Please do not open a public issue for security problems.
Open a GitHub security advisory instead. You can expect an initial response within a few days.
OneBrainer went through a full security audit in July 2026; the findings and their fixes
are documented in CHANGELOG.md under [5.2.0]. Key controls in place:
- Multi-tenant isolation enforced per route (
requireAuth()→verifyWorkspaceAccess()) - RBAC (owner/admin/member) on privileged routes
- JWT session invalidation via
User.sessionVersion - Development shortcuts are gated on
NODE_ENV === 'development'exactly, never on "not production". Four holes hang off that one answer — unauthenticated access to the default workspace, MCP without a key, the reset token returned in the response body, and a NextAuth secret that falls back to a constant published in this repository — so the gate fails closed: an unset, empty or misspelledNODE_ENVlocks everything rather than opening it, and a missingNEXTAUTH_SECRETstops startup instead of silently signing sessions with the published fallback - IP- and identity-based rate limiting on auth endpoints
- Agent API keys are generated randomly per workspace, stored only as SHA-256
hashes, and shown once at creation. This holds on every path that issues one —
prisma/seed.ts, workspace seeding on registration, and rotation — so no deployment ships a shared key and no key can be read back afterwards.test/agent-keys.test.tsscans the source tree to keep it that way. - A leaked key is replaced with
POST /api/agents/{id}/rotate; the previous key stops working immediately - MCP tools that start an LLM pipeline (
run_dreamer,run_librarian) are role-gated insrc/lib/mcp-permissions.ts; a read-onlyworkerkey cannot reach them - CSP headers, 1 MB request body cap, Zod validation on all inputs
- Audit logging across 10 sensitive event types
L1 ledger content is fully attacker-controlled: anyone who can reach POST /api/ledger
or the MCP ingest tool supplies text that the Librarian hands to an LLM. Extracted
facts are attacker-influenced in turn and get re-sent to the model by the
auto-associator and the Dreamer, so one poisoned entry reaches three model calls.
src/lib/llm-safety.ts applies two independent layers to every such call:
- Unforgeable fencing. Untrusted text is wrapped between markers carrying a 128-bit random nonce generated per call. Static delimiters are useless here — the attacker can simply type them — so the nonce is what makes the boundary real. Any marker-shaped text inside the payload is neutralised, and trusted metadata (entry ids, topics, pair indices) is kept outside the fence so it cannot be forged from within the content.
- Schema containment. Every response is validated against a strict Zod schema before a single row is written: closed enums, per-field length caps, and array caps (50 facts, 25 decisions, 10 associations, 3 sparks per pair). A reply that misses the contract is discarded whole — the Librarian falls back to heuristic extraction. Fact ids the model did not receive are rejected, which also makes cross-workspace associations impossible.
Layer 2 is the one that matters: even a fully compromised model cannot write outside
the schema. Coverage is in test/llm-safety.test.ts (20 checks, enforced in CI).
What remains. This bounds the blast radius; it does not eliminate the risk. An
attacker can still influence which well-formed facts get extracted — a plausible but
false fact can be pushed into the knowledge base, and briefs assembled from it are read
by downstream agents. Review disputes and treat extracted knowledge as attributable to
its source (Fact.source carries the originating ledger ids), not as ground truth.
- The demo seed data (
prisma/seed.ts) and itsdemo@onebrainer.aiaccount - The development-mode workspace fallback (
?workspace=1), which is disabled in production