- Local-first: nothing leaves the Mac unless the user explicitly dispatches a reviewed context package to an agent.
- Repository content, note content, and agent output are untrusted input.
- Every automatic change is visible (audit log) and reversible (graph undo, vault revision backups).
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Path traversal / symlink escape out of the vault | ObsidianVault.resolve rejects any path outside the vault root, including .. and symlinked parents (tested) |
| Accidental note overwrite | Atomic writes + .contextdock-revisions backup before every rewrite; section-append preferred over replacement (tested) |
| Secrets in context previews / agent packages | SecretRedactor (AWS keys, api_key/token/password assignments, bearer tokens, private key blocks, credentialed URLs, GitHub tokens) runs on every AgentTaskPackage.preview() (tested) |
| Command injection | All process launches use argument arrays (Process.arguments); no shell string concatenation anywhere |
| Hook spoofing / malformed events | Socket accepts only valid versioned AgentEvent JSON; malformed input rejected and audited (tested) |
| Oversized messages | 64 KB per-message bound, 256 KB per-stream bound; overflow rejected (tested) |
| Duplicate events | EventDeduplicator with bounded memory (tested) |
| Other local users reading the socket | Socket file mode 0600 |
| Network exposure | No network listener exists; Unix socket only |
| Credential parsing | The app never reads Claude/Codex auth files; adapter availability is a file-executability check only |
| Full-vault exfiltration | Task packages contain only the enumerated, user-visible fields; the preview is shown before sending |
| One repo receiving another's context | Context bundle is built per-request from the resolved repository + explicit mappings; matches carry visible reasons |
App-owned secrets belong in Keychain. v0.1 stores no secrets at all: adapters use the user's already-authenticated CLIs.
None. No analytics, no network calls of any kind.