Fix gaps in recently merged Directory code found by a full sweep

.github/workflows/dacs-directory-ci.yml

@@ -35,18 +35,16 @@ jobs:
       # Exercise the same production build-time path as the public /try page.
       NEXT_PUBLIC_BUTLER_ORIGIN: https://agents.ci.local
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v7
+      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v7
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@949feb2413d6458794dcd2491c4babbbce0c15c1 # v7
         with:
           node-version: "22"
 
       - name: Vendor + build the pinned dacs-sdk, install app deps
-        # The vendored dacs-sdk is a private repo; setup-sdk.sh authenticates
-        # the nested clone with DACS_SDK_GITHUB_TOKEN when present. Add a
-        # read-only token (repo secret) with access to DACS-Agent-commerce/dacs-sdk
-        # or this step fails at the clone. The default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot read
-        # sibling private repos.
+        # DACS-Agent-commerce/dacs-sdk is public, so the clone needs no token.
+        # setup-sdk.sh still authenticates the nested clone with
+        # DACS_SDK_GITHUB_TOKEN when present, for builds from a private mirror.
         env:
           DACS_SDK_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.DACS_SDK_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: npm run setup

reference-implementations/dacs-directory/SPEC_PIN

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# DACS Standard revision this Directory implements and tests against
+# github.com/DACS-Agent-commerce/DACS-Standard, v0.4 (annotated tag 0be9e80b342d0f3e269ae9ab45c2bbc372f161d4)
+4bb9e48a1095ab32c06c25b7c0b52018d3ce4091
+# Profile notes: primary claims use the did:demos:agent ClaimReference profile
+# (src/catalog/claimRef.ts), which the pinned revision does not yet define. It comes from
+# DACS-Standard #296, merged into `next` at 725fa78bd124a7adb65df27adee376d5d44a4bd7; its fixture
+# is vendored below. Its keys are Ed25519, so artifacts signed with ecdsa-secp256k1 or
+# sr1-aggregate cannot be verified under this profile and are not published or counted.
+# Recorded deviations (vectors: test/standard-vectors.test.ts; local guards: test/evidence-graph-rules.test.ts,
+# test/indexer-binding-rules.test.ts, test/legacy-deal-rules.test.ts and test/native-payment.test.ts):
+#   §8.5.2 checks 5-6 need the CommitmentRecord's anchored committedAt, which a bundle does not
+#     reference: a session whose listing sets deadlineSecAfterCommit or validity.notAfter is
+#     indeterminate and never counted.
+#   CD-1: a non-canonical amount (e.g. "95.00") is rejected rather than canonicalised (fail-closed).
+#   agreement-listing-v0.1 `fractional-pct-out` expects reject; the §8.5.2 text (round to the CD-1
+#     digits of bandCenter) accepts it, and the Directory follows the text.
+#   SB-1: pinned evm/x402 refs omit logIndex; Solana refs omit instructionIndex. These refs are
+#     error and never counted. AP2, htlc-* and liquidity-tank refs have no SB-1 key format and are
+#     likewise uncounted (HTLC-5 session binding is not an SB-1 key). Every legacy SDK evm-erc20
+#     or x402 deal is uncounted because its TxRef lacks the event index; only legacy pay-dem keys.
+#   Authoritative bundle absence: the Demos mapping declares no absence-evidence policy. Both
+#     absence sets below run; their policy-qualified one-sided pass/include cases deliberately
+#     remain indeterminate/excluded. No Directory endpoint authenticates those projected proofs.
+#   Vet admission resolves historical IdentityBundle bytes and checks the presentation/hash. This
+#     profile can read a signed BundleParty extension `identityBundle` (inline) or
+#     `identityBundleRef` (storage-program locator and IdentityBundle hash), or use
+#     EvidenceGraphDeps.resolveIdentityBundle. Publication self-bindings cannot supply session identity.
+#     IdentityBundle hashes omit presentation per DACS-1. Session Vet additionally requires a trusted
+#     resolveSessionChallenge adapter authenticating verifier issuance, job/party/nonce, challenge
+#     lifetime, authenticated consumedAt and consumedByPresentationHash: sha256Hex(canonicalize(identity))
+#     of the complete first attempted IdentityBundle including presentation/signatures, even on failure (CORE SN-1..4).
+#     A signed-scope bundle hash is insufficient; historical adapters must supply the complete digest.
+#     IdentityBundle.presentedAt is schema-checked but informational.
+#     No production historical-challenge resolver is installed: those sessions remain indeterminate.
+#     Listing publication continues to accept a nonce-free signed self-binding.
+#   Required credential matching uses the signed composite generatedAt (unix ms) as the historical
+#     Vet instant, bounded by finalisedAt; it does not expire old sessions against the wall clock.
+#     Session recipeRegistryVersion selects an operator-authenticated DACS_RECIPE_SNAPSHOTS roster.
+#     Unknown snapshots and results outside that roster remain indeterminate. Unversioned requirements
+#     select the latest recipe in the roster. validUntil governs; without it the roster supplies defaultMaxAgeSec for the exact
+#     scheme/recipeVersion. Every required result, including one with validUntil, also needs an
+#     live exact-version recipe policy, an allowed method and a trusted authenticated signer.
+#     RAV-2: the catalog does not disclose per-result availability yet. Non-live vet results
+#     remain indeterminate; non-live recipes cannot elevate identity tiers either. This applies
+#     to every included VerifyResult, optional ones too: each needs a valid live recipe policy.
+#     Wrapper expiry and listing maxAge only narrow that authority window.
+#     No scheme-specific requirement-parameter interpreter is configured: non-empty parameters
+#     are unmatched, as DACS-1 requires for unrecognised parameters, rather than inferred from data.
+#   DV-1..3: storage delivery resolves object cleartext and node ACL metadata. The DV-1 hash covers
+#     the complete NFC/JCS payload, including any signature/signatures fields (the pinned SDK's
+#     contentHash strips them; the Standard's lifecycle walkthrough does not). Unreadable payloads,
+#     encrypt-to-buyer payloads (no buyer decryption capability), and external pointer payloads
+#     (no external cleartext resolver) remain indeterminate and never count as completion/volume.
+#   Rail admission uses explicitly provisioned DACS_RAIL_SNAPSHOTS (PA-1 operator trust).
+#     Snapshots pin registryVersion and railVersion, handler, asset, network, parameters and availability.
+#     Operators must authenticate the registry index/definitions before provisioning; no snapshot is
+#     bundled or inferred from a listing or RPC. Unknown versions remain indeterminate. Only a live
+#     demos-native:DEM definition with native-dem/DEM/9 and network demos can use the native adapter.
+#   Native pay-dem: success additionally requires blockNumber and getTxByHash/getBlockByNumber
+#     reads establishing confirmed inclusion, native-send endpoints and the exact DEM price in OS.
+#     Stored RPC amounts are numeric/string OS; the original send payload must carry canonical string OS.
+#     Numeric legacy DEM payloads need historical fork semantics and remain indeterminate. Unavailable reads never count. The node source calls terminal inclusion "confirmed".
+#   Attested-payload and entitlement success remain indeterminate until authoritative attestation
+#     and grant adapters can establish their agreement-bound proofs; signatures alone do not count.
+#   All non-native current rails and paid SDK legacy sessions remain indeterminate without authoritative
+#     adapters; they never contribute completion or volume. AP2 and x402 success is indeterminate: this profile has no authenticated provider-receipt
+#     resolver. A signed receipt pointer/hash alone cannot establish provider or HTTP settlement.
+#   Current publisher rail IDs are demos-native:DEM and x402:default. Historical signed phase-name
+#     aliases remain readable for evidence, but public discovery excludes those current offers;
+#     their publisher must issue a new signed version. Legacy SDK rail names retain that profile.
+#   Anonymous restricted-program reads on node ac8f45f are denied: buyer-only is indeterminate
+#     on that deployment. ACL-success tests model a hypothetical readable metadata contract.
+#   Revocation candidates: discovered markers returning NOT_FOUND, PERMISSION_DENIED or a transport
+#     failure stay pending/indeterminate. Persistent 1–60 second exponential backoff bounds retries.
+#     Only successfully read invalid content can reject a candidate; verified revocation is retained.
+#   Per-claim PresentationSignature.signature retains the SDK auto-detected legacy encoding;
+#     strict SIG-6 value-envelope decoding is enforced separately.
+# Skipped vector sets at this pin:
+#   private-deliverables-v0.1: projected cci/40-byte buyer addresses and encryption/entitlement
+#     gates do not map directly to this agent profile; signed local graph cases pin DV-1..3.
+#   verifyresult-acceptance-v0.1: recipe-registry steward signatures and cci claims are outside
+#     the deployment-policy recipe adapter; local vet/recipe tests pin the supported profile.
+#   fab-bundle-extended-pointer-v0.3: no external extended-pointer resolver.
+#   settlement-finalization-propagation-v0.3 and receipt-rederivation-v0.3: handler-side
+#     finalization/receipt emission, not this read-only catalog consumer.
+#   commitment-anchor-authority-v0.3: no CommitmentRecord locator is exposed by current bundles.
+#   bundle-binding-v0.1 and outsider-binding-flooding-v0.3 use did:demos:buyer/seller signed claims
+#     outside the supported did:demos:agent profile. Changing claims would alter signed bytes;
+#     local bundle-binding tests cover BB-4..8 without rewriting these upstream fixtures.
+#   Previously skipped unresolved-vs-absent-v0.3 and bundle-absence-evidence-v0.3 are now vendored
+#     and exercised, with the two one-sided pass cases explicitly recorded above.
+# Node compatibility: ac8f45f pins source/API behavior, not the revision of a remote deployment.
+#     No remote revision attestation is available; runtime probe output is dated evidence only.
+# Vendored conformance vectors (byte-identical copies; sha256 checked by test/standard-vectors.test.ts):
+#   conformance/vectors/security/signature-value-encoding-v0.1.json   bf47cd0a42b0e0e30f2ff032327395d5a1b820758e6188c51212eb9129ba8312
+#   conformance/vectors/security/revocation-binding-v0.3.json         3e83dfe5cb603e3dce98a4280e2456bb30bcae9979f4a0db1ae322982bdaf1ce
+#   conformance/vectors/security/sb2-settlement-uniqueness-v0.1.json  31c9455dc0147f27cf7a7d47cb17ffc019016bf63aa366b9dbadd720f8b16b81
+#   conformance/vectors/security/agreement-listing-v0.1.json          857ebf0ea4b885b92b0d6ad509a37cf5076218881c510ef2f2d05d734d94503b
+#   conformance/vectors/security/mixed-version-reconciliation-v0.3.json 41c1bc7eee95ac3bf625eaea4db88929e2eb6cb20c6bade9c3192dc3337a9e0b
+#   conformance/vectors/security/fault-bundle-perspective-pair-v0.3.json f56586a27afa851202a121576814eb0a68bddc4bdc9ce675740ba085870ed285
+#   conformance/vectors/security/payee-destination-binding-v0.1.json  cd83d95982d6529ac3f776d48df8d92c86b80806a88e96a62d80674563aaa779
+#   conformance/vectors/security/listing-preserve-unknown-v0.1.json   7dbe60aa89d44321a3bb04661b1d71fc15bc84501b76f23b486a05cb905f91bd
+#   conformance/fixtures/identity/demos-agent-claim-reference.json (at 725fa78) demos-agent-claim-reference.json 0e70d2c12d9d4dd14d676519e1841b12767051153044659adcadbf8a3c994933
+#   conformance/vectors/security/unresolved-vs-absent-v0.3.json 8a543319798cb60073631a9a2431f45e866f89db8b136a76b679780718a15b91
+#   conformance/vectors/security/bundle-absence-evidence-v0.3.json 304c07d0f39f92db52dc3f5d2feac9149cf253298abe514668501451e9ee7b8e
+#   conformance/vectors/security/metered-pricing-v0.3.json 36ec8725d058062ab6dfefe79a8b0c7c97b33be3c614b6073f392647c05d4009
+#   conformance/vectors/security/phase-kind-divergence-v0.3.json 0c2c97ca1d4dece0b1f16011834aa21c446b3226311ef0a23417228565ed151e
+
+# Additional consumer/publisher profile:
+#   Canonical hashing rejects lone UTF-16 surrogates in values and keys (server and browser).
+#   The pinned SDK serializer accepts only integer JSON numbers. Listing publication rejects
+#   fractional negotiation percentages with HTTP 400; fractional-percentage publication is unsupported.
+#   Authority evidence needs a method-specific authenticated proof/hash/signer/validator-epoch adapter.
+#   No production authority adapter is installed; identity tiers and session evidence fail closed.
+#   Listing discovery retains revoked tombstones with the normative `revocation` binding.
+#   Generated A2A cards require an explicit service endpoint and transport; otherwise only the
+#   DACS discovery descriptor is emitted, without claiming an A2A service at the hosting origin.

reference-implementations/dacs-directory/app/api/dacs/build-listing/route.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  * nonce plus the live empty salt, and readback re-binds owner/name/content.
  */
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
-import { contentHash, listingAddress } from "@kynesyslabs/dacs/canonical";
+import { assertValidUnicode, contentHash, listingAddress } from "../../../../src/catalog/canonical.js";
 import { ed25519Verify, publicKeyFromRaw } from "@kynesyslabs/dacs/crypto";
 import {
   deriveStorageAddress,
@@ -76,9 +76,10 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
   if (body.description.length > 2000) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "description exceeds the 2000-char spec cap" }, { status: 400 });
   }
+  try { assertValidUnicode(body); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "invalid Unicode" }, { status: 400 }); }
   if (
     !Array.isArray(body.rails) || body.rails.length > 16 ||
-    !body.rails.every((v) => typeof v === "string" && /^[a-z0-9:-]{1,128}$/.test(v)) ||
+    !body.rails.every((v) => typeof v === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9:-]{1,128}$/.test(v)) ||
     !Array.isArray(body.delivery) || body.delivery.length > 16 ||
     !body.delivery.every((v) => typeof v === "string" && /^[a-z0-9:-]{1,128}$/.test(v))
   ) {
@@ -130,9 +131,9 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "pricing needs a positive canonical amount and currency" }, { status: 400 });
   }
   if (pricingKind === "negotiable" && (
-    !Number.isFinite(Number(body.pricing?.minPct)) || !Number.isFinite(Number(body.pricing?.maxPct)) ||
+    !Number.isSafeInteger(body.pricing?.minPct) || !Number.isSafeInteger(body.pricing?.maxPct) ||
     Number(body.pricing?.minPct) < 0 || Number(body.pricing?.minPct) >= 100 || Number(body.pricing?.maxPct) < 0
-  )) return NextResponse.json({ error: "negotiation percentages are invalid" }, { status: 400 });
+  )) return NextResponse.json({ error: "negotiation percentages must be nonnegative integers in this publisher profile" }, { status: 400 });
   if (pricingKind === "auction" && body.pricing?.selectionRule && !["lowest-price", "highest-price", "first-acceptable"].includes(body.pricing.selectionRule)) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "unsupported auction selection rule" }, { status: 400 });
   }

reference-implementations/dacs-directory/app/api/dacs/bundles/[jobId]/route.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,28 @@
-import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
 import { verifyBundleBinding } from "@/src/catalog/bundleBinding";
+import { parsePagination } from "@/src/catalog/pagination";
 import { loadScanState } from "@/src/catalog/store";
 
+/**
+ * DACS-1 §6.3.6: an unauthenticated read that serves every BB-4-valid BundleBinding this catalog
+ * holds for the jobId, whoever signed it, in pages. The BB-6 per-signer budget applies only when
+ * a consumer resolves a side, never to what the catalog serves.
+ */
 export async function GET(
-  _request: Request,
+  request: NextRequest,
   { params }: { params: Promise<{ jobId: string }> },
 ) {
   const { jobId } = await params;
   if (jobId.length < 1 || jobId.length > 160) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "jobId must be 1-160 characters" }, { status: 400 });
   }
-  const candidates = loadScanState().bundleBindings?.[jobId] ?? [];
-  const bindings = (await Promise.all(candidates.map((binding) => verifyBundleBinding(binding))))
+  const page = parsePagination(request.nextUrl.searchParams.get("limit"), request.nextUrl.searchParams.get("cursor"));
+  if (!page.ok) return NextResponse.json({ error: page.error }, { status: 400 });
+  const stored = loadScanState().bundleBindings;
+  const candidates = stored && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(stored, jobId) ? stored[jobId] ?? [] : [];
+  const slice = candidates.slice(page.cursor, page.cursor + page.limit);
+  const bindings = (await Promise.all(slice.map((binding) => verifyBundleBinding(binding))))
     .filter((binding) => binding !== null);
-  return NextResponse.json({ bindings });
+  const next = page.cursor + page.limit;
+  return NextResponse.json({ bindings, total: candidates.length, cursor: next < candidates.length ? String(next) : undefined });
 }

reference-implementations/dacs-directory/app/api/dacs/listings/route.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Normative filters plus q/profile directory extensions.
  */
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
-import { activeCatalogListings, primaryClaimMatches } from "@/src/catalog/discovery";
+import { discoveryListing, primaryClaimMatches } from "@/src/catalog/discovery";
 import { loadCatalog } from "@/src/catalog/store";
 import { parsePagination } from "@/src/catalog/pagination";
 import { catalogJson } from "@/src/catalog/http";
@@ -48,9 +48,8 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
   const { limit, cursor } = pagination;
 
   const catalog = loadCatalog();
-  // Discovery only advertises offers that remain active. Revoked listings stay
-  // available on the seller history/detail surfaces with an explicit status.
-  const all = activeCatalogListings(catalog);
+  // Machine discovery retains authenticated withdrawal tombstones.
+  const all = catalog.sellers.flatMap((seller) => seller.listings).filter(discoveryListing);
   const tierByClaim = new Map(catalog.sellers.map((seller) => [seller.primaryClaim, seller.identityTier ?? "self-declared"]));
   const filtered = all.filter((l) => {
     if (category && l.offering.category !== category && !l.offering.category.startsWith(category + ".")) return false;

reference-implementations/dacs-directory/app/api/dacs/lookup/route.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  */
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
 import { isListing } from "@kynesyslabs/dacs/artifacts";
-import { stripSignature } from "@kynesyslabs/dacs/canonical";
+import { stripSignature } from "../../../../src/catalog/canonical.js";
 import { parseCciRecord } from "@kynesyslabs/dacs/identity";
 import { readAnchor } from "@/src/catalog/chain";
 import { gcrGetIdentities } from "@/src/catalog/gcr";

reference-implementations/dacs-directory/app/api/dacs/sellers/[primaryClaimRef]/route.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  * derived only from chain-verified bundles; re-derivable client-side).
  */
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { discoveryListing } from "@/src/catalog/discovery";
 import { loadCatalog } from "@/src/catalog/store";
 import { catalogJson } from "@/src/catalog/http";
 import { requestBaseUrl } from "@/src/catalog/publicUrl";
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ export async function GET(
   if (!seller) return NextResponse.json({ error: "seller not found" }, { status: 404 });
   const origin = requestBaseUrl(req);
   return catalogJson(req, {
-    listings: seller.listings,
+    listings: seller.listings.filter(discoveryListing),
     identity: seller.identityBundle ?? {
       profile: "legacy-sdk-v0.1",
       primaryClaim: seller.primaryClaim,