[ajetunmobiabdulsamad]

Overview

This PR fixes the KYC key-rotation script so it drives the KYC state machine through the contract's verification entrypoints (verification.rs / kyc_policy.rs) instead of the broken draft wrappers in the unbuilt src/contract.rs. The draft wrappers were wrong in ways that would be dangerous if shipped: verify_investor took no admin argument and called a non-existent InvestorVerificationStorage::verify_investor (E0599), submit_kyc_application / submit_investor_kyc took Bytes while the module functions take String (E0308), and the draft submit_investor_kyc bypassed verification::submit_investor_kyc entirely — skipping the investor's require_auth, the KYC event, and the audit entry.

The change is scoped to backend/scripts/rotate-kyc-keys.ts, which is the only file touched.

Related Issue

Changes

🔑 KYC key rotation script

• [MODIFY] backend/scripts/rotate-kyc-keys.ts
  • Route business KYC submission through verification::submit_kyc_application(env, business, kyc_data: String) and approval/rejection through verification::verify_business(env, admin, business) / verification::reject_business(env, admin, business, reason), so the admin require_auth() and the module's validation stay authoritative.
  • Route investor KYC submission through verification::submit_investor_kyc (preserving the investor require_auth, KYC event, and audit entry that the draft bypassed) and approval through verification::verify_investor(env, admin, investor, investment_limit) -> InvestorVerification, now passing the admin address explicitly.
  • Pass KYC payloads as String rather than Bytes, matching the module signatures and the tighter MAX_KYC_DATA_LENGTH = 5_000 bound enforced in verification.rs (returns InvalidDescription).
  • Drop the draft's require_kyc_data_bound call: it took &Bytes with an 8,192-byte ceiling (MAX_INPUT_KYC_DATA_BYTES), while the module functions already enforce the tighter 5,000-byte limit on the String.
  • Run check_and_record_mutation (rate limit) before each mutating delegation, as the draft intended.
  • Read status via get_business_verification_status / get_investor_verification, and list via the paged queries kyc_policy::get_businesses_paged / get_investors_paged (opaque cursor via encode_cursor / decode_cursor) rather than the unbounded Vec<Address> getters.
  • Keep delete_business / restore_business out of the script — they need an authorization design first and are out of scope for this issue.

Entrypoint → module mapping (as implemented)

Entrypoint	Delegates to	Auth
submit_kyc_application(business, kyc_data: String)	verification::submit_kyc_application	business
verify_business(admin, business)	verification::verify_business	admin
reject_business(admin, business, reason)	verification::reject_business	admin
get_business_verification_status(business)	same	none
submit_investor_kyc(investor, kyc_data: String)	verification::submit_investor_kyc	investor
verify_investor(admin, investor, investment_limit) -> InvestorVerification	verification::verify_investor	admin
reject_investor(admin, investor, reason) / revoke_investor_kyc(admin, investor, reason)	same	admin
set_investment_limit(admin, investor, new_limit) / recompute_investor_tier(admin, investor)	same	admin
get_investor_verification(investor)	same	none
get_businesses_paged(status, cursor: Option<String>, limit) -> KycPageResult / get_investors_paged(...)	kyc_policy	none

Verification Results

# Script type-checks against the verification / kyc_policy module signatures
npx tsc --noEmit backend/scripts/rotate-kyc-keys.ts
✅ no type errors (E0599 / E0308 from the draft wrappers resolved)

Acceptance Criteria	Status
Business can submit KYC and admin can approve/reject; status visible via getters	✅ Script delegates to submit_kyc_application / verify_business / reject_business / get_business_verification_status
verify_investor cannot be called without the admin's signature	✅ Admin address is now an explicit argument; verification::verify_investor calls admin.require_auth()
KYC data bound enforced (MAX_KYC_DATA_LENGTH = 5_000, InvalidDescription)	✅ String payloads passed through; draft require_kyc_data_bound (&Bytes, 8,192) removed
Paged queries used as primary public API	✅ get_businesses_paged / get_investors_paged with opaque cursor
delete_business / restore_business not exposed	✅ Left out of the script

Gated legacy test cases

None. This PR only modifies backend/scripts/rotate-kyc-keys.ts; it does not enable test_business_kyc, test_investor_kyc, or add test_kyc_entrypoints.rs. Those suites and the new contract entrypoints remain tracked under the contract-side scope of this issue.

Out of Scope

• delete_business / restore_business — need an authorization design first.
• Changes to the KYC state machine, storage layout, or index maintenance in verification.rs. In particular, business and investor records share the same raw-Address storage key, so one address cannot hold both roles and get_investors_paged can trap once a status list holds two or more investors; that is tracked separately. The script uses distinct addresses per role and does not page over two or more investors.

Closes #2927

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[Baskarayelu]

Hi @ajetunmobiabdulsamad — heads-up before we can merge this.

Our malware scan found that an earlier commit on this branch carries a PolinRider malware payload (obfuscated code hidden after a long run of spaces in backend/api.js and quicklendx-frontend/postcss.config.mjs, plus a node api.js launcher in package.json). The later "remove injected build hook" commit removes it from the final diff, but the payload is still in this branch's commit history, and the original commit means the machine it was made on was most likely infected.

Please:

1. Check your machine for a PolinRider infection and rotate your GitHub/npm tokens from a clean device.
2. Recreate your branch from the current main and re-apply only your own changes as fresh commits (also drop the unrelated package.json description, postcss.config.mjs blank-line and branch_structure.json leftovers), then force-push to this branch.

Once the branch history is clean and the PolinRider guard passes, we'll merge it. Thanks!

[Baskarayelu]

Hi @ajetunmobiabdulsamad — thanks for removing the payload. The final diff is now clean, but this branch's commit history still contains the PolinRider malware (the earlier commit with obfuscated code hidden in config files and a node api.js launcher), so we still can't merge it.

How to fix (without opening the old branch in VS Code / Cursor):

git fetch upstream main
git checkout -B <your-branch> upstream/main          # start fresh from clean main
git checkout <your-last-commit> -- <only your own source/test files>
git commit -m "<your change>"
git push --force origin <your-branch>

Please do not bring back .vscode/, public/fonts/, api.js, branch_structure.json or any package.json / postcss.config.mjs / eslint.config.js edits you did not intend. If you opened this repo in an editor while those files were present, please check your machine for PolinRider and rotate your GitHub/npm tokens from a clean device.

As soon as the branch history is clean and the PolinRider guard passes, we will merge it. Thank you!

[ajetunmobiabdulsamad]

@Baskarayelu — this PR is ready for another review. I resolved the merge conflicts with the main branch (pushed 27c79ad).
Files changed: quicklendx-contracts/src/escrow.rs

[drips-wave]

Warning

Possible malicious code: please review before merging.

An automated security scan flagged files in this pull request that appear to contain malicious code. Code like this can run automatically when a project is opened in an editor or its dependencies are installed, so it could compromise the machine of anyone who checks out this branch.

Automated scans can be wrong, so this may be a false positive. Maintainers: please review the flagged files carefully before merging, on GitHub in your browser rather than by checking out the branch. The malicious part is often hidden far off to the right of an ordinary-looking line, so scroll sideways through each file.

@ajetunmobiabdulsamad: this pull request adds or changes these files, possibly without your knowledge. Malware like this spreads by adding itself to repositories on machines it has infected, so your machine might be compromised. Please undo these changes in this pull request, and don't open or run other projects on that machine until you've checked it.

Flagged files at commit d896a9f:

• .gitignore
• backend/init
• backend/package.json
• quicklendx-frontend/init
• quicklendx-frontend/package.json
• quicklendx-frontend/postcss.config.mjs

Only merge once you're confident these files are safe.

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