(\"Authorization\") and not strict_redirects:\n104 return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout)\n105 \n", + "col_offset": 15, + "end_col_offset": 59, + "filename": "src/specify_cli/_github_http.py", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "issue_cwe": { + "id": 22, + "link": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html" + }, + "issue_severity": "MEDIUM", + "issue_text": "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.", + "line_number": 104, + "line_range": [ + 104 + ], + "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/blacklists/blacklist_calls.html#b310-urllib-urlopen", + "test_id": "B310", + "test_name": "blacklist" + }, + { + "code": "113 \n114 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: # noqa: S310\n115 payload = _json.loads(\n", + "col_offset": 17, + "end_col_offset": 56, + "filename": "src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "issue_cwe": { + "id": 22, + "link": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html" + }, + "issue_severity": "MEDIUM", + "issue_text": "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.", + "line_number": 114, + "line_range": [ + 114 + ], + "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/blacklists/blacklist_calls.html#b310-urllib-urlopen", + "test_id": "B310", + "test_name": "blacklist" + }, + { + "code": "170 return opener.open(req, timeout=timeout)\n171 return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) # noqa: S310\n", + "col_offset": 11, + "end_col_offset": 55, + "filename": "src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py", + "issue_confidence": "HIGH", + "issue_cwe": { + "id": 22, + "link": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html" + }, + "issue_severity": "MEDIUM", + "issue_text": "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.", + "line_number": 171, + "line_range": [ + 171 + ], + "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/blacklists/blacklist_calls.html#b310-urllib-urlopen", + "test_id": "B310", + "test_name": "blacklist" + }, { "code": "34 run_cmd,\n35 shell=True,\n36 capture_output=True,\n37 text=True,\n38 cwd=cwd,\n39 timeout=300,\n40 )\n41 output = {\n42 \"exit_code\": proc.returncode,\n43 \"stdout\": proc.stdout,\n", "col_offset": 19, diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py b/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py index 6834ee42bf..876fbf1a47 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ def main() -> int: "--extra", "test", "--universal", + "--upgrade", "--generate-hashes", "--quiet", "--no-header", diff --git a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt index 89feef3f1a..646284db2b 100644 --- a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt +++ b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt @@ -14,113 +14,113 @@ colorama==0.4.6 ; sys_platform == 'win32' \ # via # click # pytest -coverage==7.13.5 \ - --hash=sha256:012d5319e66e9d5a218834642d6c35d265515a62f01157a45bcc036ecf947256 \ - --hash=sha256:02ca0eed225b2ff301c474aeeeae27d26e2537942aa0f87491d3e147e784a82b \ - --hash=sha256:03ccc709a17a1de074fb1d11f217342fb0d2b1582ed544f554fc9fc3f07e95f5 \ - --hash=sha256:0428cbef5783ad91fe240f673cc1f76b25e74bbfe1a13115e4aa30d3f538162d \ - --hash=sha256:04690832cbea4e4663d9149e05dba142546ca05cb1848816760e7f58285c970a \ - --hash=sha256:0590e44dd2745c696a778f7bab6aa95256de2cbc8b8cff4f7db8ff09813d6969 \ - --hash=sha256:0672854dc733c342fa3e957e0605256d2bf5934feeac328da9e0b5449634a642 \ - --hash=sha256:084b84a8c63e8d6fc7e3931b316a9bcafca1458d753c539db82d31ed20091a87 \ - --hash=sha256:0b67af5492adb31940ee418a5a655c28e48165da5afab8c7fa6fd72a142f8740 \ - --hash=sha256:0cd9ed7a8b181775459296e402ca4fb27db1279740a24e93b3b41942ebe4b215 \ - --hash=sha256:0cef0cdec915d11254a7f549c1170afecce708d30610c6abdded1f74e581666d \ - --hash=sha256:0e223ce4b4ed47f065bfb123687686512e37629be25cc63728557ae7db261422 \ - --hash=sha256:0e3c426ffc4cd952f54ee9ffbdd10345709ecc78a3ecfd796a57236bfad0b9b8 \ - --hash=sha256:0ecf12ecb326fe2c339d93fc131816f3a7367d223db37817208905c89bded911 \ - --hash=sha256:10a0c37f0b646eaff7cce1874c31d1f1ccb297688d4c747291f4f4c70741cc8b \ - --hash=sha256:145ede53ccbafb297c1c9287f788d1bc3efd6c900da23bf6931b09eafc931587 \ - --hash=sha256:1b11eef33edeae9d142f9b4358edb76273b3bfd30bc3df9a4f95d0e49caf94e8 \ - --hash=sha256:1b88c69c8ef5d4b6fe7dea66d6636056a0f6a7527c440e890cf9259011f5e606 \ - --hash=sha256:258354455f4e86e3e9d0d17571d522e13b4e1e19bf0f8596bcf9476d61e7d8a9 \ - --hash=sha256:259b69bb83ad9894c4b25be2528139eecba9a82646ebdda2d9db1ba28424a6bf \ - --hash=sha256:2aa055ae1857258f9e0045be26a6d62bdb47a72448b62d7b55f4820f361a2633 \ - 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--hash=sha256:cc3499459bbcdd51a65b64c35ab7ed2764eaf3cba826e0df3f1d7fe2e102b70b \ + --hash=sha256:d128b1bba9361fbaaf6a19e179e6cfd6a9103ce0c0555876f72780acc93efd85 \ + --hash=sha256:d1bb3543b58fea74d2cd1abc4054cc927e4724687cb4560cd2ed88d2c7d820c0 \ + --hash=sha256:d8b013632cc1ce1d09dbe4f32667b4d320ec2f54fc326ebeffcd0b0bcc2bb6c4 \ + --hash=sha256:d8e1762f0e9cbc26ec315471e7b47855218e833cd5a032d706fbf43845d878c7 \ + --hash=sha256:d9c8ef6ed820c433de075657d72dda1f89a2984955e58b8a75feb3f184250218 \ + --hash=sha256:dc38367eaa2abb1b766ac333142bce7655335a73537f5c8b75aaa89c2b987757 \ + --hash=sha256:f2bbb8254370eb4c628ff3d6fa8a7f74ddc40565394d4f7ab791d1fe568e37ef \ + --hash=sha256:f580f8c80acd94ac72e863efe2cab791d8c38d153e0b463b92dfa000d5c84cd1 \ + --hash=sha256:fab3877e4ebb06bd9d4d4d00ee53309ee5478e66873c66a382272e3ee33eb7ea \ + --hash=sha256:fb609b3658479e33f9516d46f1a89dbb9b6c261366e3a11844a96ec487533dae \ + --hash=sha256:fcaba850dd317c65423a9d63d88f9573c53b00354d6dd95724576cc98a131595 # via pytest-cov iniconfig==2.3.0 \ --hash=sha256:c76315c77db068650d49c5b56314774a7804df16fee4402c1f19d6d15d8c4730 \ @@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ json5==0.14.0 \ --hash=sha256:56cf861bab076b1178eb8c92e1311d273a9b9acea2ccc82c276abf839ebaef3a \ --hash=sha256:b3f492fad9f6cdbced8b7d40b28b9b1c9701c5f561bef0d33b81c2ff433fefcb # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) -markdown-it-py==4.0.0 \ - --hash=sha256:87327c59b172c5011896038353a81343b6754500a08cd7a4973bb48c6d578147 \ - --hash=sha256:cb0a2b4aa34f932c007117b194e945bd74e0ec24133ceb5bac59009cda1cb9f3 +markdown-it-py==4.2.0 \ + --hash=sha256:04a21681d6fbb623de53f6f364d352309d4094dd4194040a10fd51833e418d49 \ + --hash=sha256:9f7ebbcd14fe59494226453aed97c1070d83f8d24b6fc3a3bcf9a38092641c4a # via rich mdurl==0.1.2 \ --hash=sha256:84008a41e51615a49fc9966191ff91509e3c40b939176e643fd50a5c2196b8f8 \ diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 1c1c626bab..467c6989d8 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ jobs: - name: Compile scheduled audit requirements if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} run: | - uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" + uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --upgrade --generate-hashes --quiet --output-file "${{ runner.temp }}/spec-kit-audit-requirements.txt" - name: Run pip-audit (scheduled live resolution) if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} @@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ jobs: - name: Run Bandit run: uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json - # Informative: MEDIUM severity, using the SAME baseline so the - # accepted HIGH finding doesn't re-fire here. Surfaces new MEDIUM-or- - # above findings in the job summary without breaking CI. + # Informative: MEDIUM severity, using the SAME baseline so accepted + # findings do not re-fire here. Surfaces new MEDIUM-or-above findings + # in the job summary without breaking CI. - name: Run Bandit medium-severity informational pass id: bandit-medium continue-on-error: true diff --git a/.secrets.baseline b/.secrets.baseline index 42f94920b0..524003da3c 100644 --- a/.secrets.baseline +++ b/.secrets.baseline @@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ { "path": "detect_secrets.filters.allowlist.is_line_allowlisted" }, + { + "path": "detect_secrets.filters.common.is_baseline_file", + "filename": ".secrets.baseline" + }, { "path": "detect_secrets.filters.common.is_ignored_due_to_verification_policies", "min_level": 2 @@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ "filename": ".github/workflows/security.yml", "hashed_secret": "4202a5e0d1da60251e0163e869ae02016bb68767", "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 120 + "line_number": 163 } ], "docs/reference/authentication.md": [ @@ -202,5 +206,5 @@ } ] }, - "generated_at": "2026-05-15T06:22:08Z" + "generated_at": "2026-05-16T06:38:49Z" } diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index cc66b93061..2a88e034f7 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ uvx --from bandit==1.9.4 bandit -r src -lll --baseline .github/bandit-baseline.j Run these before changing dependency metadata, workflow execution code, subprocess usage, or security-sensitive paths. Pull request, push, and manual CI audits use the committed hashed requirements file so they stay deterministic. The scheduled CI audit also resolves the runtime and `test` extra dependency set across the supported Python and OS matrix to catch newly published advisories. If dependency metadata changes, refresh the committed audit input before running pip-audit: ```bash -uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes --quiet --no-header --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt +uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --upgrade --generate-hashes --quiet --no-header --output-file .github/security-audit-requirements.txt ``` Upstream package releases drift over time, so even an unrelated PR touching `pyproject.toml` can fail the `dependency-audit` check until the committed file is regenerated with the command above and re-committed. @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ Audit the new entries before committing — a leaked credential must never be me #### Bandit baseline -The CI `static-analysis` job runs Bandit with `--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json` (HIGH severity, blocking) plus a second informational pass at MEDIUM severity sharing the same baseline (`continue-on-error`, surfaced in the job summary). If a HIGH finding is intentional, audit it carefully, document the rationale next to the code (regular comment — **not** `# nosec`; see below), and append the entry to `.github/bandit-baseline.json`. Growing the baseline is gated: the `check_bandit_baseline.py` script fails the PR unless it carries the `security-baseline-change` label, so reviewers see the whitelist expansion. +The CI `static-analysis` job runs Bandit with `--baseline .github/bandit-baseline.json` (HIGH severity, blocking) plus a second informational pass at MEDIUM severity sharing the same baseline (`continue-on-error`, surfaced in the job summary). If a finding is intentional, audit it carefully, document the rationale next to the code (regular comment — **not** `# nosec`; see below), and append the entry to `.github/bandit-baseline.json`. Growing the baseline is gated: the `check_bandit_baseline.py` script fails the PR unless it carries the `security-baseline-change` label, so reviewers see the whitelist expansion. > **Do not use `# nosec` in `src/`.** The `test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source` regression test fails any PR that adds one. The supported suppression paths are (a) the bandit baseline (covered above) for HIGH findings, and (b) `# noqa: S6xx` with an inline justification for ruff's subprocess-shell rules (`S602/S604/S605`). Both are visible in review; `# nosec` hides the finding without trace. diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 4897d59bf1..c5fcdee425 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS = ".github/security-audit-requirements.txt" WORKFLOW_COMPILE_SCHEDULED_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test " - '--python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --generate-hashes --quiet ' + '--python-version "${{ matrix.python-version }}" --upgrade --generate-hashes --quiet ' f"--output-file {WORKFLOW_LIVE_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) LOCAL_REFRESH_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( - "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes " + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --upgrade --generate-hashes " f"--quiet --no-header --output-file {COMMITTED_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS}" ) WORKFLOW_SYNC_COMPILE_TEST_EXTRA_DEPS = ( - "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --generate-hashes " + "uv pip compile pyproject.toml --extra test --universal --upgrade --generate-hashes " "--quiet --no-header --output-file" ) WORKFLOW_SYNC_SCRIPT = "python .github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py" @@ -223,16 +223,20 @@ def test_bandit_does_not_globally_skip_b602(self): assert "--skip" not in run assert "--skip B602" not in workflow_text - def test_bandit_baseline_only_ignores_shell_step_b602(self): + def test_bandit_baseline_tracks_only_accepted_findings(self): baseline = json.loads(BANDIT_BASELINE.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) results = baseline["results"] - assert len(results) == 1 - assert results[0]["test_id"] == "B602" - assert ( - results[0]["filename"] - == "src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py" - ) + assert { + (result["filename"], result["line_number"], result["test_id"]) + for result in results + } == { + ("src/specify_cli/_github_http.py", 104, "B310"), + ("src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py", 114, "B310"), + ("src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py", 171, "B310"), + ("src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py", 35, "B602"), + } + assert {result["issue_severity"] for result in results} == {"MEDIUM", "HIGH"} def test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source(self): nosec_lines = [] From f5356bb99e78744f8102b502c720abb95ac6ae02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 15:27:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 19/36] fix: address copilot security review follow-up --- src/specify_cli/_utils.py | 18 ++++++++++++-- tests/test_github_http.py | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/test_security_workflow.py | 7 ++++-- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py index 30c59f553a..22170f5d38 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py @@ -27,8 +27,22 @@ def dump_frontmatter(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str: return yaml.safe_dump(data, sort_keys=False, allow_unicode=True).strip() -def run_command(cmd: list[str], check_return: bool = True, capture: bool = False, shell: bool = False) -> str | None: - """Run a shell command and optionally capture output.""" +def run_command( + cmd: list[str], + check_return: bool = True, + capture: bool = False, + shell: bool = False, +) -> str | None: + """Run a command without invoking a shell and optionally capture output. + + ``shell`` remains accepted for public API compatibility, but shell + execution is intentionally unsupported. + """ + if shell: + raise ValueError( + "run_command() does not support shell=True; pass argv as a list" + ) + try: if capture: result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=check_return, capture_output=True, text=True, shell=shell) diff --git a/tests/test_github_http.py b/tests/test_github_http.py index e258f4917f..89ad8b0f27 100644 --- a/tests/test_github_http.py +++ b/tests/test_github_http.py @@ -1,16 +1,20 @@ """Tests for GitHub-authenticated HTTP request helpers.""" +import io import json import os from contextlib import contextmanager from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch +from urllib.request import Request import pytest from specify_cli._github_http import ( + GITHUB_HOSTS, build_github_request, resolve_github_release_asset_api_url, ) +from specify_cli.authentication.http import _StripAuthOnRedirect class TestBuildGitHubRequest: @@ -188,3 +192,43 @@ def capturing_open(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): ) assert len(captured_urls) == 1 assert "releases/tags/v1%23beta" in captured_urls[0] + + +class TestGitHubRedirectAuth: + """Tests for GitHub-owned redirect auth handling.""" + + def test_multi_hop_github_redirect_preserves_unredirected_auth(self): + """Auth survives a multi-hop redirect chain within GitHub hosts.""" + handler = _StripAuthOnRedirect(tuple(GITHUB_HOSTS)) + req1 = Request( + "https://github.com/org/repo", + headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok"}, + ) + + req2 = handler.redirect_request( + req1, + io.BytesIO(b""), + 302, + "Found", + {}, + "https://codeload.github.com/org/repo/zip", + ) + assert req2 is not None + auth2 = req2.get_header("Authorization") or req2.unredirected_hdrs.get( + "Authorization" + ) + assert auth2 == "Bearer tok" + + req3 = handler.redirect_request( + req2, + io.BytesIO(b""), + 302, + "Found", + {}, + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/org/repo/main/file", + ) + assert req3 is not None + auth3 = req3.get_header("Authorization") or req3.unredirected_hdrs.get( + "Authorization" + ) + assert auth3 == "Bearer tok" diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index c5fcdee425..7105ee7942 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import subprocess from pathlib import Path +import pytest import yaml @@ -250,10 +251,12 @@ def test_bandit_nosec_is_not_suppressed_in_source(self): assert nosec_lines == [] - def test_run_command_does_not_accept_shell_argument(self): + def test_run_command_rejects_shell_execution_compatibly(self): from specify_cli import run_command - assert "shell" not in inspect.signature(run_command).parameters + assert inspect.signature(run_command).parameters["shell"].default is False + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="does not support shell=True"): + run_command(["echo", "blocked"], shell=True) # noqa: S604 def test_committed_audit_requirements_are_hashed(self): requirements = SECURITY_REQUIREMENTS.read_text(encoding="utf-8") From 8a60c1339243d8741ccfba458744da11be2d4c00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 23:59:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 20/36] fix: wrap unsafe zip extraction errors --- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 81 ++++++++++++----- tests/test_download_security.py | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index cc47c4bb1d..5b11a16f05 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ def _raise(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str) -> None: raise error_type(message) +def _raise_from(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str, exc: Exception) -> None: + raise error_type(message) from exc + + def read_response_limited( response, *, @@ -82,12 +86,15 @@ def _safe_zip_name(name: str, *, error_type: type[ErrorT]) -> str: normalized = name.replace("\\", "/") path = PurePosixPath(normalized) + raw_parts = normalized.split("/") + if raw_parts and raw_parts[-1] == "": + raw_parts = raw_parts[:-1] has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized) is not None if ( - not path.parts + not raw_parts or path.is_absolute() or has_windows_drive - or any(part == ".." for part in path.parts) + or any(part in {"", ".", ".."} for part in raw_parts) ): _raise( error_type, @@ -106,10 +113,21 @@ def safe_extract_zip( max_total_bytes: int = MAX_ZIP_TOTAL_BYTES, ) -> None: """Extract a ZIP archive after path, symlink, and size validation.""" - target_root = target_dir.resolve() - - with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf: - members = zf.infolist() + try: + target_root = target_dir.resolve() + except OSError as exc: + _raise_from(error_type, f"Invalid ZIP extraction target: {target_dir}", exc) + + try: + zf = zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") + except (OSError, zipfile.BadZipFile) as exc: + _raise_from(error_type, f"Invalid ZIP archive: {zip_path}", exc) + + with zf: + try: + members = zf.infolist() + except zipfile.BadZipFile as exc: + _raise_from(error_type, f"Invalid ZIP archive: {zip_path}", exc) if len(members) > max_entries: _raise( error_type, @@ -155,21 +173,42 @@ def safe_extract_zip( for member, normalized_name in normalized_members: member_path = target_dir / normalized_name if member.is_dir(): - member_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + try: + member_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + except OSError as exc: + _raise_from( + error_type, + f"Failed to create ZIP directory {member.filename}: {exc}", + exc, + ) continue - member_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + try: + member_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + except OSError as exc: + _raise_from( + error_type, + f"Failed to create parent directory for ZIP member {member.filename}: {exc}", + exc, + ) written = 0 - with zf.open(member, "r") as source, member_path.open("wb") as dest: - while True: - chunk = source.read(READ_CHUNK_SIZE) - if not chunk: - break - written += len(chunk) - if written > max_member_bytes: - _raise( - error_type, - f"ZIP member {member.filename} exceeds maximum size " - f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes", - ) - dest.write(chunk) + try: + with zf.open(member, "r") as source, member_path.open("wb") as dest: + while True: + chunk = source.read(READ_CHUNK_SIZE) + if not chunk: + break + written += len(chunk) + if written > max_member_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP member {member.filename} exceeds maximum size " + f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes", + ) + dest.write(chunk) + except (OSError, zipfile.BadZipFile, RuntimeError) as exc: + _raise_from( + error_type, + f"Failed to extract ZIP member {member.filename}: {exc}", + exc, + ) diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 2ce8310ff7..2e736750d7 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations +import ast import stat import zipfile -import re from pathlib import Path import pytest @@ -17,7 +17,11 @@ REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent -RAW_RESPONSE_READ_RE = re.compile(r"\b(?:resp|response)\.read\(\)") +LOCAL_FILE_HASH_READ_ALLOWLIST = { + ("src/specify_cli/extensions.py", "get_hash"), + ("src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py", "get_hash"), + ("src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py", "get_hash"), +} class _Response: @@ -28,6 +32,62 @@ def read(self, size: int = -1) -> bytes: return self.data if size < 0 else self.data[:size] +class _CustomZipError(ValueError): + pass + + +def _constant_int(node: ast.AST) -> int | None: + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, int): + return node.value + if ( + isinstance(node, ast.UnaryOp) + and isinstance(node.op, ast.USub) + and isinstance(node.operand, ast.Constant) + and isinstance(node.operand.value, int) + ): + return -node.operand.value + return None + + +def _is_unbounded_read(call: ast.Call) -> bool: + if call.args: + size = _constant_int(call.args[0]) + return size is not None and size < 0 + + for keyword in call.keywords: + if keyword.arg == "size": + size = _constant_int(keyword.value) + return size is not None and size < 0 + + return True + + +class _UnboundedReadVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor): + def __init__(self) -> None: + self._function_stack: list[str] = [] + self.offenders: list[tuple[int, str]] = [] + + def visit_FunctionDef(self, node: ast.FunctionDef) -> None: + self._function_stack.append(node.name) + self.generic_visit(node) + self._function_stack.pop() + + def visit_AsyncFunctionDef(self, node: ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> None: + self._function_stack.append(node.name) + self.generic_visit(node) + self._function_stack.pop() + + def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call) -> None: + if ( + isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute) + and node.func.attr == "read" + and _is_unbounded_read(node) + ): + function_name = self._function_stack[-1] if self._function_stack else "" + self.offenders.append((node.lineno, function_name)) + self.generic_visit(node) + + def test_read_response_limited_rejects_oversized_download(): with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum size"): read_response_limited(_Response(b"abcde"), max_bytes=4) @@ -36,12 +96,12 @@ def test_read_response_limited_rejects_oversized_download(): def test_remote_downloads_do_not_use_unbounded_response_reads(): offenders = [] for path in (REPO_ROOT / "src" / "specify_cli").rglob("*.py"): - for line_number, line in enumerate( - path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines(), - start=1, - ): - if RAW_RESPONSE_READ_RE.search(line): - offenders.append(f"{path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}:{line_number}") + rel_path = path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix() + visitor = _UnboundedReadVisitor() + visitor.visit(ast.parse(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))) + for line_number, function_name in visitor.offenders: + if (rel_path, function_name) not in LOCAL_FILE_HASH_READ_ALLOWLIST: + offenders.append(f"{rel_path}:{line_number}") assert offenders == [] @@ -70,6 +130,16 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_traversal(tmp_path, member_name): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out") +@pytest.mark.parametrize("member_name", ["", ".", "./file.txt", "nested/./file.txt", "nested//file.txt"]) +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_dot_path_segments(tmp_path, member_name): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr(member_name, "nope") + + with pytest.raises(_CustomZipError, match="Unsafe path"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", error_type=_CustomZipError) + + def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_symlinks(tmp_path): zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" info = zipfile.ZipInfo("link") @@ -111,6 +181,44 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_total_uncompressed_size(tmp_path): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_total_bytes=5) +def test_safe_extract_zip_wraps_bad_zip_file(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" + zip_path.write_bytes(b"not a zip archive") + + with pytest.raises(_CustomZipError, match="Invalid ZIP archive"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", error_type=_CustomZipError) + + +def test_safe_extract_zip_wraps_filesystem_errors(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" + blocked_parent = tmp_path / "blocked" + blocked_parent.write_text("not a directory", encoding="utf-8") + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("file.txt", "hello") + + with pytest.raises(_CustomZipError, match="Failed to create parent directory"): + safe_extract_zip( + zip_path, + blocked_parent / "out", + error_type=_CustomZipError, + ) + + +def test_safe_extract_zip_wraps_directory_filesystem_errors(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" + blocked_parent = tmp_path / "blocked" + blocked_parent.write_text("not a directory", encoding="utf-8") + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.mkdir("dir") + + with pytest.raises(_CustomZipError, match="Failed to create ZIP directory"): + safe_extract_zip( + zip_path, + blocked_parent / "out", + error_type=_CustomZipError, + ) + + def test_safe_extract_zip_extracts_safe_archive(tmp_path): zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" out_dir = tmp_path / "out" From 56999d5e74703807f1eb624ad5064ffde144af49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 00:12:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/36] fix: redact secrets baseline hash logs --- .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py | 39 ++++++++++++----- tests/test_baseline_gates.py | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py index 8f1daf2bb5..0eac171c29 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import os import subprocess import sys +from dataclasses import dataclass from pathlib import Path REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] @@ -35,6 +36,26 @@ ACK_LABEL = "secrets-baseline-change" +@dataclass(frozen=True, order=True) +class SecretIdentity: + """Comparison identity for one detect-secrets baseline entry.""" + + filename: str + line_number: str + secret_type: str + hashed_secret: str + + def log_safe(self) -> str: + return "|".join( + [ + self.filename, + self.line_number, + self.secret_type, + "hashed_secret=", + ] + ) + + def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref). Base side only.""" if not ref: @@ -77,9 +98,9 @@ def _read_baseline_from_worktree() -> tuple[dict, bool]: ) -def _identities(baseline: dict) -> set[str]: +def _identities(baseline: dict) -> set[SecretIdentity]: """Flatten detect-secrets results to a set of stable identities.""" - ids: set[str] = set() + ids: set[SecretIdentity] = set() results = baseline.get("results", {}) if not isinstance(results, dict): return ids @@ -90,13 +111,11 @@ def _identities(baseline: dict) -> set[str]: if not isinstance(entry, dict): continue ids.add( - "|".join( - [ - str(filename), - str(entry.get("line_number", "")), - str(entry.get("type", "")), - str(entry.get("hashed_secret", "")), - ] + SecretIdentity( + filename=str(filename), + line_number=str(entry.get("line_number", "")), + secret_type=str(entry.get("type", "")), + hashed_secret=str(entry.get("hashed_secret", "")), ) ) return ids @@ -160,7 +179,7 @@ def main() -> int: file=sys.stderr, ) for identity in sorted(new_ids): - print(f" + {identity}", file=sys.stderr) + print(f" + {identity.log_safe()}", file=sys.stderr) return 1 diff --git a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py index 1010634c94..d1cbe444d8 100644 --- a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py +++ b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py @@ -364,3 +364,56 @@ def test_whitespace_only_change_does_not_trip(self, gate: GateHandle): result = gate.run(base=base_sha) assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr + + +class TestSecretsSpecific: + """Cases that only exist for the detect-secrets gate.""" + + @pytest.fixture + def gate(self, tmp_path) -> GateHandle: + repo = _init_repo(tmp_path) + _install_script(repo, SECRETS_SCRIPT) + return GateHandle(config=SECRETS_GATE, repo=repo) + + @staticmethod + def _baseline_with_hash(hashed_secret: str) -> dict: + return { + "version": "1.5.0", + "results": { + "app.py": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "app.py", + "hashed_secret": hashed_secret, + "is_verified": False, + "line_number": 42, + } + ] + }, + } + + def test_same_location_secret_swap_fails_without_leaking_hash( + self, gate: GateHandle + ): + """The hash remains part of the gate identity, but not CI logs.""" + old_hash = "old-sensitive-hash" + new_hash = "new-sensitive-hash" + base_sha = _commit_baseline( + gate.repo, + gate.config.baseline_path, + self._baseline_with_hash(old_hash), + "base", + ) + _commit_baseline( + gate.repo, + gate.config.baseline_path, + self._baseline_with_hash(new_hash), + "secret swap", + ) + + result = gate.run(base=base_sha) + + assert result.returncode == 1, "hashed secret diff must catch swaps" + assert "app.py|42|Secret Keyword|hashed_secret=" in result.stderr + assert old_hash not in result.stderr + assert new_hash not in result.stderr From a4b5e00f683f66346c0854575ab88de32801717e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 00:15:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/36] fix: keep secrets baseline hashes out of repr --- .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py index 0eac171c29..0b452ee0cb 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ import os import subprocess import sys -from dataclasses import dataclass +from dataclasses import dataclass, field from pathlib import Path REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ class SecretIdentity: filename: str line_number: str secret_type: str - hashed_secret: str + hashed_secret: str = field(repr=False) def log_safe(self) -> str: return "|".join( From 9248db814b666e3dfd05b4c23a056646a5235cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 16:58:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/36] fix: address Copilot review on bounded reads and redirect-safety - read_response_limited: read in a loop until EOF or one byte past the limit instead of a single read(max_bytes + 1). A server using chunked transfer encoding can return fewer bytes per read() than requested while streaming more than max_bytes total, defeating the single-read bound. Add regression tests for the short-read and within-limit paths. - _download_security: annotate _raise / _raise_from as NoReturn so type checkers treat call sites as unreachable. - Extract the duplicated is_https_or_localhost_http redirect-safety predicate into _download_security and import it from both _github_http and authentication/http so the rule lives in one place. - azure_devops: stop catching broad ValueError/KeyError around token acquisition; give the bounded read a dedicated _TokenResponseTooLarge type and catch only URLError, OSError, JSONDecodeError, and that type so unrelated programming errors still surface. - tests: make response mocks faithful streams (advancing cursor, b"" at EOF) so the bounded read loop terminates as it would against a real http.client.HTTPResponse. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 40 +++++++++++++++---- src/specify_cli/_version.py | 6 +-- .../authentication/azure_devops.py | 17 +++++++- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 20 +--------- tests/http_helpers.py | 3 +- .../integrations/test_integration_catalog.py | 24 +++++++++-- tests/test_authentication.py | 5 ++- tests/test_download_security.py | 29 +++++++++++++- tests/test_extensions.py | 14 +++---- tests/test_presets.py | 12 +++--- tests/test_upgrade.py | 15 +++++++ tests/test_workflows.py | 13 ++++-- 12 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index 5b11a16f05..8b6cd90320 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ import stat import zipfile from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath -from typing import TypeVar +from typing import NoReturn, TypeVar +from urllib.parse import urlparse ErrorT = TypeVar("ErrorT", bound=Exception) @@ -22,11 +23,22 @@ SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$") -def _raise(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str) -> None: +def is_https_or_localhost_http(url: str) -> bool: + """Return True if *url* is HTTPS, or HTTP limited to loopback hosts. + + Shared redirect-safety predicate used by the GitHub and auth HTTP redirect + handlers so the rule (and any future tightening of it) lives in one place. + """ + parsed = urlparse(url) + is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") + return parsed.scheme == "https" or (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost) + + +def _raise(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str) -> NoReturn: raise error_type(message) -def _raise_from(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str, exc: Exception) -> None: +def _raise_from(error_type: type[ErrorT], message: str, exc: Exception) -> NoReturn: raise error_type(message) from exc @@ -37,11 +49,25 @@ def read_response_limited( error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError, label: str = "download", ) -> bytes: - """Read at most *max_bytes* from a response object.""" - data = response.read(max_bytes + 1) - if len(data) > max_bytes: + """Read at most *max_bytes* from a response object. + + ``response.read(n)`` is only guaranteed to return *up to* ``n`` bytes and may + return fewer even when more data is pending (e.g. chunked transfer encoding), + so a single ``read(max_bytes + 1)`` cannot enforce the bound on its own. Read + in a loop until EOF or until one byte past the limit has been accumulated. + """ + chunks: list[bytes] = [] + total = 0 + limit = max_bytes + 1 + while total < limit: + chunk = response.read(min(READ_CHUNK_SIZE, limit - total)) + if not chunk: + break + chunks.append(chunk) + total += len(chunk) + if total > max_bytes: _raise(error_type, f"{label} exceeds maximum size of {max_bytes} bytes") - return data + return b"".join(chunks) def normalize_sha256(value: object, *, error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError) -> str | None: diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_version.py b/src/specify_cli/_version.py index b2b6b4cc06..33dd0983e4 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_version.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_version.py @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ release tag. The ``self_app`` Typer sub-command group is co-located here so all version-related logic lives in one place. -Dependencies: stdlib + packaging + ._console only (no other internal imports -at module level, keeping this layer thin and circular-import-safe). +Dependencies: stdlib + packaging + ._console + ._download_security only +(keeping this layer thin and circular-import-safe). """ from __future__ import annotations @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import typer from packaging.version import InvalidVersion, Version +from ._download_security import MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, read_response_limited from ._console import console GITHUB_API_LATEST = "https://api.github.com/repos/github/spec-kit/releases/latest" @@ -111,7 +112,6 @@ def _fetch_latest_release_tag() -> tuple[str | None, str | None]: On anything else — including a malformed response body — the exception propagates; there is no catch-all (research D-006). """ - from ._download_security import MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, read_response_limited from .authentication.http import open_url try: diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py index 149caa2189..06bb225c5e 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ _ADO_RESOURCE_ID = "499b84ac-1321-427f-aa17-267ca6975798" +class _TokenResponseTooLarge(Exception): + """Raised when an Azure AD token response exceeds the bounded read limit.""" + + class AzureDevOpsAuth(AuthProvider): """Azure DevOps authentication provider. @@ -115,10 +119,19 @@ def _acquire_via_client_credentials(entry: AuthConfigEntry) -> str | None: read_response_limited( resp, max_bytes=MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES, - label="Azure DevOps OAuth token response", + error_type=_TokenResponseTooLarge, + label="Azure DevOps token response", ).decode("utf-8") ) token = payload.get("access_token", "").strip() return token or None - except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, _json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError): + except ( + urllib.error.URLError, + OSError, + _json.JSONDecodeError, + _TokenResponseTooLarge, + ): + # Network failure, malformed JSON, or an oversized response — fall + # through to the next strategy. Unrelated programming errors (other + # ValueErrors, KeyErrors) intentionally propagate so they surface. return None diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index c2dbe6ab25..74f341c5f6 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ import urllib.error import urllib.request from fnmatch import fnmatch -from ipaddress import ip_address from typing import Callable from urllib.parse import urlparse +from .._download_security import is_https_or_localhost_http from . import get_provider from .config import AuthConfigEntry, _default_config_path, find_entries_for_url, load_auth_config @@ -61,24 +61,8 @@ def _hostname_in_hosts(hostname: str, hosts: tuple[str, ...]) -> bool: RedirectValidator = Callable[[str, str], None] -def _is_secure_or_loopback_url(url: str) -> bool: - parsed = urlparse(url) - if not parsed.hostname: - return False - if parsed.scheme == "https": - return True - if parsed.scheme != "http": - return False - if parsed.hostname == "localhost": - return True - try: - return ip_address(parsed.hostname).is_loopback - except ValueError: - return False - - def _validate_strict_redirect(_old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: - if not _is_secure_or_loopback_url(new_url): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(new_url): raise urllib.error.URLError( "redirect target must use HTTPS with a hostname, " "or HTTP for localhost/loopback" diff --git a/tests/http_helpers.py b/tests/http_helpers.py index 46e26806b4..5c1026d385 100644 --- a/tests/http_helpers.py +++ b/tests/http_helpers.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ """HTTP test helpers shared by version-related CLI tests.""" +import io import json from unittest.mock import MagicMock @@ -8,7 +9,7 @@ def mock_urlopen_response(payload: dict) -> MagicMock: """Build a urlopen context-manager mock whose read returns JSON.""" body = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") resp = MagicMock() - resp.read.return_value = body + resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(body).read cm = MagicMock() cm.__enter__.return_value = resp cm.__exit__.return_value = False diff --git a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py index ca7bf0d43d..063a0402e9 100644 --- a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py +++ b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py @@ -177,9 +177,16 @@ class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=""): self._data = json.dumps(data).encode() self._url = url if isinstance(url, str) else url.full_url + self._pos = 0 - def read(self, _size=-1): - return self._data + def read(self, size=-1): + # Advance a cursor and return b"" at EOF like a real stream, so + # read_response_limited's bounded loop terminates. + if size is None or size < 0: + size = len(self._data) - self._pos + out = self._data[self._pos : self._pos + size] + self._pos += len(out) + return out def geturl(self): return self._url @@ -552,8 +559,17 @@ class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=""): self._data = json.dumps(data).encode() self._url = url if isinstance(url, str) else url.full_url - def read(self, _size=-1): - return self._data + self._pos = 0 + + def read(self, size=-1): + # Advance a cursor and return b"" at EOF like a real stream, so + # read_response_limited's bounded loop terminates. + if size is None or size < 0: + size = len(self._data) - self._pos + out = self._data[self._pos : self._pos + size] + self._pos += len(out) + return out + def geturl(self): return self._url def __enter__(self): diff --git a/tests/test_authentication.py b/tests/test_authentication.py index 8b09245384..00a81b829b 100644 --- a/tests/test_authentication.py +++ b/tests/test_authentication.py @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations import base64 +import io import json import os @@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ def test_resolve_token_azure_ad_success(self, monkeypatch): tenant_id="tid", client_id="cid", client_secret_env="MY_SECRET", ) mock_resp = MagicMock() - mock_resp.read.return_value = b'{"access_token": "ad-acquired-token"}' + mock_resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(b'{"access_token": "ad-acquired-token"}').read mock_resp.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_resp.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) with patch("urllib.request.urlopen", return_value=mock_resp): @@ -864,7 +865,7 @@ def side_effect(req, timeout=None): captured["request"] = req body = _json.dumps({"tag_name": "v9.9.9"}).encode() resp = MagicMock() - resp.read.return_value = body + resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(body).read cm = MagicMock() cm.__enter__.return_value = resp cm.__exit__.return_value = False diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 2e736750d7..851a2198fa 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -25,11 +25,23 @@ class _Response: - def __init__(self, data: bytes): + """Faithful stream stand-in: read() advances a cursor and returns b"" at EOF.""" + + def __init__(self, data: bytes, *, chunk: int | None = None): self.data = data + self.pos = 0 + # When set, never return more than *chunk* bytes per call even if more is + # requested — simulates short reads (e.g. chunked transfer encoding). + self.chunk = chunk def read(self, size: int = -1) -> bytes: - return self.data if size < 0 else self.data[:size] + if size < 0: + size = len(self.data) - self.pos + if self.chunk is not None: + size = min(size, self.chunk) + out = self.data[self.pos : self.pos + size] + self.pos += len(out) + return out class _CustomZipError(ValueError): @@ -93,6 +105,19 @@ def test_read_response_limited_rejects_oversized_download(): read_response_limited(_Response(b"abcde"), max_bytes=4) +def test_read_response_limited_returns_full_body_within_limit(): + assert read_response_limited(_Response(b"abcde"), max_bytes=10) == b"abcde" + + +def test_read_response_limited_enforces_bound_under_short_reads(): + # A server that streams more than max_bytes total while every read() returns + # fewer bytes than requested (chunked encoding) must still be rejected — a + # single read(max_bytes + 1) could be fooled, the accumulating loop cannot. + response = _Response(b"x" * 100, chunk=8) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum size"): + read_response_limited(response, max_bytes=16) + + def test_remote_downloads_do_not_use_unbounded_response_reads(): offenders = [] for path in (REPO_ROOT / "src" / "specify_cli").rglob("*.py"): diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py index ee1aa756cd..1cef6fae90 100644 --- a/tests/test_extensions.py +++ b/tests/test_extensions.py @@ -3215,7 +3215,7 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_sends_auth_header(self, temp_dir, monkeypatch): catalog_data = {"schema_version": "1.0", "extensions": {}} mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(catalog_data).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(catalog_data).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) mock_response.geturl.return_value = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/org/repo/main/catalog.json" @@ -3716,7 +3716,7 @@ def test_download_extension_sends_auth_header(self, temp_dir, monkeypatch): zip_bytes = zip_buf.getvalue() release_response = MagicMock() - release_response.read.return_value = json.dumps( + release_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps( { "assets": [ { @@ -3725,12 +3725,12 @@ def test_download_extension_sends_auth_header(self, temp_dir, monkeypatch): } ] } - ).encode() + ).encode()).read release_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s release_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) asset_response = MagicMock() - asset_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + asset_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read asset_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s asset_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -3814,7 +3814,7 @@ def test_download_extension_verifies_sha256(self, temp_dir): catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) zip_bytes = b"fake zip data" mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) ext_info = { @@ -3837,7 +3837,7 @@ def test_download_extension_rejects_sha256_mismatch(self, temp_dir): catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = b"fake zip data" + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(b"fake zip data").read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) ext_info = { @@ -5043,7 +5043,7 @@ def test_download_extension_allows_bundled_with_url(self, temp_dir): } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = b"fake zip data" + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(b"fake zip data").read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) diff --git a/tests/test_presets.py b/tests/test_presets.py index 3d9e5763e8..ac99497bba 100644 --- a/tests/test_presets.py +++ b/tests/test_presets.py @@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_sends_auth_header(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): catalog_data = {"schema_version": "1.0", "presets": {}} mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(catalog_data).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(catalog_data).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) mock_response.geturl.return_value = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/org/repo/main/presets/catalog.json" @@ -1980,7 +1980,7 @@ def test_download_pack_sends_auth_header(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): zip_bytes = zip_buf.getvalue() release_response = MagicMock() - release_response.read.return_value = json.dumps( + release_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps( { "assets": [ { @@ -1989,12 +1989,12 @@ def test_download_pack_sends_auth_header(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): } ] } - ).encode() + ).encode()).read release_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s release_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) asset_response = MagicMock() - asset_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + asset_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read asset_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s asset_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ def test_download_pack_verifies_sha256(self, project_dir): catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) zip_bytes = b"fake zip data" mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) pack_info = { @@ -2144,7 +2144,7 @@ def test_download_pack_rejects_sha256_mismatch(self, project_dir): catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = b"fake zip data" + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(b"fake zip data").read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) pack_info = { diff --git a/tests/test_upgrade.py b/tests/test_upgrade.py index 82fec145e0..e2afed7aa1 100644 --- a/tests/test_upgrade.py +++ b/tests/test_upgrade.py @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ `--disable-socket` as an extra safety net. """ +import io +import json import urllib.error import importlib.metadata from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch @@ -37,6 +39,19 @@ ) +def _mock_urlopen_response(payload: dict) -> MagicMock: + body = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") + resp = MagicMock() + # Back read() with a real stream so it advances and returns b"" at EOF, + # matching http.client.HTTPResponse (a fixed return_value would loop forever + # under read_response_limited's bounded read loop). + resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(body).read + cm = MagicMock() + cm.__enter__.return_value = resp + cm.__exit__.return_value = False + return cm + + def _http_error(code: int, message: str = "error") -> urllib.error.HTTPError: return urllib.error.HTTPError( url="https://api.github.com/repos/github/spec-kit/releases/latest", diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py index c9e7d6c3cd..eba4c8306f 100644 --- a/tests/test_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_workflows.py @@ -3596,9 +3596,16 @@ def _spy(response, **kwargs): class _FakeResponse: def __init__(self): self._data = json.dumps({"workflows": []}).encode() - - def read(self, _size=-1): - return self._data + self._pos = 0 + + def read(self, size=-1): + # Advance a cursor and return b"" at EOF like a real stream, so + # read_response_limited's bounded loop terminates. + if size is None or size < 0: + size = len(self._data) - self._pos + out = self._data[self._pos : self._pos + size] + self._pos += len(out) + return out def geturl(self): return entry.url From 7bb977a5ef46db7bcd9e6fbc36c32e1a9928a4cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 17:09:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 24/36] fix: address follow-up Copilot review (error typing, docs, tests) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - __init__.py preset/extension URL installs: give read_response_limited a domain error_type (PresetError / ExtensionError) and catch that instead of a blanket ValueError, so an oversized body is reported cleanly while unrelated ValueErrors surface as real errors. The extension catch now also covers install_from_zip's ValidationError (an ExtensionError). - _utils.run_command: rewrite the misleading docstring — shell=False is the only honoured mode; shell=True is rejected with ValueError, the parameter is retained only so existing keyword callers don't hit TypeError. - _download_security: document that the loopback allowance is an exact-string match (not an IP-range check), that read_response_limited's max_bytes default is the 50 MiB ceiling (callers with tighter budgets should pass an explicit value), and how _safe_zip_name handles single trailing-slash directory markers vs malformed empty segments. - authentication/http: comment the empty-hosts _StripAuthOnRedirect use as the HTTPS-downgrade guard on the unauthenticated path. - check_security_requirements: document the HEAD^ fallback failing safe (audit anyway) on shallow / single-commit checkouts. - security.yml: document the universal committed snapshot vs per-Python scheduled compile distinction. - tests: add a regression test that a symlink alongside benign members is rejected with no partial extraction to disk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- .../scripts/check_security_requirements.py | 5 +++++ .github/workflows/security.yml | 7 +++++++ src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 6 +++++- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 16 ++++++++++++++ src/specify_cli/_utils.py | 7 +++++-- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 2 ++ src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py | 7 ++++++- tests/test_download_security.py | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py b/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py index 876fbf1a47..38040d7bd9 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_security_requirements.py @@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ def _dependency_diff_refs() -> tuple[str, str]: head_ref = os.environ.get("DEPENDENCY_DIFF_HEAD", "").strip() or "HEAD" if base_ref and not set(base_ref) <= {"0"}: return base_ref, head_ref + # Fallback when no usable base is supplied (push with an all-zero + # ``github.event.before``, manual dispatch, etc.). ``HEAD^`` fails on a + # shallow checkout or a single-commit repo; that ``git diff`` error is + # caught by the caller and deliberately treated as "inputs changed" so the + # audit runs anyway — failing safe (audit) rather than skipping silently. return "HEAD^", "HEAD" diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 467c6989d8..2e9124a357 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ jobs: with: python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }} + # The committed .github/security-audit-requirements.txt is generated with + # --universal (resolves across all interpreters/platforms) and is what + # push/PR runs audit. The scheduled job instead compiles per matrix + # entry with --python-version so it can surface advisories in wheels that + # only resolve on a specific interpreter (e.g. 3.11-only) — coverage the + # universal file may not exercise. This broadening is intentional; PR runs + # trade that depth for determinism against the committed snapshot. - name: Compile scheduled audit requirements if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} run: | diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index 4bea960031..e6af791b82 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -1028,13 +1028,17 @@ def extension_add( with _open_url(from_url, timeout=60) as response: zip_data = _read_response_limited( response, + error_type=ExtensionError, label=f"extension {safe_url}", ) zip_path.write_bytes(zip_data) # Install from downloaded ZIP manifest = manager.install_from_zip(zip_path, speckit_version, priority=priority, force=force) - except (urllib.error.URLError, ValueError) as e: + # ExtensionError covers an oversized body (via error_type) and + # validation failures raised by install_from_zip. Let unrelated + # ValueErrors surface as real errors. + except (urllib.error.URLError, ExtensionError) as e: console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] Failed to download from {safe_url}: {e}") raise typer.Exit(1) finally: diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index 8b6cd90320..7589f6f4b9 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ def is_https_or_localhost_http(url: str) -> bool: Shared redirect-safety predicate used by the GitHub and auth HTTP redirect handlers so the rule (and any future tightening of it) lives in one place. + + The loopback allowance is a deliberate *exact-string* match on + ``localhost`` / ``127.0.0.1`` / ``::1``, not an IP-range check: other + loopback addresses (e.g. ``127.0.0.2``) are intentionally not covered. + ``urlparse`` already lower-cases the hostname, so the comparison is + case-insensitive. """ parsed = urlparse(url) is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") @@ -55,6 +61,12 @@ def read_response_limited( return fewer even when more data is pending (e.g. chunked transfer encoding), so a single ``read(max_bytes + 1)`` cannot enforce the bound on its own. Read in a loop until EOF or until one byte past the limit has been accumulated. + + *max_bytes* is keyword-only. It defaults to the module-wide + ``MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES`` (50 MiB) ceiling for archive/payload downloads; + callers with a tighter budget (e.g. small JSON responses) should pass an + explicit value so the intended bound is pinned at the call site rather than + tracking changes to the shared default. """ chunks: list[bytes] = [] total = 0 @@ -113,6 +125,10 @@ def _safe_zip_name(name: str, *, error_type: type[ErrorT]) -> str: normalized = name.replace("\\", "/") path = PurePosixPath(normalized) raw_parts = normalized.split("/") + # Strip a single trailing empty segment, i.e. the one-slash directory + # marker that legitimate ZIPs use ("mydir/", "mydir/subdir/"). Anything + # else that produces an empty segment — consecutive slashes ("a//b") or a + # second trailing slash — is left in place and rejected below as malformed. if raw_parts and raw_parts[-1] == "": raw_parts = raw_parts[:-1] has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized) is not None diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py index 22170f5d38..32e976c2fa 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py @@ -35,8 +35,11 @@ def run_command( ) -> str | None: """Run a command without invoking a shell and optionally capture output. - ``shell`` remains accepted for public API compatibility, but shell - execution is intentionally unsupported. + The ``shell`` parameter is kept in the signature so existing keyword + callers (and the re-export from ``specify_cli``) don't raise ``TypeError``, + but only the default ``shell=False`` is honoured. ``shell=True`` is + rejected with ``ValueError`` rather than silently ignored, so the + unsupported mode fails loudly instead of running with a different meaning. """ if shell: raise ValueError( diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index 74f341c5f6..77793f59d9 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: # No entry worked (or none matched) — unauthenticated fallback req = _make_req({}) if effective_redirect_validator is not None: + # No auth is attached on this path, so the handler's host list is empty: + # here it runs redirect validation only, not auth stripping. opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect((), effective_redirect_validator)) return opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) # noqa: S310 diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py index eaeb55391c..a00dc8b072 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py @@ -169,10 +169,15 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): zip_path.write_bytes( read_response_limited( response, + error_type=PresetError, label=f"preset {from_url}", ) ) - except (urllib.error.URLError, ValueError) as e: + # The URL scheme is validated above, so the only failures here + # are network errors and an oversized body (raised as PresetError + # via error_type). Catching those specifically lets unrelated + # ValueErrors surface instead of masquerading as download errors. + except (urllib.error.URLError, PresetError) as e: console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] Failed to download: {e}") raise typer.Exit(1) diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 851a2198fa..15169b1ffb 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -177,6 +177,27 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_symlinks(tmp_path): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out") +def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_symlink_without_partial_extraction(tmp_path): + # A symlink sitting next to benign members must be rejected before ANY + # file is written: validation runs over the whole member list first, so an + # unsafe member cannot leak a partially-extracted tree to disk. + zip_path = tmp_path / "mixed.zip" + link = zipfile.ZipInfo("evil-link") + link.external_attr = (stat.S_IFLNK | 0o777) << 16 + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("safe/first.txt", "hello") + zf.writestr(link, "target") + zf.writestr("safe/second.txt", "world") + + out_dir = tmp_path / "out" + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsafe symlink"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, out_dir) + + # Nothing should have been written — not even the benign member that + # precedes the symlink in the archive. + assert not out_dir.exists() or not any(out_dir.rglob("*")) + + def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_oversized_member(tmp_path): zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: From de2830158cbf53fb2d6a7c4fd01c5c1abcd816a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 07:18:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/36] fix(security): bound inline ZIP manifest read; guard ADO token redirects Audit follow-up to the download-hardening work, closing similar cases within the scope of this PR: - Add read_zip_member_limited() and use it for the inline extension.yml read in the extension *update* path (__init__.py). That read happened before install_from_zip()'s safe_extract_zip(), so a raw zf.open().read() bypassed the per-member size bound: a manifest declaring a huge file_size (few KB compressed, gigabytes uncompressed) would be fully loaded by yaml.safe_load. The helper rejects on declared size and reads bounded. - Route the Azure DevOps OAuth token request through a strict-redirect opener so a 307/308 redirect cannot forward the client_secret POST body to a non-HTTPS, non-loopback host. - Tests for the new helper and the updated ADO opener path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 18 +++++-- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ .../authentication/azure_devops.py | 14 ++++- tests/test_authentication.py | 7 ++- tests/test_download_security.py | 35 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index e6af791b82..e7a3181053 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ from rich.panel import Panel from rich.align import Align from rich.table import Table +from ._download_security import read_zip_member_limited from .shared_infra import ( install_shared_infra as _install_shared_infra_impl, refresh_shared_templates as _refresh_shared_templates_impl, @@ -1707,17 +1708,24 @@ def extension_update( manifest_data = None namelist = zf.namelist() - # First try root-level extension.yml + # Read the manifest under a hard size cap: this happens + # before install_from_zip()'s safe_extract_zip(), so a + # raw zf.open().read() here would bypass that bound and + # let a zip-bomb extension.yml exhaust memory. + manifest_member = None if "extension.yml" in namelist: - with zf.open("extension.yml") as f: - manifest_data = yaml.safe_load(f) or {} + manifest_member = "extension.yml" else: # Look for extension.yml in a single top-level subdirectory # (e.g., "repo-name-branch/extension.yml") manifest_paths = [n for n in namelist if n.endswith("/extension.yml") and n.count("/") == 1] if len(manifest_paths) == 1: - with zf.open(manifest_paths[0]) as f: - manifest_data = yaml.safe_load(f) or {} + manifest_member = manifest_paths[0] + + if manifest_member is not None: + manifest_data = yaml.safe_load( + read_zip_member_limited(zf, manifest_member) + ) or {} if manifest_data is None: raise ValueError("Downloaded extension archive is missing 'extension.yml'") diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index 7589f6f4b9..c164d81bbb 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -117,6 +117,59 @@ def verify_sha256( ) +def read_zip_member_limited( + zf: zipfile.ZipFile, + name: str, + *, + max_bytes: int = MAX_ZIP_MEMBER_BYTES, + error_type: type[ErrorT] = ValueError, + label: str | None = None, +) -> bytes: + """Read a single ZIP member into memory under a hard size cap. + + Reading a member with ``zf.open(name).read()`` is unbounded: a crafted + archive can declare a tiny ``file_size`` yet decompress to many gigabytes (a + "zip bomb"), exhausting memory before the caller ever inspects the data. + This rejects members whose *declared* size already exceeds *max_bytes* and, + to defend against headers that lie, also reads in bounded chunks and stops + one byte past the limit. + + Use this for any inline manifest/metadata read that happens *before* + :func:`safe_extract_zip` (which already enforces the same per-member bound + during extraction); a raw ``zf.open(...).read()`` bypasses that protection. + """ + member_label = label or name + try: + info = zf.getinfo(name) + except KeyError as exc: + _raise_from(error_type, f"ZIP member not found: {name}", exc) + if info.file_size > max_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP member {member_label} exceeds maximum size of {max_bytes} bytes", + ) + + chunks: list[bytes] = [] + total = 0 + limit = max_bytes + 1 + try: + with zf.open(name, "r") as source: + while total < limit: + chunk = source.read(min(READ_CHUNK_SIZE, limit - total)) + if not chunk: + break + chunks.append(chunk) + total += len(chunk) + except (OSError, zipfile.BadZipFile, RuntimeError) as exc: + _raise_from(error_type, f"Failed to read ZIP member {member_label}: {exc}", exc) + if total > max_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP member {member_label} exceeds maximum size of {max_bytes} bytes", + ) + return b"".join(chunks) + + def _safe_zip_name(name: str, *, error_type: type[ErrorT]) -> str: """Return a normalized ZIP member name or raise on traversal.""" if "\x00" in name: diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py index 06bb225c5e..c4637a1114 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py @@ -114,7 +114,19 @@ def _acquire_via_client_credentials(entry: AuthConfigEntry) -> str | None: headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}, ) try: - with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: # noqa: S310 + from specify_cli.authentication.http import ( + _StripAuthOnRedirect, + _validate_strict_redirect, + ) + + # A 307/308 redirect preserves the POST body, which carries the + # client_secret. Reuse the package HTTPS-downgrade guard (empty host + # list means no auth header to strip, just the scheme check) so the + # secret can never be forwarded to a non-HTTPS, non-loopback host. + opener = urllib.request.build_opener( + _StripAuthOnRedirect((), _validate_strict_redirect) + ) + with opener.open(req, timeout=30) as resp: # noqa: S310 payload = _json.loads( read_response_limited( resp, diff --git a/tests/test_authentication.py b/tests/test_authentication.py index 00a81b829b..0e5869abda 100644 --- a/tests/test_authentication.py +++ b/tests/test_authentication.py @@ -501,7 +501,12 @@ def test_resolve_token_azure_ad_success(self, monkeypatch): mock_resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(b'{"access_token": "ad-acquired-token"}').read mock_resp.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_resp.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) - with patch("urllib.request.urlopen", return_value=mock_resp): + # The token request goes through a strict-redirect opener (so a 307/308 + # cannot forward the client_secret body to a non-HTTPS host), not bare + # urlopen; patch the opener it builds. + mock_opener = MagicMock() + mock_opener.open.return_value = mock_resp + with patch("urllib.request.build_opener", return_value=mock_opener): assert AzureDevOpsAuth().resolve_token(entry) == "ad-acquired-token" def test_resolve_token_azure_ad_missing_secret_returns_none(self, monkeypatch): diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 15169b1ffb..7e6f912e34 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from specify_cli._download_security import ( read_response_limited, + read_zip_member_limited, safe_extract_zip, verify_sha256, ) @@ -265,6 +266,40 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_wraps_directory_filesystem_errors(tmp_path): ) +def test_read_zip_member_limited_returns_member_within_limit(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("extension.yml", "extension:\n id: demo\n") + + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf: + data = read_zip_member_limited(zf, "extension.yml") + + assert data == b"extension:\n id: demo\n" + + +def test_read_zip_member_limited_rejects_oversized_member(tmp_path): + # A manifest whose declared size already blows the cap (the zip-bomb shape: + # a few KB compressed that decompresses to gigabytes) is rejected before any + # of it is read into memory. + zip_path = tmp_path / "bomb.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf: + zf.writestr("extension.yml", "a" * 5000) + + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf: + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum size"): + read_zip_member_limited(zf, "extension.yml", max_bytes=16) + + +def test_read_zip_member_limited_wraps_missing_member(tmp_path): + zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("other.txt", "x") + + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as zf: + with pytest.raises(_CustomZipError, match="ZIP member not found"): + read_zip_member_limited(zf, "extension.yml", error_type=_CustomZipError) + + def test_safe_extract_zip_extracts_safe_archive(tmp_path): zip_path = tmp_path / "ok.zip" out_dir = tmp_path / "out" From c3f4d2ff06636528099fbd5d142a58079b85abcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 23:38:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/36] fix(security): pin tight read bounds on JSON responses; cap actual ZIP bytes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Addresses the Copilot review on PR #2442 and the same pattern elsewhere. - safe_extract_zip(): track the cumulative bytes actually written and fail past max_total_bytes, so the total-size bound holds even if member headers understate file_size (the declared-total check alone could be evaded). Mirrors the existing per-member written guard — defense-in-depth consistency. - Pass an explicit max_bytes to read_response_limited() at every JSON call site instead of inheriting the 50 MiB archive/payload default: * MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES (1 MiB): Azure AD token, GitHub release metadata, and the existing latest-release fetch (migrated off an inline literal). * MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES (8 MiB): preset, extension, workflow and integration catalog fetches. Binary/archive downloads keep the 50 MiB ceiling. Both ceilings are centralized as documented constants in _download_security.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) --- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 32 ++++++++++++++-- src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py | 3 +- tests/test_download_security.py | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index c164d81bbb..2a6ccc84ff 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -14,12 +14,24 @@ ErrorT = TypeVar("ErrorT", bound=Exception) MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 -MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 -MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024 MAX_ZIP_ENTRIES = 512 MAX_ZIP_MEMBER_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024 MAX_ZIP_TOTAL_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024 READ_CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024 + +# Tighter ceilings for responses that are read fully into memory and parsed as +# JSON. The 50 MiB MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES default is sized for archive/payload +# downloads; JSON responses are far smaller, so capping them close to their real +# size shrinks the memory-DoS surface and keeps the "too large" error reachable +# (rather than only triggering on tens of MiB). Pass the matching constant +# explicitly at each JSON call site so the intended bound is pinned there. +# * METADATA - fixed-shape single-object responses (an OAuth token, one +# release's metadata): a few KiB in practice, 1 MiB is already generous. +# * CATALOG - listings that grow with the number of published items. The +# largest bundled catalog is ~130 KiB today, so 8 MiB leaves ~60x headroom +# for growth while staying well under the download ceiling. +MAX_JSON_METADATA_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024 +MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024 SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$") @@ -180,8 +192,8 @@ def _safe_zip_name(name: str, *, error_type: type[ErrorT]) -> str: raw_parts = normalized.split("/") # Strip a single trailing empty segment, i.e. the one-slash directory # marker that legitimate ZIPs use ("mydir/", "mydir/subdir/"). Anything - # else that produces an empty segment — consecutive slashes ("a//b") or a - # second trailing slash — is left in place and rejected below as malformed. + # else that produces an empty segment - consecutive slashes ("a//b") or a + # second trailing slash - is left in place and rejected below as malformed. if raw_parts and raw_parts[-1] == "": raw_parts = raw_parts[:-1] has_windows_drive = re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized) is not None @@ -265,6 +277,11 @@ def safe_extract_zip( normalized_members.append((member, normalized_name)) + # The loop above bounds the *declared* total via member.file_size, but a + # crafted archive can understate those headers. Mirror the per-member + # guard below with a cumulative count of the bytes actually written so + # the total-size bound holds even when the headers lie. + total_written = 0 for member, normalized_name in normalized_members: member_path = target_dir / normalized_name if member.is_dir(): @@ -300,6 +317,13 @@ def safe_extract_zip( f"ZIP member {member.filename} exceeds maximum size " f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes", ) + total_written += len(chunk) + if total_written > max_total_bytes: + _raise( + error_type, + f"ZIP archive exceeds maximum uncompressed size " + f"of {max_total_bytes} bytes", + ) dest.write(chunk) except (OSError, zipfile.BadZipFile, RuntimeError) as exc: _raise_from( diff --git a/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py b/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py index 83ad446642..6af83762d7 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/integrations/catalog.py @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import yaml from packaging import version as pkg_version -from .._download_security import read_response_limited +from .._download_security import MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, read_response_limited from ..catalogs import CatalogEntry, CatalogStackBase @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( catalog_data = json.loads( read_response_limited( resp, + max_bytes=MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES, error_type=IntegrationCatalogError, label=f"integration catalog {entry.url}", ) diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 7e6f912e34..440ca13a82 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def __init__(self, data: bytes, *, chunk: int | None = None): self.data = data self.pos = 0 # When set, never return more than *chunk* bytes per call even if more is - # requested — simulates short reads (e.g. chunked transfer encoding). + # requested - simulates short reads (e.g. chunked transfer encoding). self.chunk = chunk def read(self, size: int = -1) -> bytes: @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def test_read_response_limited_returns_full_body_within_limit(): def test_read_response_limited_enforces_bound_under_short_reads(): # A server that streams more than max_bytes total while every read() returns - # fewer bytes than requested (chunked encoding) must still be rejected — a + # fewer bytes than requested (chunked encoding) must still be rejected - a # single read(max_bytes + 1) could be fooled, the accumulating loop cannot. response = _Response(b"x" * 100, chunk=8) with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="exceeds maximum size"): @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_symlink_without_partial_extraction(tmp_path): with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsafe symlink"): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, out_dir) - # Nothing should have been written — not even the benign member that + # Nothing should have been written - not even the benign member that # precedes the symlink in the archive. assert not out_dir.exists() or not any(out_dir.rglob("*")) @@ -228,6 +228,50 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_total_uncompressed_size(tmp_path): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_total_bytes=5) +def test_safe_extract_zip_bounds_actual_written_bytes_when_headers_understate_size( + tmp_path, monkeypatch +): + # Defense in depth: the pre-extraction check sums the *declared* + # member.file_size values, which a crafted archive can understate so that + # check passes. If the ZIP reader then yields more bytes than the header + # promised, the extraction loop must still abort once the cumulative bytes + # actually written exceed max_total_bytes. CPython's own zipfile happens to + # bound member reads to file_size and CRC-check them, so we substitute a + # reader that does not - exercising our guard rather than the stdlib's. + zip_path = tmp_path / "liar.zip" + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: + zf.writestr("a.txt", "") # declared file_size 0 means declared total stays 0 + zf.writestr("b.txt", "") + + class _OverreadingStream: + """A member reader that yields more bytes than any header declared.""" + + def __init__(self, payload: bytes): + self._remaining = payload + + def read(self, size: int = -1) -> bytes: + if size is None or size < 0: + size = len(self._remaining) + out, self._remaining = self._remaining[:size], self._remaining[size:] + return out + + def __enter__(self): + return self + + def __exit__(self, *exc): + return False + + # Each member streams 8 bytes despite declaring 0; the per-member cap (10 MiB + # default) is untouched, so only the cumulative guard can stop this. + monkeypatch.setattr( + zipfile.ZipFile, "open", lambda self, *a, **k: _OverreadingStream(b"x" * 8) + ) + + # 8 bytes for "a.txt" (total 8 ≤ 12), then "b.txt" busts the 12-byte ceiling. + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="maximum uncompressed size"): + safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out", max_total_bytes=12) + + def test_safe_extract_zip_wraps_bad_zip_file(tmp_path): zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" zip_path.write_bytes(b"not a zip archive") From 6430259fb2860a1d00b47c3b48247d71f20f7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 08:08:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 27/36] fix: align checkout pins and centralize loopback predicate - pin actions/checkout to the repo-wide df4cb1c (v6.0.3) in lint.yml and security.yml - replace the ad-hoc ip_address loopback checks in the workflow add URL/catalog flows with the shared is_https_or_localhost_http predicate, so HTTP-on-loopback rules match the redirect handler - drop the empty member name from the zip dot-segment test: zipfile cannot write such an entry, the case crashed in the test itself --- .github/workflows/lint.yml | 2 +- .github/workflows/security.yml | 6 ++-- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 58 +++++---------------------------- tests/test_download_security.py | 4 ++- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/lint.yml b/.github/workflows/lint.yml index 83ccccde7d..5ba2989cc0 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/lint.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/lint.yml @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - name: Checkout - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3 # shellcheck is preinstalled on ubuntu-latest runners. # Start at --severity=error to block real bugs without flagging style diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index 2e9124a357..a48f40c8e9 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ jobs: python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"] steps: - name: Checkout - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3 with: fetch-depth: 2 @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - name: Checkout - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3 with: # Need the PR base to compare baseline growth. fetch-depth: 0 @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - name: Checkout - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 + uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3 with: # Needed by check_secrets_baseline.py to read the baseline at base ref. fetch-depth: 0 diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index e7a3181053..a3cd147b9c 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ from rich.panel import Panel from rich.align import Align from rich.table import Table -from ._download_security import read_zip_member_limited +from ._download_security import ( + is_https_or_localhost_http, + read_zip_member_limited, +) from .shared_infra import ( install_shared_infra as _install_shared_infra_impl, refresh_shared_templates as _refresh_shared_templates_impl, @@ -2477,21 +2480,10 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: # Try as URL (http/https) if source.startswith("http://") or source.startswith("https://"): - from ipaddress import ip_address - from urllib.parse import urlparse from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url - parsed_src = urlparse(source) - src_host = parsed_src.hostname or "" - src_loopback = src_host == "localhost" - if not src_loopback: - try: - src_loopback = ip_address(src_host).is_loopback - except ValueError: - # Host is not an IP literal (e.g., a DNS name); keep default non-loopback. - pass - if parsed_src.scheme != "https" and not (parsed_src.scheme == "http" and src_loopback): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(source): console.print("[red]Error:[/red] Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost.") raise typer.Exit(1) @@ -2512,16 +2504,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: strict_redirects=True, ) as resp: final_url = resp.geturl() - final_parsed = urlparse(final_url) - final_host = final_parsed.hostname or "" - final_lb = final_host == "localhost" - if not final_lb: - try: - final_lb = ip_address(final_host).is_loopback - except ValueError: - # Redirect host is not an IP literal; keep loopback as determined above. - pass - if final_parsed.scheme != "https" and not (final_parsed.scheme == "http" and final_lb): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(final_url): console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] URL redirected to non-HTTPS: {final_url}") raise typer.Exit(1) with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".yml", delete=False) as tmp: @@ -2580,24 +2563,10 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: raise typer.Exit(1) # Validate URL scheme (HTTPS required, HTTP allowed for localhost only) - from ipaddress import ip_address - from urllib.parse import urlparse - - parsed_url = urlparse(workflow_url) - url_host = parsed_url.hostname or "" - is_loopback = False - if url_host == "localhost": - is_loopback = True - else: - try: - is_loopback = ip_address(url_host).is_loopback - except ValueError: - # Host is not an IP literal (e.g., a regular hostname); treat as non-loopback. - pass - if parsed_url.scheme != "https" and not (parsed_url.scheme == "http" and is_loopback): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(workflow_url): console.print( f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' has an invalid install URL. " - "Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost/loopback." + "Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost." ) raise typer.Exit(1) @@ -2630,16 +2599,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: ) as response: # Validate final URL after redirects final_url = response.geturl() - final_parsed = urlparse(final_url) - final_host = final_parsed.hostname or "" - final_loopback = final_host == "localhost" - if not final_loopback: - try: - final_loopback = ip_address(final_host).is_loopback - except ValueError: - # Host is not an IP literal (e.g., a regular hostname); treat as non-loopback. - pass - if final_parsed.scheme != "https" and not (final_parsed.scheme == "http" and final_loopback): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(final_url): if workflow_dir.exists(): import shutil shutil.rmtree(workflow_dir, ignore_errors=True) diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 440ca13a82..7d62317e0c 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -156,7 +156,9 @@ def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_traversal(tmp_path, member_name): safe_extract_zip(zip_path, tmp_path / "out") -@pytest.mark.parametrize("member_name", ["", ".", "./file.txt", "nested/./file.txt", "nested//file.txt"]) +# An empty member name is rejected by _safe_zip_name too, but zipfile cannot +# even write such an entry, so it is not testable through this API. +@pytest.mark.parametrize("member_name", [".", "./file.txt", "nested/./file.txt", "nested//file.txt"]) def test_safe_extract_zip_rejects_dot_path_segments(tmp_path, member_name): zip_path = tmp_path / "bad.zip" with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf: From 28adfc0355efe18f096f528047d48a98046dd99e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 22:50:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 28/36] fix: pre-empt review feedback on pins, predicate reuse, and baseline gates - align the setup-uv pin in security.yml with test.yml (v8.2.0) - use is_https_or_localhost_http for the preset_add/extension_add URL checks and pass strict_redirects=True to the latest-release fetch and the release-asset resolver call sites - baseline gate scripts fail closed on unresolvable refs and git read errors instead of treating them as "baseline did not exist"; the security workflow re-runs on labeled/unlabeled so the ack label can turn the gate green without a push - regenerate the bandit baseline against HEAD (two entries referenced removed code, one had drifted); track baseline entries by file+test_id in tests so line drift no longer breaks them - raise ZIP size-limit errors outside the broad except in safe_extract_zip so an error_type subclassing OSError/RuntimeError cannot re-wrap them - tests: drop two redirect tests duplicated from test_authentication, move the downgrade test next to its siblings, assert the workflow catalog max_bytes, route OpenerDirector.open through urlopen in the modules that patch urlopen, add set -euo pipefail to the secret scan, misc cleanup (unused helper, redundant imports, EOF-less fake read) --- .github/bandit-baseline.json | 46 ++----------------- .github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py | 31 ++++++++++++- .github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py | 34 ++++++++++++-- .github/workflows/security.yml | 10 ++-- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 12 ++++- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 23 ++++++---- src/specify_cli/_version.py | 1 + src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py | 31 ++++--------- tests/http_helpers.py | 25 ++++++++++ .../integrations/test_integration_catalog.py | 8 +++- tests/self_upgrade_helpers.py | 3 +- tests/test_authentication.py | 26 +++++++++-- tests/test_baseline_gates.py | 10 ++++ tests/test_extensions.py | 1 - tests/test_security_workflow.py | 22 ++++----- tests/test_self_upgrade_detection.py | 1 + tests/test_self_upgrade_execution.py | 1 + tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py | 1 + tests/test_upgrade.py | 5 +- tests/test_workflows.py | 6 ++- 20 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/bandit-baseline.json b/.github/bandit-baseline.json index 345fea6d2d..14ee416174 100644 --- a/.github/bandit-baseline.json +++ b/.github/bandit-baseline.json @@ -1,47 +1,7 @@ { "results": [ { - "code": "103 if not req.get_header(\"Authorization\") and not strict_redirects:\n104 return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout)\n105 \n", - "col_offset": 15, - "end_col_offset": 59, - "filename": "src/specify_cli/_github_http.py", - "issue_confidence": "HIGH", - "issue_cwe": { - "id": 22, - "link": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html" - }, - "issue_severity": "MEDIUM", - "issue_text": "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.", - "line_number": 104, - "line_range": [ - 104 - ], - "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/blacklists/blacklist_calls.html#b310-urllib-urlopen", - "test_id": "B310", - "test_name": "blacklist" - }, - { - "code": "113 \n114 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: # noqa: S310\n115 payload = _json.loads(\n", - "col_offset": 17, - "end_col_offset": 56, - "filename": "src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py", - "issue_confidence": "HIGH", - "issue_cwe": { - "id": 22, - "link": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html" - }, - "issue_severity": "MEDIUM", - "issue_text": "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.", - "line_number": 114, - "line_range": [ - 114 - ], - "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/blacklists/blacklist_calls.html#b310-urllib-urlopen", - "test_id": "B310", - "test_name": "blacklist" - }, - { - "code": "170 return opener.open(req, timeout=timeout)\n171 return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) # noqa: S310\n", + "code": "168 return opener.open(req, timeout=timeout)\n169 return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) # noqa: S310\n", "col_offset": 11, "end_col_offset": 55, "filename": "src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py", @@ -52,9 +12,9 @@ }, "issue_severity": "MEDIUM", "issue_text": "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.", - "line_number": 171, + "line_number": 169, "line_range": [ - 171 + 169 ], "more_info": "https://bandit.readthedocs.io/en/1.9.4/blacklists/blacklist_calls.html#b310-urllib-urlopen", "test_id": "B310", diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py index e81cb69f7f..5ab7d5643f 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_bandit_baseline.py @@ -43,14 +43,38 @@ ACK_LABEL = "security-baseline-change" +def _git_ok(*args: str) -> bool: + """True if the git command exits 0 (output discarded).""" + return ( + subprocess.run( + ["git", *args], + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, + stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, + ).returncode + == 0 + ) + + def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref). Used for the base side. The head side reads the working tree to avoid silently fail-opening on an unfetched/invalid head ref. + + Only a missing *path* at a resolvable ref counts as "did not exist"; + an unresolvable ref or a failing ``git show`` aborts instead, so a + transient git failure cannot silently disable the gate. """ if not ref: return {"results": []}, False + if not _git_ok("rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", f"{ref}^{{commit}}"): + raise SystemExit( + f"Base ref {ref!r} cannot be resolved (unfetched or invalid). " + f"Refusing to fail-open on a security gate." + ) + if not _git_ok("cat-file", "-e", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"): + return {"results": []}, False try: blob = subprocess.run( ["git", "show", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"], @@ -60,8 +84,11 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, ).stdout - except subprocess.CalledProcessError: - return {"results": []}, False + except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc: + raise SystemExit( + f"Could not read baseline at {ref!r}: {exc.stderr.strip()}. " + f"Refusing to fail-open on a security gate." + ) try: return json.loads(blob), True except json.JSONDecodeError: diff --git a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py index 0b452ee0cb..fcd7a07279 100644 --- a/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py +++ b/.github/scripts/check_secrets_baseline.py @@ -56,10 +56,35 @@ def log_safe(self) -> str: ) +def _git_ok(*args: str) -> bool: + """True if the git command exits 0 (output discarded).""" + return ( + subprocess.run( + ["git", *args], + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, + stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, + ).returncode + == 0 + ) + + def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: - """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref). Base side only.""" + """Return (baseline_json, file_existed_at_ref). Base side only. + + Only a missing *path* at a resolvable ref counts as "did not exist"; + an unresolvable ref or a failing ``git show`` aborts instead, so a + transient git failure cannot silently disable the gate. + """ if not ref: return {"results": {}}, False + if not _git_ok("rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", f"{ref}^{{commit}}"): + raise SystemExit( + f"Base ref {ref!r} cannot be resolved (unfetched or invalid). " + f"Refusing to fail-open on a security gate." + ) + if not _git_ok("cat-file", "-e", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"): + return {"results": {}}, False try: blob = subprocess.run( ["git", "show", f"{ref}:{BASELINE_PATH}"], @@ -69,8 +94,11 @@ def _read_baseline_at(ref: str) -> tuple[dict, bool]: stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, ).stdout - except subprocess.CalledProcessError: - return {"results": {}}, False + except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc: + raise SystemExit( + f"Could not read baseline at {ref!r}: {exc.stderr.strip()}. " + f"Refusing to fail-open on a security gate." + ) try: return json.loads(blob), True except json.JSONDecodeError: diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.yml index a48f40c8e9..abdebf77ac 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/security.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ on: push: branches: ["main"] pull_request: + # labeled/unlabeled so the baseline-growth gates re-evaluate when the + # acknowledgement label is added or removed, without requiring a push. + types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, labeled, unlabeled] schedule: - cron: "17 4 * * 1" workflow_dispatch: @@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ jobs: fetch-depth: 2 - name: Install uv - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 + uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0 - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python-version }} uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 @@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ jobs: fetch-depth: 0 - name: Install uv - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 + uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0 - name: Set up Python uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 @@ -154,7 +157,7 @@ jobs: fetch-depth: 0 - name: Install uv - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0 + uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0 - name: Set up Python uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6 @@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ jobs: # rewriting the baseline file (so there's no spurious git diff). - name: Run detect-secrets run: | + set -euo pipefail git ls-files -z \ -- ':!:.secrets.baseline' \ ':!:uv.lock' \ diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index a3cd147b9c..cdd62098ea 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -2480,6 +2480,8 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: # Try as URL (http/https) if source.startswith("http://") or source.startswith("https://"): + from functools import partial + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url @@ -2490,7 +2492,9 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url as _resolve_gh_asset _wf_url_extra_headers = None - _resolved_wf_url = _resolve_gh_asset(source, _open_url, timeout=30) + _resolved_wf_url = _resolve_gh_asset( + source, partial(_open_url, strict_redirects=True), timeout=30 + ) if _resolved_wf_url: source = _resolved_wf_url _wf_url_extra_headers = {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} @@ -2580,12 +2584,16 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: workflow_file = workflow_dir / "workflow.yml" try: + from functools import partial + from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url as _resolve_gh_asset from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited _wf_cat_extra_headers = None - _resolved_workflow_url = _resolve_gh_asset(workflow_url, _open_url, timeout=30) + _resolved_workflow_url = _resolve_gh_asset( + workflow_url, partial(_open_url, strict_redirects=True), timeout=30 + ) if _resolved_workflow_url: workflow_url = _resolved_workflow_url _wf_cat_extra_headers = {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index 2a6ccc84ff..5fe35e3d92 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ def is_https_or_localhost_http(url: str) -> bool: """Return True if *url* is HTTPS, or HTTP limited to loopback hosts. - Shared redirect-safety predicate used by the GitHub and auth HTTP redirect - handlers so the rule (and any future tightening of it) lives in one place. + Shared scheme-safety predicate used by the auth HTTP redirect handler and + by the direct URL validations in the CLI download flows, so the rule (and + any future tightening of it) lives in one place. The loopback allowance is a deliberate *exact-string* match on ``localhost`` / ``127.0.0.1`` / ``::1``, not an IP-range check: other @@ -304,6 +305,10 @@ def safe_extract_zip( exc, ) written = 0 + # Raised outside the try below: if error_type subclasses OSError or + # RuntimeError, raising inside would re-wrap the limit error as + # "Failed to extract" and lose the size-bound message. + limit_error: str | None = None try: with zf.open(member, "r") as source, member_path.open("wb") as dest: while True: @@ -312,18 +317,18 @@ def safe_extract_zip( break written += len(chunk) if written > max_member_bytes: - _raise( - error_type, + limit_error = ( f"ZIP member {member.filename} exceeds maximum size " - f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes", + f"of {max_member_bytes} bytes" ) + break total_written += len(chunk) if total_written > max_total_bytes: - _raise( - error_type, + limit_error = ( f"ZIP archive exceeds maximum uncompressed size " - f"of {max_total_bytes} bytes", + f"of {max_total_bytes} bytes" ) + break dest.write(chunk) except (OSError, zipfile.BadZipFile, RuntimeError) as exc: _raise_from( @@ -331,3 +336,5 @@ def safe_extract_zip( f"Failed to extract ZIP member {member.filename}: {exc}", exc, ) + if limit_error is not None: + _raise(error_type, limit_error) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_version.py b/src/specify_cli/_version.py index 33dd0983e4..7720cf2ab6 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_version.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_version.py @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ def _fetch_latest_release_tag() -> tuple[str | None, str | None]: GITHUB_API_LATEST, timeout=5, extra_headers={"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"}, + strict_redirects=True, ) as resp: payload = json.loads( read_response_limited( diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py index a00dc8b072..08d29d46fa 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py @@ -101,26 +101,10 @@ def preset_add( elif from_url: # Validate URL scheme before downloading - from ipaddress import ip_address - from urllib.parse import urlparse as _urlparse - - _parsed = _urlparse(from_url) - - def _is_allowed_download_url(parsed_url): - host = parsed_url.hostname - if not host: - return False - is_loopback = host == "localhost" - if not is_loopback: - try: - is_loopback = ip_address(host).is_loopback - except ValueError: - # Host is not an IP literal (e.g., a regular hostname); treat as non-loopback. - pass - return parsed_url.scheme == "https" or (parsed_url.scheme == "http" and is_loopback) + from specify_cli._download_security import is_https_or_localhost_http def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): - if not _is_allowed_download_url(_urlparse(new_url)): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(new_url): import urllib.error raise urllib.error.URLError( @@ -128,7 +112,7 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): "or HTTP for localhost/loopback" ) - if not _is_allowed_download_url(_parsed): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(from_url): console.print( "[red]Error:[/red] URL must use HTTPS with a hostname, " "or HTTP for localhost/loopback." @@ -142,12 +126,17 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: zip_path = Path(tmpdir) / "preset.zip" try: + from functools import partial + from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url _preset_extra_headers = None - _resolved_from_url = resolve_github_release_asset_api_url(from_url, _open_url) + _resolved_from_url = resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( + from_url, + partial(_open_url, strict_redirects=True), + ) if _resolved_from_url: from_url = _resolved_from_url _preset_extra_headers = {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} @@ -159,7 +148,7 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): redirect_validator=_validate_download_redirect, ) as response: final_url = response.geturl() if hasattr(response, "geturl") else from_url - if not _is_allowed_download_url(_urlparse(final_url)): + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(final_url): console.print( "[red]Error:[/red] Preset URL redirected to a disallowed URL: " f"{final_url}. Redirect targets must use HTTPS with a hostname, " diff --git a/tests/http_helpers.py b/tests/http_helpers.py index 5c1026d385..5effd27e42 100644 --- a/tests/http_helpers.py +++ b/tests/http_helpers.py @@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ import io import json +import urllib.request from unittest.mock import MagicMock +import pytest + def mock_urlopen_response(payload: dict) -> MagicMock: """Build a urlopen context-manager mock whose read returns JSON.""" @@ -14,3 +17,25 @@ def mock_urlopen_response(payload: dict) -> MagicMock: cm.__enter__.return_value = resp cm.__exit__.return_value = False return cm + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def route_opener_open_through_urlopen(monkeypatch): + """Route OpenerDirector.open through urllib.request.urlopen. + + ``open_url(..., strict_redirects=True)`` fetches via + ``build_opener(...).open()``, which bypasses ``urllib.request.urlopen`` + — and with it the urlopen patches these test modules are built on. + Delegating ``open()`` to urlopen at call time keeps those patches + effective; the redirect handler's own behavior is covered by + ``TestRedirectStripping`` in test_authentication.py. + + Import this fixture into a test module to activate it there. + """ + monkeypatch.setattr( + urllib.request.OpenerDirector, + "open", + lambda self, req, data=None, timeout=None: urllib.request.urlopen( + req, timeout=timeout + ), + ) diff --git a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py index 063a0402e9..95bae5eaa5 100644 --- a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py +++ b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ """Tests for the integration catalog system (catalog.py).""" +import io import json import os @@ -323,8 +324,11 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): ) class FakeResponse: - def read(self, _size=-1): - return b"{}" + def __init__(self): + self._stream = io.BytesIO(b"{}") + + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return entry.url diff --git a/tests/self_upgrade_helpers.py b/tests/self_upgrade_helpers.py index c363f57b13..fc0f339f92 100644 --- a/tests/self_upgrade_helpers.py +++ b/tests/self_upgrade_helpers.py @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ _verify_upgrade, ) from tests.conftest import strip_ansi -from tests.http_helpers import mock_urlopen_response +from tests.http_helpers import mock_urlopen_response, route_opener_open_through_urlopen __all__ = ( "SENTINEL_GH_TOKEN", @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ "_verify_upgrade", "mock_urlopen_response", "requires_posix", + "route_opener_open_through_urlopen", "runner", "strip_ansi", ) diff --git a/tests/test_authentication.py b/tests/test_authentication.py index 0e5869abda..e888929516 100644 --- a/tests/test_authentication.py +++ b/tests/test_authentication.py @@ -851,6 +851,18 @@ def test_multi_hop_redirect_within_hosts_preserves_auth(self): auth3 = req3.get_header("Authorization") or req3.unredirected_hdrs.get("Authorization") assert auth3 == "Bearer tok" + def test_redirect_rejects_https_downgrade(self): + """HTTPS downloads must not follow redirects to non-local HTTP URLs.""" + from specify_cli.authentication.http import _StripAuthOnRedirect + from urllib.request import Request + import io + import urllib.error + handler = _StripAuthOnRedirect(("example.com",)) + req = Request("https://example.com/archive.zip") + with pytest.raises(urllib.error.URLError, match="unsafe redirect"): + handler.redirect_request(req, io.BytesIO(b""), 302, "Found", {}, + "http://evil.example.com/archive.zip") + # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # _fetch_latest_release_tag delegation @@ -890,19 +902,25 @@ def test_gh_token_forwarded_when_configured(self, monkeypatch): assert captured["request"].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer forwarded-sentinel" def test_no_config_means_no_auth(self, monkeypatch): - from unittest.mock import patch + from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from specify_cli._version import _fetch_latest_release_tag self._set_config(monkeypatch, []) captured, side_effect = self._capture_request() - with patch("specify_cli.authentication.http.urllib.request.urlopen", side_effect=side_effect): + # The release fetch uses strict_redirects=True, so the unauthenticated + # path goes through build_opener().open(), not urlopen. + mock_opener = MagicMock() + mock_opener.open.side_effect = side_effect + with patch("specify_cli.authentication.http.urllib.request.build_opener", return_value=mock_opener): _fetch_latest_release_tag() assert captured["request"].get_header("Authorization") is None def test_accept_header_present(self, monkeypatch): - from unittest.mock import patch + from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch from specify_cli._version import _fetch_latest_release_tag self._set_config(monkeypatch, []) captured, side_effect = self._capture_request() - with patch("specify_cli.authentication.http.urllib.request.urlopen", side_effect=side_effect): + mock_opener = MagicMock() + mock_opener.open.side_effect = side_effect + with patch("specify_cli.authentication.http.urllib.request.build_opener", return_value=mock_opener): _fetch_latest_release_tag() assert captured["request"].get_header("Accept") == "application/vnd.github+json" diff --git a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py index d1cbe444d8..2ba48ad129 100644 --- a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py +++ b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py @@ -316,6 +316,16 @@ def gate(self, tmp_path) -> GateHandle: _install_script(repo, BANDIT_SCRIPT) return GateHandle(config=BANDIT_GATE, repo=repo) + def test_unresolvable_base_ref_fails_closed(self, gate: GateHandle): + # A base ref that cannot be resolved (unfetched, typo) must block + # the gate, not be treated as "baseline did not exist yet". + gate.commit([("a.py", 10)], "base") + + result = gate.run(base="0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567") + + assert result.returncode == 1 + assert "Refusing to fail-open" in result.stderr + def test_no_base_ref_is_skipped(self, gate: GateHandle): gate.commit([], "init") # need at least one commit so HEAD resolves result = gate.run(base="") diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py index 1cef6fae90..bcf132fdf0 100644 --- a/tests/test_extensions.py +++ b/tests/test_extensions.py @@ -3766,7 +3766,6 @@ def test_download_extension_accepts_direct_github_rest_asset_url(self, temp_dir, """download_extension can use a GitHub REST release asset URL directly.""" from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock import zipfile - import io monkeypatch.setenv("GITHUB_TOKEN", "ghp_testtoken") self._inject_github_config(monkeypatch, token_env="GITHUB_TOKEN") diff --git a/tests/test_security_workflow.py b/tests/test_security_workflow.py index 7105ee7942..b4e052da33 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_workflow.py +++ b/tests/test_security_workflow.py @@ -69,10 +69,6 @@ def _step(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> dict: raise AssertionError(f"Step {step_name!r} not found in job {job_name!r}.") -def _step_run(job_name: str, step_name: str) -> str: - return _step(job_name, step_name)["run"] - - def _find_step_by_run_signature(job_name: str, marker: str) -> dict: """Locate a step in *job_name* whose ``run`` command contains *marker*. @@ -175,7 +171,11 @@ def test_security_workflow_triggers_are_preserved(self): triggers = _workflow_triggers() assert triggers["push"]["branches"] == ["main"] - assert triggers["pull_request"] is None + # labeled/unlabeled so the baseline-growth gates re-evaluate when the + # acknowledgement label is toggled, without requiring a new push. + assert triggers["pull_request"] == { + "types": ["opened", "synchronize", "reopened", "labeled", "unlabeled"] + } assert triggers["workflow_dispatch"] is None assert triggers["schedule"] == [{"cron": "17 4 * * 1"}] @@ -228,14 +228,14 @@ def test_bandit_baseline_tracks_only_accepted_findings(self): baseline = json.loads(BANDIT_BASELINE.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) results = baseline["results"] + # Identify entries by (filename, test_id), not line number: unrelated + # edits shift lines and force a baseline regen, and the growth gate + # (check_bandit_baseline.py) already guards full identities. assert { - (result["filename"], result["line_number"], result["test_id"]) - for result in results + (result["filename"], result["test_id"]) for result in results } == { - ("src/specify_cli/_github_http.py", 104, "B310"), - ("src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py", 114, "B310"), - ("src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py", 171, "B310"), - ("src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py", 35, "B602"), + ("src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py", "B310"), + ("src/specify_cli/workflows/steps/shell/__init__.py", "B602"), } assert {result["issue_severity"] for result in results} == {"MEDIUM", "HIGH"} diff --git a/tests/test_self_upgrade_detection.py b/tests/test_self_upgrade_detection.py index ab575e7435..73b55ebb79 100644 --- a/tests/test_self_upgrade_detection.py +++ b/tests/test_self_upgrade_detection.py @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from specify_cli import app from tests.self_upgrade_helpers import ( + route_opener_open_through_urlopen, # noqa: F401 (autouse fixture) _InstallMethod, _assemble_installer_argv, _completed_process, diff --git a/tests/test_self_upgrade_execution.py b/tests/test_self_upgrade_execution.py index 6696b4fc79..5c761014be 100644 --- a/tests/test_self_upgrade_execution.py +++ b/tests/test_self_upgrade_execution.py @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from specify_cli import app from tests.self_upgrade_helpers import ( + route_opener_open_through_urlopen, # noqa: F401 (autouse fixture) _completed_process, mock_urlopen_response, requires_posix, diff --git a/tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py b/tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py index f1a018f06c..c4e7eecf1b 100644 --- a/tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py +++ b/tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from specify_cli import app from tests.self_upgrade_helpers import ( + route_opener_open_through_urlopen, # noqa: F401 (autouse fixture) SENTINEL_GH_TOKEN, SENTINEL_GITHUB_TOKEN, _InstallMethod, diff --git a/tests/test_upgrade.py b/tests/test_upgrade.py index e2afed7aa1..6a8b069b5c 100644 --- a/tests/test_upgrade.py +++ b/tests/test_upgrade.py @@ -27,7 +27,10 @@ _normalize_tag, ) from tests.conftest import strip_ansi -from tests.http_helpers import mock_urlopen_response +from tests.http_helpers import ( + mock_urlopen_response, + route_opener_open_through_urlopen, # noqa: F401 (autouse fixture) +) runner = CliRunner() diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py index eba4c8306f..ddd4ece242 100644 --- a/tests/test_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_workflows.py @@ -3635,11 +3635,13 @@ def _fake_urlopen(req, timeout=30): # Bounded read was invoked (not raw resp.read()). error_type must # be the WorkflowCatalogError so an oversized response surfaces # as a workflow-catalog domain error, not a generic ValueError - # that callers might miss. The size cap itself relies on the - # module-level default in _download_security.MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES. + # that callers might miss. + from specify_cli._download_security import MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES + assert "kwargs" in recorded, "read_response_limited was not called" assert recorded["kwargs"]["error_type"] is WorkflowCatalogError assert recorded["kwargs"]["label"] == "workflow catalog" + assert recorded["kwargs"]["max_bytes"] == MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES # ===== Integration Test ===== From 7e21a201b530eb426849b3f4793369b55f75dcdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 06:44:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 29/36] fix: error messages and docstring name the exact loopback hosts is_https_or_localhost_http allows HTTP for localhost, 127.0.0.1 and ::1; the user-facing messages and the open_url docstring only said localhost. --- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 9 ++++++--- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 5 +++-- src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index cdd62098ea..041961e7d1 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ def extension_add( if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost): console.print("[red]Error:[/red] URL must use HTTPS for security.") - console.print("HTTP is only allowed for localhost URLs.") + console.print("HTTP is only allowed for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1) URLs.") raise typer.Exit(1) safe_url = _escape_markup(from_url) @@ -2486,7 +2486,10 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url if not is_https_or_localhost_http(source): - console.print("[red]Error:[/red] Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost.") + console.print( + "[red]Error:[/red] Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, " + "except HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." + ) raise typer.Exit(1) from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url as _resolve_gh_asset @@ -2570,7 +2573,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: if not is_https_or_localhost_http(workflow_url): console.print( f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' has an invalid install URL. " - "Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost." + "Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." ) raise typer.Exit(1) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index 77793f59d9..401e52a77e 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ def _validate_strict_redirect(_old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: if not is_https_or_localhost_http(new_url): raise urllib.error.URLError( "redirect target must use HTTPS with a hostname, " - "or HTTP for localhost/loopback" + "or HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)" ) @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ def open_url( *redirect_validator*, when provided, is called with ``(old_url, new_url)`` before following each redirect and may raise to reject the redirect. *strict_redirects* rejects redirect targets that are not HTTPS with a - hostname, except HTTP localhost/loopback URLs. + hostname, except HTTP to localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 + (the exact hosts allowed by ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). """ entries = find_entries_for_url(url, _load_config()) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py index 08d29d46fa..2c1ed5d4ee 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py @@ -109,13 +109,13 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): raise urllib.error.URLError( "redirect target must use HTTPS with a hostname, " - "or HTTP for localhost/loopback" + "or HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)" ) if not is_https_or_localhost_http(from_url): console.print( "[red]Error:[/red] URL must use HTTPS with a hostname, " - "or HTTP for localhost/loopback." + "or HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." ) raise typer.Exit(1) @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): console.print( "[red]Error:[/red] Preset URL redirected to a disallowed URL: " f"{final_url}. Redirect targets must use HTTPS with a hostname, " - "or HTTP for localhost/loopback." + "or HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." ) raise typer.Exit(1) zip_path.write_bytes( From befeebeb2857452edb312475a395056b521856df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:09:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 30/36] docs(http): clarify redirect scheme guard is unconditional The non-HTTPS redirect rejection in _StripAuthOnRedirect applies to every authenticated attempt regardless of strict_redirects; the flag only extends the same guard to the unauthenticated fallback. Document both guards on the class and correct the open_url docstring, which previously gated the whole scheme restriction under strict_redirects. --- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 27 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index 401e52a77e..3b404a06fa 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -64,13 +64,20 @@ def _hostname_in_hosts(hostname: str, hosts: tuple[str, ...]) -> bool: def _validate_strict_redirect(_old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: if not is_https_or_localhost_http(new_url): raise urllib.error.URLError( - "redirect target must use HTTPS with a hostname, " + "unsafe redirect: target must use HTTPS with a hostname, " "or HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)" ) class _StripAuthOnRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): - """Drop ``Authorization`` when a redirect leaves trusted hosts or downgrades.""" + """Redirect handler that guards every redirect it is installed for. + + 1. Reject redirects that are not HTTPS with a hostname, except HTTP to + localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 (the exact hosts allowed by + ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). + 2. Run any caller-provided redirect validator. + 3. Drop ``Authorization`` when a redirect leaves trusted hosts or downgrades. + """ def __init__( self, @@ -82,6 +89,7 @@ def __init__( self._redirect_validator = redirect_validator def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl): + _validate_strict_redirect(req.full_url, newurl) if self._redirect_validator is not None: self._redirect_validator(req.full_url, newurl) @@ -145,18 +153,17 @@ def open_url( *extra_headers* (e.g. ``Accept``) are merged into every attempt. *redirect_validator*, when provided, is called with ``(old_url, new_url)`` before following each redirect and may raise to reject the redirect. - *strict_redirects* rejects redirect targets that are not HTTPS with a - hostname, except HTTP to localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 - (the exact hosts allowed by ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). + + Redirect scheme safety: every authenticated attempt goes through + ``_StripAuthOnRedirect``, which always rejects redirects to non-HTTPS + URLs (except HTTP to localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1, the hosts allowed by + ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). *strict_redirects* extends that same + scheme guard and the optional redirect validator to the unauthenticated + fallback; without it, the fallback follows redirects without that handler. """ entries = find_entries_for_url(url, _load_config()) effective_redirect_validator = redirect_validator - if strict_redirects: - def effective_redirect_validator(old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: - _validate_strict_redirect(old_url, new_url) - if redirect_validator is not None: - redirect_validator(old_url, new_url) def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: merged = {} From 123f8130ef96d87d482df3f680da5d2f3ec9ae25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:11:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/36] harden: reject hostless URLs in is_https_or_localhost_http A URL without a hostname (e.g. https:///x) has no real target; reject it regardless of scheme. Folds main's hostless-HTTPS guard into the shared predicate so every download/redirect call site benefits. --- src/specify_cli/_download_security.py | 5 +++++ tests/test_download_security.py | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py index 5fe35e3d92..24072af637 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_download_security.py @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ def is_https_or_localhost_http(url: str) -> bool: by the direct URL validations in the CLI download flows, so the rule (and any future tightening of it) lives in one place. + A hostname is always required: a URL without one (e.g. ``https:///x``) + has no real target and is rejected regardless of scheme. + The loopback allowance is a deliberate *exact-string* match on ``localhost`` / ``127.0.0.1`` / ``::1``, not an IP-range check: other loopback addresses (e.g. ``127.0.0.2``) are intentionally not covered. @@ -49,6 +52,8 @@ def is_https_or_localhost_http(url: str) -> bool: case-insensitive. """ parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + return False is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") return parsed.scheme == "https" or (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost) diff --git a/tests/test_download_security.py b/tests/test_download_security.py index 7d62317e0c..966425552d 100644 --- a/tests/test_download_security.py +++ b/tests/test_download_security.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import pytest from specify_cli._download_security import ( + is_https_or_localhost_http, read_response_limited, read_zip_member_limited, safe_extract_zip, @@ -25,6 +26,26 @@ } +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "url, allowed", + [ + ("https://example.com/preset.zip", True), + ("http://localhost:8000/preset.zip", True), + ("http://127.0.0.1/preset.zip", True), + ("http://[::1]/preset.zip", True), + # Non-loopback HTTP is rejected. + ("http://example.com/preset.zip", False), + # Loopback allowance is an exact-string match: 127.0.0.2 is not covered. + ("http://127.0.0.2/preset.zip", False), + # A hostname is always required, even for HTTPS. + ("https:///preset.zip", False), + ("https://", False), + ], +) +def test_is_https_or_localhost_http(url, allowed): + assert is_https_or_localhost_http(url) is allowed + + class _Response: """Faithful stream stand-in: read() advances a cursor and returns b"" at EOF.""" From 774da95e99fd4c8c903e275c1476805a3d68e808 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 17:21:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 32/36] fix(workflows): reject hostless catalog URLs during fetch --- src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py | 20 +++++++----- tests/test_workflows.py | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py b/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py index f229269f0e..c9ddf35ad7 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py @@ -161,14 +161,14 @@ def __init__(self, project_root: Path) -> None: def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (localhost HTTP allowed).""" - if not is_https_or_localhost_http(url): - from urllib.parse import urlparse + from urllib.parse import urlparse - parsed = urlparse(url) - if not parsed.hostname: - raise WorkflowValidationError( - "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." - ) + parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise WorkflowValidationError( + "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + ) + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(url): raise WorkflowValidationError( f"Catalog URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://). " "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." @@ -339,7 +339,11 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( raise WorkflowCatalogError(str(exc)) from exc try: - with _open_url(entry.url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=True) as resp: + with _open_url( + entry.url, + timeout=30, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as resp: try: self._validate_catalog_url(resp.geturl()) except WorkflowValidationError as exc: diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py index ddd4ece242..f936b3fa84 100644 --- a/tests/test_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_workflows.py @@ -3429,6 +3429,13 @@ def test_validate_url_http_rejected(self, project_dir): with pytest.raises(WorkflowValidationError, match="HTTPS"): catalog._validate_catalog_url("http://evil.com/catalog.json") + def test_validate_url_hostless_https_rejected(self, project_dir): + from specify_cli.workflows.catalog import WorkflowCatalog, WorkflowValidationError + + catalog = WorkflowCatalog(project_dir) + with pytest.raises(WorkflowValidationError, match="valid URL with a host"): + catalog._validate_catalog_url("https:///catalog.json") + def test_validate_url_localhost_http_allowed(self, project_dir): from specify_cli.workflows.catalog import WorkflowCatalog @@ -3643,6 +3650,45 @@ def _fake_urlopen(req, timeout=30): assert recorded["kwargs"]["label"] == "workflow catalog" assert recorded["kwargs"]["max_bytes"] == MAX_JSON_CATALOG_BYTES + def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_hostless_redirect(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): + from specify_cli.workflows.catalog import ( + WorkflowCatalog, + WorkflowCatalogEntry, + WorkflowCatalogError, + ) + import specify_cli.authentication.http as _auth_http + + entry = WorkflowCatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/workflow-catalog.json", + name="test", + priority=0, + install_allowed=False, + ) + + class _FakeResponse: + def geturl(self): + return "https:///workflow-catalog.json" + + def __enter__(self): + return self + + def __exit__(self, *_a): + pass + + def _fake_urlopen(req, timeout=30): + return _FakeResponse() + + monkeypatch.setattr(_auth_http.urllib.request, "urlopen", _fake_urlopen) + monkeypatch.setattr( + _auth_http.urllib.request.OpenerDirector, + "open", + lambda _self, req, data=None, timeout=30: _fake_urlopen(req, timeout), + ) + + cat = WorkflowCatalog(project_dir) + with pytest.raises(WorkflowCatalogError, match="valid URL with a host"): + cat._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + # ===== Integration Test ===== From c6dd5743632a8574aeded6f6362145de3de4dbf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 06:04:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 33/36] docs(cli): clarify host requirement for URL validation --- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 19 +++++++++---------- src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py | 5 +++-- tests/test_presets.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index 041961e7d1..3be0662b17 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -960,15 +960,13 @@ def extension_add( # Guard with ``not dev`` so that --dev + --from does not show a # confusing confirmation for a URL that will be ignored. if from_url and not dev: - from urllib.parse import urlparse from rich.markup import escape as _escape_markup - parsed = urlparse(from_url) - is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") - - if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost): - console.print("[red]Error:[/red] URL must use HTTPS for security.") - console.print("HTTP is only allowed for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1) URLs.") + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(from_url): + console.print( + "[red]Error:[/red] URL must be a valid URL with a host and use HTTPS." + ) + console.print("HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1 URLs.") raise typer.Exit(1) safe_url = _escape_markup(from_url) @@ -2487,8 +2485,8 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: if not is_https_or_localhost_http(source): console.print( - "[red]Error:[/red] Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, " - "except HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." + "[red]Error:[/red] URL must be a valid URL with a host and use HTTPS. " + "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) raise typer.Exit(1) @@ -2573,7 +2571,8 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: if not is_https_or_localhost_http(workflow_url): console.print( f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' has an invalid install URL. " - "Only HTTPS URLs are allowed, except HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." + "It must be a valid URL with a host and use HTTPS; HTTP is only allowed " + "for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) raise typer.Exit(1) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py index 2c1ed5d4ee..4e29c949c9 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py @@ -114,8 +114,9 @@ def _validate_download_redirect(old_url, new_url): if not is_https_or_localhost_http(from_url): console.print( - "[red]Error:[/red] URL must use HTTPS with a hostname, " - "or HTTP for localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1)." + "[red]Error:[/red] URL must use HTTPS with a hostname and be " + "a valid URL with a host. HTTP is only allowed for localhost, " + "127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) raise typer.Exit(1) diff --git a/tests/test_presets.py b/tests/test_presets.py index ac99497bba..dd2c18f9b3 100644 --- a/tests/test_presets.py +++ b/tests/test_presets.py @@ -4574,6 +4574,22 @@ def test_bundled_preset_missing_locally_cli_error(self, project_dir): class TestPresetAddFromUrlResolution: """CLI-level tests for preset add --from GitHub release resolution.""" + def test_preset_add_from_hostless_url_explains_hostname_requirement(self, project_dir): + """Hostless HTTPS URLs should fail with actionable CLI guidance.""" + from typer.testing import CliRunner + from unittest.mock import patch + from specify_cli import app + + runner = CliRunner() + with patch.object(Path, "cwd", return_value=project_dir): + result = runner.invoke(app, [ + "preset", "add", + "--from", "https:///preset.zip", + ]) + + assert result.exit_code == 1 + assert "valid URL with a host" in result.output + def test_preset_add_from_github_release_url_resolves_and_downloads(self, project_dir): """'preset add --from ' resolves to API asset URL.""" from typer.testing import CliRunner From 1f1b20c9e7544b67d7be067c45c7c63b3c75de45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 17:02:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 34/36] fix: stabilize security rebase follow-ups --- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 9 +-- src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py | 1 + .../integrations/test_integration_catalog.py | 3 +- tests/test_authentication.py | 13 ++-- tests/test_extensions.py | 48 +++++++------ tests/test_github_http.py | 8 +-- tests/test_presets.py | 68 +++++++++++-------- tests/test_workflows.py | 49 ++++++------- 8 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index 3b404a06fa..0647515f20 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ def _validate_strict_redirect(_old_url: str, new_url: str) -> None: class _StripAuthOnRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): """Redirect handler that guards every redirect it is installed for. - 1. Reject redirects that are not HTTPS with a hostname, except HTTP to + 1. Run any caller-provided redirect validator. + 2. Reject redirects that are not HTTPS with a hostname, except HTTP to localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 (the exact hosts allowed by ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). - 2. Run any caller-provided redirect validator. 3. Drop ``Authorization`` when a redirect leaves trusted hosts or downgrades. """ @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ def __init__( self._redirect_validator = redirect_validator def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl): - _validate_strict_redirect(req.full_url, newurl) if self._redirect_validator is not None: self._redirect_validator(req.full_url, newurl) + _validate_strict_redirect(req.full_url, newurl) original_auth = ( req.get_header("Authorization") @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ def open_url( entries = find_entries_for_url(url, _load_config()) effective_redirect_validator = redirect_validator + use_redirect_handler = strict_redirects or effective_redirect_validator is not None def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: merged = {} @@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ def _make_req(auth_headers: dict[str, str]) -> urllib.request.Request: # No entry worked (or none matched) — unauthenticated fallback req = _make_req({}) - if effective_redirect_validator is not None: + if use_redirect_handler: # No auth is attached on this path, so the handler's host list is empty: # here it runs redirect validation only, not auth stripping. opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect((), effective_redirect_validator)) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py index 41a97895d1..8839e50a81 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ def _validate(self): f"Invalid template file path '{file_path}': " "must be a relative path within the preset directory" ) + tmpl["file"] = normalized # Validate strategy field (optional, defaults to "replace") strategy = tmpl.get("strategy", "replace") diff --git a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py index 95bae5eaa5..99e8a31d18 100644 --- a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py +++ b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py @@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ def __exit__(self, *_args): pass def fake_urlopen(url, timeout=10): - assert url == entry.url + actual_url = url.full_url if hasattr(url, "full_url") else url + assert actual_url == entry.url assert timeout == 10 return FakeResponse() diff --git a/tests/test_authentication.py b/tests/test_authentication.py index e888929516..cce3ad9a7b 100644 --- a/tests/test_authentication.py +++ b/tests/test_authentication.py @@ -799,17 +799,18 @@ def test_redirect_outside_hosts_strips_auth(self): assert new_req.headers.get("Authorization") is None assert new_req.unredirected_hdrs.get("Authorization") is None - def test_https_to_http_same_host_redirect_strips_auth(self): + def test_https_to_http_same_host_redirect_rejected(self): from specify_cli.authentication.http import _StripAuthOnRedirect from urllib.request import Request import io + import urllib.error + handler = _StripAuthOnRedirect(("github.com",)) req = Request("https://github.com/org/repo", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok"}) - new_req = handler.redirect_request(req, io.BytesIO(b""), 302, "Found", {}, - "http://github.com/org/repo") - assert new_req is not None - assert new_req.headers.get("Authorization") is None - assert new_req.unredirected_hdrs.get("Authorization") is None + + with pytest.raises(urllib.error.URLError, match="unsafe redirect"): + handler.redirect_request(req, io.BytesIO(b""), 302, "Found", {}, + "http://github.com/org/repo") def test_redirect_validator_can_reject_before_following_redirect(self): import urllib.error diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py index bcf132fdf0..fda561a374 100644 --- a/tests/test_extensions.py +++ b/tests/test_extensions.py @@ -3270,7 +3270,7 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_payload(self, temp_dir, payload) catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -3337,10 +3337,12 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_cached_payload( "schema_version": "1.0", "extensions": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } - mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() - mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s - mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response entry = CatalogEntry( url=ExtensionCatalog.DEFAULT_CATALOG_URL, @@ -3349,7 +3351,7 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_cached_payload( install_allowed=True, ) - with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=lambda *a, **kw: make_response()): result = catalog._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=False) # The poisoned cache was discarded and the network payload returned. @@ -3385,7 +3387,7 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_rejects_malformed_payload(self, temp_dir, payload): catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -3424,12 +3426,14 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_recovers_from_unreadable_cache(self, temp_dir): "schema_version": "1.0", "extensions": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } - mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() - mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s - mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response - with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=lambda *a, **kw: make_response()): result = catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=False) # Recovered via network rather than crashing on the unreadable cache. @@ -3463,7 +3467,7 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_recovers_from_unreadable_metadata(self, temp_dir): "extensions": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -3537,7 +3541,7 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_writes_cache_as_utf8(self, temp_dir, monkeypatch): "extensions": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -3587,10 +3591,12 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_survives_unwritable_cache(self, temp_dir, monkeypatch): "schema_version": "1.0", "extensions": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } - mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() - mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s - mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response # Simulate an unwritable cache dir: every write_text under the # cache directory raises PermissionError (an OSError subclass). @@ -3603,7 +3609,7 @@ def failing_write_text(self, data, *args, **kwargs): monkeypatch.setattr(_PathCls, "write_text", failing_write_text) - with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=lambda *a, **kw: make_response()): # Legacy single-catalog path. assert catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=True) == valid @@ -3639,7 +3645,7 @@ def test_get_merged_extensions_skips_non_mapping_entries(self, temp_dir): }, } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -3777,7 +3783,7 @@ def test_download_extension_accepts_direct_github_rest_asset_url(self, temp_dir, zip_bytes = zip_buf.getvalue() asset_response = MagicMock() - asset_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + asset_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read asset_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s asset_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) diff --git a/tests/test_github_http.py b/tests/test_github_http.py index 89ad8b0f27..0fb82b5b99 100644 --- a/tests/test_github_http.py +++ b/tests/test_github_http.py @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ def _make_open_url_fn(self, release_json): @contextmanager def fake_open(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): resp = MagicMock() - resp.read.return_value = json.dumps(release_json).encode() + resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(release_json).encode()).read yield resp return fake_open @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ def test_returns_none_on_network_error(self): @contextmanager def failing_open(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): raise urllib.error.URLError("network error") - yield # noqa: unreachable + yield # pragma: no cover result = resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( "https://github.com/org/repo/releases/download/v1/pack.zip", @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ def test_tag_with_special_characters_is_url_encoded(self): def capturing_open(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): captured_urls.append(url) resp = MagicMock() - resp.read.return_value = json.dumps({"assets": []}).encode() + resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps({"assets": []}).encode()).read yield resp resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ def test_tag_with_hash_is_url_encoded(self): def capturing_open(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): captured_urls.append(url) resp = MagicMock() - resp.read.return_value = json.dumps({"assets": []}).encode() + resp.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps({"assets": []}).encode()).read yield resp resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( diff --git a/tests/test_presets.py b/tests/test_presets.py index dd2c18f9b3..bd39760c34 100644 --- a/tests/test_presets.py +++ b/tests/test_presets.py @@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_payload(self, project_dir, paylo catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -1648,10 +1648,12 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_cached_payload( "schema_version": "1.0", "presets": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } - mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() - mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s - mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response entry = PresetCatalogEntry( url=catalog.DEFAULT_CATALOG_URL, @@ -1660,7 +1662,7 @@ def test_fetch_single_catalog_rejects_malformed_cached_payload( install_allowed=True, ) - with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=lambda *a, **kw: make_response()): result = catalog._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=False) # The poisoned cache was discarded and the network payload returned. @@ -1696,7 +1698,7 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_rejects_malformed_payload(self, project_dir, payload): catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -1736,12 +1738,14 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_recovers_from_unreadable_cache(self, project_dir): "schema_version": "1.0", "presets": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } - mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() - mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s - mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response - with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=lambda *a, **kw: make_response()): result = catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=False) # Recovered via network rather than crashing on the unreadable cache. @@ -1775,7 +1779,7 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_recovers_from_unreadable_metadata(self, project_dir): "presets": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -1845,7 +1849,7 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_writes_cache_as_utf8(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): "presets": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -1893,10 +1897,12 @@ def test_fetch_catalog_survives_unwritable_cache(self, project_dir, monkeypatch) "schema_version": "1.0", "presets": {"foo": {"name": "Foo", "version": "1.0.0"}}, } - mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(valid).encode() - mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s - mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(valid).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response # Simulate an unwritable cache dir: every write_text under the # cache directory raises PermissionError (an OSError subclass). @@ -1909,7 +1915,7 @@ def failing_write_text(self, data, *args, **kwargs): monkeypatch.setattr(_PathCls, "write_text", failing_write_text) - with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", return_value=mock_response): + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=lambda *a, **kw: make_response()): # Legacy single-catalog path. assert catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=True) == valid @@ -1946,7 +1952,7 @@ def test_get_merged_packs_skips_non_mapping_entries(self, project_dir): }, } mock_response = MagicMock() - mock_response.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -2042,7 +2048,7 @@ def test_download_pack_accepts_direct_github_rest_asset_url(self, project_dir, m zip_bytes = zip_buf.getvalue() asset_response = MagicMock() - asset_response.read.return_value = zip_bytes + asset_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read asset_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s asset_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) @@ -4611,10 +4617,10 @@ def test_preset_add_from_github_release_url_resolves_and_downloads(self, project class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data): - self._data = data + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) - def read(self): - return self._data + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def __enter__(self): return self @@ -4622,7 +4628,9 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, *a): return False - def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, redirect_validator=None): + def fake_open_url( + url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, redirect_validator=None, strict_redirects=False + ): captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers)) if "releases/tags/" in url: return FakeResponse(json.dumps({ @@ -4669,10 +4677,10 @@ def test_preset_add_from_direct_api_asset_url_passes_through(self, project_dir): class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data): - self._data = data + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) - def read(self): - return self._data + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def __enter__(self): return self @@ -4680,7 +4688,9 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, *a): return False - def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, redirect_validator=None): + def fake_open_url( + url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, redirect_validator=None, strict_redirects=False + ): captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers)) return FakeResponse(zip_bytes) diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py index f936b3fa84..12569c1396 100644 --- a/tests/test_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_workflows.py @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations import json +import io import os import shutil import sys @@ -4577,6 +4578,8 @@ def _fake_get_step_info(self, step_id): class _FakeResponse: def __init__(self, url: str): self.url = url + data = b"step:\n type_key: my-step\n" if url.endswith("/step.yml") else b"" + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) def __enter__(self): return self @@ -4584,10 +4587,8 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb): return False - def read(self): - if self.url.endswith("/step.yml"): - return b"step:\n type_key: my-step\n" - return b"" + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return self.url @@ -4636,6 +4637,8 @@ def _fake_get_step_info(self, step_id): class _FakeResponse: def __init__(self, url: str): self.url = url + data = b"step:\n type_key: my-step\n" if url.endswith("/step.yml") else b"" + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) def __enter__(self): return self @@ -4643,10 +4646,8 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb): return False - def read(self): - if self.url.endswith("/step.yml"): - return b"step:\n type_key: my-step\n" - return b"" + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return self.url @@ -4684,6 +4685,8 @@ def _fake_get_step_info(self, step_id): class _FakeResponse: def __init__(self, url: str): self.url = url + data = b"step:\n type_key: my-step\n" if url.endswith("/step.yml") else b"" + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) def __enter__(self): return self @@ -4691,10 +4694,8 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb): return False - def read(self): - if self.url.endswith("/step.yml"): - return b"step:\n type_key: my-step\n" - return b"" + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return self.url @@ -5005,11 +5006,11 @@ def test_workflow_add_from_github_release_url_resolves_and_downloads(self, proje class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=None): - self._data = data + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) self._url = url or "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/releases/assets/42" - def read(self): - return self._data + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return self._url @@ -5020,7 +5021,7 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, *a): return False - def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): + def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False): captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers, timeout)) if "releases/tags/" in url: return FakeResponse(json.dumps({ @@ -5057,11 +5058,11 @@ def test_workflow_add_from_direct_api_asset_url_passes_through(self, project_dir class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=None): - self._data = data + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) self._url = url or "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/releases/assets/42" - def read(self): - return self._data + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return self._url @@ -5072,7 +5073,7 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, *a): return False - def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): + def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False): captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers)) return FakeResponse(self.VALID_WORKFLOW_YAML.encode()) @@ -5100,11 +5101,11 @@ def test_workflow_add_catalog_based_resolves_github_release_url(self, project_di class FakeResponse: def __init__(self, data, url=None): - self._data = data + self._stream = io.BytesIO(data) self._url = url or "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/releases/assets/55" - def read(self): - return self._data + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) def geturl(self): return self._url @@ -5115,7 +5116,7 @@ def __enter__(self): def __exit__(self, *a): return False - def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None): + def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False): captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers)) if "releases/tags/" in url: return FakeResponse(json.dumps({ From e3f0153fa90a00415ccfb871c9676fa6c9de7fcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 12:08:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 35/36] fix: address security audit follow-ups --- .github/security-audit-requirements.txt | 292 ++++++++++-------- .secrets.baseline | 53 +++- src/specify_cli/_utils.py | 4 +- .../authentication/azure_devops.py | 9 +- src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py | 6 +- tests/test_baseline_gates.py | 3 +- 6 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt index 646284db2b..9f4c7bf1a1 100644 --- a/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt +++ b/.github/security-audit-requirements.txt @@ -2,125 +2,124 @@ annotated-doc==0.0.4 \ --hash=sha256:571ac1dc6991c450b25a9c2d84a3705e2ae7a53467b5d111c24fa8baabbed320 \ --hash=sha256:fbcda96e87e9c92ad167c2e53839e57503ecfda18804ea28102353485033faa4 # via typer -click==8.3.3 \ - --hash=sha256:398329ad4837b2ff7cbe1dd166a4c0f8900c3ca3a218de04466f38f6497f18a2 \ - --hash=sha256:a2bf429bb3033c89fa4936ffb35d5cb471e3719e1f3c8a7c3fff0b8314305613 - # via - # specify-cli (pyproject.toml) - # typer +click==8.4.1 \ + --hash=sha256:482be17c6991b8c19c5429a1e995d9b0efdbb63172824c41f99965dc0ade8ec2 \ + --hash=sha256:918b5633eddf6b41c32d4f454bf0de810065c74e3f7dbf8ee5452f8be88d3e96 + # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) colorama==0.4.6 ; sys_platform == 'win32' \ --hash=sha256:08695f5cb7ed6e0531a20572697297273c47b8cae5a63ffc6d6ed5c201be6e44 \ --hash=sha256:4f1d9991f5acc0ca119f9d443620b77f9d6b33703e51011c16baf57afb285fc6 # via # click # pytest -coverage==7.14.0 \ - --hash=sha256:057a6af2f160a85384cde4ab36f0d2777bae1057bae255f95413cdd382aa5c74 \ - --hash=sha256:0773d8329cf32b6fd222e4b52622c61fe8d503eb966cfc8d3c3c10c96266d50e \ - --hash=sha256:0a951308cde22cf77f953955a754d04dccb57fe3bb8e345d685778ed9fc1632a \ - --hash=sha256:0c451757d3fa2603354fdc789b5e58a0e327a117c370a40e3476ba4eabab228c \ - --hash=sha256:0f162bc9a15b82d947b02651b0c7e1609d6f7a8735ca330cfadec8481dd97d5a \ - --hash=sha256:15228a6800ce7bdf1b74800595e56db7138cecb338fdbf044806e10dcf182dfe \ - --hash=sha256:1733198802d71ec4c524f322e2867ee05c62e9e75df86bdca545407a221827d1 \ - --hash=sha256:1a0abc7342ea9711c469dd8b821c6c311e6bc6aac1442e5fbd6b27fae0a8f3db \ - --hash=sha256:1b23b0c6f0b1db6ad769b7050c8b641c0bf215ded26c1816955b17b7f26edfa9 \ - --hash=sha256:1c9ed6ef99f88fb8c14aa8e2bf8eb0fe55fa2edfea68f8675d78741df1a5ac0e \ - --hash=sha256:22a7e06a5f11a757cdfe79018e9095f9f69ae283c5cd8123774c788deec8717b \ - --hash=sha256:23b81107f46d3f21d0cbce30664fcec0f5d9f585638a67081750f99738f6bf66 \ - --hash=sha256:29943e552fdc08e082eb51400fb2f58e118a83b5542bd06531214e084399b644 \ - 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--hash=sha256:87ebdf787d4888e3f3f2d523eadc6e18c6d18c6d0eb173801a189641627fb37e \ + --hash=sha256:8a3ce026d73290f42f08dafecbd82c193a74df280461fbf97300fec51fd133ee \ + --hash=sha256:9132cd363a68a4c3daa7c8704a654b1e39d3360f6f5b8ddd470608a945236c07 \ + --hash=sha256:99cd41ff91afd94896fea3bc002706b6ae4ce95727d06e4a0f39c0a8d8bd8b1a \ + --hash=sha256:9eeb3fcbc13ba40dfbdb22d01d196a28e9cef9ed4c29b60061a1e0e823a9929d \ + --hash=sha256:a06c76364a9360e33d6d23769aefdf7f66f38e2ffb60ceb1baaa4989d83b695c \ + --hash=sha256:a07891c3f4805442b31b71e84ba3cf29ed1aa9a428284e06deeb4b23e5b46343 \ + --hash=sha256:a24a81f9715ee42ef59a316cc11611c98fe23920f7c81861315c9f3ff4a230f4 \ + --hash=sha256:a252f21c27e38347e60111a3266b03827422a7d5525951aceee313aa68bab1d2 \ + --hash=sha256:a311d8e1da24be5c1ccf85cbfb06315dbaa1703d5a1eab3f6432c72b837917c8 \ + --hash=sha256:a5274669f37f2343635a347b91a60777621341ab3378e9c6ac9335eee704bddf \ + --hash=sha256:aa5e304a873fabddc11e484e9b6b738bd38bd7bed17b09aa84eecf5332e8b8bb \ + --hash=sha256:ab4af6352741a604c431c6072fce5bee33bf0f20dc7a56618d6bf6bb89e9810c \ + --hash=sha256:b553d04b5e778a8e56d57eb134aff42a92718ecba45e79c4764ecfa40efd92ff \ + --hash=sha256:b84800013769a78ccb9ef4659402e26d06867e337b61ec365f77ad008adea80e \ + --hash=sha256:b84ffdf877644e7096aa936991efeed873f7f3df57b9cd001312b7668ab08550 \ + --hash=sha256:bcaa50684dcaadfa599ac48f81103c756d791cfd85c97203d2217c593d48b860 \ + --hash=sha256:be9f2c802dcfce3f71298303aa5dad0dce440a76c52f2f60dacd8656dab78793 \ + --hash=sha256:c643734307300234fafa36bf2a040a7235f8f177ea1fd6ec1423aea6fb7b929f \ + --hash=sha256:c79cead5b5bc584d9c71451cb984d0e3a84e0c0937379c8efcbf27c8d661b851 \ + --hash=sha256:c7e057326434e441306226fbeb5d1aaf14a2637efe97ba668306635835f32ad7 \ + --hash=sha256:c912c259304cfb5ee584481cfb7ce1ff932b4d61e6c9140b8f19cb7b5ed82332 \ + --hash=sha256:ce66d8e46da2bb5ee313a745cbd2e391d319176c1f7a9451bfcd3a2fb920859b \ + --hash=sha256:ced2f09ef276fd58611a1ef502164ad266d2b75174e5a40cabbdb4033f9f6cf2 \ + --hash=sha256:cfe5a5fec635799ef33428f1e5e61bafa45a92a96190ba731561ba558ccc214d \ + --hash=sha256:d13e6725992e2d2fd7d81d4f5241952d13740121dfd501da09201be39b2c003a \ + --hash=sha256:d34d75f892b3ab73ba11cab5442cce7b3e168fd64162b16f0e1e0d09c508edef \ + --hash=sha256:d5b89cdfb2ee051b71e8c3c70bd81a9eff81100f736a269136fe1a68efe00474 \ + --hash=sha256:d5ed429d0b8edaac649e889b4ffcedb6c80b06629a3f93050e3dddfb99235bee \ + --hash=sha256:da028256b04ec30e5e0114b6f76172938c313991f0a2d3d894271315cf5d5e43 \ + --hash=sha256:dcbf65f1f66a26cdd88c35cf68fb4729c5d1cd2e88added72420541dfb212034 \ + --hash=sha256:dd34767fa19848d35659ffc0a75314f58c7af3f1cd87ec521e8292a1238398a3 \ + --hash=sha256:ddf799247318f34dbcd2efa8c95a8d0642674e926bb1774cf9b63dfd2a389d1c \ + --hash=sha256:de286598cc65d2b489411174b1faec2f5a7775fb3201fd925db2a76b4030f37d \ + --hash=sha256:e471bc5769ff073b058cfadb0d736b56ce067c8560eabeb0da88462df98c23e7 \ + --hash=sha256:e854312c4103f2ad4c0dc023b69b77ebfd2c89db5f86c4c94dc2353f9a92167e \ + --hash=sha256:ea8cd6ca0ee9f616aaef3afc6882e32c2cbf18b00d96313ffd76af650574034d \ + --hash=sha256:f2302660e32562a532b442480121aef8aa61a5bdb20b30bf0adab29f10a5a4b4 \ + --hash=sha256:f497a1ea81d4cd7c10ddcaa685135b9aabd291af3d55775a9ddf3cb7a364cdd9 \ + --hash=sha256:f4ddbe407477f04c45115d1a4e5bc480f753553b534d338d4c3358b1cdd0ea52 \ + --hash=sha256:f747dc8edcfe740130f28f32f3995e955494285717e86ee25af51db2219df08a \ + --hash=sha256:fad54e871165f6ec2f536063ac74c3104508a12963e64072ba44bd822de52b0c \ + --hash=sha256:fc459e5d73be2d6332fcfe8dbf3d8994671fe33c700f4565988ecfa511547253 \ + --hash=sha256:fd86572566fb40189a8260446158235159bc7a82dfbc87a3b39cf4fb57fcec1c # via pytest-cov iniconfig==2.3.0 \ --hash=sha256:c76315c77db068650d49c5b56314774a7804df16fee4402c1f19d6d15d8c4730 \ @@ -148,9 +147,9 @@ pathspec==1.1.1 \ --hash=sha256:17db5ecd524104a120e173814c90367a96a98d07c45b2e10c2f3919fff91bf5a \ --hash=sha256:a00ce642f577bf7f473932318056212bc4f8bfdf53128c78bbd5af0b9b20b189 # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) -platformdirs==4.9.6 \ - --hash=sha256:3bfa75b0ad0db84096ae777218481852c0ebc6c727b3168c1b9e0118e458cf0a \ - --hash=sha256:e61adb1d5e5cb3441b4b7710bea7e4c12250ca49439228cc1021c00dcfac0917 +platformdirs==4.10.0 \ + --hash=sha256:31e761a6a0ca04faf7353ea759bdba55652be214725111e5aac52dfa29d4bef7 \ + --hash=sha256:fb516cdb12eb0d857d0cd85a7c57cea4d060bee4578d6cf5a14dfdf8cbf8784a # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) pluggy==1.6.0 \ --hash=sha256:7dcc130b76258d33b90f61b658791dede3486c3e6bfb003ee5c9bfb396dd22f3 \ @@ -164,9 +163,9 @@ pygments==2.20.0 \ # via # pytest # rich -pytest==9.0.3 \ - --hash=sha256:2c5efc453d45394fdd706ade797c0a81091eccd1d6e4bccfcd476e2b8e0ab5d9 \ - --hash=sha256:b86ada508af81d19edeb213c681b1d48246c1a91d304c6c81a427674c17eb91c +pytest==9.1.0 \ + --hash=sha256:41dd9148c08072446394cefd3d79701701335a9f4cae69ba92e39f6c7f5c061c \ + --hash=sha256:8ebb0e7888bdf2bdfc602ec51f8f62d50200af37356c74e503c79a94f5c81f32 # via # specify-cli (pyproject.toml) # pytest-cov @@ -263,7 +262,56 @@ shellingham==1.5.4 \ --hash=sha256:7ecfff8f2fd72616f7481040475a65b2bf8af90a56c89140852d1120324e8686 \ --hash=sha256:8dbca0739d487e5bd35ab3ca4b36e11c4078f3a234bfce294b0a0291363404de # via typer -typer==0.25.1 \ - --hash=sha256:75caa44ed46a03fb2dab8808753ffacdbfea88495e74c85a28c5eefcf5f39c89 \ - --hash=sha256:9616eb8853a09ffeabab1698952f33c6f29ffdbceb4eaeecf571880e8d7664cc +tomli==2.4.1 ; python_full_version <= '3.11' \ + --hash=sha256:01f520d4f53ef97964a240a035ec2a869fe1a37dde002b57ebc4417a27ccd853 \ + --hash=sha256:0d85819802132122da43cb86656f8d1f8c6587d54ae7dcaf30e90533028b49fe \ + --hash=sha256:136443dbd7e1dee43c68ac2694fde36b2849865fa258d39bf822c10e8068eac5 \ + --hash=sha256:1d8591993e228b0c930c4bb0db464bdad97b3289fb981255d6c9a41aedc84b2d \ + --hash=sha256:2190f2e9dd7508d2a90ded5ed369255980a1bcdd58e52f7fe24b8162bf9fedbd \ + --hash=sha256:2c1c351919aca02858f740c6d33adea0c5deea37f9ecca1cc1ef9e884a619d26 \ + --hash=sha256:36d2bd2ad5fb9eaddba5226aa02c8ec3fa4f192631e347b3ed28186d43be6b54 \ + --hash=sha256:3d48a93ee1c9b79c04bb38772ee1b64dcf18ff43085896ea460ca8dec96f35f6 \ + --hash=sha256:47149d5bd38761ac8be13a84864bf0b7b70bc051806bc3669ab1cbc56216b23c \ + --hash=sha256:4ab97e64ccda8756376892c53a72bd1f964e519c77236368527f758fbc36a53a \ + --hash=sha256:4b605484e43cdc43f0954ddae319fb75f04cc10dd80d830540060ee7cd0243cd \ + --hash=sha256:504aa796fe0569bb43171066009ead363de03675276d2d121ac1a4572397870f \ + --hash=sha256:51529d40e3ca50046d7606fa99ce3956a617f9b36380da3b7f0dd3dd28e68cb5 \ + --hash=sha256:52c8ef851d9a240f11a88c003eacb03c31fc1c9c4ec64a99a0f922b93874fda9 \ + --hash=sha256:559db847dc486944896521f68d8190be1c9e719fced785720d2216fe7022b662 \ + --hash=sha256:5a881ab208c0baf688221f8cecc5401bd291d67e38a1ac884d6736cbcd8247e9 \ + --hash=sha256:5cb41aa38891e073ee49d55fbc7839cfdb2bc0e600add13874d048c94aadddd1 \ + --hash=sha256:5e262d41726bc187e69af7825504c933b6794dc3fbd5945e41a79bb14c31f585 \ + --hash=sha256:5ee18d9ebdb417e384b58fe414e8d6af9f4e7a0ae761519fb50f721de398dd4e \ + --hash=sha256:7008df2e7655c495dd12d2a4ad038ff878d4ca4b81fccaf82b714e07eae4402c \ + --hash=sha256:734e20b57ba95624ecf1841e72b53f6e186355e216e5412de414e3c51e5e3c41 \ + --hash=sha256:7c7e1a961a0b2f2472c1ac5b69affa0ae1132c39adcb67aba98568702b9cc23f \ + --hash=sha256:7f86fd587c4ed9dd76f318225e7d9b29cfc5a9d43de44e5754db8d1128487085 \ + --hash=sha256:7f94b27a62cfad8496c8d2513e1a222dd446f095fca8987fceef261225538a15 \ + --hash=sha256:88dceee75c2c63af144e456745e10101eb67361050196b0b6af5d717254dddf7 \ + --hash=sha256:8a650c2dbafa08d42e51ba0b62740dae4ecb9338eefa093aa5c78ceb546fcd5c \ + --hash=sha256:8d65a2fbf9d2f8352685bc1364177ee3923d6baf5e7f43ea4959d7d8bc326a36 \ + --hash=sha256:96481a5786729fd470164b47cdb3e0e58062a496f455ee41b4403be77cb5a076 \ + --hash=sha256:a120733b01c45e9a0c34aeef92bf0cf1d56cfe81ed9d47d562f9ed591a9828ac \ + --hash=sha256:b1d22e6e9387bf4739fbe23bfa80e93f6b0373a7f1b96c6227c32bef95a4d7a8 \ + --hash=sha256:b8c198f8c1805dc42708689ed6864951fd2494f924149d3e4bce7710f8eb5232 \ + --hash=sha256:c2541745709bad0264b7d4705ad453b76ccd191e64aa6f0fc66b69a293a45ece \ + --hash=sha256:c742f741d58a28940ce01d58f0ab2ea3ced8b12402f162f4d534dfe18ba1cd6a \ + --hash=sha256:c7f2c7f2b9ca6bdeef8f0fa897f8e05085923eb091721675170254cbc5b02897 \ + --hash=sha256:d312ef37c91508b0ab2cee7da26ec0b3ed2f03ce12bd87a588d771ae15dcf82d \ + --hash=sha256:d4d8fe59808a54658fcc0160ecfb1b30f9089906c50b23bcb4c69eddc19ec2b4 \ + --hash=sha256:da25dc3563bff5965356133435b757a795a17b17d01dbc0f42fb32447ddfd917 \ + --hash=sha256:eab21f45c7f66c13f2a9e0e1535309cee140182a9cdae1e041d02e47291e8396 \ + --hash=sha256:eb0dc4e38e6a1fd579e5d50369aa2e10acfc9cace504579b2faabb478e76941a \ + --hash=sha256:ec9bfaf3ad2df51ace80688143a6a4ebc09a248f6ff781a9945e51937008fcbc \ + --hash=sha256:ede3e6487c5ef5d28634ba3f31f989030ad6af71edfb0055cbbd14189ff240ba \ + --hash=sha256:f3c6818a1a86dd6dca7ddcaaf76947d5ba31aecc28cb1b67009a5877c9a64f3f \ + --hash=sha256:f758f1b9299d059cc3f6546ae2af89670cb1c4d48ea29c3cacc4fe7de3058257 \ + --hash=sha256:f8f0fc26ec2cc2b965b7a3b87cd19c5c6b8c5e5f436b984e85f486d652285c30 \ + --hash=sha256:fd0409a3653af6c147209d267a0e4243f0ae46b011aa978b1080359fddc9b6cf \ + --hash=sha256:ff18e6a727ee0ab0388507b89d1bc6a22b138d1e2fa56d1ad494586d61d2eae9 \ + --hash=sha256:ff2983983d34813c1aeb0fa89091e76c3a22889ee83ab27c5eeb45100560c049 + # via coverage +typer==0.26.7 \ + --hash=sha256:5c87cfbc5d34491c5346ebf49c23e18d56ccb863268d3a8d592b26087c2f5e58 \ + --hash=sha256:e314a34c617e419c091b2830dda3ea1f257134ff593061a8f5b9717ab8dddb3a # via specify-cli (pyproject.toml) diff --git a/.secrets.baseline b/.secrets.baseline index 524003da3c..0936c9f318 100644 --- a/.secrets.baseline +++ b/.secrets.baseline @@ -144,13 +144,47 @@ "line_number": 65 } ], + ".github/aw/actions-lock.json": [ + { + "type": "Hex High Entropy String", + "filename": ".github/aw/actions-lock.json", + "hashed_secret": "d85a5096b95f13fd8eadff7813c465b4f0b6b074", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 6 + }, + { + "type": "Hex High Entropy String", + "filename": ".github/aw/actions-lock.json", + "hashed_secret": "ff853346af779bcfc8f28515063f78a852a97dbf", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 11 + } + ], + ".github/workflows/add-community-extension.lock.yml": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": ".github/workflows/add-community-extension.lock.yml", + "hashed_secret": "a4fbc895dedf49406d65138d4733c6d6b1b09d0d", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 903 + } + ], + ".github/workflows/add-community-preset.lock.yml": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": ".github/workflows/add-community-preset.lock.yml", + "hashed_secret": "a4fbc895dedf49406d65138d4733c6d6b1b09d0d", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 903 + } + ], ".github/workflows/security.yml": [ { "type": "Secret Keyword", "filename": ".github/workflows/security.yml", "hashed_secret": "4202a5e0d1da60251e0163e869ae02016bb68767", "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 163 + "line_number": 173 } ], "docs/reference/authentication.md": [ @@ -184,7 +218,7 @@ "filename": "tests/test_agent_config_consistency.py", "hashed_secret": "7a549d52003f28825cf4d8a7351585120349c1c5", "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 56 + "line_number": 49 } ], "tests/test_authentication.py": [ @@ -193,7 +227,7 @@ "filename": "tests/test_authentication.py", "hashed_secret": "3c3b274d119ff5a5ec6c1e215c1cb794d9973ac1", "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 131 + "line_number": 132 } ], "tests/test_extensions.py": [ @@ -202,9 +236,18 @@ "filename": "tests/test_extensions.py", "hashed_secret": "7a9b93cfa651fbc2c93d88edea4d4fcfe33c0a0b", "is_verified": false, - "line_number": 3397 + "line_number": 4562 + } + ], + "tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py": [ + { + "type": "Secret Keyword", + "filename": "tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py", + "hashed_secret": "ea0779778816346745234384ad57b78aa101178f", + "is_verified": false, + "line_number": 624 } ] }, - "generated_at": "2026-05-16T06:38:49Z" + "generated_at": "2026-06-18T09:38:59Z" } diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py index 32e976c2fa..2afb106e3d 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py @@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ def run_command( try: if capture: - result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=check_return, capture_output=True, text=True, shell=shell) + result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=check_return, capture_output=True, text=True) return result.stdout.strip() else: - subprocess.run(cmd, check=check_return, shell=shell) + subprocess.run(cmd, check=check_return) return None except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: if check_return: diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py index c4637a1114..72e25de92b 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/azure_devops.py @@ -114,18 +114,13 @@ def _acquire_via_client_credentials(entry: AuthConfigEntry) -> str | None: headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}, ) try: - from specify_cli.authentication.http import ( - _StripAuthOnRedirect, - _validate_strict_redirect, - ) + from specify_cli.authentication.http import _StripAuthOnRedirect # A 307/308 redirect preserves the POST body, which carries the # client_secret. Reuse the package HTTPS-downgrade guard (empty host # list means no auth header to strip, just the scheme check) so the # secret can never be forwarded to a non-HTTPS, non-loopback host. - opener = urllib.request.build_opener( - _StripAuthOnRedirect((), _validate_strict_redirect) - ) + opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_StripAuthOnRedirect(())) with opener.open(req, timeout=30) as resp: # noqa: S310 payload = _json.loads( read_response_limited( diff --git a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py index 0647515f20..1aeacce9f8 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/authentication/http.py @@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ def open_url( Redirect scheme safety: every authenticated attempt goes through ``_StripAuthOnRedirect``, which always rejects redirects to non-HTTPS URLs (except HTTP to localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1, the hosts allowed by - ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). *strict_redirects* extends that same - scheme guard and the optional redirect validator to the unauthenticated - fallback; without it, the fallback follows redirects without that handler. + ``is_https_or_localhost_http``). The unauthenticated fallback installs the + same handler when *strict_redirects* is true or *redirect_validator* is + supplied; without either, it follows redirects without that handler. """ entries = find_entries_for_url(url, _load_config()) diff --git a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py index 2ba48ad129..d2971621de 100644 --- a/tests/test_baseline_gates.py +++ b/tests/test_baseline_gates.py @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations import json +import os import subprocess import sys from dataclasses import dataclass @@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ def _commit_baseline(repo: Path, baseline_path: str, payload: dict, message: str def _run_script(repo: Path, script: Path, env_overrides: dict[str, str]): env = { - "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", + **os.environ, "HOME": str(repo), **env_overrides, } From ae666179cb8686e986fff53fa2c1920584a7fdd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:31:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 36/36] fix: enforce strict redirects for catalog downloads --- src/specify_cli/__init__.py | 54 ++++- src/specify_cli/catalogs.py | 8 +- src/specify_cli/extensions.py | 33 ++- src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py | 47 ++++- src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py | 18 +- .../integrations/test_integration_catalog.py | 2 +- tests/test_extensions.py | 193 +++++++++++++++++- tests/test_presets.py | 107 ++++++++++ tests/test_workflows.py | 54 ++++- 9 files changed, 463 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py index 3be0662b17..c4e7763c6b 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/__init__.py @@ -1027,7 +1027,11 @@ def extension_add( from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url - with _open_url(from_url, timeout=60) as response: + with _open_url( + from_url, + timeout=60, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: zip_data = _read_response_limited( response, error_type=ExtensionError, @@ -2479,6 +2483,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: # Try as URL (http/https) if source.startswith("http://") or source.startswith("https://"): from functools import partial + from urllib.parse import urlparse as _urlparse from specify_cli._download_security import read_response_limited as _read_response_limited from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url @@ -2510,7 +2515,17 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: ) as resp: final_url = resp.geturl() if not is_https_or_localhost_http(final_url): - console.print(f"[red]Error:[/red] URL redirected to non-HTTPS: {final_url}") + final_parsed = _urlparse(final_url) + if not final_parsed.hostname: + console.print( + f"[red]Error:[/red] URL redirected to a URL with no hostname: {final_url}" + ) + else: + console.print( + "[red]Error:[/red] URL redirected to a URL without HTTPS " + "(HTTP is allowed only for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1): " + f"{final_url}" + ) raise typer.Exit(1) with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".yml", delete=False) as tmp: tmp.write( @@ -2587,6 +2602,7 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: try: from functools import partial + from urllib.parse import urlparse as _urlparse from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url as _open_url from specify_cli._github_http import resolve_github_release_asset_api_url as _resolve_gh_asset @@ -2613,9 +2629,17 @@ def _validate_and_install_local(yaml_path: Path, source_label: str) -> None: if workflow_dir.exists(): import shutil shutil.rmtree(workflow_dir, ignore_errors=True) - console.print( - f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' redirected to non-HTTPS URL: {final_url}" - ) + final_parsed = _urlparse(final_url) + if not final_parsed.hostname: + console.print( + f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' redirected to a URL with no hostname: {final_url}" + ) + else: + console.print( + f"[red]Error:[/red] Workflow '{source}' redirected to a URL without HTTPS " + "(HTTP is allowed only for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1): " + f"{final_url}" + ) raise typer.Exit(1) workflow_file.write_bytes( _read_response_limited( @@ -3052,20 +3076,28 @@ def workflow_step_add( def _safe_fetch(url: str) -> bytes: parsed = urlparse(url) is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") - if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost): - raise ValueError(f"Refusing to fetch from non-HTTPS URL: {url}") if not parsed.hostname: raise ValueError(f"Refusing to fetch from URL with no hostname: {url}") - with _open_url(url, timeout=30) as resp: + if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost): + raise ValueError( + "Refusing to fetch from URL without HTTPS " + "(HTTP is allowed only for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1): " + f"{url}" + ) + with _open_url(url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=True) as resp: final_url = resp.geturl() final_parsed = urlparse(final_url) final_is_localhost = final_parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") + if not final_parsed.hostname: + raise ValueError(f"Redirect to URL with no hostname: {final_url}") if final_parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( final_parsed.scheme == "http" and final_is_localhost ): - raise ValueError(f"Redirect to non-HTTPS URL: {final_url}") - if not final_parsed.hostname: - raise ValueError(f"Redirect to URL with no hostname: {final_url}") + raise ValueError( + "Redirect to URL without HTTPS " + "(HTTP is allowed only for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1): " + f"{final_url}" + ) return _read_response_limited(resp, label=f"workflow step {url}") _validate_step_id_or_exit(step_id) diff --git a/src/specify_cli/catalogs.py b/src/specify_cli/catalogs.py index 8bd3b2dc06..33cc0bc996 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/catalogs.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/catalogs.py @@ -68,18 +68,18 @@ def _entry( @classmethod def _validate_catalog_url(cls, url: str) -> None: - """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS, except localhost HTTP.""" + """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS, except loopback HTTP.""" from urllib.parse import urlparse parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise cls._error("Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host.") is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost): raise cls._error( f"Catalog URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://). " - "HTTP is only allowed for localhost." + "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) - if not parsed.netloc: - raise cls._error("Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host.") def _load_catalog_config(self, config_path: Path) -> list[CatalogEntry] | None: """Load catalog stack configuration from a YAML file. diff --git a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py index aa63ec5324..0e7d6b5e44 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py @@ -1995,6 +1995,7 @@ def _open_url( url: str, timeout: int = 10, extra_headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None, + strict_redirects: bool = True, ): """Open a URL with provider-based auth, trying each configured provider. @@ -2002,7 +2003,12 @@ def _open_url( """ from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url - return open_url(url, timeout, extra_headers=extra_headers) + return open_url( + url, + timeout, + extra_headers=extra_headers, + strict_redirects=strict_redirects, + ) def _resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( self, @@ -2220,7 +2226,11 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog( # Fetch from network try: - with self._open_url(entry.url, timeout=10) as response: + with self._open_url( + entry.url, + timeout=10, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: catalog_data = json.loads( read_response_limited( response, @@ -2404,7 +2414,11 @@ def fetch_catalog(self, force_refresh: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]: try: import urllib.error - with self._open_url(catalog_url, timeout=10) as response: + with self._open_url( + catalog_url, + timeout=10, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: catalog_data = json.loads( read_response_limited( response, @@ -2562,10 +2576,16 @@ def download_extension( from urllib.parse import urlparse parsed = urlparse(download_url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise ExtensionError( + f"Extension download URL must be a valid URL with a host: {download_url}" + ) is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") if parsed.scheme != "https" and not (parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost): raise ExtensionError( - f"Extension download URL must use HTTPS: {download_url}" + "Extension download URL must use HTTPS " + "(HTTP is allowed only for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1): " + f"{download_url}" ) # Determine target path @@ -2586,7 +2606,10 @@ def download_extension( # Download the ZIP file try: with self._open_url( - download_url, timeout=60, extra_headers=extra_headers + download_url, + timeout=60, + extra_headers=extra_headers, + strict_redirects=True, ) as response: zip_data = read_response_limited( response, diff --git a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py index 8839e50a81..0630edfce7 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py @@ -1840,7 +1840,7 @@ def __init__(self, project_root: Path): self.cache_metadata_file = self.cache_dir / "catalog-metadata.json" def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: - """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (localhost HTTP allowed). + """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (loopback HTTP allowed). Args: url: URL to validate @@ -1851,17 +1851,17 @@ def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: from urllib.parse import urlparse parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise PresetValidationError( + "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + ) is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") if parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost ): raise PresetValidationError( f"Catalog URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://). " - "HTTP is only allowed for localhost." - ) - if not parsed.netloc: - raise PresetValidationError( - "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." ) def _make_request(self, url: str): @@ -1877,13 +1877,19 @@ def _open_url( url: str, timeout: int = 10, extra_headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None, + strict_redirects: bool = True, ): """Open a URL with provider-based auth, trying each configured provider. Delegates to :func:`specify_cli.authentication.http.open_url`. """ from specify_cli.authentication.http import open_url - return open_url(url, timeout, extra_headers=extra_headers) + return open_url( + url, + timeout, + extra_headers=extra_headers, + strict_redirects=strict_redirects, + ) def _resolve_github_release_asset_api_url( self, @@ -2161,7 +2167,11 @@ def _fetch_single_catalog(self, entry: PresetCatalogEntry, force_refresh: bool = pass try: - with self._open_url(entry.url, timeout=10) as response: + with self._open_url( + entry.url, + timeout=10, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: catalog_data = json.loads( read_response_limited( response, @@ -2319,7 +2329,11 @@ def fetch_catalog(self, force_refresh: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]: pass try: - with self._open_url(catalog_url, timeout=10) as response: + with self._open_url( + catalog_url, + timeout=10, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: catalog_data = json.loads( read_response_limited( response, @@ -2492,12 +2506,18 @@ def download_pack( from urllib.parse import urlparse parsed = urlparse(download_url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise PresetError( + f"Preset download URL must be a valid URL with a host: {download_url}" + ) is_localhost = parsed.hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") if parsed.scheme != "https" and not ( parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost ): raise PresetError( - f"Preset download URL must use HTTPS: {download_url}" + "Preset download URL must use HTTPS " + "(HTTP is allowed only for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1): " + f"{download_url}" ) if target_dir is None: @@ -2515,7 +2535,12 @@ def download_pack( extra_headers = {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} try: - with self._open_url(download_url, timeout=60, extra_headers=extra_headers) as response: + with self._open_url( + download_url, + timeout=60, + extra_headers=extra_headers, + strict_redirects=True, + ) as response: zip_data = read_response_limited( response, error_type=PresetError, diff --git a/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py b/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py index c9ddf35ad7..71a3f2f490 100644 --- a/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py +++ b/src/specify_cli/workflows/catalog.py @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ def __init__(self, project_root: Path) -> None: # -- Catalog resolution ----------------------------------------------- def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: - """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (localhost HTTP allowed).""" + """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (loopback HTTP allowed).""" from urllib.parse import urlparse parsed = urlparse(url) @@ -776,15 +776,15 @@ def _is_cache_path_safe(self) -> bool: # -- Catalog resolution ----------------------------------------------- def _validate_catalog_url(self, url: str) -> None: - """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (localhost HTTP allowed).""" - if not is_https_or_localhost_http(url): - from urllib.parse import urlparse + """Validate that a catalog URL uses HTTPS (loopback HTTP allowed).""" + from urllib.parse import urlparse - parsed = urlparse(url) - if not parsed.hostname: - raise StepValidationError( - "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." - ) + parsed = urlparse(url) + if not parsed.hostname: + raise StepValidationError( + "Catalog URL must be a valid URL with a host." + ) + if not is_https_or_localhost_http(url): raise StepValidationError( f"Catalog URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://). " "HTTP is only allowed for localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1." diff --git a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py index 99e8a31d18..1402ec418d 100644 --- a/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py +++ b/tests/integrations/test_integration_catalog.py @@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ def test_add_catalog_accepts_numeric_string_priority(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch ("bad_url", "reason"), [ ("http://insecure.example.com/catalog.json", "HTTPS"), - (123, "HTTPS"), + (123, "valid URL with a host"), ], ) def test_add_catalog_rejects_existing_entry_with_bad_url( diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py index fda561a374..dd210d046b 100644 --- a/tests/test_extensions.py +++ b/tests/test_extensions.py @@ -2693,6 +2693,16 @@ def test_catalog_initialization(self, temp_dir): assert catalog.project_root == project_dir assert catalog.cache_dir == project_dir / ".specify" / "extensions" / ".cache" + def test_validate_catalog_url_hostless_https_rejected(self, temp_dir): + """Hostless HTTPS catalog URLs should fail before scheme messaging.""" + project_dir = temp_dir / "project" + project_dir.mkdir() + (project_dir / ".specify").mkdir() + + catalog = ExtensionCatalog(project_dir) + with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="valid URL with a host"): + catalog._validate_catalog_url("https:///catalog.json") + def test_cache_directory_creation(self, temp_dir): """Test catalog cache directory is created when fetching.""" project_dir = temp_dir / "project" @@ -3241,6 +3251,59 @@ def fake_open(req, timeout=None): assert captured["req"].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer ghp_testtoken" + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_strict_redirects(self, temp_dir): + """Catalog stack fetches must reject unsafe redirects.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) + payload = {"schema_version": "1.0", "extensions": {}} + calls = [] + + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response + + def fake_open_url(*args, **kwargs): + calls.append(kwargs) + return make_response() + + entry = CatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/catalog.json", + name="default", + priority=1, + install_allowed=True, + ) + + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url): + catalog._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + + assert calls[-1]["strict_redirects"] is True + + def test_fetch_catalog_uses_strict_redirects(self, temp_dir): + """Legacy catalog fetch uses the same redirect hardening.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = self._make_catalog(temp_dir) + payload = {"schema_version": "1.0", "extensions": {}} + calls = [] + + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + + def fake_open_url(*args, **kwargs): + calls.append(kwargs) + return mock_response + + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url): + catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=True) + + assert calls[-1]["strict_redirects"] is True + @pytest.mark.parametrize( "payload", [ @@ -4170,7 +4233,7 @@ def test_load_catalog_config_defaults_blank_names(self, temp_dir): @pytest.mark.parametrize( ("url", "expected_detail"), [ - ("relative/catalog.json", "HTTPS"), + ("relative/catalog.json", "valid URL with a host"), ("https:///no-host", "valid URL with a host"), ], ) @@ -5002,10 +5065,138 @@ def test_add_from_url_cancel_exits_cleanly(self, tmp_path): assert result.exit_code == 0 assert "Cancelled" in result.output + def test_add_from_url_download_uses_strict_redirects(self, tmp_path): + """extension add --from must harden the direct ZIP download.""" + from types import SimpleNamespace + from typer.testing import CliRunner + from unittest.mock import patch + from specify_cli import app + + project_dir = tmp_path / "test-project" + project_dir.mkdir() + (project_dir / ".specify").mkdir() + captured = [] + + class FakeResponse: + def __init__(self): + self._stream = io.BytesIO(b"fake zip") + + def read(self, size=-1): + return self._stream.read(size) + + def __enter__(self): + return self + + def __exit__(self, *args): + return False + + def fake_open_url( + url, + timeout=None, + extra_headers=None, + redirect_validator=None, + strict_redirects=False, + ): + captured.append( + { + "url": url, + "timeout": timeout, + "extra_headers": extra_headers, + "strict_redirects": strict_redirects, + } + ) + return FakeResponse() + + fake_manifest = SimpleNamespace( + id="my-ext", + name="My Extension", + version="1.0.0", + description="Test extension", + warnings=[], + commands=[], + ) + + runner = CliRunner() + with patch.object(Path, "cwd", return_value=project_dir), \ + patch("typer.confirm", return_value=True), \ + patch("specify_cli.authentication.http.open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url), \ + patch( + "specify_cli.extensions.ExtensionManager.install_from_zip", + return_value=fake_manifest, + ): + result = runner.invoke( + app, + ["extension", "add", "my-ext", "--from", "https://example.com/ext.zip"], + catch_exceptions=True, + ) + + assert result.exit_code == 0, result.output + assert captured == [ + { + "url": "https://example.com/ext.zip", + "timeout": 60, + "extra_headers": None, + "strict_redirects": True, + } + ] + class TestDownloadExtensionBundled: """Tests for download_extension handling of bundled extensions.""" + def test_download_extension_rejects_hostless_url(self, temp_dir): + """Catalog download URLs must include a hostname.""" + from unittest.mock import patch + + project_dir = temp_dir / "project" + project_dir.mkdir() + (project_dir / ".specify").mkdir() + + catalog = ExtensionCatalog(project_dir) + ext_info = { + "id": "test-ext", + "name": "Test Extension", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https:///test-ext.zip", + } + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_extension_info", return_value=ext_info): + with pytest.raises(ExtensionError, match="valid URL with a host"): + catalog.download_extension("test-ext") + + def test_download_extension_uses_strict_redirects(self, temp_dir): + """Catalog-based extension downloads must reject unsafe redirects.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + project_dir = temp_dir / "project" + project_dir.mkdir() + (project_dir / ".specify").mkdir() + + catalog = ExtensionCatalog(project_dir) + calls = [] + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(b"fake zip").read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + ext_info = { + "id": "test-ext", + "name": "Test Extension", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https://example.com/test-ext.zip", + } + + def fake_open_url(*args, **kwargs): + calls.append(kwargs) + return mock_response + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_extension_info", return_value=ext_info), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_resolve_github_release_asset_api_url", return_value=None), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url): + zip_path = catalog.download_extension("test-ext", target_dir=temp_dir / "downloads") + + assert zip_path.read_bytes() == b"fake zip" + assert calls[-1]["strict_redirects"] is True + def test_download_extension_raises_for_bundled(self, temp_dir): """download_extension should raise a clear error for bundled extensions without a URL.""" from unittest.mock import patch diff --git a/tests/test_presets.py b/tests/test_presets.py index bd39760c34..83b2286a51 100644 --- a/tests/test_presets.py +++ b/tests/test_presets.py @@ -1424,6 +1424,12 @@ def test_validate_catalog_url_http_rejected(self, project_dir): with pytest.raises(PresetValidationError, match="must use HTTPS"): catalog._validate_catalog_url("http://example.com/catalog.json") + def test_validate_catalog_url_hostless_https_rejected(self, project_dir): + """Hostless HTTPS catalog URLs should fail before scheme messaging.""" + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + with pytest.raises(PresetValidationError, match="valid URL with a host"): + catalog._validate_catalog_url("https:///catalog.json") + def test_validate_catalog_url_localhost_http_allowed(self, project_dir): """Test that HTTP is allowed for localhost.""" catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) @@ -1550,6 +1556,59 @@ def fake_open(req, timeout=None): assert captured["req"].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer ghp_testtoken" + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_strict_redirects(self, project_dir): + """Catalog stack fetches must reject unsafe redirects.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + payload = {"schema_version": "1.0", "presets": {}} + calls = [] + + def make_response(): + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + return mock_response + + def fake_open_url(*args, **kwargs): + calls.append(kwargs) + return make_response() + + entry = PresetCatalogEntry( + url="https://example.com/catalog.json", + name="default", + priority=1, + install_allowed=True, + ) + + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url): + catalog._fetch_single_catalog(entry, force_refresh=True) + + assert calls[-1]["strict_redirects"] is True + + def test_fetch_catalog_uses_strict_redirects(self, project_dir): + """Legacy catalog fetch uses the same redirect hardening.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + payload = {"schema_version": "1.0", "presets": {}} + calls = [] + + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(json.dumps(payload).encode()).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + + def fake_open_url(*args, **kwargs): + calls.append(kwargs) + return mock_response + + with patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url): + catalog.fetch_catalog(force_refresh=True) + + assert calls[-1]["strict_redirects"] is True + @pytest.mark.parametrize( "payload", [ @@ -2078,6 +2137,54 @@ def fake_open(req, timeout=None): assert captured[0].get_header("Authorization") == "Bearer ghp_testtoken" assert captured[0].get_header("Accept") == "application/octet-stream" + def test_download_pack_rejects_hostless_url(self, project_dir): + """Catalog download URLs must include a hostname.""" + from unittest.mock import patch + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + pack_info = { + "id": "test-pack", + "name": "Test Pack", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https:///test-pack.zip", + "_install_allowed": True, + } + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_pack_info", return_value=pack_info): + with pytest.raises(PresetError, match="valid URL with a host"): + catalog.download_pack("test-pack") + + def test_download_pack_uses_strict_redirects(self, project_dir): + """Catalog-based preset downloads must reject unsafe redirects.""" + from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock + + catalog = PresetCatalog(project_dir) + zip_bytes = b"fake zip data" + calls = [] + mock_response = MagicMock() + mock_response.read.side_effect = io.BytesIO(zip_bytes).read + mock_response.__enter__ = lambda s: s + mock_response.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False) + pack_info = { + "id": "test-pack", + "name": "Test Pack", + "version": "1.0.0", + "download_url": "https://example.com/test-pack.zip", + "_install_allowed": True, + } + + def fake_open_url(*args, **kwargs): + calls.append(kwargs) + return mock_response + + with patch.object(catalog, "get_pack_info", return_value=pack_info), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_resolve_github_release_asset_api_url", return_value=None), \ + patch.object(catalog, "_open_url", side_effect=fake_open_url): + zip_path = catalog.download_pack("test-pack", target_dir=project_dir) + + assert zip_path.read_bytes() == zip_bytes + assert calls[-1]["strict_redirects"] is True + def test_fetch_single_catalog_uses_bounded_read(self, project_dir): """Catalog JSON responses must use the shared bounded-read helper.""" from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock diff --git a/tests/test_workflows.py b/tests/test_workflows.py index 12569c1396..a6a7549771 100644 --- a/tests/test_workflows.py +++ b/tests/test_workflows.py @@ -4004,6 +4004,13 @@ def test_validate_url_http_rejected(self, project_dir): with pytest.raises(StepValidationError, match="HTTPS"): catalog._validate_catalog_url("http://evil.com/step-catalog.json") + def test_validate_url_hostless_https_rejected(self, project_dir): + from specify_cli.workflows.catalog import StepCatalog, StepValidationError + + catalog = StepCatalog(project_dir) + with pytest.raises(StepValidationError, match="valid URL with a host"): + catalog._validate_catalog_url("https:///step-catalog.json") + def test_validate_url_localhost_http_allowed(self, project_dir): from specify_cli.workflows.catalog import StepCatalog @@ -4562,6 +4569,7 @@ def test_add_rejects_non_string_extra_files_key(self, project_dir, monkeypatch): from specify_cli.authentication import http as auth_http monkeypatch.chdir(project_dir) + strict_values = [] def _fake_get_step_info(self, step_id): return { @@ -4593,7 +4601,8 @@ def read(self, size=-1): def geturl(self): return self.url - def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30): + def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=False): + strict_values.append(strict_redirects) return _FakeResponse(url) monkeypatch.setattr(StepCatalog, "get_step_info", _fake_get_step_info) @@ -4604,6 +4613,8 @@ def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30): assert result.exit_code != 0 assert "non-string path key" in result.output + assert strict_values + assert all(value is True for value in strict_values) @pytest.mark.parametrize( "rel_path,expected", @@ -4652,7 +4663,7 @@ def read(self, size=-1): def geturl(self): return self.url - def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30): + def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=False): return _FakeResponse(url) monkeypatch.setattr(StepCatalog, "get_step_info", _fake_get_step_info) @@ -4700,7 +4711,7 @@ def read(self, size=-1): def geturl(self): return self.url - def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30): + def _fake_open_url(url, timeout=30, strict_redirects=False): return _FakeResponse(url) monkeypatch.setattr(StepCatalog, "get_step_info", _fake_get_step_info) @@ -5022,7 +5033,7 @@ def __exit__(self, *a): return False def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False): - captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers, timeout)) + captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers, timeout, strict_redirects)) if "releases/tags/" in url: return FakeResponse(json.dumps({ "assets": [{"name": "workflow.yml", "url": "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/releases/assets/42"}] @@ -5040,13 +5051,23 @@ def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False) assert result.exit_code == 0, result.output assert "Test Workflow" in result.output # First call resolves the release tag with timeout=30 - tag_calls = [(url, h, t) for url, h, t in captured_urls if "releases/tags/" in url] + tag_calls = [ + (url, h, t, strict) + for url, h, t, strict in captured_urls + if "releases/tags/" in url + ] assert len(tag_calls) == 1 assert tag_calls[0][2] == 30 # timeout matches download timeout + assert tag_calls[0][3] is True # Second call downloads from the resolved asset URL with octet-stream - asset_calls = [(url, h, t) for url, h, t in captured_urls if "releases/assets/" in url] + asset_calls = [ + (url, h, t, strict) + for url, h, t, strict in captured_urls + if "releases/assets/" in url + ] assert len(asset_calls) >= 1 assert asset_calls[0][1] == {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} + assert asset_calls[0][3] is True def test_workflow_add_from_direct_api_asset_url_passes_through(self, project_dir): """'workflow add ' uses URL directly with octet-stream.""" @@ -5074,7 +5095,7 @@ def __exit__(self, *a): return False def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False): - captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers)) + captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers, strict_redirects)) return FakeResponse(self.VALID_WORKFLOW_YAML.encode()) runner = CliRunner() @@ -5090,6 +5111,7 @@ def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False) assert len(captured_urls) == 1 assert captured_urls[0][0] == "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/releases/assets/42" assert captured_urls[0][1] == {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} + assert captured_urls[0][2] is True def test_workflow_add_catalog_based_resolves_github_release_url(self, project_dir): """'workflow add ' with catalog GitHub release URL resolves via API.""" @@ -5117,7 +5139,7 @@ def __exit__(self, *a): return False def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False): - captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers)) + captured_urls.append((url, extra_headers, strict_redirects)) if "releases/tags/" in url: return FakeResponse(json.dumps({ "assets": [{"name": "workflow.yml", "url": "https://api.github.com/repos/org/repo/releases/assets/55"}] @@ -5153,13 +5175,23 @@ def fake_open_url(url, timeout=None, extra_headers=None, strict_redirects=False) assert result.exit_code == 0, result.output # Should resolve via releases/tags API - tag_calls = [url for url, _ in captured_urls if "releases/tags/" in url] + tag_calls = [ + (url, strict) + for url, _, strict in captured_urls + if "releases/tags/" in url + ] assert len(tag_calls) == 1 - assert "releases/tags/v2.0" in tag_calls[0] + assert "releases/tags/v2.0" in tag_calls[0][0] + assert tag_calls[0][1] is True # Should download from resolved asset URL with octet-stream - asset_calls = [(url, h) for url, h in captured_urls if "releases/assets/" in url] + asset_calls = [ + (url, h, strict) + for url, h, strict in captured_urls + if "releases/assets/" in url + ] assert len(asset_calls) >= 1 assert asset_calls[0][1] == {"Accept": "application/octet-stream"} + assert asset_calls[0][2] is True class TestWorkflowRunExitCodes: