AEGIS is a compliance and interdiction control plane: the system that signs the audit ledger must itself withstand audit. Security reports are treated as priority work.

Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Email kartikgaikwad2828@gmail.com with:

• A description of the vulnerability and the component affected (aegis/pipeline, aegis/ap2, aegis/ledger, gateway, providers, …)
• Reproduction steps or a proof-of-concept
• The impact you believe it has (e.g. "a crafted mandate bypasses the delegation-chain verifier", "a ledger entry can be mutated without breaking the hash chain")

You will receive an acknowledgement within 72 hours and a triage assessment within 7 days. Please allow up to 90 days for a fix before public disclosure; we will credit reporters in the release notes unless you prefer otherwise.

In scope:

• Verifier bypasses: any input that produces ALLOW where the design says BLOCK/fail-closed (mandate forgery, constraint evasion, rebind/replay, quorum forgery, screening evasion)
• Ledger integrity: tampering that survives verify_chain, replay divergence
• Evidence forgery: evidence bundles that verify against the wrong decision
• Fail-open behavior: any dependency failure that silently skips a pipeline stage instead of blocking

Out of scope:

• Denial of service against the demo gateway (it is not a hardened deployment)
• Vulnerabilities in third-party providers themselves (report to Moov, OpenSanctions, etc.); the integration is in scope
• The synthetic demo data (it is intentionally fictional)

Tracked openly rather than reported: demo-mode keys are held in process memory (keystore/HSM abstraction is on the roadmap), and the reference gateway does not enforce mTLS. See ROADMAP.md.