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8 changes: 5 additions & 3 deletions crates/rsa/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ date = "2023-11-22"
keywords = ["cryptography"]
categories = ["crypto-failure"]
url = "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/626"
references = ["https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19#issuecomment-1822995643", "https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/"]
references = ["https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19#issuecomment-1822995643", "https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/", "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/394", "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/680", "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/702"]
cvss = "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
aliases = ["CVE-2023-49092", "GHSA-c38w-74pg-36hr", "GHSA-4grx-2x9w-596c"]

Expand All @@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ patched = []
Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

### Patches
No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.
No patch is yet available. The crypto-bigint migration ([RustCrypto/RSA#394](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/394)) did not close this. Tracking is [RustCrypto/RSA#626](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/626) (padding still not constant-time). Implicit rejection work is in [RustCrypto/RSA#680](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/680); default-path blinding is in [RustCrypto/RSA#702](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/702).

Still affected as of 2026-09-12: rsa 0.9.10 (latest stable) and rsa 0.10.0-rc.18 (latest). `patched = []` is intentional.

### Workarounds
The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the `rsa` crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.
Avoid using the `rsa` crate in settings where attackers can observe timing, for example over the network. Local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

### References
This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "[Marvin Attack]", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.
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