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[PLACEHOLDER] wire/stable version - #81

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OtaK wants to merge 57 commits into
feat/rfc9420from
wire/stable
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OtaK wants to merge 57 commits into
feat/rfc9420from
wire/stable

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@OtaK

@OtaK OtaK commented Feb 14, 2024

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@github-actions github-actions Bot added size/xl and removed size/l labels Apr 15, 2024
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This PR is so big! Please, split it 😊

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This PR is so big! Please, split it 😊

Kyber PQ KEM is still being worked on and has an active draft:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cfrg-schwabe-kyber-04.

Additionally, the hybrid scheme that combines X25519 and Kyber is
also in the drafting phase:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-02.html

Given this, it makes no sense for us to provide support for Kyber-based
KEMs.
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github-actions Bot commented Jul 4, 2024

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This PR is so big! Please, split it 😊

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This PR is so big! Please, split it 😊

They're just too big and overflow the stack when they run.
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This PR is so big! Please, split it 😊

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This PR is so big! Please, split it 😊

This allows creating a commit from proposals without sending the
proposals over the wire first.
Previously, the tree shrink function would be called eagerly after each
remove proposal. If the shrink threshold was reached, the blanked out
nodes were removed from the diff tree.

If there were additional add proposals in a commit that triggered the
tree to grow again, this resulted in incorrect state if there were FEWER
add proposals than remove proposals. That's because the blanked out nodes
removed during shrinking were not re-added during growing.

To fix this, we don't shrink/trim the tree eagerly after each remove
proposal, but after remove and add proposals have been processed.
This proves that we don't suffer from the bug fixed in
openmls/openmls@26eaa4d0e
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CLAassistant commented Jun 11, 2026

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CLA assistant check
Thank you for your submission! We really appreciate it. Like many open source projects, we ask that you all sign our Contributor License Agreement before we can accept your contribution.
0 out of 4 committers have signed the CLA.

❌ beltram
❌ coriolinus
❌ franziskuskiefer
❌ OtaK
You have signed the CLA already but the status is still pending? Let us recheck it.

SimonThormeyer and others added 21 commits June 11, 2026 15:40
It's been broken for a long time.
We're going to need the Generate trait.
(cherry picked from commit f24eb69)
It was dropped in upstream commit 6d36342, and prior to that it was commented out.
(cherry picked from commit ad36084)
Bumps [codecov/codecov-action](https://github.com/codecov/codecov-action) from 3 to 4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/codecov/codecov-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/codecov/codecov-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](codecov/codecov-action@v3...v4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: codecov/codecov-action
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

- name: Upload to codecov.io
uses: codecov/codecov-action@v3
uses: codecov/codecov-action@v4

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Semgrep identified an issue in your code:

The coverage-upload step runs codecov/codecov-action@v4, a mutable tag that can be silently repointed to malicious code. A compromised action could execute on the CI runner and access the checked-out repository, coverage files, environment variables, and available CI credentials.

More details about this

check runs codecov/codecov-action@v4 in the Upload to codecov.io step. Because v4 is a mutable tag rather than an immutable commit reference, the action owner—or an attacker who gains control of that repository—can silently repoint it to malicious workflow code.

A plausible attack is:

  1. An attacker compromises the codecov/codecov-action repository and moves the v4 tag to a malicious commit.
  2. A subsequent run of this workflow resolves codecov/codecov-action@v4 to that commit.
  3. The malicious action executes on the ubuntu-latest runner after the repository has been checked out and coverage data has been created by Run profiling tests and Run grcov.
  4. It can read the workspace, including the generated target/debug/coverage/lcov, inspect environment variables and available GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, and exfiltrate source code, credentials, or other CI data before uploading the coverage file.

The same mutable-reference risk is also present in the nearby actions/checkout@v3, dtolnay/rust-toolchain@nightly, and Swatinem/rust-cache@v2 steps, but this finding is for codecov/codecov-action@v4.

To resolve this comment:

✨ Commit fix suggestion
  1. Replace the mutable v4 tag with the full 40-character commit SHA for the intended codecov/codecov-action v4 release, for example: uses: codecov/codecov-action@<40-character-commit-sha>.
  2. Verify that the SHA belongs to the expected codecov/codecov-action v4 release before applying it.
  3. Keep the existing with configuration unchanged, including files: target/debug/coverage/lcov.

Pinning the commit SHA prevents the action reference from changing silently if the tag is moved.

💬 Ignore this finding

Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.

  • /fp <comment> for false positive
  • /ar <comment> for acceptable risk
  • /other <comment> for all other reasons

Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by github-actions-mutable-action-tag.

You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.

@istankovic istankovic closed this Sep 18, 2026
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