Security fixes are applied to the current source on main and, when practical, to the latest
public macOS release and the latest iPhone build. The macOS release covers the Mac app, the vocello command line in both of its forms (the signed
and notarized installer package, including the uninstall.sh it installs, and the folder in
Vocello-macos26-cli.dmg) and the vocello mcp server. The iPhone app reaches people through the
public TestFlight beta, and through the App Store once it is published there; a fix ships in a new
build of that channel. Older releases and development snapshots are not supported security branches.
| Surface | Supported |
|---|---|
Current main |
Yes |
Latest signed and notarized macOS release (the Mac app, the CLI package and folder, vocello mcp) |
Yes |
| Latest iPhone build in the public TestFlight beta or the App Store | Yes |
| Older releases, earlier iPhone builds and development snapshots | No |
| iPhone builds distributed outside an official project channel | No |
Dependabot monitors the repository's GitHub Actions, website npm lock, and owned Swift package
declarations. Every push to main also submits a privacy-safe Swift dependency snapshot built from
both tracked Package.resolved files (the dependency-submission job in ci.yml, via
scripts/swift_dependency_snapshot.py). These snapshots make the root Xcode workspace and the owned Qwen3 runtime
visible to GitHub's dependency graph and advisory matching without uploading source, credentials,
absolute paths, or local device data.
security.yml runs the website npm advisory audit (high severity, lock-only; an advisory that
cannot reach a shipped product may be excepted for at most 30 days, by a dated maintainer decision in
config/npm-audit-exceptions.json, through scripts/npm_audit_gate.py) and CodeQL for
JavaScript/TypeScript and Swift on a weekly schedule, on manual dispatch, and inside release.yml on
the tagged commit. Security required aggregates those jobs into one exact-commit verdict. Every
push to main runs ci.yml; a push that touches the release path (the release workflows, packaging
and verification scripts, project.yml, the toolchain and release contracts) also runs the
secrets-free release-rehearsal.yml. Neither runs the Security workflow. Pull requests run only
ci.yml's Linux jobs with a read-only token; there is no per-pull-request security lane. Release
SBOM generation continues to use the committed lock files as its authoritative input.
The repository intentionally permits its maintainer to develop directly on main, so that
administrator bypass is treated as a residual risk rather than as release authorization. A release
candidate requires an annotated version tag whose signature GitHub verifies as valid, a tag commit
contained in origin/main, and a latest successful CI required check run on that exact commit.
The release workflow runs the Security workflow on that same commit before it checks this source
authority, and both must pass before any packaging step.
A dispatched release must run from the tag's own ref, so a branch's edited copy of the workflow never
receives signing secrets; the signing jobs use a tag-restricted release environment, grant only
codesign access to the temporary keychain, restore no Actions cache and delete the signing material
right after the signing step. The job that builds third-party code holds a read-only token; the
Sparkle update key reaches only a separate job on a fresh runner that builds and installs nothing but
the SHA-pinned sign_update, and the job that writes the draft Release holds no secret. The secrets-free release rehearsal (release-rehearsal.yml, weekly, on
dispatch and on the release-path pushes above) exercises the same toolchain and packaging path
between tags with ad-hoc signing and no notarization. Candidate creation and later public promotion
both re-evaluate this authority and fail closed on lightweight or unsigned tags, missing checks,
cross-commit evidence, or an incomplete check-run response.
The iOS export unlock protects access in the official app through verified StoreKit transactions; it does not attempt to prevent someone modifying and compiling MIT-licensed source. Product IDs, purchase code and isolated test fixtures are public configuration, not credentials. Apple signs transactions and StoreKit returns their verification result; the app grants access only for a verified, matching, non-revoked non-consumable. See Apple's StoreKit documentation.
The runtime owner is Sources/iOS/Commerce/IOSStoreKitClient.swift, with entitlement decisions in
Sources/iOSSupport/Services/IOSExportPurchaseState.swift and outward-export policy in
Sources/iOSSupport/Services/IOSExportAccessPolicy.swift. No developer API key is needed by this
purchase flow. Do not put App Store Connect private keys, signing private keys, passwords, tokens or
private customer transaction records in tracked files, public logs or shipping resources. Keep release
credentials in approved local Keychain/CI secret storage, separate from public StoreKit configuration.
If a credential is exposed, revoke/rotate it; deleting the latest file alone does not remove exposure.
Removing checks in a self-built fork is an accepted local-client limitation, not by itself a vulnerability in the official binary. Forged or unverified transactions granting official-app access, unintended export routes, credential exposure and release-signing compromise remain in scope. There is no anti-fork backend, obfuscation requirement or paid preference flag. macOS/CLI stay unrestricted. The isolated StoreKit fixture is test-only and must never authorize production access. Source checks do not replace physical StoreKit/sandbox and processed-candidate purchase acceptance.
Credential-file exclusions in .gitignore cover private keys, signing containers/profiles, local
.env files and .asc/.appstoreconnect directories. Only synthetic .env.example/.env.sample
templates belong in Git. Ignore rules do not protect already-tracked files or forced additions;
continue reviewing staged changes and using GitHub secret scanning/push protection.
The release workflow sets umask 077 before creating credential files, disables shell tracing,
and registers cleanup paths before importing secrets. Setup traps remove partial material on failure
or handled cancellation; unconditional final steps remove retained signing material after the job.
Setup refuses pre-existing target files; final cleanup reports deletion failures without skipping other
credential paths. Synthetic workflow tests exercise permissions before chmod, import/copy failures,
termination and cleanup without using real credentials. A killed or lost runner still relies on the
hosted runner's disposal; this is defense in depth, not guaranteed secure erasure.
Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability or include user data, credentials, model tokens, private audio, prompts, transcripts, absolute paths, device identifiers, or exploit details in public project content.
Use the repository's Security tab and select Report a vulnerability to open a private security advisory with the maintainer. Include the affected version or commit, platform, impact, and minimal reproduction steps. If private vulnerability reporting is temporarily unavailable, contact the repository owner privately through their GitHub profile and provide only enough detail to establish a secure follow-up channel.
The maintainer will acknowledge a complete report when it is reviewed, coordinate validation and a fix privately, and publish an advisory after affected users have a reasonable update path. Exact response times are not promised for this maintainer-run project.
In scope: the Vocello macOS/iPhone applications, the vocello CLI, signed release artifacts,
release automation, model-download integrity, local persistence, and the project
website. Upstream vulnerabilities in Qwen, MLX, Apple frameworks, GitHub Actions, npm packages, or
Hugging Face should also be reported to their owners; report them here when Vocello needs a
mitigation or ships an affected version.