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Security: chris-swift-dev/parro-api-client

SECURITY.md

Security

This client handles passwords, OAuth tokens and school data about children, so security reports are very welcome.

Reporting a problem

Please report privately, not in a public issue: Report a vulnerability (GitHub's private vulnerability reporting). Describe what you found, how to reproduce it, and which version or commit you used. You will get an answer as soon as possible; a fix goes into a new release, and the advisory is published once that release is out.

Never include real credentials or data: no passwords, tokens, HAR files, calendar subscription links, or names and messages from a real Parro account. Use invented data, like the test suite does.

What is in scope

  • This repository: parro/, parro_gui/, parro_cli.py, parro_mcp.py, the release archives, the packages on PyPI (parro-api-client), the desktop app's installers on the release page, the GitHub Actions workflows and the published OpenAPI spec.
  • For example: a token, password or download link that ends up in a log, a file or an error message; files written with permissions that are too open; anything that makes the client write to the Parro API other than the three mark-as-read calls (PUT /event/{id}/read, PUT /event/markannouncementsasread, PUT /chatroom/{id}/read) and sending one text message (POST /chatroom/{id}/chatmessage) and deleting one message of the user's own (DELETE /chatroom/{id}/chatmessage/{messageId}) and signing up or withdrawing as a helper (POST /calendaritem/{id}/resource/{resourceId}/commitment/, DELETE /calendaritem/{id}/resource/{resourceId}/commitment/{commitmentId}) and answering an invitation (POST /calendaritem/{id}/calendaritemrsvp), or that sends one of those without the user asking for it (for example through parro_mark_read, parro_send_chat_message, parro_delete_chat_message, parro_helper_signup, parro_helper_withdraw or parro_rsvp while its switch is off, or a message, a helper change or an answer without confirmation); a message, a helper change or an answer that is sent twice by the client on its own; a way for an MCP tool to read the list of everyone an invitation went to (GET /calendaritem/{id}/calendaritemrsvp); the text of a message that ends up in a log or a file; a way around the lockout latch (docs/LOGIN.md).

For the desktop app, also: a change made without a click on Confirm (or the question for marking as read), a script or remote resource from Parro's content that gets loaded, a link that opens without showing its address first, and for logging in by itself: a password that ends up in the app's own desktop-app.json (it holds only the e-mail address and the path of your password file), a password file used while others can read it, or more than one password check per expired login. For the update check: a request to GitHub before you agreed, more than one a day by itself, anything about you or Parro in it, or a link opened that was not built from the version number. For the Linux Flatpak: a sandbox permission it does not need.

The risk that text in Parro steers an assistant while PARRO_ALLOW_SEND_CHAT=1, PARRO_ALLOW_DELETE_CHAT=1, PARRO_ALLOW_HELPER_SIGNUP=1 or PARRO_ALLOW_RSVP=1 is on is known and described in the README (messages, helpers, invitations). A way to send a message, change a helper slot or answer an invitation without the preview and confirm: true is in scope.

Problems in Parro itself (its API, the login server, the app) are not ours to fix: please report them to Topicus / ParnasSys directly.

Supported versions

Only the latest release gets fixes.

There aren't any published security advisories