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Document root cause of eMudhra intermediate compromise: trivially small private keys - #8

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emudhra-weak-keys
Oct 20, 2026
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Follow-up to #6. The eight compromised eMudhra intermediates were not stolen. Each one's P-384 private key is a tiny integer:

Intermediate Private key
EM OV TLS CA - G3C 4
EM EV TLS CA - G3C 56
EM OV CS CA - G3B 66
EM EV TLS CA - G3B 115
EM OV TLS CA - G3B 155
EM DV TLS CA - G3B 156
EM DV TLS CA - G3C 230
EM OV CS CA - G3C 237

Verified by computing k·G on P-384 for each value and comparing the result with the public keys in the incident's impacted-intermediates.json. All eight match.

This PR adds the root cause to CHANGELOG-roots.md and roots/eMudhra/README.md. It changes documentation only. The decision to disable the root stands.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…ll private keys

Each of the eight compromised P-384 intermediate keys is a tiny scalar
(4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237), verified against the public keys in
the incident's impacted-intermediates.json.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@MagicalTux
MagicalTux merged commit 9df8cc0 into master Oct 20, 2026
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