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…o ✅ (LAB-513) Tracks cachekit-ts#123. The Encryption row, the Intent-preset semantics warning, the reversed-cells summary and the Rust builder-stub cross-reference all described cache.secure.wrap() as an unconditional alias for wrap(); with the guard shipped that is a stale claim. Stale line references corrected in the same pass.
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Included review availability: 0 reviews are currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 3 reviews per hour. WalkthroughThe changelog and SDK feature matrix document TypeScript secure-wrapper failures when encryption is missing. They also clarify Rust feature behaviour, preset semantics, and the unchanged TypeScript type surface. ChangesSecure wrapper documentation
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In `@sdk-feature-matrix.md`:
- Line 71: Update sdk-feature-matrix.md at lines 71-71 to scope the former
secure alias’s plaintext behavior to instances without configured encryption.
Update CHANGELOG.md at lines 14-17 to limit the historical claim to the secure
entry point on unencrypted instances and state that callers can use wrap() for
explicit plaintext; both locations require documentation changes.
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CHANGELOG.mdsdk-feature-matrix.md
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The pre-LAB-513 secure.wrap() alias delegated to wrap(), which honours instance-level encryption: plaintext only ever landed on instances with no encryption configured, and wrap() remains the explicit plaintext path. Scope the matrix row, the intent-preset warning and the CHANGELOG entry to that condition instead of implying every secure registration stored plaintext.
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Summary
This PR updates the SDK feature matrix documentation to reflect a security fix in the TypeScript SDK where
cache.secure.wrap()now enforces encryption (LAB-513).What Changed
Documentation-only update to
sdk-feature-matrix.mdandCHANGELOG.mdreflecting a behavioral change in the TypeScript SDK (cachekit-ts#123):Encryption enforcement cell flipped ❌ → ✅: The "Does the
secureAPI enforce encryption?" row for TypeScript now shows ✅. Previously,cache.secure.wrap()was an unconditional alias forwrap()that silently cached plaintext (CWE-311) on any instance not built bycreateCache.secure().New behavior documented: Both
cache.secure.wrap()andcache.withExecutionContext(ctx).secure.wrap()now throwConfigurationErrorat wrap time on any instance withoutencryptionconfigured, routing through a single private guard (CacheImpl.secureWrap). There is no opt-in to run unencrypted.Cross-SDK parity noted: All three SDKs now refuse a missing key on the secure entry point — Python raises at decoration time, Rust's
secure()returnsErr, and TypeScript throws at wrap time.Why
Before this change, the matrix documented a CWE-311 (plaintext storage) trap in TypeScript's
secureAPI. The code fix eliminated that trap, so the documentation is updated to:cache-core.ts:832/:873/:486,cache.ts:87,intents-core.ts:240) with current line references.Impact
Readers relying on the matrix now see accurate, current guidance that TypeScript's
cache.secure.wrap()enforces encryption and fails loudly when misconfigured, aligning it with the Python and Rust SDKs.Description
This PR updates documentation to reflect that the TypeScript SDK's
secure.wrap()API now enforces encryption (fails closed), flipping the feature-matrix indicator from ❌ to ✅.Background
Previously,
cache.secure.wrap()in the TypeScript SDK was an unconditional alias for the plaintextwrap()method. On a cache instance withoutencryptionconfigured, a "secure" registration would silently store plaintext data — with no error, warning, or type error (CWE-311). This behavior diverged from the Python and Rust SDKs, which both refuse a missing key on their secure entry points.Changes
This is a documentation-only change across two files:
sdk-feature-matrix.mdsecureAPI enforce encryption?" row to more precisely describe the prior insecure behavior: that on an instance without configured encryption, a "secure" registration cached plaintext (while it always encrypted on an encrypted instance).encryptionconfigured — typically ones not built bycreateCache.secure().CHANGELOG.mdwrap()directly, since there is no opt-in to run the secure entry point unencrypted.Enforced Contract (documented)
All three SDKs now refuse a missing key on the secure entry point:
secure.wrap()throwsConfigurationErrorat wrap timesecure()returnsErrThe clarifications ensure the documentation accurately distinguishes the old vulnerable behavior from the new fail-closed contract, without overstating the prior risk (encrypted instances were never affected).
Summary by CodeRabbit
ConfigurationErrorat wrap time when encryption is not configured, including execution-context views.