Several APIs return or hold sensitive key material (recovered plaintext from AES-KW(P) ,private key bytes from ECDH/ECDSA/RSA exports, derived secrets from HKDF/SP800-108, etc.) in plain Vec or [u8; N]. Dropping these values does not wipe the underlying memory, so secrets can linger in the allocator until the pages are reused.
At a minimum, should document to users that they should zero themselves, or implement zeroize.
Several APIs return or hold sensitive key material (recovered plaintext from AES-KW(P) ,private key bytes from ECDH/ECDSA/RSA exports, derived secrets from HKDF/SP800-108, etc.) in plain Vec or [u8; N]. Dropping these values does not wipe the underlying memory, so secrets can linger in the allocator until the pages are reused.
At a minimum, should document to users that they should zero themselves, or implement zeroize.