Only the latest release receives security fixes. The current line is 1.x.

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:

https://github.com/MHJoy99/CCUsageX/security/advisories/new

Include:

• the version or commit, your operating system, and your Node.js version
• the steps to reproduce, with a synthetic transcript if possible
• what an attacker could do with it
• a proposed fix, if you have one

Do not send real prompts, transcripts or store.json files. A small synthetic transcript that reproduces the problem is ideal.

CCUsageX is maintained by volunteers. We will acknowledge each report and keep you informed as it is worked on.

CCUsageX is a local tool. It assumes the machine and your user account are trusted. Its aim is that your usage data does not leave the machine, and is not reachable from other machines or from other websites.

• Binds to 127.0.0.1 only. The host is not configurable, so the server is not reachable from the network.
• Checks the Host header. Requests must name 127.0.0.1, localhost or [::1]. This blocks DNS-rebinding attacks, where a web page resolves its own name to 127.0.0.1.
• Accepts only GET and HEAD, and sends no CORS headers, so a web page on another origin cannot read responses.
• Makes no outbound requests and loads no external scripts, stylesheets or fonts.
• Reads Claude Code transcripts read-only. It writes only its own store (~/.ccusagex/store.json, or the folder in CCU_DATA_DIR) and its runtime files in the install folder.
• Confines static files to public/. Paths that resolve elsewhere get a 404.
• Escapes spreadsheet formulas in CSV export. Cells starting with =, +, -, @, a tab or a carriage return get a leading apostrophe.
• Stops only its own server. The launcher stops only the process whose PID it recorded, after checking that its command line is this project's server.js.
• Keeps dependencies at zero. There is no third-party package code to audit, and the repository runs no CI workflows or automated bots.

• It does not encrypt the store. The store holds prompt text (up to 8,000 characters per prompt) and response text (up to 1,200 characters per request) as plain JSON. The file gets your default file permissions, and CCUsageX does not restrict them further. Treat ~/.ccusagex as sensitive, and do not sync or share it.
• It does not authenticate requests. Any process that can connect to 127.0.0.1 on the port can read the dashboard while the server runs. On a shared computer, other local user accounts can do this too.
• It is not designed to resist someone with access to your user account. Anything running as you can read your transcripts and the store directly.

In scope:

• bypassing the loopback binding or the Host check
• reading files outside the transcripts, the store and public/
• path traversal in static file serving
• cross-site scripting in the dashboard. Prompt text and transcript content are untrusted input and must be escaped
• CSV or spreadsheet formula injection in the export
• the launcher stopping a process it did not start
• any write to ~/.claude

Out of scope:

• Claude Code, Node.js and Microsoft Edge themselves
• problems that require an attacker who already has access to your user account