An independent PostHog integration and modular integration platform for WordPress. Connect the platforms you use, configure global privacy rules once, and send clean browser and server-side events with zero code.
Tagbridge is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by PostHog.
This is the developer README. End-user documentation lives in readme.txt.
Note on the name: This project was previously called HogPress. It was renamed to Tagbridge to avoid any potential WordPress or PostHog trademark issues. The old
hogpressrepository is kept as an archive; all further development happens here. The plugin is published on WordPress.org at https://wordpress.org/plugins/tagbridge/.
Three layers with strict boundaries:
src/Core/: platform-agnostic PHP with zero WordPress function calls (enforced byCorePurityTest). Plain data in, plain data out: normalizedEventvalue objects,Schema,Hostresolution,Identity\Resolver,ServerClient, andPrivacypolicy/consent rules.src/Platform/: WordPress platform shell:Plugin, lazyRegistry, upcomingCatalog,Options&GlobalSettings,PrivacyGate(WP Consent API, DNT, role exclusions), sharedEventBus, shared Event Sources (WordPressSource,WooCommerceSource), and the Integrations Hub + Privacy admin shell (SettingsPage,Notices).src/Modules/: self-contained integration modules (currentlyPostHog/). Disabled modules never instantiate or load their runtime classes.
- Runtime: PHP 8.2+, WordPress 5.8+. WooCommerce is optional.
- Dev: PHP 8.2+ and Composer, Node 18+, and Docker / OrbStack (for
wp-env).
composer install # PHP dev tools + posthog-php
npm install # wp-env + build tooling
npm run env:start # WordPress at http://localhost:8888 (admin / password)composer lint # PHPCS (WordPress Coding Standards)
composer lint:fix # auto-fix
composer test:unit # PHPUnit unit tests (Core, Platform, Modules)bin/build-zip.sh # produces dist/tagbridge.zip (production files only)tagbridge.php Main plugin file: header, guards, bootstrap
uninstall.php Uninstall cleanup
readme.txt WordPress.org readme
src/Core/ Platform-agnostic logic (no WP calls)
src/Platform/ WordPress platform shell (EventBus, Sources, PrivacyGate, Registry, Admin Hub)
src/Modules/ Self-contained integration modules (PostHog, ...)
assets/ Admin CSS/JS and bundled Sora font
languages/ Translation template (.pot)
tests/ PHPUnit tests
When the PostHog region is set to "Self-hosted or reverse proxy," the admin
supplies a custom host URL. The server then makes requests to that URL: a
validation POST (Modules\PostHog\Connection\Validator) and, when server-side
events are enabled, event delivery via posthog-php. A server fetching an
admin-supplied URL is the classic shape of a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
vector: a crafted internal URL (e.g. a cloud metadata endpoint like
http://169.254.169.254/...) could be reached from inside the host's network.
This is accepted as-is for now, because:
- Only users with
manage_optionscan set the custom host. Such a user can already install plugins and run arbitrary PHP, so this grants no new capability on a single-site install. - The custom host is a documented, advertised feature. Hardening with
wp_safe_remote_*/wp_http_validate_url()would block private/internal IPs and break legitimate self-hosted or reverse-proxy installs on internal networks.
If a stronger threat model is needed later (e.g. multisite with semi-trusted
site admins), the recommended middle ground is to reject only the cloud-metadata
link-local range (169.254.169.254) in the validator before saving: this
removes the highest-value SSRF target without breaking internal self-hosted
hosts.
GPL-2.0-or-later.