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270572f
Clarify the meaning of revocation
ChristopherRC Jan 21, 2025
a37126e
fix typo
ChristopherRC Jan 21, 2025
c704cd0
improve the usefulness of CPRs
ChristopherRC Jan 21, 2025
4a6b8ce
fix smart quote and bump BR version number references
ChristopherRC Jan 21, 2025
bd57535
Merge branch 'cabforum:main' into improveCPRs-2
ChristopherRC Jun 13, 2025
ab72e67
Nit - fix bullet points
ChristopherRC Jun 13, 2025
7612e9d
Merge pull request #1 from ChristopherRC/improveCPRs-2
XolphinMartijn Oct 2, 2025
5c81321
Update effective dates and add more permissive language
XolphinMartijn Oct 2, 2025
df07211
fix: Utilize "MUST evaluate"
XolphinMartijn Oct 15, 2025
31a6479
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Nov 11, 2025
be40b46
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Nov 11, 2025
342ff48
use "applicable Subscriber"
XolphinMartijn Nov 11, 2025
65085bd
Linebreak
XolphinMartijn Nov 11, 2025
4bb06c1
Linebreak
XolphinMartijn Nov 11, 2025
594427d
Character replacement
XolphinMartijn Nov 11, 2025
91f8e5e
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Nov 13, 2025
4e43a30
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Nov 13, 2025
cf05e90
Use Key Compromise term
XolphinMartijn Nov 18, 2025
332ac9e
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Nov 18, 2025
a2a51e2
fix: Revert language based on feedback, removing "Subordinate"
XolphinMartijn Nov 26, 2025
b4bb5c5
Utilize Issuing CAs
XolphinMartijn Nov 26, 2025
9093e46
Move 4.4.4 into 4.9.3
XolphinMartijn Nov 26, 2025
9642e7b
"Revoked" defined term
XolphinMartijn Nov 26, 2025
0b97d0d
Move Key Compromise language to 4.9.12
XolphinMartijn Nov 26, 2025
0f2553b
Don't call out attachments specifically
XolphinMartijn Nov 26, 2025
c32f356
Remove "revocation requests or"
XolphinMartijn Dec 2, 2025
ef4e201
Simplify the Revoked language
XolphinMartijn Dec 3, 2025
f0b7e46
Simplify the Revoked language
XolphinMartijn Dec 3, 2025
2ad1582
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Dec 3, 2025
f010ab1
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Dec 3, 2025
fb938d0
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Dec 3, 2025
572ee86
Apply suggestions from code review
XolphinMartijn Dec 3, 2025
9db978c
Add contact-details carve-out
XolphinMartijn Dec 4, 2025
8193abc
Use SHA256 fingerprint
XolphinMartijn Dec 5, 2025
53df8aa
Use "information"
XolphinMartijn Jan 19, 2026
339b88d
Add Subscriber revocation requests authentication language
XolphinMartijn Jan 19, 2026
90856b8
Merge branch 'main' into CPR_Revamp
XolphinMartijn Jan 19, 2026
2840471
Update "Revoked" definition
XolphinMartijn Jan 19, 2026
d25aa9b
"and" no longer required
XolphinMartijn Jan 19, 2026
d7c86f8
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Feb 24, 2026
267cdf4
Update effective date
XolphinMartijn Mar 16, 2026
9112942
Update Baseline Requirements version in BR.md
XolphinMartijn Mar 18, 2026
6cf96bd
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Mar 18, 2026
d4df4e7
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn May 21, 2026
4751419
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn May 21, 2026
bcee0b8
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Aug 25, 2026
a0722b0
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Aug 31, 2026
ef1dda7
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Sep 1, 2026
a45b4ac
Push out effective date
XolphinMartijn Sep 2, 2026
c0231eb
Update docs/BR.md
XolphinMartijn Sep 16, 2026
2390397
delete lingering quote
XolphinMartijn Sep 16, 2026
9ac300c
consistency with other numerical spellings
XolphinMartijn Sep 16, 2026
4285aa5
Address #252 in regards to distributed edge POPs
XolphinMartijn Sep 16, 2026
4a97edf
Merge branch 'main' into CPR_Revamp
XolphinMartijn Sep 17, 2026
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43 changes: 39 additions & 4 deletions docs/BR.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -485,6 +485,10 @@ The script outputs:

[https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml](https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml)

**Revoked**: Effective 2027-02-15, the following conditions must be met for a Certificate to be considered revoked:
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- if the Certificate contains a CRL Distribution Point URI: any request to that URI for the CRL (regardless of network perspective or serving endpoint) returns a CRL containing the Certificate's serial number.
- if the Certificate contains an Authority Information Access OCSP URI: any OCSP request to that URI for the Certificate's serial number (regardless of network perspective or serving endpoint) results in a response with a `certStatus` value of `revoked`.

**Reverse Zone Domain Name**: the FQDN in the `.arpa` namespace that corresponds to an IP address. This FQDN is constructed by converting the IP address to a sequence of labels followed by the applicable IP Reverse Zone Suffix, as specified in RFC 1035 (for IPv4 addresses) and RFC 3596 (for IPv6 addresses).

**Root CA**: The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1632,19 +1636,48 @@ The Subscriber, RA, or Issuing CA can initiate revocation. Additionally, Subscri

### 4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
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The CA SHALL provide a process for Subscribers to request revocation of their own Certificates. The process MUST be described in the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement. The CA SHALL maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports.
Prior to 2027-02-15, for Section 4.9.3 of these Requirements, the CA SHALL adhere to these Requirements or Version 2.2.5 of the Baseline Requirements for TLS Server Certificates. Effective 2027-02-15, the CA SHALL adhere to these Requirements.

The CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement MUST describe a process for Subscribers to request revocation of their own Certificates.

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Including this info in a standalone CP isn't appropriate; that document places requirements on CAs, not communicates about how CAs fulfill requirements. A description of a CA's revocation process belongs in a CPS, not a CP.

Suggested change
The CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement MUST describe a process for Subscribers to request revocation of their own Certificates.
The CA's Certification Practice Statement or combined CP/CPS MUST describe a process for Subscribers to request revocation of their own Certificates.


The CA SHALL maintain highly available systems to accept revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports, and the personnel and procedures to meet the response deadlines specified in these Requirements.

The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions for submitting Certificate Problem Reports. The CA SHALL publicly disclose the instructions in Section 1.5.2 of their CPS and SHOULD additionally disclose the instructions through readily accessible online means (e.g. a KB article, dedicated webpage, FAQ).

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In response to discussion, consider adding something like

Suggested change
A revocation request submitted by the Subscriber of the identified Certificate, an entity with demonstrated access to the Certificate's Private Key, or an account key (e.g., an ACME account key) authorized to make requests on behalf of the Subscriber is considered a Subscriber revocation request and NOT a Certificate Problem Report. Where a report is received through the CA's Certificate Problem Report channel and the CA authenticates the requester as the Subscriber (or as possessing the Certificate's Private Key or an authorized account key), the CA SHALL handle it as a Subscriber revocation request under [Section 4.9.5](#495-time-within-which-ca-must-process-the-revocation-request). This does not affect the CA's obligations with respect to Key Compromise, including where the demonstration of access is itself evidence of Key Compromise, or the CA's obligations under this Section where the report also describes how a Certificate violates these Requirements or the CA's own policies.

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Is the intent of this to remove the 24 hour investigation in section 4.9.5? Is there a thought that today a subscriber request is 24 hours to investigate + 24 hours to revoke? If so I think we should probably rework the sections in general to consolidate processing times to that section.
React

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Is the intent of this to remove the 24 hour investigation in section 4.9.5?

I’m not sure I follow - can you please explain? What 24-hour investigation period currently exists for Subscriber initiated revocation?

I read 4.9.1.1 (“Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate”) to state that all Subscriber initiated revocation (e.g., points 1 and 2) must be completed within 24 hours from the time of request - there is no investigation period.

While 4.9.5 (today) commingles Subscriber initiated revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports, this proposed ballot attempts to separate them. I also read the 24 hour requirement in 4.9.5 to be specific only to Certificate Problem Reports - not Subscriber initiated revocation (mostly because of the “Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report” lead-in”).

Is there a thought that today a subscriber request is 24 hours to investigate + 24 hours to revoke? If so I think we should probably rework the sections in general to consolidate processing times to that section.

Though addressed above - no, there is no thought that there’s a 24 hour investigation period for Subscriber initiated revocation requests. If a Subscriber initiates their own revocation (e.g., through a customer portal or using ACME) - it’s unclear what needs to be investigated.

The proposed 24 hour investigation period is for Certificate Problem Reports (e.g., somebody reports via the CPS’ defined problem reporting mechanism “Your policy says X, your certificates do Y”) - where the CA Owner needs (and deserves) time to corroborate the claim and scope next steps.

Within twenty-four (24) hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, the CA SHALL investigate the facts and circumstances related to the report and determine if it's "actionable."

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nit: s/receiving a/receiving a properly submitted and complete/

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I’d respectfully push back on this one, for a few reasons:

  1. The ballot intentionally establishes an objective definition of what makes a report "actionable", rather than relying on subjective or undefined terms like "complete."

  2. CAs are already required to disclose clear CPR submission instructions in Section 1.5.2 of their CPS, and this update explicitly permits CAs to use input control validation (e.g., on a web form) to prevent the submission of incomplete/non-actionable reports at intake. IMO, those seem like the “right” tools for managing intake quality.

  3. The purpose of this initial 24-hour window is to assess the report for actionability - and if it is not actionable (i.e., incomplete), it requires the CA within 24 hours to notify the reporter and request the missing information. If the 24-hour clock only started after a report was already "complete," an incomplete report would never trigger the 24-hour review or the obligation to request the missing details from the reporter.

If the concern is that spam or malformed submissions shouldn't each start a 24-hour investigation, I'd rather address that in the "A CA MAY take measures to prevent submission of non-actionable Certificate Problem Reports..." sentence if you feel it’s not already covered.


A Certificate Problem Report is considered actionable if it includes:
1. at least one valid identifier for a time-valid and unrevoked Certificate issued by the CA. The CA MUST support the use of a serial number and SHOULD support the use of a SHA-256 fingerprint of the Certificate and/or Precertificate as an identifier; and
2. information about either:
- how the Certificate(s) in question violates these Requirements or a CA's own policies; or
- a reason for Certificate revocation (e.g., a demonstration of Key Compromise, or a Subscriber request aligned with [Section 4.9.1](#491-circumstances-for-revocation)).

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In response to discussion:

Suggested change
- a reason for Certificate revocation (e.g., a demonstration of Key Compromise, or a Subscriber request aligned with [Section 4.9.1](#491-circumstances-for-revocation)).
- a reason for Certificate revocation (e.g., a demonstration of Key Compromise).


A CA MAY take measures to prevent submission of non-actionable Certificate Problem Reports (e.g., input control validation on a form used to collect Certificate Problem Reports), but MUST be able to receive actionable Certificate Problem Reports.

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The CA SHALL provide Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties with clear instructions for reporting suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates. The CA SHALL publicly disclose the instructions through a readily accessible online means and in Section 1.5.2 of their CPS.
Within twenty-four (24) hours after determining a Certificate Problem Report is actionable:
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1. The CA SHALL provide a report on its findings to the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report, if contact details have been provided.
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2. The CA SHOULD provide a report on its findings to applicable Subscriber(s).
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3. If the CA determines the Certificate Problem Report requires an action of revocation for the Certificate(s) specified within, the CA SHOULD work with the applicable Subscriber to determine the date and time which the CA will revoke the Certificate. The period from the time the Certificate Problem Report was determined actionable to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).
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Suggested change
3. If the CA determines the Certificate Problem Report requires an action of revocation for the Certificate(s) specified within, the CA SHOULD work with the applicable Subscriber to determine the date and time which the CA will revoke the Certificate. The period from the time the Certificate Problem Report was determined actionable to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).
3. If the CA determines the Certificate Problem Report requires an action of revocation for the Certificate(s) specified within, the CA SHOULD work with the applicable Subscriber to determine the date and time at which the CA will revoke the Certificate. The period from the time the Certificate Problem Report was determined actionable to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).


Within one-hundred-twenty (120) hours after determining a Certificate Problem Report is actionable, the CA MUST evaluate all time-valid and unrevoked Certificates issued by the CA to detect additional instances of the non-compliance described in the report. The period from the time the additional affected Certificates were first identified to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).

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In response to the "3. Scope of “all time-valid and unrevoked Certificates issued by the CA”" question on list.

Suggested change
Within one-hundred-twenty (120) hours after determining a Certificate Problem Report is actionable, the CA MUST evaluate all time-valid and unrevoked Certificates issued by the CA to detect additional instances of the non-compliance described in the report. The period from the time the additional affected Certificates were first identified to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).
Within one-hundred-twenty (120) hours after determining a Certificate Problem Report is actionable, the CA organization MUST complete an evaluation of all time-valid and unrevoked Certificates it has issued to detect additional instances of the non-compliance described in the report. The period from the time the additional affected Certificates were first identified to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).

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It feels like this section needs a carve-out for when the report is considered Actionable because it includes "a reason for Certificate revocation (e.g., a Subscriber request aligned with Section 4.9.1)". It's impossible for such a request to affect other certificates in the CA's valid corpus, so there should be no obligation for them to conduct a search.


Within twenty-four (24) hours after determining a Certificate Problem Report is not actionable, the CA MUST provide a report on its findings to the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report if contact details have been provided and request the information necessary to satisfy the above requirements of an actionable Certificate Problem Report, unless the CA can reasonably claim the Certificate Problem Report is unrelated to the compliance or security of certificates it issued.

**Note**: If a non-actionable Certificate Problem Report is later amended by the reporter to satisfy the requirements of an actionable report described above, the time of receipt of the requested missing information is the basis for subsequent revocation timelines, if determined necessary.
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### 4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

No stipulation.

### 4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request
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Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, the CA SHALL investigate the facts and circumstances related to a Certificate Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report.
Prior to 2027-02-15, for Section 4.9.5 of these Requirements, the CA SHALL adhere to these Requirements or Version 2.2.5 of the Baseline Requirements for TLS Server Certificates. Effective 2027-02-15, the CA SHALL adhere to these Requirements.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the CA SHALL work with the Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which the CA will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate). The date selected by the CA SHOULD consider the following criteria:
The period between receipt of a revocation request from the Subscriber and published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate). If the request is not authenticated upon receipt, the CA SHALL within 24 hours of receipt work with the requester to authenticate the request, and the period listed above will be measured from the time of authentication.

The period between the determination that a Certificate Problem Report is actionable and published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set forth in [Section 4.9.1.1](#4911-reasons-for-revoking-a-subscriber-certificate).

The date selected by the CA SHOULD consider the following criteria:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1734,6 +1767,8 @@ No Stipulation.

See [Section 4.9.1](#491-circumstances-for-revocation).

Effective 2027-02-15, the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement MUST describe the circumstances that necessitate the CA to (1) reject subsequent certificate requests containing a known compromised public key and (2) perform a cascading revocation of all unexpired and unrevoked certificates containing the same compromised public key when the revocation reason of a revocation is `keyCompromise`,

### 4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension

The Repository MUST NOT include entries that indicate that a Certificate is suspended.
Expand Down
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