feat(research): add DOI for cA2A version 2

data/research.json

@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@
           "sha256": {
             "paper.pdf": "275927a47972fd9ae5f08df97dc29c2e2baa2daa2ebf53e90820e59c68d885aa",
             "source.zip": "be0428adb5ae8ba81d9c809c60af89812e104d70e7bd45a92b4f393bbd78ef12"
-          }
+          },
+          "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.23086110"
         }
       ]
     },

research/ca2a/index.html

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
 <meta name="citation_author" content="Rishabh Poddar">
 <meta name="citation_author" content="Aaron Fulkerson">
 <meta name="citation_author" content="Imran Siddique">
-<script type="application/ld+json">{"@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", "headline": "cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A", "abstract": "The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol moves tasks between agents, and its Signed Agent Card lets a client check that a domain owner issued a card. The card does not bound the authority a delegating agent passes on, establish what code a peer runs, keep a task payload from the peer's host, or leave an offline record of who delegated what to whom. This technical report describes cA2A (Confidential A2A), a trust profile layered on A2A rather than a new transport. It composes four mechanisms: signed delegation credentials whose scope can only narrow at each hop, appraisal of a peer's attestation evidence before a task is sent, a payload sealed to the channel key that evidence vouches for, and a signed per-hop provenance record linked to its parent. Attenuated delegation and provenance binding are covered by prior capability-token work and IETF drafts; the contribution here is their composition on A2A with an open implementation. We state six properties and report software experiments rerun against ca2a 0.3.1: attenuation checks over 5,400 generated chains, rejection of in-chain replay and cross-chain splicing, intersection of delegated scope with local policy, sealed-payload behavior at the cryptographic layer, structural checks on linked provenance records, and a cross-operator attestation protocol exercised with synthetic evidence. Chain verification cost about 0.22 ms per hop in this environment. These results do not show that a peer's key is confined to attested code or that attestation works across independent operators. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal of an Intel TDX peer by an AMD SEV-SNP peer in another cloud and a same-operator mutual SEV-SNP diagnostic; mutual attestation between independent operators has not been demonstrated.", "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/", "author": [{"@type": "Person", "name": "Rishabh Poddar"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Aaron Fulkerson"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Imran Siddique"}], "datePublished": "2026-10-01", "version": "2", "creativeWorkStatus": "Technical report; not peer reviewed", "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/", "encoding": {"@type": "MediaObject", "encodingFormat": "application/pdf", "contentUrl": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf"}}</script>
+<meta name="citation_doi" content="10.5281/zenodo.23086110">
+<script type="application/ld+json">{"@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", "headline": "cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A", "abstract": "The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol moves tasks between agents, and its Signed Agent Card lets a client check that a domain owner issued a card. The card does not bound the authority a delegating agent passes on, establish what code a peer runs, keep a task payload from the peer's host, or leave an offline record of who delegated what to whom. This technical report describes cA2A (Confidential A2A), a trust profile layered on A2A rather than a new transport. It composes four mechanisms: signed delegation credentials whose scope can only narrow at each hop, appraisal of a peer's attestation evidence before a task is sent, a payload sealed to the channel key that evidence vouches for, and a signed per-hop provenance record linked to its parent. Attenuated delegation and provenance binding are covered by prior capability-token work and IETF drafts; the contribution here is their composition on A2A with an open implementation. We state six properties and report software experiments rerun against ca2a 0.3.1: attenuation checks over 5,400 generated chains, rejection of in-chain replay and cross-chain splicing, intersection of delegated scope with local policy, sealed-payload behavior at the cryptographic layer, structural checks on linked provenance records, and a cross-operator attestation protocol exercised with synthetic evidence. Chain verification cost about 0.22 ms per hop in this environment. These results do not show that a peer's key is confined to attested code or that attestation works across independent operators. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal of an Intel TDX peer by an AMD SEV-SNP peer in another cloud and a same-operator mutual SEV-SNP diagnostic; mutual attestation between independent operators has not been demonstrated.", "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/", "author": [{"@type": "Person", "name": "Rishabh Poddar"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Aaron Fulkerson"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Imran Siddique"}], "datePublished": "2026-10-01", "version": "2", "creativeWorkStatus": "Technical report; not peer reviewed", "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/", "encoding": {"@type": "MediaObject", "encodingFormat": "application/pdf", "contentUrl": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf"}, "identifier": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23086110"}</script>
 <link rel="icon" href="/favicon.ico">
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/design-system.css?v=22">
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/research/research.css">
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ <h1>cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A</h1>
 <div class="paper-status"><span>October 1, 2026</span><span>Not peer reviewed</span><span>Patent Pending</span></div>
 </header>
 <section class="paper-abstract" aria-labelledby="abstract"><h2 id="abstract">Abstract</h2><p>The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol moves tasks between agents, and its Signed Agent Card lets a client check that a domain owner issued a card. The card does not bound the authority a delegating agent passes on, establish what code a peer runs, keep a task payload from the peer&#x27;s host, or leave an offline record of who delegated what to whom. This technical report describes cA2A (Confidential A2A), a trust profile layered on A2A rather than a new transport. It composes four mechanisms: signed delegation credentials whose scope can only narrow at each hop, appraisal of a peer&#x27;s attestation evidence before a task is sent, a payload sealed to the channel key that evidence vouches for, and a signed per-hop provenance record linked to its parent. Attenuated delegation and provenance binding are covered by prior capability-token work and IETF drafts; the contribution here is their composition on A2A with an open implementation. We state six properties and report software experiments rerun against ca2a 0.3.1: attenuation checks over 5,400 generated chains, rejection of in-chain replay and cross-chain splicing, intersection of delegated scope with local policy, sealed-payload behavior at the cryptographic layer, structural checks on linked provenance records, and a cross-operator attestation protocol exercised with synthetic evidence. Chain verification cost about 0.22 ms per hop in this environment. These results do not show that a peer&#x27;s key is confined to attested code or that attestation works across independent operators. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal of an Intel TDX peer by an AMD SEV-SNP peer in another cloud and a same-operator mutual SEV-SNP diagnostic; mutual attestation between independent operators has not been demonstrated.</p></section>
-<nav class="paper-actions" aria-label="Paper resources"><a class="primary-action" href="/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf">Read PDF <span>(21 pages)</span></a><a href="#cite">Cite this report</a><a href="/research/ca2a/v2/source.zip">Source and recorded evidence</a><a href="https://github.com/agentrust-io/ca2a">Project code</a></nav>
+<nav class="paper-actions" aria-label="Paper resources"><a class="primary-action" href="/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf">Read PDF <span>(21 pages)</span></a><a href="#cite">Cite this report</a><a href="/research/ca2a/v2/source.zip">Source and recorded evidence</a><a href="https://github.com/agentrust-io/ca2a">Project code</a><a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23086110">Archive and DOI</a></nav>
 <section class="research-section"><h2>What this report contributes</h2><p>A trust profile on A2A composing narrowing delegation credentials, peer attestation appraisal, sealed payloads and linked per-hop provenance records.</p></section>
 <section class="research-section"><h2>Evidence and limits</h2><ul><li>Software experiments were rerun on September 27, 2026 against ca2a 0.3.1: correctness counts matched the July 2026 draft, and chain verification cost about 216 rather than 195 microseconds per hop.</li><li>Cross-operator attestation was exercised only with synthetic evidence. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal across clouds and a same-operator diagnostic, not mutual attestation between independent operators.</li><li>The results do not show that a peer&#x27;s key is confined to attested code. Provenance checks on unsigned records establish structural consistency only; authenticity rests on signed records.</li></ul>
 <p>The source package preserves the recorded inputs and results. The software experiments were rerun against ca2a 0.3.1 for this edition; no hardware run was repeated. No independent replication is claimed.</p>
@@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ <h1>cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A</h1>
   year = {2026},
   type = {Technical report},
   note = {Version 2; not peer reviewed},
+  doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23086110},
   url = {https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/}
 }
 </code></pre></section>

research/ca2a/v2/CITATION.cff

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
   ],
   "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/",
   "license": "CC-BY-4.0",
+  "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.23086110",
   "preferred-citation": {
     "type": "report",
     "title": "cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A",

research/ca2a/v2/citation.bib

@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ @techreport{agentrust2026ca2a
   year = {2026},
   type = {Technical report},
   note = {Version 2; not peer reviewed},
+  doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23086110},
   url = {https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/}
 }

research/ca2a/v2/index.html

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
 <meta name="citation_author" content="Rishabh Poddar">
 <meta name="citation_author" content="Aaron Fulkerson">
 <meta name="citation_author" content="Imran Siddique">
-<script type="application/ld+json">{"@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", "headline": "cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A", "abstract": "The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol moves tasks between agents, and its Signed Agent Card lets a client check that a domain owner issued a card. The card does not bound the authority a delegating agent passes on, establish what code a peer runs, keep a task payload from the peer's host, or leave an offline record of who delegated what to whom. This technical report describes cA2A (Confidential A2A), a trust profile layered on A2A rather than a new transport. It composes four mechanisms: signed delegation credentials whose scope can only narrow at each hop, appraisal of a peer's attestation evidence before a task is sent, a payload sealed to the channel key that evidence vouches for, and a signed per-hop provenance record linked to its parent. Attenuated delegation and provenance binding are covered by prior capability-token work and IETF drafts; the contribution here is their composition on A2A with an open implementation. We state six properties and report software experiments rerun against ca2a 0.3.1: attenuation checks over 5,400 generated chains, rejection of in-chain replay and cross-chain splicing, intersection of delegated scope with local policy, sealed-payload behavior at the cryptographic layer, structural checks on linked provenance records, and a cross-operator attestation protocol exercised with synthetic evidence. Chain verification cost about 0.22 ms per hop in this environment. These results do not show that a peer's key is confined to attested code or that attestation works across independent operators. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal of an Intel TDX peer by an AMD SEV-SNP peer in another cloud and a same-operator mutual SEV-SNP diagnostic; mutual attestation between independent operators has not been demonstrated.", "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/", "author": [{"@type": "Person", "name": "Rishabh Poddar"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Aaron Fulkerson"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Imran Siddique"}], "datePublished": "2026-10-01", "version": "2", "creativeWorkStatus": "Technical report; not peer reviewed", "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/", "encoding": {"@type": "MediaObject", "encodingFormat": "application/pdf", "contentUrl": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf"}}</script>
+<meta name="citation_doi" content="10.5281/zenodo.23086110">
+<script type="application/ld+json">{"@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", "headline": "cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A", "abstract": "The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol moves tasks between agents, and its Signed Agent Card lets a client check that a domain owner issued a card. The card does not bound the authority a delegating agent passes on, establish what code a peer runs, keep a task payload from the peer's host, or leave an offline record of who delegated what to whom. This technical report describes cA2A (Confidential A2A), a trust profile layered on A2A rather than a new transport. It composes four mechanisms: signed delegation credentials whose scope can only narrow at each hop, appraisal of a peer's attestation evidence before a task is sent, a payload sealed to the channel key that evidence vouches for, and a signed per-hop provenance record linked to its parent. Attenuated delegation and provenance binding are covered by prior capability-token work and IETF drafts; the contribution here is their composition on A2A with an open implementation. We state six properties and report software experiments rerun against ca2a 0.3.1: attenuation checks over 5,400 generated chains, rejection of in-chain replay and cross-chain splicing, intersection of delegated scope with local policy, sealed-payload behavior at the cryptographic layer, structural checks on linked provenance records, and a cross-operator attestation protocol exercised with synthetic evidence. Chain verification cost about 0.22 ms per hop in this environment. These results do not show that a peer's key is confined to attested code or that attestation works across independent operators. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal of an Intel TDX peer by an AMD SEV-SNP peer in another cloud and a same-operator mutual SEV-SNP diagnostic; mutual attestation between independent operators has not been demonstrated.", "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/", "author": [{"@type": "Person", "name": "Rishabh Poddar"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Aaron Fulkerson"}, {"@type": "Person", "name": "Imran Siddique"}], "datePublished": "2026-10-01", "version": "2", "creativeWorkStatus": "Technical report; not peer reviewed", "license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/", "encoding": {"@type": "MediaObject", "encodingFormat": "application/pdf", "contentUrl": "https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf"}, "identifier": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23086110"}</script>
 <link rel="icon" href="/favicon.ico">
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/design-system.css?v=22">
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/research/research.css">
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ <h1>cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A</h1>
 <div class="paper-status"><span>October 1, 2026</span><span>Not peer reviewed</span><span>Patent Pending</span></div>
 </header>
 <section class="paper-abstract" aria-labelledby="abstract"><h2 id="abstract">Abstract</h2><p>The Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol moves tasks between agents, and its Signed Agent Card lets a client check that a domain owner issued a card. The card does not bound the authority a delegating agent passes on, establish what code a peer runs, keep a task payload from the peer&#x27;s host, or leave an offline record of who delegated what to whom. This technical report describes cA2A (Confidential A2A), a trust profile layered on A2A rather than a new transport. It composes four mechanisms: signed delegation credentials whose scope can only narrow at each hop, appraisal of a peer&#x27;s attestation evidence before a task is sent, a payload sealed to the channel key that evidence vouches for, and a signed per-hop provenance record linked to its parent. Attenuated delegation and provenance binding are covered by prior capability-token work and IETF drafts; the contribution here is their composition on A2A with an open implementation. We state six properties and report software experiments rerun against ca2a 0.3.1: attenuation checks over 5,400 generated chains, rejection of in-chain replay and cross-chain splicing, intersection of delegated scope with local policy, sealed-payload behavior at the cryptographic layer, structural checks on linked provenance records, and a cross-operator attestation protocol exercised with synthetic evidence. Chain verification cost about 0.22 ms per hop in this environment. These results do not show that a peer&#x27;s key is confined to attested code or that attestation works across independent operators. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal of an Intel TDX peer by an AMD SEV-SNP peer in another cloud and a same-operator mutual SEV-SNP diagnostic; mutual attestation between independent operators has not been demonstrated.</p></section>
-<nav class="paper-actions" aria-label="Paper resources"><a class="primary-action" href="/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf">Read PDF <span>(21 pages)</span></a><a href="#cite">Cite this report</a><a href="/research/ca2a/v2/source.zip">Source and recorded evidence</a><a href="https://github.com/agentrust-io/ca2a">Project code</a></nav>
+<nav class="paper-actions" aria-label="Paper resources"><a class="primary-action" href="/research/ca2a/v2/paper.pdf">Read PDF <span>(21 pages)</span></a><a href="#cite">Cite this report</a><a href="/research/ca2a/v2/source.zip">Source and recorded evidence</a><a href="https://github.com/agentrust-io/ca2a">Project code</a><a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23086110">Archive and DOI</a></nav>
 <section class="research-section"><h2>What this report contributes</h2><p>A trust profile on A2A composing narrowing delegation credentials, peer attestation appraisal, sealed payloads and linked per-hop provenance records.</p></section>
 <section class="research-section"><h2>Evidence and limits</h2><ul><li>Software experiments were rerun on September 27, 2026 against ca2a 0.3.1: correctness counts matched the July 2026 draft, and chain verification cost about 216 rather than 195 microseconds per hop.</li><li>Cross-operator attestation was exercised only with synthetic evidence. Recorded hardware runs cover one-directional appraisal across clouds and a same-operator diagnostic, not mutual attestation between independent operators.</li><li>The results do not show that a peer&#x27;s key is confined to attested code. Provenance checks on unsigned records establish structural consistency only; authenticity rests on signed records.</li></ul>
 <p>The source package preserves the recorded inputs and results. The software experiments were rerun against ca2a 0.3.1 for this edition; no hardware run was repeated. No independent replication is claimed.</p>
@@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ <h1>cA2A: Confidential Agent-to-Agent Delegation as a Profile on A2A</h1>
   year = {2026},
   type = {Technical report},
   note = {Version 2; not peer reviewed},
+  doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23086110},
   url = {https://agentrust-io.com/research/ca2a/v2/}
 }
 </code></pre></section>